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Abstract	The	 objective	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 and	 outcomes	 of	 democratic	deliberation	as	a	political	instrument	for	district	and	local	administrations	in	the	urban	village	 regeneration	 process	 under	 China’s	 New-type	 Urbanization	 Plan	 (2014-2020).	The	purpose	of	the	research	is	to	use	detailed	field	research	to	inquire	into	deliberative	practices	 regarding	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 to	 advance	 the	 theoretical	 concept	 of	“deliberative	 system”.	 In	 particular,	 this	 research	 looks	 at	 the	 role	 of	 Chinese	 rural	regimes	 (which	 combine	 village	 committees	 and	 village	 party	 branches)	 in	 the	regeneration	process,	as	well	as	the	citizens’	reactions	to	the	deliberations	led	by	local	governments	and	their	grassroots	level	branches.	Empirically,	the	investigation	focuses	on	two	stages	of	 the	urban	village	regeneration	programme.	First,	 the	thesis	discusses	how	the	local	government	can	relieve	the	conflicts	resulting	from	public	resistance	as	well	as	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	the	programme.	Second,	it	discusses	the	transformation	of	 the	 grassroots	 level	 governance	 system	 regarding	 the	 regenerated	 urban	 village	community,	including	the	transformation	from	the	village	governance	system	to	an	urban	community	 governance	 system	 and	 the	 integration	 of	 villagers	 as	 ordinary	 citizens.	Throughout,	 deliberation	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 both	 policy-making	 and	 policy	implementation	process.		Deliberation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 is	 part	 of	 a	 complex,	 scalar,	political-administrative	system,	with	many	actors	whose	activities	are	often	not	aligned.	Although	 this	 configuration	 has	 authoritarian	 traits	 and	 operates	 largely	without	 the	protection	of	a	strong	and	well-functioning	rule	of	law,	it	is	not	all-sovereign.	One	of	the	most	fascinating	aspects	of	urban	village	deliberation	is	the	way	that	it	reveals	the	limits	of	authoritarian	rule.	As	the	thesis	shows,	 the	Party	encounters	 the	same	problems	of	technical,	social	and	institutional	complexity,	with	the	ensuing	limits	on	vertical	steering,	as	experienced	by	administrations	in	democratic	countries.	This	thesis	contributes	to	a	better	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 democratic	 deliberation	 and	 public	policy	making,	and	the	theory	of	deliberative	systems.	 						
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Chapter	One:	Introduction	
1.1	A	Brief	Introduction	to	Urban	Village	Regeneration	In	 the	 last	 four	 decades,	 China	 has	 experienced	 double-digit	 economic	 growth	accompanied	 by	 unprecedented	 urban	 expansion	 and	 social	 change.	 One	 of	 the	 side	effects	of	this	urbanization	has	been	the	emergence	of	so-called	“urban	villages”	(Liu	et	
al.,	 2010;	 Ho,	 2003;	 Lin	 and	 Ho,	 2005).	 The	 urban	 village	 is	 a	 special	 type	 of	 urban	neighbourhood,	produced	by	the	unique	institutions	of	the	land	ownership	and	Hukou	systems	(Liu	et	al.,	2010;	Wu	et	al.,	2013),	two	systems	that	will	be	explained	later	in	this	thesis.	Although	urban	villages	are	geographically	part	of	a	city,	they	have	retained	their	original	 village	 structure	 administratively	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 property	 rights.	 They	 also	function	as	a	repository	of	affordable	accommodation	for	the	millions	of	migrants,	who	have	 been	 attracted	 by	 the	 economic	 opportunities	 that	 the	 city	 offers	 but	 lack	 the	necessary	 hukou	 rights	 for	 full	 social	 and	 economic	 integration.	 This	 is	 because	 the	Chinese	 urbanization	 process	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 rapid	 urban	 land	 expansion	since	 1990.	 Accompanying	 this	 expansion,	 the	 surrounding	 village	 territories	 were	absorbed	into	the	urban	territories	throughout	the	country	(Tian,	2009;	Zhang,	2003).	These	 rural	 villages	 were	 self-developed	 from	 rural	 settlements	 into	 transitional	neighbourhoods	by	the	native	villagers	(Liu	et	al.,	2010).	Within	China’s	megacities,	urban	villages	are	thus	a	common	form	of	informal	settlement.		These	transitional	neighbourhoods	are	named	“urban	villages”	in	Chinese	literature.	The	urban	villages	were	traditional	rural	villages	located	close	to	the	cities.	Aiming	to	enhance	the	 land	development	and	urban	expansion,	 the	 central	 government	encouraged	 local	governments	to	acquire	the	rural	farmlands	from	these	villages.	Meanwhile,	their	housing	plots,	as	well	as	their	property,	had	been	left	for	villagers	(Lin	et	al.,	2011;	Han	et	al.,	2009).	In	short,	the	villagers	owned	their	housing	plots	but	lost	their	farmland.	Leftover	village	lands	 (mainly	 housing	 plots)	 have	 always	 been	 self-developed	 by	 villagers	 for	commercial	and	residential	usage,	especially	for	low-rental	housing	(He	et	al.,	2009;	Ho,	2003;	Ho	&	van	Aartsen,	2005)	and	mostly	 rent	 to	migrant	workers	 (Liu	et	al.,	 2010;	Zhang	et	al.,	2003).	 		
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In	order	to	secure	higher	rental	income,	despite	insufficient	planning	or	permission	to	develop	 (Liu	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Lin	 and	 Ho,	 2005),	 villagers	 usually	 attempt	 to	 build	 their	buildings	as	large	as	possible	(Ho	2003).	These	low-quality	houses	are	characterized	by	closely	 packed	 residential	 blocks	 with	 2–8	 floors;	 the	 apartment	 blocks	 have	 an	exceedingly	 high	 population	 density.	 In	 short,	 the	 urban	 village	 in	 China	 could	 be	considered	as	an	informal	settlement,	developed	from	the	rural	village	in	the	context	of	urban	expansion.	Because	of	the	residential	component	and	dual	land	ownership	these	neighbourhoods	are	characterized	by	unstable	property	rights	and	a	mixture	of	urban	and	rural	society	(Liu	et	al.,	2010).	In	Chinese	culture,	as	well	as	in	the	national	academic	discourse,	urban	villages	have	a	negative	reputation,	with	high	population	density,	poor-quality	 housing	 and	 allegedly	 high	 crime	 rates	 (Zhang	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Liu	 et	 al.,	 2010).	However,	they	often	occupy	geographically	attractive	sites	within	the	urban	environment	with	high	potential	land	values	when	developed	(Hao	et	al.,	2011).		For	various	reasons,	local	governments	have	embarked	on	a	programme	of	regenerating	urban	villages.	Local	governments,	in	search	of	additional	revenue	and	job	growth,	have	long	targeted	urban	villages	for	profitable	regeneration.	The	background	to	this	was	the	Party’s	 strategy	 to	use	 competition	between	cities	as	a	means	 to	attract	domestic	 and	foreign	investment.	Initially,	in	the	early	1990s,	the	two	major	policy	instruments	in	this	strategy	of	 internal	 competition	were	 the	 revised	Planning	Act	 and	 the	 so-called	Tax-Sharing	system.	In	this	arrangement	central	government	only	took	part	of	the	revenues	generated	by	local	governments	and	left	the	remainder	as	the	financial	resources	for	local	governments	to	seek	further	development	and	to	pay	for	public	services	and	the	welfare	system.	This	arrangement	became	a	strong	incentive	for	local	governments	to	maximize	revenues	from	land	release,	including	land	auctions	and	land	transformation	fees.	When	China	formally	joined	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	in	2001,	foreign	capital	was	allowed	to	directly	invest	in	real	estate,	the	land	market	and	other	industries	outside	the	‘special	economic	zones’.	The	result	was	a	significant	acceleration	of	land	acquisition	by	local	authorities	and	subsequent	urban	expansion.		Urban	 village	 regeneration	 was,	 thus,	 a	 strategy	 to	 acquire	 valuable	 urban	 land	 for	purposes	of	local	economic	development,	a	process	that	was	made	easier	by	the	negative	reputation	 of	 urban	 villages.	 Initially,	 this	 process	 took	 the	 form	 of	 “demolition	 and	
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development”	(Zhang,	2005).	Within	the	targeted	area,	all	buildings	and	infrastructure	were	completely	demolished,	after	which	the	area	was	redeveloped	following	the	new	planning	proposal.	This	type	of	redevelopment	became	increasingly	controversial	as	it	led	to	many	undesirable	side	effects,	such	as	large-scale	displacement	of	residents,	the	emergence	of	housing	bubbles	and	a	growing	sense	of	injustice	among	residents.	One	of	the	 drivers	 of	 these	 negative	 unanticipated	 consequences	 is	 the	 complex	 process	 of	property	acquisition	(land,	houses	and	 infrastructure)	 that	precedes	the	regeneration.	Thus,	a	policy	configuration	arises	in	which	village	residents,	who	own	the	land	in	the	urban	village,	 find	 themselves	pitted	against	 local	 authorities	who	seek	 to	acquire	 the	land	 at	 the	 lowest	 possible	 price.	 This	 configuration	 is	 further	 complicated	 by	 three	additional	factors:	the	traditional	collectivist	and	deliberative	decision-making	process	in	villages,	 the	 fact	 that	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 is	 organized	 as	 a	 public-private-partnership	(PPP)	arrangement	(with	private	developers	doing	most	of	the	development	work	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	 share	 of	 the	 profits)	 and	 the	 asymmetrical	 power	 relations	between	villagers	on	the	one	hand	and	 the	 local	 and	district	 authorities	and	property	developers	on	the	other.	 		To	obtain	 the	necessary	property	 rights	 in	 the	areas	occupied	by	urban	villages,	 local	governments	followed	one	of	two	strategies.	The	first	and	earliest	of	these	was	market-based.	After	the	government’s	endorsement,	the	private	sector	was	allowed	to	directly	negotiate	 with	 the	 village	 residents.	 It	 had	 a	 certain	 autonomy	 to	 amend	 the	compensation	 for	each	 individual	 if	 they	 felt	necessary.	To	 compensate	 for	 the	 loss	of	rental	 income	 from	 their	 largely	 illegal	 additions	 to	 buildings,	 villagers	were	 offered	compensation	in	the	form	of	newly-built	apartments	in	the	reallocation	community.	To	obtain	 higher	 compensation	 packages,	 village	 residents	 adopted	 petitioning	 as	 a	bargaining	 strategy.	To	defuse	 the	petitions	and	protests,	government	and	developers	increased	the	compensation	ratio,	in	effect	rewarding	continued	resistance.	In	some	cases,	native	villagers	were	able	to	obtain	ten	or	more	apartments	this	way.	This	in	turn	resulted	in	overbuilding	and	the	emergence	of	local	housing	bubbles.	 		This	 arrangement	was	 supported	 by	 the	 expectation	 that	 the	 superior	 location	 of	 the	villages	and	the	high	potential	market	value	of	the	developed	property	would	generate	considerable	 profits	 (Chung,	 2009;	 Lin	 and	 De	 Meulder,	 2012;	 Hin	 and	 Xin,	 2011).	
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However,	while	these	financial	projections	were	largely	met	in	the	large	East-Coast	cities,	the	profits	were	much	lower	in	smaller	central	cities	such	as	Happy	City,	our	case	study	site.	For	this	reason,	developers	and	construction	consortiums	began	to	shy	away	from	the	full	responsibility	for	the	regeneration	process.	Instead,	the	state	stepped	in	and	local	government,	 such	 as	 in	 Happy	 City,	 took	 charge	 of	 the	 process	 of	 land	 acquisition,	demolition	 and	 reallocation.	 The	 aim	was	 to	 limit	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 land-centred	urbanization	and	to	pursue	financially	sustainable	urban	development.	However,	the	 negative	 side	 effects	 of	 the	 market-driven	 strategy	 became	 an	 obstacle	 in	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 government-led	 strategy.	 The	 villagers’	 negotiating	 skills	 had	raised	their	expectation	of	compensation	to	levels	far	beyond	the	government’s	capacity.	To	 make	 the	 strategy	 financially	 viable	 and	 to	 create	 optimal	 space	 for	 revenue-generating	 and	 job-creating	 commercial	 developments,	 the	 government	 more-or-less	shut	down	the	possibility	for	village	residents	to	negotiate	the	size	of	the	compensation	package	(Lu	et	al.,	2015).	In	the	next	two	sections	we	will	see	that	village	deliberation	did	indeed	begin	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	regeneration	process,	but	that	in	practice	it	existed	in	an	uneasy	relationship	with	the	complex,	scalar	Chinese	government	system.		Initially,	most	of	these	initiatives	were	rather	heavy-handed	demolition-redevelopment	projects.	These	early	regeneration	efforts	proved	to	be	controversial	as	they	resulted	in	resistance	 by	 residents	 (through	 protests,	 petitioning	 and	 collective	 resistance),	undesirable	 side-effects	 such	 as	 large-scale	 social	 displacement,	 housing	 bubbles	 and	ghost	 towns,	 as	well	 as	 a	 perceived	 loss	 of	 legitimacy	 by	 national,	 regional	 and	 local	governments.	In	2014,	China’s	state	council	issued	a	new	national	policy:	the	New-Type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020.	This	new	policy	stimulated	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	 throughout	 China.	 This	 new	 policy	 emphasises	 the	 “urbanization	 of	 the	people”	as	the	first	priority	–	not	only	confirming	100	million	urban	villagers	and	rural	migrants	as	new	urban	citizens	by	2020	-	but	also	improving	housing	conditions	for	low-income	groups	and	providing	education	 for	 rural	migrants’	 children.	The	government	believes	that	urban	village	regeneration	should	not	only	pursue	economic	growth	and	physical	development	of	the	site,	but	should	also	integrate	the	various	groups	of	urban	villagers	 into	urban	society.	Therefore,	 in	 this	research,	 I	will	argue	that	urban	village	regeneration	 is	 a	 complex	 long-lasting	 programme,	 involving	 different	 scales	 of	
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governance,	 and	 aimed	 at	 physical	 regeneration,	 political	 integration,	 and	 social	integration	in	addition	to	economic	and	urban	development.		As	 a	 national	 level	 political	movement,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 China’s	 government	 for	 this	policy	to	target	both	the	villagers’	integration	and	the	unblocking	of	the	urban-rural	dual-tier	governance	system	(as	explained	in	Chapter	2)	within	the	city.	Through	the	urban	village	 regeneration	 programme,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 governance	 system,	 the	 municipal	governments	want	to	develop	the	urban	villages	into	an	urban	residents’	community	and	use	 the	 residents’	 committee	 to	 replace	 the	 village	 committee	 as	 the	 grassroots-level	authority.	However,	this	movement	faced	a	great	challenge.	This	is	because	the	urban-rural	 duality	 (will	 be	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2)	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	hukou	 system	 and	territorial-based	 administrative	 functions 1 .	 To	 promote	 the	 involvement	 of	 village	residents	 in	 the	 regeneration	 process,	 the	 Party	 stipulated	 deliberation	 with	 village	residents	as	a	central	instrument	to	improve	“local	governance”,	in	particular	grassroots-level	governance,	and	reduce	social	unrest.		
1.2	Research	Rationale	After	the	last	four	decades	of	‘opening-up’,	China	has	experienced	an	economic	and	social	reform	which	introduced	liberal	and	democratic	elements	into	the	country’s	governance	(Howell,	 2004).	 The	 China	 Communist	 Party	 (CCP)	 cooperates	 with	 private	entrepreneurs,	 professionals	 and	 technocrats	 to	 optimize	 its	 decision-making	 and	legitimize	 its	 leadership.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 central	 government	 decentralized	 economic	power	to	the	 local	governments	and	allowed	them	to	have	some	autonomy	to	manage	their	 own	 issues.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 reform,	 the	 roles	 of	 private	 entrepreneurs,	professionals,	 technocrats	 and	 the	 public	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	 significant	 in	 the	local	development	process.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 investigate	how	Chinese	 local	governments	cope	with	these	actors.	 	 This	thesis	will	use	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	as	a	lens	to	explore	Chinese	local	governance.	In	particular,	this	thesis	will	focus	 on	 the	 role	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 as	 a	 policy	 instrument	 for	 local	
                         
1 See Li et al., (2018): “urban villages are administrated by village committees and the 
supervising township governments, the two levels of rural administration constituting what are 
called rural collectives. As direct descents of the former People’s Communes, these collectives 
assume both economic and administrative functions, including ownership of land within their 
jurisdiction. (2018: 3)” 
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administration.	 It	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	between	 democratic	 deliberation,	 public	policy	making	 and	 the	 theory	of	 deliberative	systems.	 		There	 are	 three	 rationales	 for	 this	 research	 to	 select	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	programme	as	an	ideal	lens	to	explore	Chinese	local	governance	and	deliberations.	Firstly,	urban	village	regeneration	is	an	arena	that	reflects	the	tensions	between	state	and	society	in	a	wider	modern	China.	In	recent	decades,	urban	village	regeneration	has	become	an	economic	and	social	incentive	for	local	development	that	attracts	the	concern	of	the	local	government,	 and	 has	 the	 potential	 for	 conflicts	 between	 government	 and	 the	 general	public.	Within	this	context,	how	deliberation	could	provide	an	answer	to	these	tensions	is	particularly	worthy	of	 investigation.	Therefore,	 this	research	 sets	out	 to	 investigate	how	 local	 governments	use	 these	 deliberation	 to	 cope	with	 the	 conflicts	 between	 the	various	stakeholders.		Secondly,	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	involves	many	actors	including	the	government,	village	authorities,	developers	and	the	villagers	(general	public).	Initiated	by,	and	under	the	guidance	of,	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	(CCP),	local	governments	are	 compelled	 by	 law	 to	 adopt	 a	 deliberative	 approach	 to	 urban	 regeneration.	 The	proximate	 reasons	are	 to	 increase	 social	 and	political	 stability,	 limit	social	unrest	 and	increase	the	government’s	legitimacy	(Qin	and	He,	2018).	Deliberation	over	urban	village	regeneration	 consists	 of	 different	 and	 disparate	 elements,	 such	 as	 authoritarian	 rule,	corporate	 project	 management,	 command-and-control	 regulation,	 popular	 protest,	public-private	 arrangements,	 rumours,	 traditional	 village	 deliberation,	 subterfuge	 and	playing	 the	 system.	 Thus,	 through	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 the	different	actors	involved,	urban	village	regeneration	is	an	important	site	to	explore	how	deliberative	the	political	and	administrative	system	in	China	is	in	practice.		Third,	deliberation	in	China	functions	as	one	element	in	a	large	number	of	techniques	of	preference	 formation,	decision-making	and	policy	 implementation.	 In	 this,	 it	does	not	differ	in	principle	from	the	deliberative	systems	of	the	liberal	democracies	of	the	West.	However,	deliberation	is	also	closely	linked	to	Chinese	culture	and	history,	especially	in	terms	of	Confucian	moral	philosophy,	which	connects	to	authoritarianism.	For	example,	
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the	 Confucian	 ideal	 of	min-ben	 (being	 people-centric)	 was	 a	 political	 foundation	 for	Confucian	deliberation	(He,	2014).	Meanwhile,	Confucius	stated	that	“in	a	world	which	follows	the	Way,	there	is	no	need	for	commoners	to	dispute	over	politics”	(He,	2014:	62),	which	limits	deliberation	to	the	central	level	and	reinstates	political	authority.	This	thesis	aims	to	contribute	therefore	to	the	theory	of	authoritarian	deliberation.	 		Accordingly,	deliberation	in	the	context	of	urban	village	regeneration	is	part	of	a	complex,	multi-level,	political-administrative	system,	with	many	actors	whose	activities	are	often	not	 aligned.	 Although	 this	 configuration	 has	 authoritarian	 traits	 and	 operates	 largely	without	the	protection	of	a	strong	and	well-functioning	rule	of	law,	it	is	not	all-sovereign.	In	 fact,	 one	of	 the	most	 fascinating	aspects	of	urban	village	deliberation	 is	 the	way	 in	which	it	reveals	the	limits	of	authoritarian	rule	in	a	modern	national	and	international	context.	As	we	show,	 the	Party	encounters	 the	 same	problems	of	 technical,	social	 and	institutional	complexity,	with	the	ensuing	limits	on	vertical	steering,	as	administrations	in	democratic	countries.	For	example,	after	regeneration,	when	officials	attempt	to	curtail	the	legally	mandated	village	deliberation	process	within	urban	community	governance,	they	encounter	stiff	resistance	and	even	a	participation	strike.	Therefore,	this	research	will	also	focus	on	how	hierarchical	commands	sit	uneasily	with	deliberation	throughout	the	process.	 	
	
1.3	Research	aims	and	questions	This	 study	 adopted	 a	 systematic	 framework	 to	 investigate	 the	 deliberation	 processes	involved	 in	 Chinese	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 the	 governance	 of	 regenerated	communities,	as	well	as	the	integration	of	villagers	into	the	urban	fabric.	This	research	was	 carried	 out	 in	 response	 to	 a	 political	movement	 by	 China’s	 central	 government	 -	‘New-type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020’.	The	aim	of	this	research	is	to	explore	the	role	and	 outcomes	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 as	 a	 political	 instrument	 for	 local	administrations	 in	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process.	 This	 research	 leads	 to	 the	following	research	questions:	 	1. On	 what	 grounds	 do	 local	 governments	 adopt	 democratic	 deliberation	 in	 the	urban	village	regeneration	practice?	2. How	does	the	process	of	democratic	deliberation	proceed	in	the	process	of	urban	village	regeneration?	 	
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• What	role	does	the	village	administration	play	in	the	regeneration	process?	 	
• How	does	democratic	deliberation	play	a	role	in	the	redeveloped	urban	village	community?	 	3. How	does	the	village	deliberative	system	fit	into	urban	community	governance?	 	 	4. What	is	the	place	of	deliberation	in	the	larger	governance	configuration	around	urban	village	regeneration?	 	5. Is	authentic	deliberation	happening	in	authoritarian	China?	
• Do	the	interactions	between	stakeholders	have	the	general	characteristics	of	democratic	deliberation?	 	
• To	what	extent	is	this	a	form	of	authoritarian	deliberation?	 		
1.4	The	Structure	of	the	Thesis	The	thesis	begins	with	the	discussions	around	the	political,	social	and	economic	context.	Chapter	Two	will	discuss	the	social	and	economic	context	of	urban	village	regeneration,	which	 includes	 China’s	 land-ownership	 system,	 urban	 development	 mechanisms	 and	urban	village	regeneration	approaches.	It	focuses	on	questioning	why	implementing	an	urban	village	regeneration	programme	is	necessary	for	China’s	local	governments.	 		Chapter	Three	will	 introduce	the	complexity	and	diversity	of	China’s	 local	governance	system	 from	 an	 inside-out	 perspective	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 how	 social,	 political	 and	economic	 change	 varies	 among	 different	 provinces,	 cities,	 districts	 and	 villages.	 This	chapter	will	also	explain	that	the	power	structures	in	China	are	hierarchical,	however,	that	 authority	 has	 become	 increasingly	 devolved	 to	 the	 local	 government	 and	 the	hierarchical	structure	is	becoming	“fragmented”	and	“disjointed”	(Keane,	2017:	2).	These	two	chapters	not	only	introduce	the	background	information	about	this	research,	but	also	set	out	a	specific	context	within	which	to	understand	China’s	deliberations.		Chapter	Four	will	introduce	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	thesis.	As	with	the	political	decentralization,	 China	 has	 been	 experimenting	 with	 some	 forms	 of	 democracy,	 in	particular	at	local-level,	such	as	democratic	elections	in	rural	villages	and	deliberations	in	conflict-solving.	Therefore,	this	chapter	will	raise	an	important	theoretical	question:	is	authentic	deliberation	going	on	in	authoritarian	China,	in	particular,	within	urban	village	regeneration?	 Admittedly,	 deliberation,	 deliberative	 cultures	 and	 institutions	 within	
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China	are	different	from	those	in	liberal	democratic	contexts.	The	systematic	approach	of	deliberative	democracy	provides	a	framework	to	examine	its	characteristics	and	evaluate	the	 quality	 of	 these	 deliberations.	 It	 helps	 the	 researchers	 to	understand	 the	 designs,	developments	and	the	implementations	of	the	deliberations	and	deliberative	institutions	in	China	despite	contextual	differences	(Dryzek	and	Tang,	2015).	The	chapter	will	then	explain	how	this	approach	can	be	used	to	develop	an	analytical	scheme	to	encourage	the	diverse	kinds	and	sites	of	deliberative	practices	and	 institutions	within	 the	particular	political	 issue	 of	 urban	 village	 regeneration.	 Based	 on	 this	 systematic	 approach,	 this	analytical	scheme	will	be	used	to	evaluate	the	deliberative	functions	of	political	actions	in	imperfectly	deliberative	moments.	 		Chapter	Five	will	outline	the	research	methodology	and	further	explore	the	research	aims,	objectives	 and	 questions.	This	 chapter	will	 justify	 the	 selection	of	 cases	 and	 samples;	meanwhile,	it	will	also	explain	the	research	methods,	design	and	the	procedures	for	the	data	collection	and	analysis.	 		The	 empirical	 studies	 of	 this	 research	 will	 begin	 with	 Chapter	 Six;	 this	 chapter	 will	present	two	cases	of	urban	village	regeneration	in	Sunny	District	in	considerable	detail.	This	is	because	the	policy	context	of	different	cases	varies	greatly	from	village	to	village	in	China.	Thus,	the	political-administrative	context	of	these	two	cases	should	be	specified.	Chapter	6	will	introduce	the	social	and	political	background	of	these	two	cases:	Village	N	and	Community	 T.	 This	 background	 information	 on	 the	 political	 and	 social	 context	 is	important	for	understanding	the	later	policy	interpretation	(Chapter	7	and	Chapter	8).	 		The	 research	 objective	 of	 Chapter	 Seven	 and	Eight	 is	 to	 explore	 and	 understand	how	democratic	 deliberation	 played	 a	 role	 as	 a	 political	 instrument	 used	 by	 the	 local	administrations	 during	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process.	 Through	 the	 in-depth	investigation	 of	 two	 cases,	 this	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 Chinese	 rural	 regimes,	including	village	committees	and	village	Party	branches,	in	the	regeneration	process	and	the	citizens’	reactions	to	the	deliberations	led	by	local	regimes.	Following	the	case	studies,	this	 thesis	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 scalar	 governance	 system	 around	 urban	 village	regeneration	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 deliberative	 system,	 which	 operates	 on	 different	spatially	and	functionally	distributed	registers	of	deliberation,	negotiation,	exhortation,	
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persuasion	and	top-down	decision-making.	These	two	chapters	address	three	questions:	
1)	What	 role	 does	 the	 village	 administration	 play	 in	 the	 regeneration	 process?	 2)	 How	
deliberative	are	the	deliberation	and	deliberative	system	in	an	urban	village	regeneration	
programme?	 3)	 What	 is	 the	 place	 of	 the	 deliberative	 system	 in	 the	 larger	 governance	
configuration	around	urban	village	regeneration?	 	 		
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Chapter	Two:	Complexities	of	Urban	Village	Regeneration	 	
2.1	Introduction	This	chapter	will	discuss	the	social	and	economic	context	of	urban	village	regeneration,	which	 includes	 China’s	 land-ownership	 system,	 urban	 development	 mechanisms	 and	urban	village	regeneration	approaches.	It	focuses	on	the	question	of	why	implementing	an	urban	village	regeneration	programme	is	necessary	for	China’s	local	governments.	The	first	part	of	this	chapter	will	introduce	the	formation	of	the	urban	village	and	explain	that	the	complexities	of	a	land-based	urban	development	system	are	the	fundamental	reason	for	urban	village	 formation.	Such	a	system	not	only	brings	trouble	 for	urban	planning	systems	but	also	for	urban-rural	integration.	The	second	part	will	introduce	the	essential	characteristics	of	the	urban	village.	This	part	aims	at	helping	the	international	reader	to	make	sense	of	why	urban	villages	have	become	enclaves	within	the	cities.	The	third	part	will	 explain	 that	 the	 regeneration	 of	 urban	 villages	 is	 a	 pressing	 need	 for	 local	government	within	 the	 current	 social	 and	 economic	 context.	 The	main	 reason	 is	 that	Chinese	cities	use	space	to	pursue	capital	accumulation.	Therefore,	the	local	governments	not	only	want	to	create	more	space	to	 introduce	capital,	but	also	want	to	 improve	the	quality	 of	 the	 space.	 This	 part	 will	 also	 introduce	 two	 approaches	 to	 urban	 village	regeneration:	 the	 market-led	 and	 government-led	 approaches.	 Because	 of	 this	 urban	development	 system,	 the	 regeneration	 of	 urban	 villages	 is	 necessary	 for	 local	governments.	Finally,	 the	 changing	urbanization	policy	 in	China:	 from	 land-centred	 to	people-originated	will	be	introduced.		
2.2.	The	Formation	of	the	Urban	Village	This	section	covers	three	topics.	First,	China’s	local	development	relies	on	the	land-based	development	logic:	using	land	to	pursue	investments	to	develop	the	city.	A	major	dynamic	for	local	government	is	to	acquire	land	from	villagers.	Second,	this	section	will	explain	the	chaos	and	‘tricks’	in	the	urban	planning,	land	ownership	and	land	acquisition	systems,	which	are	 important	 for	understanding	the	 further	analysis	 in	 later	chapters.	 	 This	 is	due	to	the	considerable	amount	of	discretion	in	the	rules	that	govern	land	ownership	and	acquisition,	and	how	different	parties	use	this	‘space’	to	‘play	the	system’	around	urban	village	regeneration.	Under	the	current	system,	the	local	government	prefers	to	acquire	rural	agricultural	 land	and	 leaves	the	village	residential	 land,	which	 later	becomes	the	
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kernel	of	the	urban	village.	Finally,	the	third	part	will	explain	the	dynamic	of	the	informal	and	illegal	developments	within	the	urban	village.	These	developments	have	increased	in	step	with	 the	 urban	 development	 needed	 to	 accommodate	 rural	migrants,	 who	 have	created	a	huge	demand	for	affordable	accommodation;	meanwhile,	the	urban	villagers	have	to	find	alternative	income	sources	for	their	livelihoods,	having	lost	their	farmland.		
2.2.1	Land-based	Urban	Development	‘Land-based	 urban	 development’	 has	 become	 the	 basic	 logic	 for	 local	 government	 to	develop	the	cities.	This	logic	has	resulted	in	a	series	of	institutional	arrangements	which	have	 led	 to	China’s	 local	 government	acquiring	 rural	 land	and	expanding	 city	 sizes	at	breakneck	speed.	Since	1978,	China’s	social-economic	reform	initiated	profound	socio-economic	 transitions.	 In	 this	 era,	 China	 adopted	 a	 unique	 urban	 development	 system	whereby	the	state	tried	to	create	a	competitive	environment	between	cities	based	on	a	land-driven	growth	machine	and	a	tax-sharing	system	(to	be	explained	later).	Wu	(2003;	2015)	points	out	that	the	Chinese	local	governance	and	urban	development	strategies	are	becoming	increasingly	entrepreneurial.	This	theory	is	mainly	used	to	describe	two	trends:	first,	the	local	government	keeps	local	economic	development	as	its	priority,	particularly,	the	GDP	growth	rate.	That	is,	the	leaders	of	local	governments	become	virtual	CEOs	of	the	‘urban	 development	 corporation’	 (Chien,	 2007),	 instead	 of	 being	 “ideological	 rulers”.	Second,	 the	 pressure	 on	 local	 public	 finance	 drives	 the	 government	 to	 initiate	 urban	mega-development	projects	to	gain	revenues	from	land	bargains	and	taxes	to	fill	the	gap	between	budgetary	fiscal	income	and	expenditure.		China	has	operated	a	tax-sharing	system	(fen	shui	zhi)	since	1994.	This	system	aims	at	separating	the	tax	sources	and	increasing	the	ratio	of	the	central	and	reducing	the	ration	of	local	governments.	That	is,	most	of	the	revenues	goes	to	the	central	level	government.	This	 tax-sharing	 system	 encourages	 the	 local	 government	 to	 pursue	 revenues	 and	economic	growth	through	a	system	of	land-lease,	also	known	as	the	“land	economy”.	This	is	because	the	tax-sharing	system	was	designed	originally	to	cope	with	the	decline	in	the	central	government’s	income	since	the	1980s;	the	central	government	sets	up	its	own	tax	base	(guo	shui)	and	leaves	partial	revenues	to	the	local	government	(di	shui).	That	is,	most	of	 the	 tax	 from	 the	 industrial	 enterprises	 belongs	 to	 the	 state;	 however,	most	 of	 the	revenues	 from	retail	and	land-
 23 
with	economic	devolution,	the	central	government	managed	to	devolve	the	expenditure	of	public	service	and	social	welfares	to	the	local	government.	This	policy	left	a	fiscal	deficit	for	 local	 governments	 since	 they	 need	 to	 share	 most	 of	 the	 taxes	 with	 the	 central	government;	meanwhile,	 they	have	 to	pay	 for	 the	public	 services	 they	 supply	 to	 their	citizens	(Wu,	2015;	Hsing,	2006;	2010).	The	land	economy	supports	local	governments	in	maximising	their	local	revenue	to	overcome	the	fiscal	deficit	(Rithmire,	2015).	This	is	because	local	governments	have	power	to	lease	the	land-use	right	and	to	claim	fees	from	the	enterprises	as	the	revenues	(see	Figure	2.1).	 		Figure	2.1:	Institutional	framework	for	understanding	land	urbanization	in	China	
	
Source:	He	et	al.,	(2016:	439)	
	As	Figure	2.1	illustrates,	the	‘land	economy’	can	be	grouped	into	two	kinds:	leasing	the	land	at	a	high	price	to	real-estate	developers	and	releasing	the	land	at	a	low	price	(even	free)	 to	 industries	or	other	big	projects.	The	 first	model	 is	 targeted	at	 the	 ‘population	urbanization’:	 the	revenues	 from	 ‘leasing	land	to	the	real-estates’	make	a	 ‘once-for-all’	contribution	to	local	income	(He	et	al.,	2016).	According	to	data	from	the	Lincoln	Institute	of	Land	Policy,	 “the	 ratio	of	 land	 leasing	and	property	–	or	 land-related	 taxes	 to	 local	government	budgetary	revenues	–	grew	from	25	percent	in	2000	to	more	than	90	percent	in	2010.	Real	estate	investment	–	funds	invested	in	the	development	of	land	and	property	–	grew	from	2	percent	of	GDP	in	1992	to	13	percent	in	2011”	(Rithmire	2015:	31).	The	
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second	 model	 is	 targeted	 at	 the	 industrialization,	 which	 is	 also	 desirable	 for	 local	governments,	who	have	a	great	willingness	to	release	low	priced	industrial	land,	even	a	zero	 price,	 for	 industrial	 development	 projects	 as	 they	 can	 provide	 employment	opportunities	 (Hsing,	 2006;	 Rithmire,	 2015).	 The	 local	 government	 can	 also	 share	 a	certain	 amount	of	 tax	 from	 industrial	development	 projects,	which	 is	 a	 desirable	 and	stable	long-term	source	of	revenue	(He	et	al.,	2016).	Meanwhile,	industrial	development	projects	 can	 stimulate	 the	 local	 economy,	which	 can	positively	affect	 the	 local	 service	industry	 as	 well	 as	 the	 real	 estate	 (Wu,	 2015).	 This	 could	 increase	 the	 demand	 for	commercial	retail	space	and	residential	housing	and	increase	the	profits	and	income	from	‘selling-land’,	 as	 well	 as	 retail	 sales	 taxation,	 which	 the	 local	 governments	 retain	(Rithmire,	2015).	 	 		
2.2.2	The	Urban	Planning	System,	Land	Ownership	System	and	Land	Acquisition	
System	This	 part	 suggests	 that	 China’s	 local	 government	 needs	 an	 urban	 planning	 system	 to	provide	legitimacy	for	its	acquisition	of	rural	land;	however,	it	faces	obstacles	caused	by	the	current	land	ownership	system.	These	institutional	conflicts	have	brought	chaos	and	the	use	of	tricks	into	the	land	acquisition	system.	 		Under	 the	 above	 institutional	 arrangements,	 the	 land	 becomes	 the	 major	 asset	 and	income	 source	 of	 local	 governments.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 economic	 development	 and	 land	control	 has	 become	 the	 primary	 activity	 undertaken	 by	 local	 government	 in	 China	(Rithmire,	2015).	This	power	is	strengthened	by	the	planning	system,	which	contributes	to	 local	 government	maintaining	 this	 monopolistic	 position	 by	 charging	 for	 planning	permission	on	land-sales	(Wu,	2015;	Hsing,	2010).	Before	the	1980s,	the	vast	majority	of	urban	land	was	controlled	by	state-owned	industries	and	enterprises	that	enjoyed	land-use	 privileges	 essentially	 free	 of	 charge.	 This	 left	 city	 governments	 to	 face	 the	 dual	problems	of	inefficient	land	use	and	a	lack	of	stable	funding	to	invest	in	infrastructure.	Therefore,	in	October	1980,	the	National	Urban	Work	Conference	drafted	a	proposal	to	force	 the	 state-owned	 industries	 and	 enterprises	 to	 pay	 taxes	 and	 fees	 to	 the	 local	government	(municipal	level	or	county	level)	if	they	changed	the	land	usages.	Since	1990,	the	Planning	Act	has	required	all	land	development	projects	to	conform	to	the	cities’	land-use	 plans.	 In	 1994,	 China’s	 national	 government	 issued	 the	 Urban	 Real	 Estate	
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Management	Law,	which	set	up	a	legal	real-estate	industry	and	a	commercial	land	market	(Wu,	2015).	Because	the	land	itself	is	owned	by	the	state,	the	land-use	right	(from	30-70	years)	 and	 the	 properties	 can	 be	 tradeable	 (Rathmire,	 2015;	 He	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	transaction	of	properties	with	state-ownership	was	legally	allowed	 in	the	 free	market,	that	is,	properties	on	state-owned	land	could	be	traded	and	transferred	in	the	market	like	general	merchandise.	Therefore,	except	for	geographical	and	land	utility	differences,	the	land	value	also	became	polarized	because	of	the	land	ownership	system.	This	is	because	the	land	market	and	real	estate	industries	are	only	available	for	state-owned	land,	hence	the	value	of	state-owned	land	increased	significantly	(Hao	et	al.,	2011;	He	2009;	Zhang	et	
al.,	2003).	This	arrangement	allows	the	local	government	to	lease	the	land	with	a	real-estate	planning	permit	to	the	developers	through	bidding	at	an	auction	(Rithmire,	2015).	The	 income	 from	 the	 land	 became	 the	 most	 important	 source	 of	 local	 government	revenue.		After	 the	 land	 market	 reform,	 cities	 in	 China	 experienced	 rapid	 urbanization	 and	marketization	of	real	estate	properties	(Weiss,	2002).	This	generated	a	large	demand	for	land	to	 launch	urban	development;	meanwhile,	urban	territory	sprawled	out	 to	engulf	suburban	and	rural	areas.	Crucially,	instead	of	fully-scaled	rural	land	expropriation,	only	farmland	was	expropriated	for	urban	development.	This	phenomenon	resulted	in	China’s	urban-rural	dual	land-ownership	system,	meanwhile,	it	contributes	to	the	proliferation	and	formation	of	urban	villages	(Zhou,	2014;	Lin	and	Ho,	2005).	 		The	 land	 ownership	 system	 in	 China	 is	 unique	 in	 the	world	 and	 very	 different	 from	western	countries.	In	China,	instead	of	private	ownership	as	in	western	countries,	China’s	lands	are	publicly	owned	by	the	state	or	collectively	by	rural	villagers’	collectives	(Lin	and	Ho,	2005;	Li	et	al.,	2015,	Huang	et	al.,	2015).	Simply	speaking,	land	in	urban	areas	is	owned	by	the	state	and	controlled	by	local	governments;	this	is	known	as	state-owned	land.	 However,	 the	 land	 in	 rural	 areas	 is	 collectively	 owned	 by	 single	 villages,	 which	means	every	villager	within	the	village	shares	the	ownership	of	all	of	the	village’s	land;	these	 lands	 are	 known	 as	 rural	 collective	 land.	 Beyond	 the	 simple	 property-rights	attributes,	land	ownership	is	also	crucial	in	China’s	planning	control	system	(Wu	2014;	Guan	 et	 al.,	 2018).	 Under	 the	 current	 regulations	 in	 the	 planning	 control	 system,	 the	government	 cannot	 develop	 the	 rural	 collective	 lands	 until	 their	 ownership	 has	 been	
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legally	transferred	to	become	state-owned	land	(Hao	et	al.,	2011).	However,	this	does	not	mean	 that	 a	 village	 can	 develop	 its	 land	 for	 any	 kind	 of	 non-agricultural	use.	 Beyond	ownership	itself,	the	planning	system	assigns	different	kinds	of	property	rights	and	usage	rights	to	different	kinds	of	land	and	different	groups	of	people	(Wu,	2015).	Any	change	in	land	 usage	 should	 have	 planning	 permission	 from	 local	 government.	 The	 case	 study	chapters	later	in	this	thesis	shows	that	this	institutional	arrangement	allows	the	villagers	to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 developers	 and	 district	 government	 during	 the	 regeneration	process.	 		According	to	the	Constitution	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC),	 the	 land	within	urban	jurisdiction	is	owned	by	the	state	and	is	known	as	‘state-owned	land’.	The	usages	of	 state-owned	 lands	 are	 controlled	 by	 the	 state	 (both	 central	 and	 local	 level)	governments	through	land-use	planning	permissions	(Wu,	2015).	However,	as	explained	above	the	land	and	collective	properties	in	rural	areas	are	owned	by	the	rural	collective	and	known	as	‘rural	collective	land	(Lin	and	Ho,	2005;	Huang,	2018;	Li	et	al.,	2015,	Deng	
et	al.,	2015).	The	‘rural	collective’	is	the	name	of	the	‘juridical	person	of	the	rural	village’	(Wang	 et	 al.,	 2006),	 which	 refers	 to	 all	 of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 village.	 That	 is,	 rural	collective	ownership	means	that	all	of	the	members	of	a	village	share	the	ownership	of	land	and	collective	properties	(He,	2005;	Wang	et	al.,	2006;	Sargeson,	2018).	In	terms	of	land-use	 rights,	 the	 usage	 of	 rural	 collective-owned	 lands	was	 strictly	 controlled	 and	classified	into	agricultural	land	and	rural-residential	land.	That	is,	neither	the	utility	nor	the	ownership	can	be	traded,	changed	or	capitalised	(Wang	et	al.,	2006;	Hao	et	al.,	2011).	Only	the	governments	(local	and	higher	level)	are	the	legal	entities	which	empowered	by	the	law	to	request	rural	land,	and	change	its	ownership:	from	rural	collective–ownership	to	 state–ownership	 through	 a	 complex	 land	 acquisition	 process	 with	 an	 amount	 of	compensation	for	the	village	collective	and	villagers.	This	process	was	summarized	by	He	
et	 al.	 (2009)	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 2.2	 Compared	with	 rural	 agricultural	 land,	 the	 land	acquisition	 of	 residential	 land	 is	much	more	 complicated	 since	 the	 arrangements	 for	compensation	 are	 not	 regulated	 by	 law.	 In	 practice,	 the	 resettlement	 of	 indigenous	villagers,	agreeing	the	amount	of	compensation	and	citizenship	arrangements	(which	will	be	discussed	in	the	later	section	about	the	Hukou	system)	are	very	difficult	and	complex	processes,	which	can	lead	to	many	social	issues.	As	will	be	seen,	there	are	no	national-level	 regulations	 to	 sp
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different	local	governments	might	adopt	different	approaches	and	policies	to	compensate	the	villagers,	such	as	a	market-based	approach	or	a	government-led	approach.	Therefore,	the	level	of	compensation	might	vary	in	different	cases.		Figure	2.2:	The	institution	of	land	requisition	and	property	rights	redistribution	in	China	 	
		 Source:	He	et	al.,	2009:	1933	 		In	many	cases	in	east-coast	cities,	in	view	of	the	large	profits	of	the	real-estate	industry,	the	 government	 has	 encouraged	 private	 developers	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 villagers	directly,	based	on	the	market	price	(Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012;	Hao	et	al.,	2011;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	However,	aiming	at	pursuing	higher	compensation,	and	even	unreasonable	sky-high	price	compensation,	villagers	adopt	a	variety	of	actions	as	negotiating	tactics,	such	as	protests	(He	et	al.,	2009;	Sargeson	2018;	Rithmire	2015).	To	avoid	uncontrolled	high	costs	for	land	expropriation	and	social	unrest,	local	governments	prefer	to	acquire	rural	agricultural	 land	 rather	 than	 rural	 residential	 land	 (Zhou	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Seeking	more	profit,	the	central	government	developed	a	strategy	for	rural	land	acquisition:	it	prefers	to	acquire	rural	agricultural	land	rather	than	rural	residential	land	(Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012).	According	to	the	land-use	law,	the	amount	of	farmland	compensation	depends	on	its	annual	agricultural	output;	the	maximum	compensation	is	12	times	the	mean	value	of	local	annual	agricultural	output	(Wang	et	al.,	2006;	Ye,	2015).	However,	compensation	
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for	 residential	 land	 is	 much	 more	 complicated	 because	 it	 involves	 monetary	compensation	 for	 the	 land	 and	 buildings,	 as	 well	 as	 relocating	 the	 villagers	 (house-owners)	 who	 lose	 their	 homes.	 This	 process	 is	 complicated,	 time-consuming	 and	expensive	as	there	are	no	existing	laws	to	regulate	it.	To	meet	the	demand	of	urban	sprawl,	rural	land	acquisition	has	occurred	nationwide	in	almost	every	city	since	the	1990s.	The	total	 amount	 of	 regulated	 urban	 built-up	 areas	 (i.e.	 just	 state-owned	 land)	more	 than	quadrupled	between	1984	and	2017,	from	8,842km2	to	55,155km2;	(National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	PRC,	2017).	 		
2.2.3	Informal	Development	of	Urban	Villages	Informal	 development	 in	 urban	 villages	 refers	 to	 villagers	 who	 engage	 in	 the	 self-development	of	their	original	rural	housing	into,	for	example,	high-density,	low-quality,	cheap,	rental	housing	without	any	permission	or	authorisation	from	the	government	(He	et	al.,	2010;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	The	motivation	of	these	informal	developments	is	that	rural	migrants	generate	demands	for	cheap	rental	housing	(Mak	et	al.,	2007;	He	et	al.,	2010).	The	informal	developments	never	follow	the	city	and	regional	plan;	meanwhile,	almost	all	of	these	informal	developments	have	broken	the	land	administration	law.	As	a	result,	urban	 village	 becomes	 an	 enclave	 within	 the	 cities,	 a	 situation	 which	 provides	 a	considerable	challenge	for	local	government.	 	 	 		Once	the	rural	agricultural	land	has	been	acquired	and	developed	into	urban	areas,	the	remaining	villages	and	their	residential	lands	are	surrounded	by	developed	urban	areas.	In	the	early	stages	of	China’s	urbanization	(1990s	to	early	2000s),	the	main	targets	of	the	urban	development	were	urban	expansion	and	the	growth	of	GDP	(He	et	al.,	2016).	The	urban	development	projects	 focused	on	manufacturing,	construction	and	basic	service	industries,	 all	 of	 them	 labour-intensive.	 These	 development	 projects	 significantly	increased	the	demand	for	a	workforce	at	that	time	(Fan	and	Wang,	2008);	meanwhile,	rural	modernization	had	improved	farming	efficiency,	which	liberated	rural	populations	from	agricultural	work.	Therefore,	a	large	rural	population	flowed	into	the	city	as	migrant	labourers	because	 the	 rapid	urban	development	provided	abundant	 job	opportunities	(Song	 and	 Zenou,	 2012:	 497).	 These	migrants	 created	 a	 large	 demand	 for	 affordable	accommodation	 in	 urban	 areas.	 However,	 they	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 access	 the	 urban	housing	 system,	 particularly	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 benefits	 from	 the	 urban	 public	
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housing	system	(Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012).	This	is	because	the	urban	housing	system	in	China	 consisted	 of	 social	 housing	 (with	 limited	 availability)	 and	 general	 commercial	housing.	Commercial	housing	is	based	on	the	real-estate	industry;	it	is	built	under	strict	supervision	 by	 the	 government,	 the	 legal	 system	 and	 the	 customers.	 To	 seek	 higher	profits,	this	housing	is	targeted	at	middle-	and	upper-class	customers;	always	well-built	and	 designed	 and	 furnished	 to	 a	 good,	 even	 luxury,	 standard.	 Therefore,	 the	 existing	research	(Mak	et	al.,	2007)	shows	that	the	housing	and	rental	prices	are	unaffordable	for	the	vast	majority	of	 rural	migrants.	However,	 the	public	welfare	policy	 (including	 the	social	housing	system)	excludes	migrants	(both	rural	migrants	and	migrants	from	other	cities	and	countries),	as	they	do	not	hold	the	indigenous	household	registration	(Hukou).	This	is	because	access	to	social	housing	is	based	on	the	local	policy	and	local	economic	situation.	 Local	 government	 revenue	 funds	 these	 welfare	 benefits	 and	 the	 central	government	only	provides	very	 limited	support,	 therefore,	 the	 local	governments	only	provide	affordable	housing	for	indigenous	low-income	households	(Hukou	holders).	 		Consequently,	rural	migrants	created	a	huge	demand	for	affordable	accommodation.	At	the	 same	 time,	 urban	 villagers	 have	 to	 find	 alternative	 income	 sources	 to	make	 their	livelihoods	because	they	lost	their	farmland	(Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012).	Therefore,	they	remodelled	their	homesites	without	any	permission	to	create	many	cheap	rental	rooms.	These	 cheap	 rental	rooms	are	 clearly	 illegal;	however,	 considering	 the	need	 for	social	stability,	the	local	government	turned	a	blind	eye	to	these	self-developments	rather	than	demolish	them.	At	that	stage,	this	cheap	rental	housing	significantly	reduced	the	pressure	on	affordable	and	accessible	accommodations	for	rural	migrants	and	also	provided	a	new	livelihood	for	urban	villagers	in	the	rental	business	(Liu	et	al.,	2010;	Jiang	et	al.,	2009).	Some	research	(Zhou,	2014;	He	et	al.,	2009)	has	criticised	the	local-level	governments	for	tolerating	these	informal	developments,	and	even	“deliberately	designing”	them	(Zhou,	2014)	as	a	source	of	affordable	housing	for	rural-migrants,	which	relieved	the	pressure	on	local	governments	(Jiang	et	al.,	2009).	These	affordable	but	informal	and	even	illegal	settlements	 became	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 accessible	 and	 affordable	 accommodation,	which	 accommodate	massive	 numbers	of	migrants	 (Ye,	 2011,	 Jiang	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Like	many	 informal	neighbourhoods	around	the	world,	 these	 informally	developed	villages	are	characterised	by	“face-to-face	buildings”,	“narrow	roads”,	“a	thin	strip	of	sky”	as	well	as	“inner	streets	packed	with	service	outlets”,	“grocery	stores	and	shops,”,	and	“referred	
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to	as	‘urban	villages’	(cheng	Zhong	cun	 in	Chinese,	literately	meaning	‘villages	in	city’)”	(Liu	et	al.,	2010:	136).	 		
2.2.4	Summary	To	sum	up,	current	research	(Zhou,	2014;	Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012;	He	et	al.,	2009;	Xu	
et	al.,	2011)	suggests	that	China’s	urban	villages	are	the	product	of	complex	social	and	economic	 development	 processes	 arising	 for	 a	 series	 of	 reasons:	 urban	 sprawl	 and	industrialization,	social	and	economic	reform,	the	dual	land-holding	system	and	the	land-based	revenue	system	(He	et	al.,	2009;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	In	addition,	the	rapid	urbanization	process	attracts	large	numbers	of	rural	migrants	working	and	living	in	the	cities.	The	lack	of	affordable	and	accessible	accommodation	in	cities	encourages	villagers	to	expand	and	develop	 their	 home	 site	 as	 a	 rental	 business	without	 any	 authorization.	 These	 illegal	developments	and	businesses	became	villagers’	new	livelihoods;	and	the	urban	village	itself	became	an	enclave	within	the	city	in	which	state	regulation	and	enforcement	were	largely	absent	(Song	and	Zenou,	2012;	Hao	et	al.,	2011;	Zhang	et	al.,	2003;	Zhang,	2011).	 	
	
2.3	Characteristics	of	urban	villages	The	next	 section	 introduces	 four	basic	 characteristics	of	 the	urban	village	 in	order	 to	explain	 from	 the	 institutional	perspective	why	urban	villages	became	enclaves	within	cities.	In	addition,	this	section	will	also	explain	some	particular	‘Chinese	concepts’,	which	might	help	the	Western	reader	to	make	sense	of	the	following	issues.		
2.3.1	Basic	Physical	Images	of	Urban	Villages	As	 stated	 above,	 the	 urban	 villages	 have	 become	 enclaves	within	 the	 city,	 which	 has	generated	a	series	of	social	issues.	The	urban	village	is	a	transitional	neighbourhood	that	has	 not	 been	 fully	 and	 officially	 urbanized.	 Urban	 villages	 in	 China	 are	 commonly	characterized	as	slum-like	informal	settlements,	which	have	poor	living	conditions	and	high	 crime	 rates	 and	 are	 isolated	 from	 the	 urban	 system	 (Zhang	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 These	neighbourhoods	are	increasingly	seen	as	transitional,	informal,	flexible	spaces	that	link	migrants	with	urban	society	(Kochan,	2015;	Liu	et	al.,	2010;	Wang	et	al.,	2009;	Wu	et	al.,	2012).	According	to	Figure	2.3	(Liu	et	al.,	2010:	137),	the	urban	village	is	a	mixture	of	low	quality	urban	residential	communities	and	rural	characteristics.	To	limit	the	budgets	and	seek	 high	 profits,	 village	 houses	 were	 simply	 altered	 to	 become	 high-rise	 and	 high-
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density	buildings	with	very	poor	conditions	(Tian,	2008).	According	to	Liu	et	al.	(2010):	“the	average	household	size	(2.94	persons	per	household)	and	space	(26.74m2	per	capita)	for	each	urban	resident	with	rural	migrant	household	which	is	smaller	(2.58	persons	per	household	 and	 14.56m2	 per	 capita);	 meanwhile,	 the	 size	 of	 indigenous	 villager’s	household	is	larger	(3.82	persons	per	household	and	43.58m2	per	capita)”	(2010:137).	This	caused	many	safety	and	security	issues.	In	particularly,	fire	disasters	have	frequently	caused	 mass	 casualties	 in	 urban	 villages.	 This	 is	 because	 both	 the	 constructions	themselves	 and	 the	 accommodation	 rental	 businesses	were	 illegal	 and	 not	 subject	 to	urban	 planning	 and	 regulatory	 control	 in	 terms	 of	 public	 safety.	 However,	 the	 urban	planning	 department	 could	 not	 fully	 intervene	 in	 these	 issues	 as	 urban	 villages	 are	beyond	the	jurisdiction	of	the	urban	planning	system	(Zhang,	2005;	Tian,	2008;	Zhang	et	al.,	2003).	 	 		Figure	2.3:	The	characteristics	of	the	urban	villages.	 	
	 	Source:	Liu	et	al.	(2010:137)			
2.3.2	Property	rights	Property	 rights	 in	 the	 urban	 village	 are	 an	 exceedingly	 complex	 issue	 for	 the	 local	government	when	 they	want	 to	 regenerate	 an	 urban	 village.	 Particularly,	most	 of	 the	properties	in	urban	villages	are	a	combination	of	a	legal	building	with	illegal	parts	added	on.	The	landlords	(native	villagers)	in	urban	villages	have	legal	property	ownership	of	the	rural	housing.	This	is	a	bit	complicated,	as	unlike	the	urban	property	rights	system,	the	property	rights	in	the	rural	system	are	separated	into	two	parts:	land	ownership	and	attachment	ownership	(Ho	and	van	Aartsen,	2005;	Zhang	et	al.,	2003;	Tian,	2008).	The	
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land	ownership	is	the	authentic	ownership,	which	has	the	right	of	disposal	(Ho	and	van	Aartsen,	2005;	Deng	and	Huang,	2004);	however,	the	attachment	ownership	is	a	utility	right	only	(Wang	et	al.,2009;	Deng	and	Huang,	2004).	For	example,	when	we	talk	about	one	 building	 in	 an	 urban	 village,	 we	 should	 notice	 that	 the	 land	 in	 urban	 village	 is	collectively	owned	by	the	village	(all	indigenous	villagers)	and	managed	by	the	village	committee;	that	is,	the	building’s	owner	only	has	the	utility	rights	of	their	building	–	they	can	rent	it	out	but	they	cannot	sell	them	in	real-estate	market	(Wang	et	al.,	2009;	Ho	and	van	Aartsen,	2005).	This	is	because	of	the	building	is	one	of	attachments	on	collective-owned	land	which	is	not	allowed	to	enter	the	commercial	property	market	(Wu,	2015;	Hsing,	 2010;	 Rithmire,	 2015).	 The	 legal	 property	 rights	 in	 urban	 villages	 are	 under-protected	 before	 and	 during	 the	 process	 of	 redevelopment,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	compensation	for	the	property	after	demolition	(Wu,	2015;	He,	2015).	In	practice,	if	local	government	 acquires	 the	 rural	 land	 from	 the	 village	 collective,	 it	 still	 needs	 to	compensate	the	village	collective	for	the	rural	land	and	compensate	the	villagers	for	the	attachments	(Wu,	2015;	Rithmire,	2015).	The	government	cannot	forcibly	demolish	the	legal	 property	 as	 all	 of	 the	 legal	 properties	 are	 owned	 and	 regulated	 by	 the	 village	collective.	 Thus,	 the	 local	 government	 have	 to	 co-operate	 with	 village	 authorities	 to	compensate,	acquire	and	demolish	(Hsing,	2010;	Rithmire,	2015).	However,	since	most	of	 the	housing	within	 the	urban	village	 consists	of	 illegal	buildings	 (Wu,	2015;	Hsing,	2010),	they	are	unauthorised	by	either	urban	or	village	authorities.	This	is	because	the	land	 use	 law	 requires	 that	 all	 of	 the	 development	 within	 a	 village	 should	 have	 the	permission	issued	by	the	township-level	government2,	which	can	compel	the	demolition	of	illegal	buildings	without	any	compensation.	 		Controversially,	in	the	era	of	urban	village	formation,	China’s	local	governments	lack	the	incentive	to	deal	with	informality	and	informal	settlements.	Instead,	the	local	government	tolerates	these	illegal	constructions,	not	only	because	the	villagers	are	not	directly	under	the	control	of	 the	district-level	government,	but	also	because	these	 informal	buildings	effectively	 release	 the	 pressure	 on	 the	 local	 government	 to	 build	 affordable	accommodation	for	rural	migrants	(Liu	et	al.,	2010;	Wu	et	al.,	2012).	In	addition,	from	the	urban	governance	perspective,	property	demolition	and	the	relocation	of	urban	residents	
                         
2 Township-level government is the lowest level local government in China, it is directly supervised 
by county/district level government. 
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have	generated	risks	for	state-society	conflict	(Sargeson	2018;	Rithmire	2015).	Therefore,	these	 illegal	buildings	are	 likely	 to	 survive	until	 the	 regeneration	of	 the	urban	 village	occurs.	These	buildings	can	be	distinguished	as	being	of	two	parts	(legal	parts	and	illegal	self-expansion	parts)	This	is	because	most	of	the	informal	developments	are	expansions	by	the	owner	(Tang	and	Chung,	2002;	Hao	et	al.,	2011).	For	example	(see	figure	2.4),	the	original	housing	is	only	on	two	levels,	but	the	villagers	have	converted	it	into	5	levels	by	building	3	more	levels	onto	their	former	house	instead	of	totally	rebuilding	it.	Therefore,	although	 the	actual	 floor-space	area	within	 the	urban	village	 is	high,	 the	area	of	 legal	floor-space	remains	very	limited.	Figure	2.4:	Photos	in	urban	villages.	 	
	
Source:	photos	from	fieldwork		
2.3.3	Population	in	the	Chinese	urban	village	At	this	point,	it	is	important	that	the	household	registration	system	should	be	explained.	It	is	a	fundamental	institution	in	China	that	groups	people	by	two	criteria:	original	living	
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place	(local	or	migrant)	and	Hukou	type	(whether	citizenship	is	urban	or	rural).	All	people	are	allocated	a	hukou	type	and	location;	and	both	hukou	type	and	location	are	passed	on	from	parents	to	their	children	(Liu	et	al.,	2010;	Song	et	al.,	2008).	In	China,	Hukou-based	citizenship	includes	political	rights,	economic	rights	and	the	right	to	access	the	welfare	system	(He,	2005).	Remarkably,	as	the	Hukou	 system	allocates	people	by	both	original	living	 place	 and	Hukou	 type,	 their	 citizenship	 is	 strongly	 spatially	 bounded	 by	 their	original	home.		The	residents	in	 the	urban	village	are	separated	 into	 indigenous	villagers	and	migrant	workers	(Zheng	et	al.,	2009;	Chen	and	Fan,	2016).	The	 indigenous	villagers	own	their	household	 registration	 and	 property	 in	 the	 urban	 village,	 and	 all	 of	 the	 indigenous	villagers	collectively	own	the	land	(He,	2005).	They	have	full	citizenship	in	their	village	and,	since	they	own	their	property	in	the	village,	they	also	play	a	role	as	landlords	to	the	migrant	workers	(Zheng	et	al.,	2009).	The	migrant	workers	are	another	group	that	live	in	the	urban	village.	As	they	are	tenants	in	the	village,	they	do	not	own	land,	property	or	household	registration	within	the	village	(He	et	al.,	2010;	Chen	and	Fan,	2016).	Existing	research	(He	et	al.,	2010;	Zheng	et	al.,	2009;	Chen	and	Fan,	2016)	suggests	that,	in	terms	of	population	size,	migrant	workers	are	the	largest	component	of	the	population	in	urban	villages.	 However,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 household	 registration	 status	 in	 the	 locality,	 the	migrant	workers	are	officially	considered	as	outsiders	in	the	village	(He	et	al.,	2010;	He,	2005;	Chen	and	Fan,	2016).	These	people	only	have	 limited	 citizenship	 in	 the	village,	especially	 political	 and	 economic	 rights.	 Thus,	 during	 the	 redevelopment	 process,	 the	migrant	workers	are	always	displaced	without	exception.		Majority	residents	in	urban	village	are	employed	in	low	status:	“small	business	owners	and	self-employed	(17.86%)”,	“service	sector	and	manual	workers	(17.86%)”,	as	well	as	“casual	workers	and	others	(52.68%)”	(Hao	et	al.,	2011:	218).	In	addition,	Hao	et	al.	(2011)	took	another	investigation	on	the	livelihoods	of	villagers	in	an	urban	village	in	the	Futian	District	 of	 Shenzhen	 and	 find	 out:	 “majority	 income	 is	 the	 informal	 accommodation	renting	(60%),	and	the	village	collective	economies’	profit-sharing	(30%)”	(2011:	215).	Based	on	the	social	and	economic	status	in	the	urban	villages,	compared	to	the	migrants,	the	indigenous	villagers	are	a	higher	class	with	privileges:	priority	access	to	facilities	and	events,	 enjoying	 certain	 public	 services	 and	 welfare	 from	 the	 village	 collective	 and	
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political	rights	in	terms	of	negotiating	with	village	authorities	(this	will	be	discussed	in	following	sections).	Nevertheless,	compared	to	urban	citizens,	both	of	these	groups	are	the	marginalised	classes	in	the	city	who	living	in	deprived	communities.	 		
2.3.4	Authorities	and	Governance	System	In	the	current	legal	and	administration	system,	the	village	committee	is	the	autonomous	grassroots	 organization,	 which	 is	 nominally	 led	 by	 the	 Village	 branch	 of	 the	 Chinese	Communist	Party.	The	village	committee	takes	charge	of	routine	governance	and	village	affairs,	meanwhile	the	village	Party	Committee	takes	on	the	duty	of	ideological	control,	particularly	in	some	political	issues	(He,	2006;	Louie,	2001;	Kelliher,	1997).	Many	studies	(Hao	et	al.,	2011;	Liu	et	al.,	2010)	point	out	that,	within	the	transitional	process,	the	village	committees	retain	the	traditional	rural	governance	structure	to	undertake	routine	affairs	in	the	urban	village,	mainly	about	managing	their	village	collective	property	in	the	urban	market	context.	 In	 the	traditional	rural	governance	structure,	as	some	villages	usually	have	a	large	population	to	govern,	the	village	committee	is	always	constituted	to	include	several	villager	groups	which	serve	as	the	authorities	to	deal	with	the	routine	matters	of	village	life	(Zhou,	2010).	The	village	committee	serves	as	the	body	which	negotiates	the	“big	 issues”	 across	 the	 groups.	 In	 many	 cases,	 some	 land	 is	 specifically	 reserved	 for	potential	 development	 (particularly	 industrial	 development),	 which	 is	 known	 as	“reserved	land”	or	“industrial	land”	within	village	collectively	owned	properties	(Li	et	al.,	2014;	 Wang	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 The	 land	 was	 intended	 for	 village	 collective	 economic	development,	which	provides	funding	for	the	village	routine	budget	and	basic	services	for	villagers.	This	is	because	the	local	government	is	not	willing	to	cover	the	budgets	for	the	 villagers’	welfare	 and	 the	 administrative	 routines	 of	 the	 village	 (He,	 2005;	2006).	Therefore,	 the	 village	 committee	 operates	 various	 forms	 of	 shareholding 3 ,	 mainly	companies	and	co-operatives	(He,	2006;	Tang,	2014),	to	create	profits	to	fund	themselves	by	managing	collective	properties,	especially	through	renting	or	developing	the	reserved	land	 (Wu,	 2012).	 These	 actions	 are	 supervised	 by	 all	 the	 native	 villagers	 because	 all	profits	 of	 these	 companies	 are	 used	 for	 their	 benefit:	 sharing	 the	 profits,	 improving	villagers’	 living	 conditions	 and	 providing	 public	 services	 such	 as	 social	 security,	infrastructure	maintenance	 and	 constructing	 collective-owned	 buildings	 (Zhou	2010).	
                         
3 shareholding companies can always be undertaken by village committees in China, but the forms 
might be difference in different cases 
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Therefore,	 the	 urban	 village	 becomes	 an	 enclave,	 since	 the	 village	 routine	 affairs	 are	administrated	 by	 the	 village	 committee	 and	 their	 indigenous	 villagers’	 welfare	 is	provided	by	the	village	(or	shareholding	economies)	rather	than	by	urban	welfare	and	public	services.		
2.4	Why	regeneration	projects	are	undertaken	and	the	problems	they	
generate.	This	section	explains	why	China’s	local	government	has	strong	incentives	to	regenerate	urban	 villages.	 There	 are	 two	 perspectives:	 space	 shortage	 within	 the	 city	 and	competition	between	the	cities.	 In	addition,	 the	ways	 in	which	these	villages	are	to	be	regenerated	 and	 the	 challenges	 and	 side	 effects	 of	 the	 different	 approaches	 will	 be	examined.		
2.4.1	Space	Shortage	within	the	City	 	The	 first	 incentive	 for	 regeneration	 is	 to	 create	 more	 space	 for	 cities	 to	 introduce	industries,	primarily,	the	real-estate	industry.	As	mentioned	above,	since	the	1990s,	local	governments	have	held	the	right	to	release	the	usage	rights	for	the	land	and	to	claim	the	resulting	 revenues	 (Rithmire,	 2015).	 Consequently,	 local	 governments	 have	 become	increasingly	 aggressive	 on	 land	 (re)development	 as	 a	 way	 to	 generate	 revenue	 and	attract	 investment	 (He,	 2015).	 This	 is	 because,	 the	 state	 (both	 local	 and	 central)	monopolizes	the	land	ownerships	and	primary	land	market	with	the	discretion	to	levy	taxes	and	make	rules	(Wu,	2012;	Deng	et	al.,	2010).	The	main	approach	to	redevelop	the	old	 urban	 community	 in	 China	 is	 the	 public-private	 partnership	 between	 local	government	and	real	estate	developers.	Consequently,	the	urban	area	has	been	expanded	rapidly	over	a	few	years	(Wu,	2015;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	To	slow	down	the	urban	expansion,	in	2007,	led	by	the	central	government,	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Resource	(MLR)	adopted	the	“toughest”	policy	to	restrict	local	governments’	ability	to	acquire	rural	land	(He,	2014;	Zhang	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 In	 addition,	 a	 strict	 quota	 programme	 was	 established:	 “each	subnational	jurisdiction	is	assigned	an	amount	of	arable	land	that	cannot	be	decreased	and	 an	 annual	 amount	 of	 rural	 land	 that	 may	 be	 converted	 for	 urban	 construction”	(Rithmire,	 2015:	 7).	 Thus,	 local	 governments	 now	 have	 to	 regenerate	 the	 old	 urban	neighbourhoods	to	create	the	space	for	development	(Hao	et	al.,	2011).	 		
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As	mentioned	 in	 previous	 sections,	 governance	 and	 planning	 were	 reinforced	 in	 the	2000s,	accompanied	by	the	development	of	a	land-driven	growth	machine.	In	that	context,	the	Urban	and	Rural	Planning	Law	28th	Oct	2007	was	enacted	in	2008	by	the	Ministry	of	Land	and	Resource	 (MLR)	which	had	begun	 to	enforce	a	 system	of	 land	development	quotas,	especially	in	the	regulation	of	the	conversion	of	rural	to	urban	land	(Wang	et	al.,	2010;	Zhang	et	al.,	2014).	As	a	result,	local	governments	can	no	longer	easily	acquire	rural	agricultural	land,	which	has	forced	them	to	create	space	through	urban	regeneration.	This	has	involved	the	demolition	of	old	and	run-down	areas	and	neighbourhoods,	especially	those	 inefficient	 areas	 with	 low	 land-utilization	 such	 as	 shantytowns,	 old	 run	 down	factories	and	urban	villages	(Sorace	and	Hurst,	2016;	Chen	et	al.,	2016).		
2.4.2	Competition	between	cities	As	 stated	 above,	 academics,	 the	government	 and	 the	media	widely	 condemned	urban	villages	in	terms	of	bad	construction	quality,	poor	living	conditions	and	intensified	crime	and	social	disorder	(Liu	et	al.,	2010;	Zhang	et	al.,	2003).	The	population	within	the	urban	village	is	high-density,	however,	the	land	use	in	urban	villages	is	badly	managed	as	it	does	not	make	a	sufficient	economic	contribution	(Wang	et	al.,2009;	He	et	al.,	2010).	However,	each	city	needs	to	speed	up	the	development	to	win	the	competition	with	other	cities	to	attract	 investment	 and	 special	 priority	 policies	 from	 the	 higher-level	 government.	Investment	 and	 priority	 policies	 (see	 Chapter	 3)	 always	 accompany	 a	 big	 project.	Therefore,	 to	attract	big	projects,	a	 local	government	should	create	not	only	sufficient	space,	but	also	a	positive	environment	(Zhou	2010).	This	approach	was	developed	since	1978;	the	east-coast	cities	in	China	tried	to	introduce	foreign	investment	and	industries	from	 the	 western	 world.	 As	 these	 programmes	 were	 important	 opportunities	 for	development,	 local	 governments	 always	 tried	 their	 best	 to	 prioritise	 the	 programme	(ibid).	 During	 1980s-2000s,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 fixed-asset	 investment	 projects	 or	engineering	 projects	 have	 been	 developed	 and	 constructed	 throughout	 the	 country;	therefore,	 China	 was	 nicknamed	 “project-impulsed	 nation”	 (Hsing,	 2006;	 2010).	Generally	speaking,	creating	the	conditions	for	each	project	is	the	most	important	‘task’	for	 local	 government.	 As	 they	 face	 the	 competition	 from	 other	 cities,	 each	 local	government	should	create	the	conditions	for	the	project	as	quickly	as	possible.	To	attract	enterprises,	local	governments	need	to	make	greater	efforts:	acquire	large	plots	of	land	for	them	to	build	factories	and	little	airports;	and	release	land	with	a	very	low	ratio	of	
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land-transferring	 fees4	 and	 other	 advantages	 such	 as	 tax	 ratio	 discounts,	 priority	 in	water	and	energy	supply	and	better	infrastructure.	 		Local	 governments	 do	 not	 develop	 the	 cities	 themselves;	 they	 seek	 partners,	 mainly	private	 developers,	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investments	 (FDI)	 and	 state-owned	 industries.	Therefore,	one	of	the	most	important	targets	for	urban	development	is	attracting	not	only	foreign	investment	but	also	domestic	capital	from	other	regions,	such	as	introducing	an	enterprise	from	another	city	(Ding	and	Lichtenberg,	2011;	Li	et	al.,	215).	To	be	attractive	and	 mobilize	 investment,	 local	 governments	 set	 up	 economic	 development	 vehicles,	known	as	‘local	financing	and	investment	platforms’	(Lu	and	Sun	2013),	to	facilitate	the	development	 projects.	 Within	 the	 platforms,	 each	 development	 project	 has	 certain	priorities	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 urban	 administrative	 process:	 the	 local	 government	 will	aggressively	mobilise	local	economic	and	political	sources	to	facilitate	these	projects	and	seek	to	develop	the	city	by	attracting	and	launching	them	(Pan	et	al.,	2017;	Zhang	and	Barnett,	2014).	Therefore,	local	governments	need	more	land	to	launch	these	projects.	As	the	 central	 government	 strictly	 limits	 rural	 land	 acquisition,	 especially	 of	 agricultural	land,	 urban	 regeneration	 creates	 a	major	 land	 source	 (Wu,	 2015;	 Zhang	 and	Barnett,	2014).	 In	 addition,	 to	 increase	 the	 cities’	 competitiveness,	 local	 governments	 have	 to	provide	 better	 urban	 environments	 and	 infrastructure.	 Therefore,	 China’s	 urban	development	 is	 heavily	 reliant	 on	 land	 development	 and	 the	 local	 revenue	 is	 heavily	reliant	on	land	revenue.	This	institutional	arrangement	encourages	local	government	to	facilitate	urban	and	urban	village	regeneration,	as	it	not	only	provides	space	for	attracting	investment,	but	also	improves	the	urban	environment	and	infrastructure.	 		After	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2008,	the	Chinese	central	government	redirected	urban	redevelopment	 towards	 facilitating	 economic	 restructuring.	 Since	 2009,	 the	 local	governments’	 aims	 of	 redevelopment	 were	 more	 ambitious	 than	 improving	 local	infrastructures	 and	housing	 conditions:	 the	 policy	 has	 targeted	 the	 extraction	of	 land	revenue	(Tao	et	al.,	2010),	economic	restructuring	(He,	2014,	Shin	2009)	and	physical	upgrading	 (He,	 2012).	To	 pursue	 high	profits	 and	 revenue	 and	 to	 create	modern	 and	luxurious	 physical	 images	 of	 “global	 cities”,	 local	 governments	 have	 produced	 more	
                         
4 land-transferring fees（土地转让金）is a kind of revenues. It applies for local government 
releasing the agricultural land to industries for non-agricultural use. 
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property-related	upscale	housing	and	luxury	skyscraper	accommodation	than	common	residential	housing	(Since	2000s)	(Smith,	2010;	Wu,	2015).	In	that	context,	the	removal	and	redevelopment	of	urban	villages	have	been	significantly	promoted.	As	a	result,	the	old	 urban	 neighbourhoods	 have	 been	 expanded	 from	 urban	 villages	 to	 mixed-use	complexes,	 such	as	 skyscrapers	 in	 the	 city.	Meanwhile,	 the	 residents	 in	 the	old	urban	neighbourhoods	 have	 been	 relocated	 to	 housing	 estates	 (Wu,	 2015).	 However,	 as	explained	 below,	 the	 redevelopment	 processes	 and	 issues	 such	 as	 demolition,	reallocation	and	exclusion	of	migrants	have	become	increasingly	problematic.		
2.4.3	Approaches	and	side	effects	in	urban	village	regeneration5	In	 the	 early	 2000s,	 the	 primary	 practices	 surrounding	 urban	 village	 regeneration	followed	the	market-oriented	approach,	which	involved	private	property	developers	in	the	 demolition-and-redevelopment	 process.	 This	 new	 approach	 was	 referred	 to	 as	“property-led	redevelopment”	(Turok,	1992),	a	term	taken	up	by	researchers	(He,	2012;	Shin,	2009;	Yang	and	Chang,	2007)	who	focus	on	Chinese	urban	studies.	 		This	 demolition	 and	 redevelopment	 approach	 aims	 to	 use	 capital	 from	 property	developers,	particularly	private	and	foreign	capital	to	fund	urban	regeneration	projects.	To	 launch	a	regeneration	project,	 the	properties	(housing,	attachments	and	 land)	 first	need	to	be	acquired	and	demolished,	and	the	spaces	so	created	will	be	released	to	new	projects	following	the	master	plan	and	land-use	plan	(Shih,	2010;	2015).	This	process	is	different	 from	 the	previous	 farmland	acquisition	 (Hao	et	al.,	 2010),	 in	 that	 these	new	approaches	of	acquisition	have	proven	to	be	increasingly	controversial	as	they	have	led	to	many	undesirable	obstacles	and	practices:	over-construction	of	real	estate	(Sorace	and	Hurst,	2016;	Chen	et	al.,	2016;	Yu,	2014);	high	risk	of	bank	failures	(Ding	and	Lichtenberg,	2011);	conflicts	between	different	interest	groups	and	aggressive	social	injustice	(Shih,	2015;	Wu	et	al.,	2013).	One	of	the	drivers	of	these	unanticipated	negative	consequences	
                         
5 This section is developed from a part of the author’s publication, see:	Niu,	P.,	&	Wagenaar,	H.	(2018)	The	limits	of	authoritarian	rule:	policy	making	and	deliberation	in	urban	village	regeneration	in	China.	Japanese	
Journal	of	Political	Science.	19(4),	678-693.		
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is	 the	 complex	 process	 of	 property	 acquisition	 (land,	 houses	 and	 infrastructure)	 that	precedes	the	regeneration.	 	 	 		As	 noted	 above,	 indigenous	 villagers	 own	 the	 land	 in	 the	 urban	 village,	 and	 the	municipality	needs	to	find	ways	to	acquire	the	land	from	them	at	the	lowest	possible	price.	This	pits	the	interests	of	the	city	against	those	of	the	village	collective.	In	addition,	most	of	 the	urban	 village	 regenerations	were	 organized	 as	 a	 PPI	 arrangement	with	private	developers	doing	most	of	the	development	work	in	exchange	for	a	share	of	the	profits	(Sorace	and	Hurst,	2016;	Wu,	et	al.,	2013).	To	obtain	the	necessary	property	rights	in	the	areas	occupied	by	urban	villages,	local	governments	followed	one	of	two	strategies.	The	first	is	market-based.	For	example,	Liede	Village	in	Guangzhou	was	regenerated	by	private	capital	(Liu	et	al.,	2014;	Li,	2011);	and	Xintiandi	in	Shanghai	was	regenerated	by	foreign	capital	 (He	 and	 Wu,	 2005;	 Ren,	 2008).	 After	 the	 redevelopment,	 Liede	 Village	 was	developed	 into	 a	 mixed-use	 community	 comprising	 residential	 and	 commercial	 real-estate	(Li	et	al.,	2014);	Xintiandi	was	redeveloped	into	mixed-use	commercial	buildings	(Wai	 2006;	 He	 and	 Wu,	 2005).	 These	 cases	 show	 that	 property-led	 redevelopments	always	rely	on	real-estate	developers.	This	does	not	only	generate	considerable	profits	for	developers	and	land	revenue	for	local	government,	but	also	transform	the	low-quality	neighbourhoods	 into	 high-quality	 urban	 communities,	 providing	 a	 positive	 physical	image	 for	 the	cities.	This	was	the	earliest	approach	and	 it	was	most	prevalent	 in	east-coast	cities	where	the	need	to	redevelop	urban	village	sites	was	initially	felt	most	acutely.	 	Developers’	need	for	a	speedy	development	process	led	to	inflation	of	the	agreed-upon	compensation	 packages.	 After	 the	 government	 endorsement,	 the	 private	 sector	 was	allowed	to	directly	negotiate	with	the	village	residents	and	establish	land	and	property	values	according	to	market	rates	(Shih	2010;	2015).	Private	developers	also	had	a	certain	autonomy	 to	 amend	 the	 compensation	 for	 each	 individual	 if	 they	 felt	 it	 necessary.	 As	village	residents	were	 free	to	negotiate	with	developers,	 they	adopted	petitioning	as	a	strategy	to	argue	for	higher	compensation	packages.	To	solve	this	issue,	the	developer	needed	 to	 make	 deals	 with	 each	 individual	 resident	 (Ding	 2007).	 To	 limit	 this	 local	resistance	and	expedite	redevelopment,	governments	encouraged	developers	to	increase	the	 compensation	 level	 (Lichtenberg	 and	 Ding,	 2009).	 To	 compensate	 for	 the	 loss	 of	rental	income	from	their	largely	illegal	additions,	villagers	were	offered	compensation	in	the	form	of	newly-built	apartments	in	the	re-located	community	(Wu	et	al.,	2013;	Wang	
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and	Scott,	2008,	Hin	and	Xin,	2011)	Usually,	each	household	was	compensated	by	at	least	two	 to	 three	 apartments,	 but	 to	 defuse	 the	 petitions	 and	 protests	 government	 and	developers	increased	the	compensation	ratio,	in	effect	rewarding	continued	resistance.	In	some	cases,	native	villagers	were	able	to	obtain	ten	or	more	apartments	this	way6	 (Li	et	al.,	2014).	This	 in	 turn	resulted	 in	negative	effects	 like	overcompensation,	conflicts,	injustices,	 overbuilding	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 local	 housing	 bubbles	 and	 unequal	treatment.	 		
2.5	Negative	consequences	and	changing	policies7	As	stated	above,	 the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	is	attractive	to	developers	because	the	land	holds	significant	potential	profits.	During	the	regeneration	programme,	the	villagers	also	attempt	to	share	these	profits	by	arguing	for	higher	compensation.	This	process	 for	 the	 redistribution	 of	 interests	 causes	 many	 conflicts.	 To	 cope	 with	 these	issues,	 local	 governments	 used	 to	 increase	 the	 compensation	 levels,	 but	 this	 also	generates	many	further	issues.	After	several	years,	China’s	government	decided	to	change	the	urbanization	policy	 from	land-based	development	 into	what	 the	authorities	 called	‘human-oriented	development’	(Chen	et	al.,	2016;	Taylor,	2015;	Wang	et	al.,	2015).	The	key	idea	is	to	integrate	more	rural	and	urban	villagers	into	the	cities	instead	of	simply	seeking	physical	development	and	urban	modernization	(Taylor	2015;	Chan,	2014).	 		
2.5.1	Negative	Consequences	Initially	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	adopted	the	market	approach,	with	excessive	compensation	levels	being	the	subject	of	research	and	media	reports	(Shi	et	al.,	2018;	 Ren	 2018;	 Qian,	 2015).	 Consequently,	 urban	 villagers’	 negotiating	 skills	 have	increased	 as	 have	 their	 expectations	 of	 significant	 compensation	 (Ren,	 2018).	 This	process	had	become	the	most	significant	obstacle	for	local	government.	As	stated	above,	the	market-based	approach	was	supported	by	the	expectation	that	the	superior	location	of	 the	 villages	 and	 the	 high	 potential	market	 value	 of	 the	 developed	 property	would	
                         
6 See LH Li, J Lin, X Li, F Wu (2014) evidence in Liede village, Guangzhou 
7 This section is developed from a part of the author’s publication, see:	Niu,	P.,	&	Wagenaar,	H.	(2018)	The	limits	of	authoritarian	rule:	policy	making	and	deliberation	in	urban	village	regeneration	in	China.	Japanese	
Journal	of	Political	Science.	19(4),	678-693.	
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generate	considerable	profit	(Chung,	2009;	Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012;	Hin	and	Xin,	2011).	This	approach	is	controversial	because	it	is	still	based	on	the	land-centred	development	strategy	(Zhang,	2005).	The	land-centred	development	strategy	and	urbanization	policies	created	certain	social	and	economic	benefits	in	many	cases:	however,	this	policy	proved	unsustainable	as	these	financial	projections	were	largely	met	only	in	the	large	east-coast	cities.	The	profits	of	urban	village	regeneration	were	much	lower	in	smaller	central	and	western	 cities	 (Hsing,	 2010).	 For	 this	 reason,	 developers	 and	 construction	 consortia	began	 to	 shy	away	 from	accepting	 full	 responsibility	 for	 the	 regeneration	process	 (Li,	2015;	Lin	et	al.,	2015).	Instead,	the	state	stepped	in	alongside	local	government	and	took	charge	of	 the	process	of	 land	acquisition,	demolition	and	reallocation,	with	the	aim	of	limiting	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 land-centred	 urbanization	 and	 to	 pursue	financially	sustainable	urban	development	(Lin	et	al.,	2015;	Wu	et	al.,	2018).	However,	the	negative	 side-effects	of	 the	market-driven	 strategy	had	become	an	obstacle	 in	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 government-led	 strategy.	 The	 villagers’	 negotiating	 skills	 had	raised	their	expectation	of	compensation	to	levels	far	beyond	the	government’s	capacity.	To	 make	 the	 strategy	 financially	 viable	 and	 to	 create	 optimal	 space	 for	 revenue-generating	and	job-creating	commercial	developments,	the	government	more	or	less	shut	down	 the	 possibility	 for	 village	 residents	 to	 negotiate	 the	 size	 of	 the	 compensation	package.	Compensation	for	native	villagers	took	the	form	of	the	allocation	of	apartments	in	 government-constructed,	 high-density,	 high-rise	 developments	 (Lu	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	practice,	the	following	three	negative	effects	were	most	significant.		Firstly,	 the	 regeneration	 generates	 large	 conflicts	 between	 different	 interest	 groups.	Guided	 by	 the	 land-centred	 urbanization	 policy,	 the	 redevelopment	 process	 involves	capturing	 the	 economic	 value	 of	 central	 areas	 by	 transforming	 them	 into	 commercial	centres,	 relocating	 local	people,	 shifting	 the	peri-urban	estates	 into	superblocks,	high-priced	housing	and	business	areas.	One	of	the	consequences	is	the	emergence	of	often	bitter	and	persistent	conflicts	over	land	acquisition	and	property	demolition,	particularly	in	terms	of	the	interest	redistribution	issue.	As	stated	above,	by	targeting	the	search	for	high-speed	and	 low-cost	development	through	 land	acquisition	and	 land	trading,	 local	government	 and	 developers	 always	 limited	 the	 compensation	 given	 during	 the	demolition.	 However,	 taking	 advantage	 of	 local	 governments’	 desperation	 for	 land	acquisition,	the	landlords	in	urban	villages	saw	the	fortune	to	be	made	from	real-estate	
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market	growth	and	argued	for	higher	compensation	(Hsing,	2010).	According	to	the	2013	
Annual	Summary	of	China’s	Violent	Demolition	and	Land	Expropriation	and	Violence	Index,	in	2012,	the	Central	Commission	for	Discipline	Inspection	investigated	and	disposed	427	cases	of	violent	demolition	and	in	2013,	16	people	died	because	of	violent	demolitions	(Liu	 and	Xu,	 2018).	 These	 violent	 demolitions	 and	 forced	 evictions	 caused	 significant	socio-political	tension	and	controversy	over	the	legitimacy	of	both	the	central	and	local	governments	in	China	(He,	2014;	Liu	and	Xu,	2018).	Although	the	land-development	and	urbanization	created	large	economic	growth	within	the	last	two	decades,	these	conflicts	still	damaged	the	public	image	of	the	Chinese	government.	 		Secondly,	 urban	 village	 redevelopments	 are	 widely	 criticized	 as	 being	 unjust	 and	exclusionary.	The	Chinese	government	has	adopted	a	market-oriented	governance	model	to	deal	with	the	redevelopment,	which	is	beneficial	to	the	government	and	the	developer.	Native	villagers	will	also	benefit	as	the	property	rights	are	legally	protected.	In	addition,	to	encourage	the	native	villagers	to	accept	redevelopment	proposals,	as	well	as	to	limit	the	conflict	generated	by	the	demolition,	informal	developments	within	the	urban	village	were	always	compensated	as	well.	Peter	Ho	(2003)	has	examined	institutional	change	in	property	rights	systems	across	land	types,	concluding	that	the	“central	state’s	choice	to	allow	 local,	 informal	 institutions	a	 certain	 space	 for	existence	 rather	 than	 formalizing	them	 through	 national	 laws	 is	 the	 fundamental	 explanation	 of	 such	 institutions’	credibility	and	successful	 functioning”	(Ho,	2003:	18).	Under	that	arrangement,	native	villagers	are	usually	handsomely	compensated	(He,	2014).	However,	existing	research	(He,	2005;	Ho,	2003)	shows	that	migrants	who	are	dependent	on	urban	villages	as	sites	of	 informal	 settlement	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	 the	 redevelopment.	 They	 are	 considered	outsiders	in	the	process	of	urban	village	regeneration	(Ho,	2003)	and	they	cannot	find	a	legal	 channel	 to	 articulate	 and	 present	 their	 interests	 and	 demands	 during	 the	regeneration	process	(He,	2005;	Chung,	2013).	Furthermore,	neither	governments	nor	developers	care	about	rehousing	migrants.	This	puts	migrants	in	a	very	disadvantageous	position,	as	they	are	also	excluded	from	the	social	housing	system	in	the	city	because	of	the	hukou	housing	distribution	system	(Liu	and	He,	2010).	Existing	research	(Ho,	2005;	2003;	He,	2005;	Chung,	2013;	Liu	and	He,	2010)	has	pointed	out	 the	 issues	of	unjust	development	in	urban	village	regeneration	and	criticized	the	social	exclusion	caused	by	these	 institutional	 arrangements.	 Although	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 processes	 of	
 44 
deliberation	for	those	included	within	these	arrangements,	it	recognises	the	exclusion	of	migrants	as	an	important	focus	for	future	research.	 		Thirdly,	the	rapid	urban	expansion	under	the	land-centred	urbanization	system	seems	to	waste	land	resources.	As	a	direct	consequence,	‘ghost	cities’	have	emerged	in	many	cities	in	China.	‘Ghost	cities’	refers	to	vast	areas	of	empty	apartment	buildings	and	magnificent	squares	(Chen	et	al.,	2015).	For	example,	a	new,	urban	redevelopment	project	was	settled	in	 the	 Kangbashi	 district	 in	 the	 Ordos	 (Chinese	 city’s	 name),	 which	 is	 a	wealthy	 and	medium-sized	 coal-mining	 city	 in	Northern	 China.	 Previously,	 this	 area	was	 an	 urban	village	 located	 far	 from	 the	 city	 centre.	 After	 redevelopment,	 it	 was	 filled	 with	 new	neighbourhoods,	government	buildings,	office	towers	and	sports	 fields.	Originally,	 this	district	was	designed	as	a	new	town	for	a	million	 inhabitants,	yet	hardly	anyone	 lives	there	(Dunford	and	Liu,	2017).	The	underlying	processes	are	complex.	First,	the	excess	housing	stock	is	the	effect	of	the	urban,	built-up	land	area	increasing	faster	than	the	urban	population.	This	 trend	has	significantly	 increased	 since	2000,	because	when	 the	WTO	subjected	the	opening	of	China’s	property	market	to	WTO	rules,	abundant	FDI	came	into	Chinese	cities	and	boosted	the	real	estate	industries	(Ding	et	al.,	2011).	The	second	cause	is	a	mismatch	between	supply	and	demand,	with	the	market-driven	construction	process	producing	upscale	housing	where	low-income	housing	is	needed.	As	Chen	et	al.	(2015:17)	comment:	“this	corporatized	urbanization	mode	was	rooted	in	a	one-sided	evaluation	of	local	 government	 performance	 based	 on	 GDP,	 which	 in	 turn	 resulted	 in	 aggressive	development	and	 further	 induced	 social	 injustice	and	 the	 financial	 risks	of	 real	 estate	bubbles”.		
2.6	From	a	‘Land-Centred’	to	a	‘Human-Oriented’	Urbanization	Policy	To	cope	with	the	challenges	generated	by	land-centred	urbanization’,	the	Chinese	central	government	issued	a	new	policy	approach	to	urban	development:	the	‘National	New-type	Urbanization	Plan	(2014–2020)’	in	March	2014	(Taylor,	2015;	Chan,	2014).	In	this	plan,	the	central	committee	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	(CPC)	and	the	State	Council	jointly	released	a	new	strategy	for	urban	development.	The	most	significant	change	put	forward	in	 this	 plan	 is	 the	 transfer	 from	 a	 land-centred	 urbanization	 to	 a	 people-oriented	urbanization.	 As	 Long	 comments:	 “This	was	 the	 first	 official	 plan	 to	 regard	 new-type	urbanization	as	a	national	policy	and	it	pointed	out	the	problems	that	had	emerged	in	the	
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previous	 accelerated	 urbanization	mode;	 this	 plan	 is	 expected	 to	 explore	 a	 new	 path	toward	sustainable	urbanization.	The	most	notable	aspect	in	it	is	the	transition	from	land-centred	urbanization	to	people-oriented	urbanization”	(2014:	112).	 		According	to	Taylor	(2015),	in	the	‘New-type	Urbanisation	Plan	2014-2020’,	the	primary	objective	of	urban	village	regeneration	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• Unblock	the	internal	dual-track	system	of	the	city,	in	terms	of	social	form,	property	ownership	 and	 citizenship,	 such	 as	 redeveloped	 the	 slum	 like	 areas	 into	modern	residential	 communities;	 integrated	 ownership	 of	 rural	 collective-owned	 land	(urban	villages)	into	the	state-owned	land;	and	transfer	the	rural/urban	based	hukou	into	the	unified	household	registration	based	on	residential	address.	
• Promote	 the	 New-type	 urbanisation	 strategy	 to	 facilitate	 the	 integration	 of	 100	million	migrant	workers	into	the	city	(2015:108).		For	the	first	time,	in	contrast	to	previous	approaches	to	urban	village	regeneration,	the	official	policy	is	designed	with	the	goal	of	integrating	migrant	workers	into	the	social	and	economic	 fabric	 of	 the	 city.	 However,	 such	 research	 as	 exists	 on	 the	 human-oriented	approach	 to	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 reviews	 the	 redevelopment	 process	 from	 a	property-based	perspective,	which	is	anchored	in	the	traditional	notion	of	‘land-centred	development’	 (He	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Frequently	 researched	 topics	 regarding	 urban	 village	regeneration	 include:	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 integrating	 collective-owned	 land	 into	 urban	systems	(Hin	&	Xin,	2011,	Liu,	et	al.,	2014);	compensation	for	informal	buildings	(Liang,	2013,);	and	conflict-management	during	demolition	(Chung,	2013;	He,	2005).	 		The	 new	 policy	 of	 new-type	 urbanization	 significantly	 promotes	 a	 “human-oriented”	approach	through	political	reform.	Public	participation	in	planning	has	been	enhanced,	aiming	 at	 respecting	 the	willingness	 of	 local	 residents	 as	well	 as	 limiting	 the	 conflict	between	stakeholders.	Institutional	space	for	public	participation	was	first	recognized	in	the	 Planning	 Act	 of	 1990	 and	 the	 subsequent	 City	 and	 Countryside	 Planning	 Act	(implemented	 in	 2008).	 Under	 that	 institutional	 arrangement,	 the	 use	 of	 land	 for	development	should	be	negotiated	between	the	potential	user	and	the	current	possessor	of	 the	 land	 (Hsing,	 2010;	 Wu,	 2015).	 This	 has	 created	 opportunities	 for	 the	 public,	especially	for	local	residents,	allowing	them	to	participate	in	the	planning	process.	Under	
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the	 National	 New-type	 Urbanization	 Plan	 (2014–2020)	 the	 city	 planning	 system	 has	begun	 to	 adopt	 a	 public	 participation	 approach	 to	 urban	 village	 regeneration.	 At	 the	planning	level,	the	urban	planning	system	has	begun	to	open	up	(Wu,	2015).	The	planning	process	has	been	updated	with	new	approaches,	such	as	communicative	planning	and	collaborative	planning	in	some	cases	(Li,	2015).	Therefore,	in	urban	village	regeneration	practices,	public	participation	 in	the	Chinese	planning	system	has	become	an	officially	recognized	strategy	of	the	Chinese	government.	
	
2.7	Conclusion	In	the	 implementation	of	 this	new	policy,	 the	role	of	rural	village	regimes	has	become	increasingly	 important;	 in	 particularly,	 rural	 village	 regimes	 can	 build	 a	 platform	 for	communication	and	deliberation	between	government	and	villagers.	This	is	because	the	government	has	realized	the	significance	of	communication	and	deliberation	in	terms	of	overcoming	conflicts	caused	by	land	expropriation.	As	introduced	in	this	chapter,	in	some	cases	of	violent	demolition,	because	of	the	absence	of	an	independent	jurisdical	system,	it	is	difficult	for	villagers	to	find	an	effective	channel	for	legal	complaint	(Liu	&	de	Jong,	2017)	as	a	result,	they	have	to	resort	to	protest.	In	many	cases,	however,	villagers	would	not	 passively	 accept	 government-mandated	 compensation	 proposals;	 instead,	 they	protested	 and	 bargained	 strategically	 to	 maximize	 their	 compensation	 (Liu,	 2016).	Sometimes	 they	 claim	 unreasonable	 prices	 (ibid).	 In	 the	 past,	 for	 example,	 the	government	tended	to	pay	the	“nail	houses”8	 more	money	to	relieve	their	resistances;	however,	this	method	upset	“honest	people”	who	had	accepted	the	initial	compensation	(Liu	and	Xu,	2018).	 It	is	here	that	deliberation	already	plays	roles	 in	 the	urban	village	redevelopment	process;	and	it	might	be	an	ideal	answer	for	these	issues.	Based	on	the	practices	of	democratic	deliberation	at	 the	 local	 level,	 the	Chinese	central	government	has	explicitly	endorsed	the	importance	and	validity	of	employing	democratic	deliberation	in	the	community	governance	system.	The	overt	goal	is	to	promote	a	harmonious,	stable	and	 ‘controllable’	 society	 by	 building	 up	 harmonious,	 stable	 and	 ‘controllable’	communities.	 The	 next	 chapter	 introduces	 China’s	 governance	 system	 and	 planning	systems,	 and	 illustrates	 how	 the	 village	 committee	 plays	 roles	 in	 both	 the	 urban	
                         
8 Nail House (Dingzihu): homeowners who resisted the force evictions and try to obtain some 
advantage by getting broad attentions (Hans 2017: 139-153) 
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governance	system	and	the	planning	system.	 	 This	could	provide	a	general	context	for	understanding	the	role	of	deliberation	in	China’s	authoritarian	system.	 		 	
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Chapter	Three:	China’s	Political	System	and	Local	
Governance	
3.1	Introduction	 	 	The	 preceding	 chapter	 described	 China’s	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 its	 issues.	 It	attempted	to	capture	the	scale	and	scope	of	changes	caused	by	China’s	urbanization	and	the	 urban	 expansion.	 Before	 the	 discussion	 of	 deliberation	 and	 policymaking	 in	 local	China,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	role	of	local	government	in	the	context	of	China’s	political	system.	This	chapter	will	introduce	the	complexity	and	diversity	of	China’s	local	governance	system	from	an	inside-out	perspective	in	order	to	help	people	understand	how	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 change	 varies	 between	 different	 provinces,	 cities,	districts	and	villages.	State	policy	is	unidirectional,	top-down,	and	omnipresent;	however,	local	government	implements	these	policies	with	discretionary	power.	Particularly,	the	lower-level	 local	 government,	 composed	 of	 district/county	 and	 street/township	governments,	have	strong	–	not	simply	“selective”	–	autonomy	to	implement	the	policies	but	 also	 to	 cooperate	 with	 their	 immediate	 supervising	 government	 to	 evade	 the	monitoring	from	higher-level	government.	On	the	other	hand,	these	autonomies	allow	the	local	government	to	implement	a	variety	of	democratic	elements	at	the	local	level,	which	is	known	as	“phantom	democracy”	(Keane,	2017).		The	central	theme	that	runs	through	this	chapter	is	the	existence	of	two	major	tensions:	that	between	centralized	control	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	necessity	to	grant	autonomy	and	discretion	to	lower	levels	of	government	on	the	other	hand.	The	latter	is	necessary	to	ensure	 effective	 policy	 implementation	 that	 takes	 the	 local	 context	 into	 account.	 The	second	tension	is	that	between	Party	control	and	market	competition.	One	of	the	ways	that	 the	 latter	 tension	manifests	 itself	 is	 through	 internal	 competition	 between	 local	governments	for	economic	development.	I	mention	these	tensions	here,	and	refer	to	them	throughout	the	chapter.	 		
3.2	The	Political	System	in	China	
3.2.1	An	overview	of	the	political	system	in	China:	A	Party-State	The	 aim	of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 introduce	 China’s	 political	 and	 administrative	 system,	 in	particular,	with	an	explanation	of	the	relationship	between	the	state	government	and	the	
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Chinese	Communist	Party.	Practically,	the	State	and	Chinese	Communist	Party	are	closely	intertwined	in	every	state	entity	(from	national	level	to	township	level);	moreover,	their	primary	 functions	 are	 combined	 together	 not	 only	 in	 each	 council,	 but	 also	 in	 each	governmental	 branch	 and	 agency.	 Keane	 observes	 “the	 way	 China’s	 rapid	 economic	growth	has	been	guided	by	a	strong	state	ruled	by	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	(CCP)	that	promotes	and	controls	a	high	degree	of	empowerment	of	officials	at	the	provincial,	municipal,	county	and	village	 levels”	(Keane,	2017:	91).	Therefore,	Weatherley	(2007)	adopted	the	term	“party-state”	to	describe	the	complexity	of	the	political-administrative	system.	 Tsang	 (2009:	 886)	 describes	 China’s	 Party-state	 using	 five	 defining	characteristics:		 “1)	 the	 Communist	 Party	 is	 obsessively	 focused	 on	 staying	 in	 power,	 for	
which	maintaining	 stability	 in	 the	 country	 and	 pre-emptively	 eliminating	
threats	 to	 its	 political	 supremacy	 are	 deemed	 essential;	 2)	 a	 focus	 on	
governance	reform	both	within	the	Party	and	in	the	state	apparatus	in	order	
to	 pre-empt	 public	 demands	 for	 democratization;	 3)	 a	 commitment	 to	
enhance	the	Party’s	capacity	to	elicit,	respond	to	and	direct	changing	public	
opinion;	 4)	 a	 commitment	 to	 sustain	 rapid	 growth	 and	 economic	
development	 by	 whatever	 means	 and,	 where	 the	 party	 leadership	 deems	
politically	 expedient,	 regardless	 of	 its	 previous	 ideological	 commitment	 to	
Communism;	and	5)	the	promotion	of	a	brand	of	nationalism	that	integrates	
a	sense	of	national	pride	in	a	tightly	guided	narrative	of	China’s	history	and	
its	 civilization	 with	 the	 greatness	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 under	 the	
leadership	of	the	Party”.	These	characteristics	are	helpful	for	western	readers	to	understand	the	rationale	of	the	institutional	arrangements	for	China’s	policy-making	and	implementation	system,	as	well	as	the	logic	behind	the	actions	of	local	governments.	These	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	 		
3.2.2.	The	Party-State:	A	modern	hierarchical	governance	system	China	is	described	by	the	international	press	as	an	authoritarian	country	ruled	by	the	CCP	that	 lacks	 liberty,	democracy	and	 rule	of	 law.	However,	 in	 contemporary	China,	many	democratic	 practices	 have	 been	 identified	 by	 western	 scholars,	 that	 contradict	 the	traditional	image	of	an	authoritarian	system.	These	scholars	began	to	describe	China	as	a	
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system	of	‘fragmented	authoritarianism’	(Landry,	2008),	or	‘soft	authoritarianism’	(Roy,	1994).	Some	observers	go	further,	by	emphasising	how	the	cracks	and	crevices	within	the	political	system	enable	local	resisters	to	press	home	their	demands,	to	take	advantage	of	the	ill-coordinated	but	remarkably	flexible	governance	structures	within	what	they	call	‘contentious	authoritarianism’	(Chen,	2012),	or	a	system	of	‘fragmented	authoritarianism	2.0’	 (Mertha,	 2009)	 with	 uniquely	 Chinese	 characteristics.	 Before	 the	 discussion	 of	‘authoritarianism’	or	‘democratization	of	China’	(in	Chapter	4),	this	section	will	propose	that	 the	 Chinese	 Party-state	 contains	 ‘top-down’	 hierarchical	 characteristics	 to	 some	extent:	all	levels	of	state	entities	are	formalised	in	the	same	institutional	arrangement	and	‘vertically’	 controlled	 by	 their	 superiors	 (Kooiman,	 2003).	 However,	 China	 is	experiencing	modernization	by	moving	from	a	command	to	a	regulated	economic	model,	and	the	governance	system	is	becoming	multi-level	and	fragmented.	
	
3.2.2.1	Basic	Structures	The	foundation	of	 the	Party-State	provides	the	central	committee	with	the	centralized	power	to	facilitate	its	vertical	control	of	each	level	of	government.	In	the	early	1950s,	the	newly	founded	Chinese	Communist	government	imported	the	primary	political	structure	as	well	as	 the	centrally-planned	economic	system	from	the	Soviet	Union;	 this	political	structure	became	the	framework	of	the	Party-state	(Harding	2010;	1994).	As	Figure	3-1	shows,	 the	 structure	 of	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	mirrors	 the	 state	 government	with	hierarchical	 congresses	 from	 the	 national	 (central	 committee)	 level	 down	 to	 the	township	level.	This	general	structure	of	Party-state	comprises	five	levels	congresses	and	councils,	 descending	 from	 the	 national	 down	 to	 the	 township,	 namely:	 national	 level,	provincial	level,	prefectural	level,	county/district	level,	and	township/street	level.	Within	this	system,	each	level	of	the	state	congresses	serves	as	the	decision-making	body.	This	is	because	 the	 state	 congress	 is	 the	 legal-rational	 system	 of	 procedures	 for	 officials’	appointment	 and	 decapitation	 as	well	 as	 reaching	 decisions	 (Weatherley,	 2007).	 This	hierarchical,	 intertwined,	 governance	 system	 ensures	 the	 Party	 leader’s	 capacity	 for	vertical	 steering	 through	 “goal-setting”	 and	 ensures	 control	 through	 this	 top-down	command	 structure.	 The	 Party	 shares	 the	 same	 congress	 structure	 with	 the	 state	 to	facilitate	its	vertical	control	of	the	governments	at	each	level.	Based	on	this	arrangement,	the	 higher-level	 government	 can	 directly	 intervene	 in	 lower-level	 government	 issues	through	the	vertical	command	structure.	
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	Following	 the	 institutional	 arrangements	at	national	 level,	 the	other	 lower-level	Party	committees	 and	 governments	 are	 operated	 similarly.	 Therefore,	 the	 following	description	 of	 basic	 political	 institutions	 will	 take	 the	 central	 Party	 committee,	 the	national	peoples’	congress	and	the	state	council	as	examples,	to	introduce	their	functions.	The	National	Party	Congress	heads	the	CCP,	at	national	 level,	 the	Congress	consists	of	around	2,000	members	who	are	indirectly,	noncompetitively	elected.	It	consists	a	series	of	 forums	 for	 debate	 and	 making	 decision	 on	 the	 important	 Party	 matters.	 The	government	acts	in	a	similar	way	with	the	Party,	the	National	People’s	Congress	heads	China’s	State	Council	and	the	election	system	features	direct	and	indirect	nominations.	The	 Central	 Committee	 is	 the	 highest	 decision	making	 body	who	 consists	 a	 group	 of	senior	 members,	 it	 carries	 out	 the	 function	 of	 the	 Party	 congresses.	 The	 Central	Committee	is	headed	and	led	by	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	Politburo	which	consists	of	the	7-9	most	powerful	men	in	the	Party.	The	representatives	at	the	county	level	up	to	the	 national	 level	 are	 indirectly	 elected	 by	 the	 representatives	 from	 the	 level	 below	following	the	Election	Law	(since	1953);	however,	at	the	township	level	congresses,	the	representatives	are	directly	elected	by	their	residents.	Literally,	unlike	the	National	Party	Congress,	 the	 National	 People’s	 Congress	 (NPC)	 has	 2,000	 delegates,	 and	 exercises	control	over	the	supreme	legislative	power.	It	is	constitutionally	defined	as	the	entity	to	amend	 the	 state	 constitution,	 devise	 laws,	 ratify	 international	 treaties	 and	 appoint	or	nominate	senior	officials	to	the	State	Council.	The	State	Council	is	led	by	the	president	and	 vice-presidents,	 consists	 of	 the	 State	 Government,	 the	 Military	 Commission,	 the	Supreme	 Court	 and	 the	 Supreme	 People’s	 Procuratorate9.	 The	 executive	 power	 is	 in	charged	by	the	national	government,	and	has	ultimate	governmental	authority.	The	head	of	the	state	government	is	the	premier	of	the	state,	who	is	appointed	by	the	president.	The	vice-premiers,	ministers	and	vice-ministers	are	nominated	by	the	prime	minister.	 		This	system,	as	we	can	observe,	offers	centralized	power	to	the	central	level	government,	in	particular,	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party.	Centralized	power	not	only	influences	the	interaction	between	the	levels	of	the	state,	but	also	influences	the	relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 Practically,	 government	 influences	 the	
                         
9 In	March	2018,	China	established	the	State	Supervisory	Committee,	which	is	the	highest	institution	to	supervise	any	level	of	government.	A	Supervisory	Committee	will	also	be	found	in	any	level	of	government 
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behaviour	of	other	actors	participating	in	these	interactions,	even	involuntarily,	and	often	with	sanctions	attached.	Such	interventions	are	common	in	all	spheres	of	social	life,	as	well	as	in	the	hierarchical	structure	of	government	interactions.	In	greater	detail,	the	role	of	the	Party	is	focusing	on	“steering”	the	“direction”	of	governance,	and	the	“steering”	is	a	crucial	way	for	the	Party	to	intervene	in	society	and	the	state.	According	to	Kooiman	(2003),	 direction	 is	 the	 key	 element	 of	 steering;	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Party	 is	 to	 provide	 a	general	idea	of	where	it	wants	to	go.	Therefore,	as	we	can	see	many	examples	in	this	thesis,	China’s	governance	activities	are	goal-oriented,	including	goal-seeking	and	goal-setting.	Apart	 from	“steering”,	 top-down	control	 is	still	an	 important	 instrument	by	which	the	Party	 can	 control	 complex	 activities,	 noticeably,	 other	 instruments	 like	 public	deliberations	providing	checks	and	balances.	As	will	be	 introduced	 in	the	next	part,	 in	Mao’s	era,	 the	Communist	Party	 focused	on	staying	 in	power;	 this	hierarchical	system	was	becoming	bureaucratic	 and	authoritarian,	 even	 totalitarian,	 like	 the	Soviet	Union.	The	impacts	of	this	era	are	still	apparent	in	contemporary	China.	 																				
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Figure	3.1:	Chinese	state	structure	and	Party	structure	
	Source:	Schram,	1987		
3.2.2.2	Orientation	of	the	hierarchical	governance	 	The	Chinese	Party-State’s	hierarchical	governance	was	built	in	the	Mao	era,	and	its	impact	still	remains.	The	most	significant	characteristic	is	the	Party’s	commitment	to	ideological	propaganda.	It	believes	that	it	is	the	most	effective	away	to	steer	and	control	the	political	system	and	Chinese	society.	Since	the	Mao	era,	the	Party	adopted	“Marxism-Leninism”	as	the	 political	 doctrine	 to	 provide	 a	 set	 of	 guidelines	 for	 China’s	 social	 and	 economic	development;	meanwhile,	it	also	provides	a	set	of	moral	standards	for	the	behaviour	of	Party	members,	government	officials	and	the	public.	The	“Marxism-Leninism”	ideology	was	adopted	to	explain	the	legitimacy	of	the	CCP’s	rule	and	the	sovereignty	of	Mao,	and	this	allowed	him	to	steer	Chinese	society.	This	is	because	“Marxism	Leninism”	can	be	used	
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to	explain	the	necessity	and	legitimacy	of	“goal-setting”,	whilst	also	providing	the	moral	standards	 to	 judge	 its	 opponents.	 As	 can	 be	 observed,	 many	 contemporary	 Chinese	political	movements	are	goal-oriented	with	uni-directional	and	top-down	direction,	such	as	“building	a	harmonious	society”	and	“new-type	urbanization”.	Meanwhile,	the	Party	created	an	extensive	propaganda	network	to	enhance	its	ideological	control	over	Chinese	society	 in	 the	early	1950s.	This	 is	because	the	Party	under	Mao	acquired	even	greater	powers	 over	mass	 organization,	working	 units,	 and	 the	 state	 bureaucracy	 than	 it	 had	gained	under	the	Leninist	model.	It	adopted	the	impersonal	mass	media	to	disseminate	its	 discourse;	 meanwhile,	 it	 mobilized	 small	 discussion	 groups	 to	 provide	 a	 way	 of	conveying	official	policy	and	doctrine	 to	 the	mass	of	Chinese.	Consequently,	 the	Party	secretariat	and	its	functional	departments	replaced	the	State	Council	and	the	government	bureaucracies	as	the	supervisors	who	can	clarify	the	policy	options	and	translate	policy	decisions	 into	 administrative	 guidelines	 through	 their	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Party’s	discourses.	 In	 this	way,	 the	Party	 increasingly	expanded	 its	power	and	administrative	responsibilities	 from	 the	 Party’s	 issues	 into	 routine	 governance,	 and	 additionally,	 the	Party	secretaries	at	all	levels	supplanted	government	leaders	and	state-owned	enterprise	managers	as	the	authorities	for	day-to-day	decision-making.	 		In	 addition,	 in	 Mao’s	 era,	 the	 Party	 created	 the	 mass	 organization	 network	 that	penetrated	all	sectors	of	society.	As	the	result,	nearly	every	Chinese	man,	woman,	and	child	was	ruled	by	mass	organizations	such	as	villagers’	agricultural	groups,	trade	unions,	student	organizations,	professional	associations,	the	militia,	the	women’s	associations,	or	a	combination	of	these.	Until	now,	some	of	the	mass	organizations	still	play	essential	roles	in	China’s	political	system	like	villagers’	agricultural	groups.	Zhou	states:	 	
From	the	head	of	the	state	down	to	the	typist	in	a	town	government	office,	as	long	as	
one	is	a	formal	employee	subject	to	the	administration	of	the	government	system	(both	
central	and	local	governments),	one	is	covered	and	regulated	in	this	system.	And	this	is	
only	the	beginning.	As	long	as	one	is	a	cadre	or	a	professional	in	a	work	organization	
owned	by	the	government	–	no	matter	what	one	does	or	what	occupation	one	belongs	
to	(e.g.	a	university	professor,	a	journalist,	a	writer,	an	engineer	or	a	librarian),	or	which	
sector	 one	 works	 in	 (e.g.,	 manufacturing,	 service,	 education,	 or	 residential	
administration)	–	one	is	covered	under	this	system.	 	 (Zhou,	2007:	156)	 	
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The	Party	installed	semi-committees	into	every	mass	organization	and	grassroots-level	government	bureaucracy	and	branch	to	ensure	its	vertical	control.	Therefore,	based	on	these	mass	organizations	and	the	government	bureaucracy	and	branch,	the	Party	built	a	network	to	control	every	single	cell	of	Chinese	society.	Through	this	network,	the	Party	could	 monitor	 the	 loyalty	 and	 performance	 of	 grassroots	 organizations	 as	 well	 as	dispatch	 its	 own	 members	 to	 occupy	 their	 key	 leadership	 positions	 (Jeffreys,	 2009;	Harding,	2010).	 		As	the	case	studies	will	show,	until	now,	most	of	the	secretaries	of	the	village	party	branch	were	born	in	the	Mao-era,	and	Maoism	deeply	impacts	their	working	style,	for	example,	they	emphasise	the	authority	of	the	leadership,	the	importance	of	ideological	control,	and	of	mass-line	 slogans.	The	political	 logic	of	 state	 socialism	stipulaltes	 that	 the	effective	implementation	 of	 state	 policies	 can	 be	 ensured	 by	 rewarding	 political	 loyalty.	 The	bureaucracy,	to	some	extent,	is	a	kind	of	organizational	or	institutional	instrument	of	the	state	and	results	in	the	most	obvious	features	of	bureaucratic	career	patterns.	According	to	the	Burns	(1987),	the	admissions	and	promotions	of	this	system	are	only	limited	by	political	 criteria	 and	 political	 processes	 of	 selection.	 The	 privileges	 and	 statutes	 of	bureaucratic	positions	can	be	applied	by	the	state	as	incentives	to	obtain	political	loyalty	and	 people’s	 compliance	 (Zhou,	 2016).	 Therefore,	 the	 most	 significant	 standard	 for	promotion	and	recruitment	in	the	Chinese	bureaucracy	is	to	adhere	to	the	Party	line	and	political	loyalty,	but	it	often	sacrifices	competence	and	efficiency	(ibid).	Besides,	another	method	as	a	gate-keeping	device	for	political	selection	is	the	political	screening,	such	as	the	recruitment	of	Party	members	(Harding,	1981;	Lee,	1991).		 	To	sum	up,	Mao’s	rule	left	many	effects	on	China’s	political-administrative	system.	One	of	the	most	significant	characteristics	is	that	the	secretary	of	the	Party-branch	is	nominally	the	 highest	 decision-maker.	 When	 local	 authorities	 make	 decisions,	 no	 matter	 how	technical	or	trivial,	they	were	supposed	to	be	made	by	explicit	reference	to	the	Party’s	discourses	 and	 the	 speeches	 from	 Party	 leaders.	 However,	 this	 totalitarian	 political	control	generates	significant	social	and	economic	problems,	and	China’s	internal	political	and	economic	problems	were	getting	worse	until	Mao’s	death	in	1976	(Harding,	1987).	China’s	rate	of	economic	growth	declined	to	emergency	conditions;	meanwhile,	the	gap	and	 technological	 disparity	 between	 China	 and	 the	 outside	 world	 was	 significantly	
 56 
widening.	Those	problems	forced	the	CCP	to	reform	the	political	system.	However,	as	will	be	explained	in	later	Chapters,	until	now,	the	totalitarian	elements	of	Maoism	still	exist	in	Chinese	society,	for	example,	in	urban	village	regeneration,	the	local	government	and	the	village	 committee	 mobilized	 small	 discussion	 groups	 to	 provide	 a	 way	 of	 conveying	official	policy	and	doctrine	to	the	mass	of	Chinese.		
3.2.3	Modern	hierarchical	system:	power	decentralization	 	Since	 1978,	 the	 Party	 has	 relaxed	 its	 control	 over	 Chinese	 society	 and	 the	 central	government	 has	 allowed	 local	 governments	 to	 have	 some	 autonomy	 to	 promote	economic	 development.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Party	 focus	 is	 now	 more	 on	 economic	development	 than	 political	 control.	 China’s	 governance	 system	 has	 begun	 a	transformation	from	command	to	regulation.	Since	the	1978	economic	reforms,	the	CCP	has	 relaxed	 social	 control.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 economic	 marketization	 significantly	challenged	the	economies	based	on	a	centrally-planned	economic	system.	In	addition,	the	economic	 reform	 required	 China	 to	 link	 its	 economic	 system	 to	 the	 international	economy.	This	also	required	the	CCP	to	empower	professionals	 in	decision-making,	 in	particular,	the	technical	decisions;	meanwhile,	this	also	required	the	CCP	to	change	the	focus	 from	 political	 control	 to	 social	 and	 economic	 development.	 One	 of	 the	 most	significant	changes	in	the	1978	reform	was	that	the	Party	emphasized	“seeking	truth	from	facts”	and	empowered	professionalism	in	public	administration.	This	reform	relaxed	the	political	control	of	the	public	and	raised	urban	and	rural	living	standards.	From	this	point,	the	 Party	 reduced	 its	 involvement	 in	 detailed	administrative	matters,	 assigning	 those	responsibilities	 to	 government	 bureaus,	 economic	 enterprises	 and	 the	 Party’s	 State	Council.	Instead,	the	state	government	system	(from	national	level	to	street	level)	became	a	powerful	entity	to	take	charge	of	routine	governance	and	socio-economic	development.	Furthermore,	since	the	1978	reforms,	the	central	government	has	given	great	autonomy	to	 the	 lower	 level	 governments	 thus	 making	 the	 Chinese	 governance	 system	 multi-layered	and	fragmented.		Meanwhile,	 the	 role	of	 the	CCP	has	been	extended	 to	 take	more	actions	on	social	 and	economic	development.	As	observed	above,	although	the	state	and	the	Party	are	officially	separated,	 the	 institutions	 of	 Party	 and	 state	 in	 China	 always	 act	 as	 a	 single	 entity	(Goodman,	2000).	In	practice,	when	local	go	v	undertake	an	action,	because	the	senior	
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Party’s	 personnel	 dominate	 the	 staffing	 of	 the	 state-council,	 therefore,	 the	 Party	 can	significantly	 shape	 the	 decision-making	 process	 at	 state-council	 (ibid,	 2000).	 This	 is	because	China	remains	politically	centralized	so	that	the	superiors	highly	centralizes	the	power	 of	 personnel	 control,	 while	 economic	 performance	 and	 social	 stability	 have	replaced	political	conformity	as	the	primary	criteria	for	evaluating	government	officials	(He,	 2016;	 Li	 and	 Zhou,	 2005).	 Since	 2000,	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 the	 Party	 authorities	reward	and	punish	lower	officials	according	to	their	economic	performance;	this	became	an	important	way	for	higher	level	government	to	motivate	lower	officials	to	develop	local	economies	 (Blanchard	 and	 Shleifer,	 2001).	 This	 political	 incentive	 mechanism	contributes	to	the	competition	among	local	officials,	as	well	as	competition	between	each	local	 state.	 To	 win	 the	 competition,	 the	 local	 officials	 try	 to	 extend	 their	 role	 as	 an	entrepreneur.	For	example,	real	estate,	land-marketing	and	other	urban	developments	were	 carried	out	at	both	the	political	 and	 ideological	 levels.	High-profile	development	projects	and	real	estate	values	are	regarded	as	 indicators	of	urban	modernization	and	were	adopted	by	the	higher-level	government	to	measure	the	political	achievements	of	the	local	leaders	(Hsing,	2010).	In	this	sense,	the	hierarchical	governance	of	Party-State	in	China	is	different	to	that	of	a	liberal	democratic	country	because	the	power	of	the	Party	and	the	State	are	 lacking	 in	 ‘accountability’.	However,	as	 I	will	explain	below,	Chinese	governance	 is	developing	 from	hierarchical	governance	to	that	of	a	modern	state.	 It	 is	developing	from	command	to	regulation,	from	procuring	to	enabling,	from	benevolence	to	activation.	 		
3.3	Transformation	from	command	to	regulation:	As	suggested	above,	Chinese	governance	is	transforming	from	command	to	regulation,	which	makes	the	citizens	able	to	predict	the	impact	of	the	state’s	actions	upon	themselves	and	secure	redress	when	affected	by	illegal	action	(Hill	and	Hupe,	2014).	Therefore,	it	is	important	 to	 discuss	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 before	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 policy-making	 and	implementation	 system	 in	 China.	 As	 will	 be	 explained	 in	 the	 following	 sections,	 the	regulation	system	and	rule	of	law	allow	the	local	government	to	use	their	discretionary	powers	during	the	 implementation.	However,	 the	 lack	of	an	 independent	“rule	of	law”	also	resulted	in	pragmatic	results	in	policy-implementation,	among	other	things	through	collusive	actions.	The	transformation	from	command	to	regulation	shows	a	considerable	
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change	 in	 aims	 and	 tools;	 however,	 the	 state	 remains	 the	 central	 governing	 entity.	According	to	Kooiman	(2013:	120):	 	
In	the	regulatory	state,	 the	emphasis	 is	 less	on	direct,	 rigid	and	restrictive	
rules	 and	 interventions,	 than	 on	 administrative	 decentralisation	 and	
regionalisation	 […]	 The	 regulatory	 state	 can	 be	 characterised	 by	 its	main	
function,	 of	 correcting	 market	 failures,	 using	 rule-making	 as	 its	 main	
instrument.	The	main	area	of	political	conflict	is	the	review	and	control	of	this	
rule-making;	 characteristic	 institutions	 are	 parliamentary	 committees,	
independent	agencies	and	commissions	and	tribunals;	key	actors	are	single-
issue	 movements,	 regulators,	 experts	 and	 judges;	 the	 policy	 style	 is	 rule-
bound	and	 legalistic	and	the	political	culture	can	be	described	as	pluralist	
and	political	accountability	is	indirect.	 (Kooiman,	2013:	120)	
	
3.3.1	The	Law-making	System	 	Thus,	one	of	the	most	important	reforms	is	the	empowerment	of	the	National	People’s	Congress	to	regain	the	law-making	system.	As	will	be	explained	later,	the	general	policies	in	China	can	be	categorized	into	4	types	in	general:	the	constitution,	laws,	local	rules	and	administrative	regulations.	Within	these	types,	the	constitution	and	laws	are	made	by	the	NPC,	and	the	NPC	also	has	the	duty	of	supervising	government.	 Instead	of	stimulating	social	 and	 economic	 development,	 the	 Law	 emphasizes	 the	 protection	 of	 people’s	interests,	which	is	the	bottom	line	for	a	government	making	and	implementing	policies.	 	The	 ‘legislation	 law’	 emphasizes	 the	 equality	 and	 fairness	 principles,	 clear	 lines	 of	authority	and	 jurisdiction,	 as	well	 as	 legislative	procedure.	 Importantly,	 it	 emphasizes	that	the	bases	of	legislation	are	investigation	and	objectivity.	Secondly,	the	Constitution	(1982)	also	authorizes	the	NPC	to	supervise	the	government.	For	example,	every	year,	the	prime	minister	of	 the	 state	 council	should	 submit	 the	 “Report	on	 the	Work	of	 the	Government”	 to	 the	National	People’s	Congress.	The	 report	 reviews	 the	government’s	work	for	the	previous	year,	including	economic,	social	and	welfare,	diplomatic,	and	other	important	 issues.	 During	 the	 Congress,	 the	 government	 should	 report	 its	 record	 and	documents	to	the	NPC	to	review,	such	as	the	final	revenue	and	expenditure	accounts.	The	government	should	also	report	the	working	proposals	for	next	year	to	Congress	to	get	approval.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 Congress,	 the	 government	 should	 submit	 development	
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proposal	 to	 the	 standing	 committee	 of	 the	NCP	 to	 get	 approval.	 Beyond	 the	 standing	committee	and	NPC	Congress,	the	member	of	the	NPC	can	query	government	about	any	decision	at	any	time.	The	government	should	reply	to	every	query	formally.	In	each	local	level,	 the	 government	 officials	 (Governor	 of	 Province,	 Mayor	 of	 city,	 Mayor	 of	district/county,	and	Director	of	the	town/street	office)	should	also	submit	the	“Report	on	
the	Work	of	the	Government”	to	the	People’s	Congress	and	reply	to	every	query.	 		
3.3.2	Policy-making	and	implementation	System	Based	on	descriptive	theory	of	Barrett	and	Hill	(1984),	Hill	and	Hupe	(2014)	argues	that	decisions	are	made	by	the	‘top’	(legislatures,	central	government	and	its	departments),	and	 implemented	 at	 the	 bottom	 (through	 the	 implementing	 entities)	 (Hill	 and	 Hupe,	2014).	Barrett	and	Hill	(1984)	believe	that	a	bargaining	process	plays	a	significant	role	in	decision	making	in	both	higher-	and	lower-level	government.	This	is	because	as	a	part	of	the	 bargaining	 process,	 decisions	 made	 at	 the	 highest	 level	 are	 constantly	 changing	because	each	participant	is	involved	in	the	implementation	of	"attempts	to	negotiate	to	maximize	its	own	interests	and	priorities"	(ibid).	Ding	(1994)	points	out	that,	in	China,	all	important	policies	or	administrative	decisions	are	made	by	a	few	men	on	the	CCP	central	committee	 or	 the	 State	 Council;	 however,	 this	 is	 not	 arguing	 that	 the	 Central-level	government	 is	 the	 most	 influential	 actor,	 particularly,	 in	 some	 cases,	 Central	 level	government	does	not	have	a	strong	interest	in	the	subject	(Cairney,	2011).	According	to	Cairney	(2011)	“Policy	from	the	top	may	represent	only	one	of	many	factors	(including	the	lower	level	 ‘environment’	in	which	local	demands	and	needs	arise)	relevant	to	the	deliberations	and	actions	of	 those	agencies”	 (2011:	38).	Thus,	we	should	 focus	on	 the	implementing	agencies	and	explore	how	they	implement	policies	according	to	their	local	context.	 		Overall,	as	a	hierarchical	Party-state	structure,	during	policy	implementation,	the	most	important	task	for	local	government	is	to	unify	the	implemented	national	policies	within	their	jurisdiction	in	the	course	of	policy	implementation.	The	central	government	and	its	ministries	make	administrative	regulations,	fiats	and	other	policies	that	are	intended	to	be	applicable	for	all	localities	and	regions	or	in	a	whole	policy	domain.	Within	this	system,	policies	and	administrative	fiats	are	passed	on	to	all	levels	of	the	local	governments	and	their	agencies	in	a	top-down	manner,	which	covers	different	localities	and	areas	within	
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the	 Party-state’s	 jurisdiction.	 Local	 governments	 formulate	 the	 national	 policy	 into	specifics	and	targets,	work	out	plans	and	procedures	based	on	the	local	socio-economic	background,	 together	 with	 mobilizing	 organizational	 resources	 for	 implementating	further	 downstream	 (Zhou:	 2010).	 That	 is,	 higher	 level	 policies	 frame	 and	 leave	autonomous,	discretionary	spaces	for	lower	level	policies.	The	majority	of	the	policy	from	the	central	government	is	goal	oriented;	and	these	policies	tend	to	be	specific	from	the	national	 down	 to	 the	 district/county	 level.	 For	 example,	 the	 New-Type	 Urbanization	Policy	2020	clearly	settled	a	goal	of	integrating	100	million	rural	migrants	into	the	cities	which	will	 be	 dispatched	 as	 a	mission	 to	 each	 province	 according	 to	 their	 social	 and	economic	context.	Accordingly,	the	provincial	government	will	dispatch	their	mission	to	each	 municipal	 government,	 and	 finally,	 the	 municipal	 governments	will	 allocate	 the	mission	to	each	district	and	county.	To	carry	out	these	upper	level	missions,	the	policy-making	at	district	level	is	to	specify	these	missions	into	a	single	case	or	a	programme.	This	is	because	a	municipal	level	government	always	administrates	a	large	geographical	jurisdiction	including	several	administrative	districts	and	counties.	These	districts	and	counties	have	different	levels	of	geographical,	social	and	economic	conditions.	Therefore,	the	 policies	 relevant	 to	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 should	 be	 specific	 and	 formulated	according	 to	 particular	 conditions.	 For	 example,	 the	 compensation	 standards,	 the	municipal	 level	 government	will	set	up	a	principle	 that	 ‘over-compensation	should	be	limited’	 and	 ‘strictly	 limit	 the	 accommodation	 compensation	 form’.	 In	 practice,	 the	district-level	policies	specify	these	principles	down	to	a	specific	ratio	or	figure	according	to	the	relevant	policies	at	municipal	level.	 		
3.3.3	General	Policies	Order	As	explained	above,	executive	power	is	framed	by	the	constitution,	laws	and	local	rules;	and	operated	according	to	administrative	regulations	and	other	policy	instruments.	The	general	 policies	 (See	 Table	 3.1)	 in	 PRC	 state	 legislation	 could	 be	 categorized	 into	hierarchical	 types	 from	high	 to	 low:	 the	 constitution,	 laws,	 administrative	 regulations	(national	level)	and	local	regulations	and	rules	(provincial,	municipal	and	district	level).	Rules	 can	 be	 categorized	 into	 two	 sub-types:	departmental	 rules	 and	 local	 regulatory	documents.	 The	 regulation	 system	 and	 the	 rule	 system	 form	 the	 policy	 framework	implemented	for	the	relatively	permanent	forms.	As	a	framework,	these	policies	enable	ministries	 to	allow	significant	autonomy	 to	 townships	and	street	offices.	 It	 allows	 the	
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local	 government	 and	 its	 leaders	 to	 make	 and	 implement	 the	 relatively	 temporary	policies	such	as	programme-based	policies,	executive	orders	and	actions	in	accord	with	the	political	 spirit	of	 the	 leader’s	 speech.	Practically,	 these	 forms	of	policy	are	mainly	made	by	local	government,	and	the	progress	of	policy-making	is	relatively	simple.	That	is,	these	temporary	policies	always	focus	on	a	particular	issue	or	programme	and	are	made	by	 a	 small	 group	 of	 decision	 makers	 within	 a	 short	 time.	 For	 example,	 most	 of	 the	compensation	 policy	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 only	 applies	 to	 a	 particular	programme.	 Therefore,	 the	 local	 government	 relies	 on	 these	 policies	 to	 enhance	 the	effectiveness	of	governance.	However,	the	legitimate	status	of	these	policies	is	relatively	irregular	because	there	is	lack	of	specific	legislation	to	prescribe	their	effectiveness	and	existence	as	well	as	 the	policy-making	processes	(Jin,	2003).	That	is,	sometimes,	 there	might	be	two	temporary	policies	from	different	departments	to	address	one	issue	making	it	difficult	for	the	lower	level	government	to	figure	out	which	one	has	priority.	 																					
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Table	3.1:	Hierarchy	of	Policy	and	Regulation	
Level	 Priority	 Category	 Policy	and	
regulation	makers	
National	
level	
1	 The	Constitution	 National	People’s	Congress	
National	
level	
Provincial	
level	
2	 Laws	 National	People’s	Congress	State	Council	3	 National	Administrative	Regulation	4	 Ministries’	Administrative	Rules	 Ministries	of	State	Council	5	 Local	Regulatory	Laws	 Provincial	People’s	Congress	 	
Provincial	
level	
Municipal	
level	
6	 Local	Administrative	Regulations	 Provincial	Government	7	 Regulatory	Documents	 Provincial	Government	Department	of	Provincial	Government	8	 Local	Departmental	Administrative	Rules	9	 Local	Regulatory	Laws	 Municipal	People’s	Congress	
Municipal	
level	
District	or	
County	
level	
10	 Local	Administrative	Regulations	 Municipal	Government	11	 Regulatory	Documents	 	 Municipal	Government	Department	of	Municipal	Government	12	 Local	Departmental	Administrative	Documents	13	 Executive	Orders;	political	spirit	of	leader’s	speech	 Government	and	individual	leaders	14	 Local	Administrative	Regulations;	Regulatory	Documents	 District	or	County-level	Government	
District	or	
County	
level	
15	 Executive	Orders	 	 District	or	County-level	Government		 		
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In	 addition,	 as	 Table	 3.1	 shows,	 the	 lowest	 decision	 maker	 is	 the	 district	 or	 county	government.	As	will	be	introduced	later,	the	township	level	government	and	street	office	emphasise	executive	routine	and	policy	implementation	at	the	grassroots	level.		
3.3.4	Administrative	Discretion	 	In	terms	of	the	policy-making	and	implementation	process,	there	is	an	interesting	debate	about	administrative	discretion	under	the	“rule	of	law”.	The	questions	here	is	the	how	precisely	 the	conduct	of	government	officials	should	and/or	could	be	regulated	by	the	law	 (Hill	 and	Hupe,	2002:	25);	meanwhile,	 on	the	other	hand,	regarding	 the	extent	 to	which	officials	 require	employing	 their	discretion	 for	 interpreting	and,	 in	 some	cases,	modify	the	effect	of	the	law.	Dworkin	(1977)	differentiates	the	strong	discretion,	in	which	the	decision	maker	formulates	the	standards;	meanwhile,	the	weak	discretion,	in	which	standards	established	by	the	(or	one	of	the)	superior	authorities	require	interpretation	(Zhou,	 2010).	 Similarly,	 Galligan	 (1986)	 has	 concerns	 with	 analysing	 discretion	accordingly,	and	he	points	out	that	decision	makers	are	required	to	adopt	the	standards	to	the	interpretation	of	facts	(Zhou,	2010).		Zhou	(2010)	argues	that	some	existing	research	(Van	der	Veen,	1990;	Ringeling,	1978)	differentiates	 between	 the	 existing	 sources	 of	 what	 they	 call	 ‘policy	 discretion’,	 for	instance,	 “the	 character	 of	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	 involved;	 the	 structure	 (labour	division)	 of	 the	 implementing	 organization;	 the	 way	 in	 which	 democratic	 control	 is	exercised	and	work	circumstances	in	a	narrow	sense,	particularly	interaction	with	clients”	(Zhou,	 2010:	 26).	 In	 addition,	 ‘police	 styles’	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 policy	 programmes	 or	regulations,	which	are	required	to	be	implemented	(Van	der	Torre,	1999:19).		This	theory	elaborates	the	understanding	that	the	street	level	public	servants	working	have	a	certain	autonomy;	however,	a	specific	form	of	‘logic	of	implementation’	could	be	identified	 on	 street	 level.	 The	 street-level	 bureaucrat	 considers	 itself	 as	 the	 decision	maker,	with	their	decisions	are	according	to	the	normative	choices,	instead	of	being	the	functionaries	 that	 respond	 to	 the	policies,	 rules,	 regulations	or	procedures	 (Maynard-Moody	and	Musheno,	2000).	The	discussion	of	discretion	coupled	with	the	issues	around	professions,	these	issues	are	rooted	in	a	legal	concern	of	the	controlling	the	processes	of	the	implementation.	Zhou	(2010)	points	out	that	as	the	remedy,	discretionary	activities	
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require	careful	hedging	within	a	framework	of	regulations	and	rules;	as	well	as	that	there	is	required	to	be	a	scope	for	the	adjudicative	procedures,	enabling	the	discretion	could	be	challenged	in	the	courts	or	the	tribunals.	 	 	
	
3.4	Local	governance	in	China	The	introduction	above	describes	the	governance	system	of	the	Chinese	state	as	a	whole;	however,	it	is	not	easy	to	understand	China’s	local	government	according	to	a	“big	picture”	of	 the	 national	 government	 structure.	 In	 practice,	 the	 local	 governments	 are	 the	autonomous	authorities	which	actively	contributing	economic	development	under	their	jurisdictions	 (Zhou,	2007;	Oi,	1999;	Walder,	1995).	This	phenomenon	was	 introduced	with	a	 concept	of	 “fragmented	authority”	by	 researchers	 (Zhou,	2007;	Shue,	1998)	 to	describe	 the	 active	 roles	 of	 Chinese	 local	 governments	 in	 the	 interactions	 between	themselves	and	the	state	bureaucracy.	On	this	view,	the	Chinese	political	system	is	not	simply	a	top-down	monolith	but	also	has	a	multi-layered	pyramid	of	bureaucratic	units	jostling	for	influence	over	resources	and	policies.		As	 the	 lower	 levels	 of	 the	 bureaucracy	 in	 China,	 local	 government	 directly	 links	 the	society	and	the	state;	as	well	as	occupies	a	strategic	position	in	Chinese	society	(Zhou,	2007).	Therefore,	this	section	will	specify	policy	implementation	around	the	urban	village	regeneration	and	local	governance	programmes	at	the	local	level.	As	with	the	economic	opening-up	policy,	the	decentralization	of	power	from	the	central	government	down	to	the	 local	 governments	 has	 changed	 relations	 between	 central	 and	 local,	 as	 well	 as	changed	 the	 behaviour	 of	 local	 governments	 (Huang	 et	 al.,	 2015;	He	 and	 Zhu,	 2007).	Local-level	government	has	become	increasingly	crucial	to	urban	governance	and	growth,	and	this	is	now	firmly	rooted	in	China’s	institutional	framework.	On	the	one	hand,	fiscal	decentralization	enabled	 local	governments	to	develop	 land	and	regenerate	the	urban	village;	meanwhile,	political	decentralization	provided	 them	with	autonomy	 in	policy-making.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 centralized	 power	 and	 top-down	hierarchical	 system	require	uniformity	in	policy-making	and	flexibility	in	policy	implementation	(Zhou,	2007);	this	in	turn	requires	formal	and	informal	cooperation	among	local	governments	and	their	agencies.	Before	 introducing	the	 cooperation	among	 local	 governments	 to	assert	 their	discretion	in	implementing	commands	and	instructions	from	higher-level	authorities,	it	
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is	 important	to	 introduce	the	two	grassroots-level	governance	systems:	(1)	 the	street-office	and	urban	community	and	(2)	the	township	government	and	village.	 		
3.4.1	Urban	grassroots-level	governance	system	 	After	 the	 economic	 reforms	 in	 1978,	 the	 CCP	 developed	 a	 new	 grassroot	 level	administration	system	at	to	supplement	the	urban	governance	system	and	finally	replace	work	units	to	deliver	public	services	to	urban	residents.	The	street	office	and	community	plays	a	central	role	in	this	grassroots-level	governance.	 	
	
3.4.1.1	The	street	office:	the	lowest	level	of	urban	government	After	 Mao	 died	 in	 1976,	 China	 began	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 reforms	 in	 1978	 that	resulted	 in	a	 fundamental	 change	 in	 the	grassroots-level	 administration.	According	 to	Elaine	 Jeffreys	 and	 Gray	 Sigley	 (2009):	 “since	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 (CCP)	embarked	on	a	program	of	‘reform	and	openness’	in	the	late	1970s,	Chinese	society	has	undergone	a	series	of	dramatic	transformations	in	almost	all	realms	of	social,	cultural,	economic	 and	 political	 life.”	 After	 this	 reform,	 the	 economies	 became	 marketized,	meanwhile,	 the	 private	 sectors	 and	 enterprises	 occupied	 the	 public	 realm	 to	 do	 their	business.	Consequently,	the	private	sectors	occupied	the	market	in	a	short	time	and	the	majority	 of	 local	 state-owned	 enterprises	 went	 bankrupt.	 Thus,	 massive	 number	 of	employees	were	laid	off	and	beyond	the	control	of	their	former	working	units.	Within	this	context,	a	political	movement	of	‘community	construction’	(in	Chinese:	she-qu-jian-she)	has	 taken	 place	 since	 the	 1980s	 as	 the	 government’s	 political	 solution	 in	 terms	 of	rebuilding	a	new	urban	grassroots	administration	system.	Currently,	this	system	has	two	tiers:	 the	 Street	 Office	 and	 the	 Residents’	 Committee.	 This	 section	will	 introduce	 the	newest	 relationship	 between	 local	 governments	 and	 citizens,	 with	 the	 target	 of	developing	state	control	over	society.	 		In	law,	the	“Street	Office”	is	the	lowest	level	of	government-delegated	organization	(pai-
chu	 jigou	 in	 Chinese,	 means:	 executive	 branch	 of	 municipal	 and	 district	 government	without	policy-making	rights).	The	Urban	Street	Office	Organization	Regulation	describe	the	functions	of	the	street	office	are	to:	supervise	the	residents’	committees	with	their	routine	 affairs;	 assist	 district	 and	municipal	 governments	 to	 implement	 policies;	 and	reflect	the	opinions	from	public	to	superior	government.	After	the	reform	in	2000,	the	
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power	and	functions	were	extended	in	order	to	carry	out	more	assignments	and	political	programmes	from	higher	level	governments.	Apart	from	neighbourhood	level	service	and	executive	roles,	the	street	office	also	has	responsibilities	of	strengthening	power	at	the	primary	 level,	 maintaining	 social	 stability,	 expanding	 grassroots	 democracy	 and	promoting	 the	 development	 of	 self-governing	 organizations,	 solving	 social	 conflicts,	developing	 a	 community	 economy,	 conducting	 local	 events,	 attracting	 investment,	organizing	events	for	local	Party	branches,	and	so	on10.	That	is,	instead	of	the	‘lowest	level	of	government	delegated	organization’,	practically,	the	street	office	has	comprehensive	government	function	as	the	lowest	level	urban	government.	As	will	be	explained	later,	this	trend	leads	to	an	ambivalent	identity	for	the	Residents	Committee;	while	it	is	partly	a	 ‘self-governance’	 organization	 in	 the	 western	 sense,	 the	 ‘community’	 also	 involves	government	control	through	the	empowering	of	the	street	office.	 		
3.4.1.2	Community	as	a	Power	Agency	of	Local	State	The	community	(she-qu)	is	the	basic	unit	of	the	urban	grassroots	administration	system.	In	the	1980s,	a	new	urban	grassroot	level	administration	system	in	China	began	to	act	as	a	branch	of	the	local	state	to	deliver	social	welfare	and	public	services	to	the	residents	lived	 in	 urban	 community	 (Zhang,	 2009;	Wang,	 2009).	 According	 to	 Hua	 (1999),	 the	National	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	defines	the	community	as	a	territory	and	a	collective-managed	 organization	 which	 takes	 charge	 of	 public	 affairs	 under	 the	 immediate	supervision	of	the	street	office.	After	the	urban	grassroots	administration	reform	in	2000,	the	meanings	of	“community”	was	further	developed	as	“a	social	collective	organized	by	the	public	residing	inside	a	bounded	and	defined	urban	district11”;	in	the	meantime,	the	geographical	 jurisdiction	of	a	community	was	further	stipulated	as	“the	 jurisdiction	 in	charged	by	 the	enlarged	Residents’	Committee”	 (Bray,	2006).	Thus,	 from	 this	point	of	view,	 the	 community	 has	 administrative	 roles	 and	 a	 demarcated	 space,	 that	 is,	 the	community	 is	a	concrete	entity	of	neighbourhood-level	administration	 in	urban	areas.	However,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 community	 is	 ambivalent.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 ‘Residents	Committee’	 is	 a	 self-governing	 organization	 at	 neighbourhood	 level 12 .	 That	 is,	 in	
                         
10 source:	Ministries’	Administrative	Rules	by	The	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs:	opinions	on	promoting	urban	community	construction	across	the	country,	2000 
11 Source:	Ministries’	Administrative	Rules	by	The	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs:	opinions	on	promoting	urban	community	construction	across	the	country,	2000. 
12 Source:	Urban	Street	Office	Organization	Regulation	1954 
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accordance	with	 the	 law,	 the	Residents	 Committee	 to	 be	 a	 “mass	 organization	 that	 is	established	by	the	residents;	together	with	having	its	members	and	leaders	campaigned	in	 accordance	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 democratic,	 multitude	 and	 transparent…	coordinating	 with	 the	 street	 office	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies	 and	 the	accomplishment	of	pertinent	job	targets”.	Thus,	literally,	the	Residents	Committee	does	not	hold	the	responsibility	to	any	government	department,	a	street	office	and	a	residents’	committee	should	collaborate	equally.	However,	in	reality,	the	Residents	Committees	lost	their	independence	after	the	urban	grassroots	administration	reform	in	2000.	Since	2000,	except	for	basic	community	services	and	basic	social	welfare,	the	community	takes	on	the	duties	for	more	advanced	public	services	like	issues	of	migrant	administration,	elderly	care,	disadvantaged	group	relief	and	so	on.	In	this	sense,	the	community	has	become	the	main	channel	to	deliver	public	services	with	the	local	government	as	the	executive	branch.	Therefore,	 the	 existing	 research	 (Zhang,	 2009;	 Li,	 2004;	 Zhu,	 1999;	Kang,	 2007)	 also	prefer	 to	 categorise	 the	 residents’	 committee	 as	 a	 statutory	 ‘branch’	 of	 the	 local	government,	instead	of	treating	the	it	as	a	self-governing	organization.	One	of	the	most	important	 reasons	 is	 that	 the	 community	 campaign	 is	 increasingly	 symbolic:	 in	 some	cases,	the	cadres	and	members	of	the	residents’	committee	are	appointed	by	its	superior	government.	 Practically,	 in	many	 cases,	 the	 directors	 of	 the	Residents	 Committee	 are	always	additionally	posted	as	an	officer	in	local	government.	 	
	
3.4.2	Rural	Grassroots	Administrative	System	Although	the	policies	are	originally	developed	and	issued	by	the	central	government,	the	rural	grassroots	authority	has	certain	discretionary	powers	to	implement	these	policies.	In	China,	the	rural	grassroots-level	governance	system	is	composed	of	the	county/district	level	governments,	township	governments,	and	the	village.	The	village	and	the	two	levels	of	government	work	together	closely.	 	
	
3.4.2.1	Township-level	government	Literally,	in	most	cases,	the	township	government	are	obliged	to	implement	orders	from	the	county	government.	However,	 in	practice,	 the	township	governments	are	not	very	reliable	in	terms	of	their	conformity	with	the	stated	policies	of	the	central	government.	According	 to	 Shuli	 Zhao	 (2013):	 “The	 township	 with	 strong	 autonomy	 not	 only	‘selectively’	implements	the	policies	and	may	evade	the	monitoring	and	audit	from	upper-
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level	government	in	many	ways,	but	also	frequently	gets	directly	involved	in	many	social	issues	to	maximize	its	own	interests”	(2013:	5).	Therefore,	in	some	cases,	the	township	government	 is	not	 reliable	 for	 central	 government	as	 the	 central	 government’s	policy	might	 be	 shifted,	 even	 ignored,	 during	 the	 implementation	 process.	 This	 situation	 is	particularly	serious	in	the	formation	of	an	urban	village.	Since	the	1990s,	based	on	their	strong	autonomy,	township	governments	not	only	implement	the	policies	“selectively”,	but	also	frequently	become	directly	involved	in	many	social	issues	such	as	the	control	of	public	 petitions	 (Zhao,	 2013).	 After	 the	 urban	 expansion,	 many	 of	 the	 township	governments’	 jurisdictions	 were	 developed	 into	 urban	 areas	 and	 became	 within	 the	charge	 of	 the	 urban	 district	 governments.	 After	 the	 urbanization,	 the	 township	 was	unable	 to	 fully	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 grassroots	 governance	 because	 this	 was	 beyond	 its	resources	 and	 power.	 Unlike	 the	 street	 office,	 the	 township	 governments	 are	 strictly	limited	in	their	functions	and	the	capacity	to	operate	the	urban	governance	mechanism	based	on	 their	 institutional	system.	Before	 the	urban	village	 regeneration	programme	had	taken	place,	the	townships	within	the	urban	area	were	replaced	by	the	street	offices.	Therefore,	it	is	not	necessary	to	consider	the	township	government	in	depth;	instead,	the	village	authority	 (including	 the	village	Party-branch	and	village	 committee)	 should	be	discussed	in	detail.	 	 		
3.4.2.2	The	Structure	of	Village	Governance	 	The	structure	of	the	village	authority	is	almost	the	same	as	other	Party-State	agencies,	which	are	created	by	the	Village	Committee	(village	council)	and	the	Party	Branch	of	the	village.	In	most	cases,	they	are	the	same	entity.	Real	power	lies	with	the	Party	Secretary	of	the	village	committee,	who	is	elected	every	three	years	by	the	local	Communist	Party	members	within	the	village.	Commonly,	in	particular	for	a	village	with	a	large	population,	the	 residents	 are	 grouped	 into	 the	 villagers’	 group	which	 takes	 charge	 of	 the	 routine	administration	of	their	village	and	manages	the	collective	properties	of	the	group.	Apart	from	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 village	 committee,	 the	 village	 Party	 branch	 and	 villagers’	groups,	a	typical	village	authority	has	21	village	cadres,	including	18	men	and	3	women,	known	as	members	of	the	village	committee;	in	most	cases,	they	come	from	members	of	the	Communist	Party.	The	village	authority	 is	powerful.	 It	 takes	 charge	of	major	 land	transactions	 within	 its	 jurisdiction;	 meanwhile,	 as	 introduced	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 they	 can	terminate	a	30-year-lease	for	a	nominal	fee	if	the	local	government	acquires	their	lands.	 	
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	Unlike	the	urban	administration	system,	the	rural	administration	system	emphasizes	its	democratic	elections	and	public	participation	in	village	governance	which	have	endured	since	 1952.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 citizenship	 and	 property	 rights	 of	 villagers	 are	distinguished	from	the	urban	and	state	administration	system.	In	the	Mao	era,	the	CCP	allocated	the	farmland	to	every	rural	villager	through	a	“village	collective”.	This	“village	collective”	was	organized	by	all	adult	villagers	within	their	village.	All	of	the	villagers	in	a	village	collective	shared	the	ownership	of	the	village	properties,	including	the	land,	farm	tools,	and	 infrastructure.	Villagers	were	allowed	to	build	their	own	house	within	their	land,	 and	 their	 employment	 was	 guaranteed	 through	 the	 allocation	 of	 farmland.	Therefore,	 any	 decision	 on	 village	 affairs	 should	 be	 collectively	 made,	 as	 all	 of	 the	property	is	collectively	owned	by	each	villager.	Therefore,	the	village	governance	system	was	totally	different	to	the	urban	government.	First	of	all,	the	village	was	governed	by	the	village	 collective,	which	was	 a	 self-governing	organization	within	 the	 Constitution.	 As	introduced	 above,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 village	 collective	 is	 clearly	 defined	 by	 the	Constitution,	which	cannot	be	altered	even	‘mis-interpreted’	by	any	level	of	government.	In	 addition,	 unlike	 an	 urban	 community,	 the	 village	 collective	 was	 financially	independent	 from	 any	 level	 of	 government	 and	 should	 provide	 public	 services	 and	additional	welfare	through	the	village’s	collective	 income.	This	 financial	 independence	offered	the	village	collective	the	capacity	to	exercise	its	autonomy.	 		Unlike	an	urban	community,	the	village	collective	is	only	responsible	for	their	villagers	who	own	a	hukou	(household	registration)	within	the	village.	This	is	because	the	village	is	 the	 relevant	autarky,	which	pushes	 the	village	 collective	 to	 take	on	more	economic	responsibilities,	 such	 as:	managing	 of	 collective-owned	 properties	 and	 respecting	 the	others	legal	rights;	improving	and	maintaining	environmental	conditions;	using	of	their	natural	resources	 in	a	reasonable	way;	and	providing	basic	social	welfare	 for	relevant	low-income	groups	(He,	2005).	That	is,	the	income	of	the	village	will	only	benefit	its	own	villagers,	and	the	collective	income	highly	affects	the	villagers’	welfare.	This	arrangement	encourages	the	villagers	to	participate	in	village	governance;	meanwhile,	the	Constitution	also	gives	the	villagers’	the	right	to	hold	direct	elections:	The	leadership	and	members	of	a	village	collective	are	directly	elected	by	every	adult	villager.	As	He	(2005)	summarizes:	“a	villager	has	the	right	to	vote,	nominate	a	candidate,	elect	the	village	head,	deputy	head,	
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members	of	the	village	committee,	village	representatives,	and	leaders	of	branch	village,	dismiss	 corrupt	 village	 leaders,	 participate	 in	 village	 decision-making	 processes	 and	monitor	village	affairs”	(2005:	207).	 		Under	 these	 institutional	 arrangements,	 public	 participation	 in	 villages	 is	 relatively	substantial	 compared	 with	 urban	 communities.	 This	 is	 because	 village	 leadership	 is	under	the	democratic	control	of	villagers	and	the	village	governance	system	also	provides	a	 substantial	 channel	 for	 participation.	 According	 to	 Article	 19	 of	 the	 Organic	 Law,	 a	village	congress	is	required	to	conduct	a	discussion	and	democratically	make	decisions	on	the	following	domains:	 	
1. levy	and	fees	collect	for	the	township	government,	 	
2. collection	and	allocation	the	village	fees;	 	
3. allocation	of	allowances;	 	
4. allocation	 and	 distribution	 of	 gains	 and	 profits	 from	 the	 village	 collective	
economy;	 	
5. collecting	 of	 funds	 for	 collective	 projects	 such	 as	 village	 schools	 and	 roads;	
village	 economic	 projects	 such	 as	 business	 deals	 and	 village	 construction	
contracts	
6. in-village	business	contracts	which	namely	between	the	village	and	individual	
villagers	 	
7. land	allotted	to	villagers	for	building	new	houses	8. other	important	issues	Source:	Article	19	of	the	Organic	Law,	(translated	by	He,	2005:	208)	Most	 importantly,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 residents	 in	 village	 are	grouped	into	the	insiders	and	the	outsiders.	Insiders	are	villagers	who	have	hukou	within	their	village,	who	have	full	citizenship	within	the	village.	The	outsiders	are	allowed	to	live	within	the	village;	however,	they	are	not	qualified	to	participate	in	village	affairs,	enjoy	village	welfare	or	even	to	access	the	village	resources.	Therefore,	although	the	village	is	geographically	 open	 to	 public	 access,	 it	 has	 its	 own	 territorial	 and	 constitutional	boundaries.	 		
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3.4.3	The	logic	of	local	government	in	urban	village	regeneration	
3.4.3.1	Fiscal	Decentralization	and	Career	Promotion	 	The	 tax-sharing	 system	 was	 established	 in	 1994	 in	 order	 to	 decentralize	 fiscal	responsibilities	 and	 promote	 local	 economic	 growth	 by	 reducing	 the	 share	 of	 local	governments	 and	 enhancing	 their	 autonomy	 in	 securing	 extra-budgetary	 revenues	(Eckaus,	2003).	According	to	the	tax-sharing	system	and	the	land	management	law,	the	land	 conveyance	 fee	 is	 not	 regarded	 as	 a	 tax	 and	 is	under	 the	 direct	 control	 of	 local	government	(Lin,	2007).	As	noted	in	Chapter	2,	fiscal	decentralization	is	one	of	the	most	important	 factors	 in	 land	 acquisition.	 Superficially,	 fiscal	 decentralization	 seems	 to	tighten	the	local	budget	constraints	and	promote	localities	to	urbanize	land	to	relief	fiscal	hardship.	Meanwhile,	within	the	context	of	fiscal	decentralization,	a	political	reason	for	local	 government	 to	 acquire	 the	 land	 for	 urbanization	 is	 that	 economic	 performance	highly	influences	the	politicians’	career	promotion.	Consequently,	until	the	early	2000s,	through	 offering	 farmers	 low	 standard	 compensation	 fees,	 local	 governments	 were	capable	 to	 increase	 their	 local	 revenue	 through	 acquiring	 lands	 on	 a	 large	 scale	 from	farmers	and	leasing	or	selling	them	to	developers	(Huang	et	al.,	2015;	Ding,	2007;	Lin	and	Ho,	2005).	The	drive	to	develop	the	land	and	regenerate	the	urban	village	is	also	rooted	in	the	competition	between	local	governments	and	politicians.	This	is	because,	after	1978,	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	 requested	 local	governments	 to	make	economic	growth	their	first	priority	and	that	officials	should	compete	with	each	other	to	get	promoted.	As	a	 hierarchical	 Party-State,	 in	 China,	 shifts	 in	 the	 state	 policy	 lead	 to	 the	 significantly	shifting	distribution	of	the	opportunities	among	officials	in	varying	economic	sectors	as	well	 as	 localities,	work	enterprises	and	 regions	 (Zhou,	2001).	For	example,	 as	 the	 top	leaders	 forced	 on	 the	 political	 compliance	 (such	 as	 Mao	 era)	 political	 officials	 and	bureaucrats	 like	 Party	 secretaries	were	 provided	with	 the	 largest	 power	 in	 the	work	organization.	However,	the	leaders	in	the	post-Mao	era	shifted	their	focus	on	economic	growth,	the	new	“manager-in-charge”	policy	provided	the	management	with	more	power	over	the	political	cadres	(ibid).	 		In	addition,	the	shifting	policy	changes	the	life	chances	of	various	officials	and	bureacrats	concerning	not	 just	 their	status,	but	also	the	promotion	and	economic	rewards	(Zhou,	2004;	2007).	The	local	governments	and	bureaucrats,	in	particular	at	the	grassroots	level,	always	“selectively”	implemented	the	policies	according	to	their	immediate	supervisory	
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government’s	 priority.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 Party-State	 relies	 on	 the	 bureaucratic	organization	 to	 ensure	 effective	 policy	 implementation,	 especially	 emphasis	 on	 the	quality	of	the	bureaucratic	personnel	and	their	understanding	of	the	top	leaders’	political	rational.	As	Lampton	(1987:	9)	observed:	“A	principal	 task	of	political	 leadership	 is	 to	create	an	 institutional	and	personnel	context	hospitable	 to	 the	regime’s	specific	policy	initiatives”.	This	characteristic	 is	also	captured	 in	Walder’s	neo-traditionalist	model	of	China	 in	which	“the	 impersonal	 standards	dictate	preferential	 treatment	 in	 return	 for	loyalty	and	ideological	adherence,	and	standard	Party	 leadership	practices	require	the	cultivation	of	stable	networks	of	such	activists	in	all	social	settings”	(1986:	6).	 		
3.4.3.2	Local	collusion	 	 	Another	logic	of	local	and	grassroots	governments	in	urban	village	regeneration	is	the	need	 to	 engage	 in	 “collusion”	 (Zhou,	 2007)	 with	 their	 immediate	 supervising	governments.13	 They	have	to	work	closely	to	avoid	public	petitions,	which	were	a	great	concern	of	higher-level	government.	The	concept	of	“collusion	among	local	governments”	refers	 to	 the	 “cooperative	 behaviours	 between	 lower-level	 local	 government	 and	 its	immediate	supervising	government,	often	in	the	form	of	various	coping	strategies	to	deal	with	 policies,	 regulations	 and	 inspections	 from	 the	 higher	 authorities,	 which	 is	inconsistent	with	the	original	intentions	behind	the	policies”	(2007:	47).	The	“collusion”	among	local	governments	is	important	for	understanding	why	local	and	grassroots-level	governments	 are	 keen	 on	 formal	 and	 informal	 actions,	 such	 as	 ‘deliberations’,	‘negotiations’	and	other	‘soft-policies’	during	policy	implementation.	This	is	because	the	‘collusive	relationship’	generates	the	spaces	for	lower	level	government	to	adopt	many	experimental	 policy	 instruments	 to	 mitigate	 the	 limits	 of	 hierarchical	 command	 and	authoritarian	rule	(these	will	be	introduced	in	Chapter	4).	 		As	noted	before,	in	China,	governments	or	agencies	at	all	levels	belong	to	the	Party-state	system.	In	China,	higher	authorities	can	direct	and	steer	their	departments,	subordinate	offices	 and	 agencies	 through	 policies	 or	 administrative	 fiats.	 To	 some	 extent,	 “a	main	
                         13	 The	term	“collusion”	refers	a	different	meaning	in	this	research	due	to	the	linguistic	differences.	According	to	the	Cambridge	Dictionary,	collusion	means	“agreement	between	people	to	act	together	or	illegally	in	order	to	deceive	or	cheat	someone”.	However,	the	“collusion”	(BianTong)	in	the	Chinese	context	refers	“to	the	adaptive	use	of	informal	devices	or	improvised	strategies,	often	based	on	social	relations,	to	carry	out	bureaucratic	tasks,	in	contrast	to	official	procedures,	official	rhetoric	or	formal	authority”	(Zhou,	2010:	52)	
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component	of	activities	in	local	governments	is	to	respond	to	and	implement	policies	and	directives	 from	 above”	 (Zhou	 2007:	 50).	 The	 local	 governments	 as	 well	 as	 their	immediate	 supervising	 governments	 possess	 a	 direct	 administrative	 authority	relationship,	which	is	to	send	or	receive	the	directives	in	a	direct	manner	to	or	from	each	other.	Other	agencies	or	apparatuses	above	the	immediate	authority,	or	the	agencies	from	lateral	level,	have	no	direct	administrative	association.	In	this	manner,	a	local	government	at	a	specific	 level,	holds	the	primary	responsibility	 towards	 its	 immediate	supervising	government	 (ibid).	 Therefore,	 collusive	 behaviours	 between	 the	 lowest	 two	 levels	(village/community	and	street	offices)	of	governments	and	their	agencies	are	especially	significant	 in	 dealing	 with	 higher-level	 authorities.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	phenomena	 is	 local	 government	 adopting	 many	 informal	 actions	 during	 policy	implementation.	 Zhou	 (2010)	 summarizes	 this	 collusive	 behaviour	 as	 ‘biantong’:	 “it	refers	to	the	adaptive	use	of	informal	devices	or	improvised	strategies,	often	based	on	social	relations,	to	carry	out	bureaucratic	tasks,	in	contrast	to	official	procedures,	official	rhetoric	or	formal	authority”	(Zhou,	2010:	52).	Meanwhile,	existing	research	also	focused	on	social-relation-based	and	informal	actions	in	grassroots	governance,	for	example,	tax	collection	(Sun	and	Gu	2000);	problems	and	conflicts	solving	(Diamant,	2000)	andso	on.	Thus,	 significance	 of	 social-relation-based	 and	 informal	 strategies	 in	 policy	implementation	should	be	focused,	and	it	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	7	and	8.		
3.5	Conclusion	This	chapter	has	introduced	China’s	complex	political-administrative	system.	The	Party	and	 State	 are	 intertwined	 in	 a	 close	 manner,	 whereas	 their	 functions	 and	 roles	 are	primarily	integrated	into	one	entity.	That	is,	the	institutions	of	Party	and	State	in	China	mostly	refer	to	the	same	body.	Even	though	both	the	Party	and	the	state	literally	have	an	independent	 and	 separate	 status,	 in	most	 cases,	 the	 Party	 has	 dominated	 of	 the	 state	through	 the	 staffing	 of	 the	 decision-makers	 of	 the	 state	 with	 senior	 Party	 personnel	(Goodman,	 2000).	 In	 addition,	 the	 Party’s	 function	 and	 roles	 have	 experienced	 a	significant	change,	considerably	emphasizing	more	economic	growth.	The	social	power	decentralization	 at	 each	 of	 the	 levels	 is	 significant,	 and	 the	 charismatic	 compelling	individual	leadership	is	no	longer	promoted	within	the	Party	as	well	(Wei,	2000).	As	a	strong	theme,	self-governance	has	run	through	China	during	the	post-reform	era.		
 74 
With	regard	to	the	current	political	administrative	system,	local	authorities	have	more	autonomy	to	reduce	the	pressure	on	public	services	including	healthcare,	employment	and	housing.	Rapid	economic	and	social	transformation	has	stimulated	local	autonomy.	This	autonomy	at	local	level	is	urged	by	the	rapid	social	and	economic	change,	thereby	causing	 the	 large	 mobility	 of	 labourers	 as	 well	 as	 an	 intimidating	 agenda	 of	 social	demands.	 Also,	 the	 relationship	 between	 central	 and	 local	 governments	 has	 made	 a	significant	shift	 favouring	 the	 latter	 resulting	 in	 the	decentralization	of	 administrative	authority,	growing	administrative	rationalization	and	reducing	central	planning.	This	is	shown	in	the	local	governments	as	well	as	the	basic	economic	units	being	awarded	larger	autonomy	in	the	economic	decision-making	mechanism.	In	addition,	the	village	authority	shares	almost	the	same	structure	as	other	Party-State	agencies.	In	most	cases,	they	are	the	same	entity.	However,	the	village	and	villagers	in	China	are	governed	differently	to	the	urban	grassroots.	They	emphasize	the	democratic	elections,	voting,	and	other	forms	of	public	participation.	These	democratic	elements	not	only	impact	on	the	village	routine	governance,	 but	 also	 have	 a	 considerable	 impact	 on	 the	 policy-making	 and	implementation	of	urban	village	regeneration.	 	 						 	
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Chapter	Four:	Deliberation	Theories	and	Analytical	
Framework	
4.1	Introduction	 	 	Deliberative	democracy	has	rapidly	developed	in	the	last	decade	with	both	practitioners	and	scholars	implementing	various	initiatives	designed	to	put	deliberation	into	real-word	practice.	 Deliberative	 democracy	 is	 rooted	 in	 and	 characterized	 as	 a	 ‘talk	 centric’	democracy	(Dryzek,	2009).	It	can	provide	the	opportunity,	right,	and	ability	to	participate	and	make	a	collective	decision	through	deliberation	(ibid;	Benhab,	1996:	86;	Cohen,	1989:	22).	This	deliberative	democracy	has	also	been	the	subject	of	empirical	research	that	aims	at	“tackling	the	connection	between	the	normative	standards	of	deliberation,	how	well	they	are	met	and	the	empirical	consequences	of	meeting	them”	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010:	32).	The	early	chapters	have	claimed	that	the	power	structures	in	China	are	hierarchical,	however,	authority	has	become	increasingly	devolved	to	the	local	government	and	the	hierarchical	 structure	 is	 becoming	 “fragmented”	 and	 “disjointed”	 (Keane,	 2017:	 2).	Meanwhile,	as	with	political	decentralization,	China	has	been	experimenting	with	some	forms	 of	 democracy,	 in	 particular	 at	 local-level,	 such	 as	 democratic	 elections	 in	 rural	villages	and	deliberations	in	conflict	solving.	Therefore,	I	raise	an	important	theoretical	question	 in	 this	 thesis:	 is	 authentic	 deliberation	 going	 on	 in	 authoritarian	 China,	 in	particular,	in	urban	village	regeneration?	 	 		Admittedly,	 deliberations,	 deliberative	 cultures	 and	 institutions	 within	 China	 are	different	 from	 those	 in	 liberal	 democratic	 contexts.	 The	 systematic	 approach	 of	deliberative	democracy	provides	a	framework	to	examine	its	characteristics	and	evaluate	the	 quality	 of	 these	 deliberations.	 It	 helps	 scholars	 to	 understand	 the	 designs,	developments	and	the	implementations	of	the	deliberations	and	deliberative	institutions	in	China	despite	contextual	differences	(Dryzek	and	Tang,	2015).	I	will	then	explain	how	this	approach	can	be	used	to	develop	an	analytical	scheme	to	develop	the	diverse	sites	and	kinds	of	deliberative	practices	and	institutions	within	the	particular	political	issue	of	urban	village	regeneration.	Based	on	this	systematic	approach,	I	will	use	this	analytical	scheme	 to	 evaluate	 the	 deliberative	 functions	 of	 political	 actions	 in	 imperfectly	deliberative	moments.	This	chapter	first	discusses	deliberation	and	deliberative	culture	in	China.	It	will	then	review	theories	and	types	of	deliberative	democracy,	followed	by	an	
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explanation	of	the	deliberative	system	as	a	conceptual	approach.	Finally,	it	sets	out	the	analytical	scheme	of	this	thesis	based	on	this	deliberative	system	approach.	
	
4.2	Deliberation	and	Deliberation	in	China?	“Deliberation	 is	 a	 very	 old	 idea.	 Humans,	 as	 social	 beings,	 have	 to	 make	 collective	decisions.	Across	a	range	of	settings,	argument,	discussion,	compromise	and	consensus	often	drive	the	decisions”	(Heller	and	Rao,	2015:	2).	In	this	very	basic	sense,	deliberation	is	 the	 process	whereby	 groups	 of	 people	 can	 discuss	 and	 debate	 an	 issue	 to	 reach	 a	consensus	 or	 an	 agreement.	 Dryzek	 (2000:	 76)	 defined	 deliberation	 as	 “mutual	communication	 that	 involves	 weighing	 and	 reflecting	 on	 preferences,	 values	 and	interests	 regarding	 matters	 of	 common	 concern”	 (2000:76).	 These	 theories	 of	deliberation	 and	 deliberative	 democracy	 are	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 liberal	democracy.	 However,	 an	 “authoritarian	 setting”	 like	 China,	 although	 it	 remains	 an	authoritarian	 regime,	 has	 employed	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 consultative	 and	 deliberative	processes	 (He,	 2006;	 2011)	 which	 suggest	 that	 deliberation	 might	 also	 be	 rooted	 in	Chinese	 culture	 (He,	2014;	Dryzek	and	Tang,	2015).	The	Western	 literature	 (Bohman,	1998;	Chambers,	2003;	Warren,	2002)	criticizes	the	lack	of	democracy	in	Chinese	public	deliberation,	in	particular,	the	lack	of	democratic	elections	and	a	well-functioning	rule	of	law.	Therefore,	the	following	important	questions	are	raised:	what	forms	of	deliberation	exist	in	China?	How	can	these	deliberations	be	understood	and	are	they	“authentic”?	
	
4.2.1	Deliberation	in	Modern	China	
Consultative	democracy	or	deliberative	democracy	In	the	recent	decade	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	(CCP)	and	the	central	government	of	China	 have	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 “political	 consultation”,	 and	 officially	conceptualized	 the	 “democracy	 based	 on	 consultation”	 as	 “consultative	 democracy”	(Xieshang	Minzhu).	 Since	 the	1990s,	 consultative	 institutions	at	both	 central	 and	 local	level	 have	 been	 developed	 (Fishkin	 et	 al.,	 2010);	 with	 consultations	 being	 widely	implemented	 at	 the	 local	 level	 (Fishkin	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 He,	 2010).	 For	 example,	 “in	 the	Shangcheng	District	of	Hangzhou	City,	a	consensus	conference	or	consultation	meeting	is	held	regularly	once	a	month.”	(Fishkin	et	al.,	2010:	463).	 		
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The	Chinese	government	officially	translate	their	practices	as	“consultative	democracy”	aiming	 at	 conceptually	 distinguishing	 from	 “deliberative	 democracy”	 in	 liberal	democratic	 countries.	 However,	 both	 “deliberative	 democracy”	 and	 “consultative	democracy”	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 series	 of	 political	 practices.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	 CCP	intended	 to	 crack	 down	on	 “liberal	 ideas”	 in	 its	 public	 propaganda	 and	 their	political	documents;	they	therefore	translate	the	“Xieshang	Minzhu”	as	“consultative	democracy”.	 		In	 China,	 deliberation	 and	 consultation	often	overlap.	 Scholars	 (Konreich	 et	 al.,	 2012;	Fishkin:	2014)	posit	that	in	China	“consultative	process	often	shades	into	a	deliberative	process”.	 Instead	of	viewing	deliberation	and	consultation	as	 two	distinct	phenomena,	they	view	them	as	a	continuum.	
Consultation,	 in	 its	 extreme	 form,	 is	 a	 means	 of	 two-way	 communication	
employed	by	decision-maker	solely	to	obtain	information;	at	the	other	end	of	
the	spectrum;	“deliberation”,	in	its	purest	form,	implies	that	decision-maker	
will	do	more	than	solicit	input	–	they	will	enable	space	for	people	to	discuss	
issues	and	to	engage	in	the	give	and	take	reasons,	to	which	decisions	are	then	
responsive	 	 (Konreich	et	al.,	2012:	177)	Most	 scholars	 use	 the	 term	 “democratic	 deliberation”	 or	 “deliberative	 democracy”	 to	emphasise	the	essence	of	these	political	practices:	discussing	issues	and	making	decisions	based	 on	 these	 discussions.	 In	 the	 real-wold	 practice,	 the	 government	 sometimes	organizes	forums	(such	as	conferences	or	small-group	discussion)	for	consultation.	These	forums	encourage	participants	 to	discuss	with	decision-makers	and	others,	 and	 these	forums	 provide	 platforms	 for	 the	 participants	 involved	 in	 discussions,	 debates,	 and	providing	 concrete	 policy	 options.	 Thus,	 in	 this	 research,	 I	 will	 adopt	 the	 terms	 of	“deliberation”	 and	 “deliberative	 democracy”	where	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 consultation	 is	deliberation.	 	
	
Deliberative	Democracy	in	China	Since	 2015,	 the	 CCP	 and	 the	 central	 government	 of	 China	 have	 raised	 a	 political	movement	 to	 “institutionalize	 deliberative	 democracy”.	 Although	 the	 central	 level	leadership	maintains	a	certain	level	of	popular	support,	however,	because	of	“seemingly	illegal	decision-making”	and	the	 low	quality	of	policy	 implementation,	 in	 the	past	 two	
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decades	 the	 local	 governments	have	been	challenged	by	growing	public	petitions	and	resistance	(Tang	and	Dryzek,	2014).	As	I	explained	in	Chapter	3,	collusion	among	local	government	 personnel	 generates	 corruption	 and	 undermines	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 (local)	government.	The	implementation	of	deliberation	is	increasingly	crucial	for	central	and	local	 government	 as	 a	 ‘soft’	 mechanism	 to	 enhance	 social	 stability	 and	 generate	legitimacy	 for	 the	 CCP’s	 governance,	 particularly,	 at	 local	 level.	 This	 is	 because	deliberation	is	also	partly	meant	as	a	bulwark	against	corruption	as	it	builds	a	platform	for	the	public	to	supervise	the	governments.	 		Deliberations	in	China	are	led,	endorsed	and	promoted	by	the	CCP.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	speech	made	by	former	President	Jintao	Hu	in	2006:	the	implementation	of	‘socialist	democratic	deliberation’	in	China	should	combine	the	elements	of	“the	leadership	of	the	Party”,	“public	participation	in	the	policy	process”	and	“governance	through	‘the	rule	of	law’”	 (translated	 by	 Cheng	 2013:	 70).	 Since	 then,	 deliberation	 has	 become	 one	of	 the	important	 features	 in	China’s	political	 culture	under	 the	CCP.	The	Party	established	a	political	deliberation	and	multiparty	cooperation	system,	namely	The	People’s	Political	
Consultative	Conference.	This	system	is	a	national	level	organization,	which	takes	charge	of	 the	 deliberations	 around	 important	 policy	 decisions	 at	 state-level	 (Guo,	 2000).	 As	required	 by	 CCP14,	 the	 “leadership	 of	 the	 Party”	 (Dang	 de	 lingdao,	 党的领导)	 is	 the	priority	principle	of	the	political	deliberation.	Thus,	the	“leadership	of	the	Party”	must	be	fully	recognized	in	the	deliberations	and	other	forms	of	public	participation.	The	form	of	this	national-level	deliberation	among	 representatives	or	political	 authorities	 includes	mechanisms	such	as	democratic	consultation,	participatory	meetings	or	seminars.	 	 		Meanwhile,	the	reform	of	‘social	management	innovations’	(shehui	guanli	chuangxin)	has	introduced	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	 elements	 into	 local	 society	 since	 the	 2000s.	Under	the	reform,	local	governments	(mainly	municipal	level)	obtained	more	autonomy	than	before	to	decide	their	local	issues.	Moreover,	the	direct	elections	at	the	village	level	and	other	innovations	that	reflect	democratic	or	deliberative	elements	were	introduced	in	 1980s	 by	 Organic	 Law.	 Clearly,	 these	 practices	 are	 talk-based	 politics	 that	 rely	 on	persuasion	 to	 influence	 events.	 The	 Party	 Central	 Committee	 officially	 endorsed	
                         
14 See	CCP’s	opinions	on	Further	Improving	the	Multiparty	Cooperation	and	Political	Deliberation	System	under	the	
Leadership	of	the	Party 
 79 
deliberative	democracy	in	November	2013,	the	Third	Plenum	of	the	Eighteenth	National	Congress.	 As	 an	 outcome,	 the	 Central	 Party	 Committee	 formally	 encouraged	 the	 local	levels	 of	 governments	 and	 grassroots	 regimes	 to	 implement	 deliberative	 elements.	 A	Third	Plenum	document	from	the	Central	Committee	on	9th	Feb.	2015,	“Strengthening	Socialist	Consultative	Democracy”,	reinforced	by	a	further	Central	Committee	directive	on	 25th	 June,	 2015,	 outlines	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Chinese	 People’s	 Political	 Consultative	Congress	in	promoting	“socialist	deliberative	democracy”.	He	(2017)	summarized	the	six	main	ideas	prominent	in	these	directives:	 	
• consultative	democracy	is	an	ordered	way	of	absorbing	wisdom	and	strength	from	
the	 Chinese	 people	 to	 improve	 governance	 and	public	 policy,	 as	 has	 always	 been	
emphasized	by	the	CCP’s	Mass	Line;	
• democracy	is	a	way	of	ensuring	that	expertise	is	included	in	public	policies;	 	
• consultative	 democracy	 is	 a	 key	 resource	 for	 developing	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 Party	
leadership;	 	
• consultative	democracy	is	a	way	of	ensuring	social	harmony	by	providing	places	for	
people’s	problems	and	demands	to	be	heard	and	channelled	into	the	political	system;	
• the	long-term	goal	is	to	develop	not	just	consultative	democracy	in	a	few	places,	but	
rather	a	“multi-institutional”	and	“complete	system	of	consultative	democracy”;	 	
• the	ultimate	goal	of	developing	consultative	democracy	is	to	ensure	Chinese	“minzhu”	
(the	people	are	the	masters)	 	 (He,	2017:	157).	These	central-level	directives	above	not	only	incorporated	political	inventives,	but	also	responded	 to	 governance	 challenges,	 especially	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Particularly,	 the	importance	of	social	harmony	is	highlighted	by	the	CCP,	which	puts	social	stability	as	one	of	 the	 first	 priorities	 in	 routine	 governance.	 For	 example,	 the	 concept	 of	 “community	building”	at	the	local	level	aims	to	endorse	the	community	as	providing	the	institutional	basis	 for	 “self-government”	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 social	 stability.	 According	 to	 Some	
Opinions	 on	 Comprehensively	 Promoting	 the	 Construction	 of	 Harmonious	 Communities	(Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs,	2006):	
Community	building,	under	the	leadership	of	the	Party	and	government,	is	to	
strengthen	the	functions,	improve	the	services	and	solve	the	problems	in	the	
community,	relying	on	various	social	forces	and	social	resources.	It	is	a	new	
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government	 program,	 which	 was	 required	 by	 the	 economic	 and	 social	
development	in	the	construction	of	modernization	in	the	new	era.	The	first	
condition	 is	 democratic	 self-governance,	 improving	 and	 smoothing	 the	
democratic	norms	and	channels	of	citizens’	participation	in	the	community,	
formulating	a	mechanism	of	citizens’	autonomy	under	the	leadership	of	the	
Party,	increasing	the	influence	of	residents	on	grassroots’	economic,	political,	
cultural	and	other	affairs.	 	 Source:	(Translated	by	Cheng,	2013:	71)		Deliberation	in	China	has	attracted	scholars	in	the	past	decade	(Fishkin	et	al.,	2010;	Keane,	2017,	 Dryzek	 and	 Tang,	 2015),	 with	 some	 researchers	 conducting	 detailed	 empirical	research	 into	 China’s	 grassroots	 level,	 especially	 around	 deliberation	 in	 urban	communities	and	villages.	The	evolution	of	traditional	village	deliberation	practices	can	be	seen	from	as	early	as	the	village	deliberative	forums	in	the	1980s:	a	village	committee	would	 organize	 a	 deliberative	 forum	where	 decision-makers	 (village	 officials)	would	come	 together	 to	 discuss	 village	 affairs	 with	 villagers	 and	 facilitate	 a	 “give-and-take	decision-making	process”	(He,	2005).	These	deliberative	forums	in	rural	China	are	often	specifically	 associated	 with	 village	 elections	 (ibid;	 Ogden,	 2002),	 as	 the	 political	legitimacy	of	the	village	officials	is	most	likely	to	be	the	result	of	an	approval	voting	and	democratic	 election	 (Tan,	2006;	Unger	et	al.,	2014).	Recently,	 to	enhance	government	performance	 and	 promote	 the	 governance	 capacities	 of	 the	 state,	 local	 governments	introduced	deliberation	forums	as	a	key	institution	into	the	governance	of	urban	middle-class	neighbourhoods	(Tang,	2018).	The	deliberation	process	is	actively	involved	in	the	routine	 governance	 in	 both	 village	 and	 urban	 neighbourhood	 governance	 including	public	 hearings	 (He,	 2017),	 participatory	 budgeting	 (Qin	 and	 He,	 2018),	 as	 well	 as	consultative	meetings	and	village	assemblies	(Tang	and	Dryzek,	2014).	These	practices	not	only	facilitate	governance	through	a	process	of	cooperation	among	stakeholders,	such	as	negotiation,	information-sharing	and	other	legitimate	forms	(He,	2005;	Ogden,	2002);	but	also	help	to	improve	governmental	performance,	resolve	conflicts,	and	provide	the	legitimacy	in	governance.	As	we	can	observe	(see	table	4.1),	policy	movements	adopting	deliberative	 approaches	 and	 elements	 have	 been	 more	 frequently	 identified	 at	 local	levels	than	central	level.	 		
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Table	4.1:	the	political	movement	of	deliberative	democracy	in	the	post-reform	era	
Time	 Political	
movement	
Forms	and	practices	
1982-1992	 Economic	reform	 Village	elections,	the	decisions	in	villages	should	be	discussed	with	the	public.	1992-2002	 Three	representatives	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 practices	 above,	 the	 Party	emphasises	 that	 it	 should	 represent	 the	 public	interest	 and	 institutionalize	 and	 enhance	 the	function	of	letters	and	petitions.	2003-2012	 Build-up	a	harmonious	society	
In	addition	to	the	practices	above.	 	Community	 building:	 the	 residents’	 committee	replaced	the	role	of	the	work	unit	as	the	grassroots	level	authority.	Soft	 demolition:	 the	 land	 acquisition	 should	 be	conflict-free;	 landlords	 are	 allowed	 to	 negotiate	with	the	government.	Public	 hearing:	 government	 should	 explain	 some	important	decisions	(like	changing	prices	for	public	services)	to	the	public	through	public	hearings.	 	Public	 consultation:	 to	 solve	 frequent	 petitioning	through	communication	rather	than	‘violence’.	Many	 regional	 practices	 like	 the	 4+2	 system	 in	Henan,	Earnest	Talk	(kentan)	in	Zhejiang	and	so	on.	2013-	 Socialist	deliberative	democracy	
To	promote	local	deliberative	democracy.	To	institutionalize	local	deliberations.	 	To	formalize	the	deliberation	process.	To	empower	the	deliberations.	To	 improve	 governance	 and	 strengthen	 the	authority	and	legitimacy	of	the	Party	and	the	state.		It	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 apart	 from	 the	 instrumental	 use	 of	 the	 deliberations,	 the	discourse	of	“the	leadership	of	the	Party”	is	also	emphasised	by	all	level	of	governments.	
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It	reflects	the	authoritarian	ideology:	“empower	the	society”	and	“employ	the	deliberative	elements”.	This	should	not	challenge	the	Party’s	control	of	the	political	agenda.	 		
4.2.2	Authoritarian	Deliberation	The	 concept	 of	 authoritarian	 deliberation	 is	 introduced	 in	 Baogang	 He	 and	 Mark	Warren’s	 (2011)	 article	 “Authoritarian	 deliberation:	 the	 deliberative	 turn	 in	 Chinese	political	 development”,	 which	 demonstrates	 the	 forms	 of	 deliberation	 act	 in	 an	authoritarian	 setting	 and	 led	 by	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 such	 as	 Chinese	 Communist	Party.	In	China,	deliberations	are	policy-oriented;	they	are	guided	in	choice	of	topic	by	the	Chinese	Communist	Party;	they	are	instrumentally	used	to	persuade	the	oppositions	and	solve	the	conflicts;	they	are	not	allowed	to	use	to	infect	aggregate	democratization.	These	 characteristics	 will	 be	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 section.	 According	 to	 He	 and	Wagenaar	(2018:	2):	“a	high	level	of	public	deliberation,	with	sound	reasoning	and	proper	procedures,	happens	not	only	 in	 liberal	democratic	 societies	but	also	 in	authoritarian	states	such	as	China”.	Although	China	remains	an	authoritarian	regime,	it	has,	however,	employed	a	variety	 forms	of	participatory	approaches,	 include	public	deliberation	and	consultation	in	the	government	and	in	a	local	situations	such	as	the	village	committee	(He,	2006;	2011).	For	example,	in	the	1980s,	leaders	of	the	CCP	introduced	direct	elections	in	rural	villages,	since	then	village	deliberation	is	highlighted	as	the	most	important	rural	decision-making	institution.	Deliberative	governance	at	the	local	level	was	promoted	by	the	CCP	as	an	instrument	for	providing	legitimacy	to	government	actions,	strengthening	the	authority	of	 the	Party-state,	and	 improving	governance	(He	and	Wagenaar,	2018).	Other	deliberative	innovations	are	also	implemented,	such	as	“participatory	budgeting”	(He,	2011;	Wu	and	Wang,	2011),	“voting	and	electing	at	the	village	governance”	(He,	2005;	2006),	“deliberative	forums”	(He,	2014;	Dryzek	and	Tang,	2015),	public	hearings	(Qin	and	He,	 2018),	 and	 “deliberative	 polls”	 (Fiskin,	 2018).	 Therefore,	 China	 demonstrates	 a	variety	of	forms	of	deliberation	which	can	be	included	within	the	concept	of	authoritarian	deliberation:	
Although	very	uneven,	many	of	these	innovations	appear	to	have	genuinely	
deliberative	elements:	that	is,	they	involve	the	kinds	of	talk-based	politics	that	
generate	 persuasive	 influence,	 from	which	 political	 leaders	 take	 guidance	
and	upon	which	they	rely	for	the	legitimacy	of	their	decisions.	Curiously,	these	
practices	are	appearing	within	an	authoritarian	state	led	by	a	party	with	no	
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apparent	interest	in	regime-level	democratization.	We	call	this	paradoxical	
phenomenon	authoritarian	deliberation.	 	 (He,	2017:	155-156).		The	concept	of	authoritarian	deliberation	theoretically	reconstructs	deliberative	politics	in	China.	As	one	of	the	most	important	elements,	“deliberation	as	everyday	talk”	should	be	understood	within	a	broader	definition	(see	section	4.3,	Type	two	deliberation)	with	a	systemic	approach	(see	section	4.4,	deliberative	system)	that	tolerates	many	different	forms	of	deliberation.	As	He	(2014)	comments:	 	
As	soon	as	deliberation	 is	conceptualized	as	everyday	talk,	or	as	a	 form	of	
persuasion-based	 influence	 different	 from	 democratic	 empowerments	 like	
voting	and	rights,	we	open	our	eyes	to	the	diverse,	rich	and	complex	world	of	
deliberation.	 Democratic	 deliberation,	 very	 much	 associated	 with	 liberal	
society,	 is	more	 or	 less	 free	 and	 equal	 and	 is	 an	 advanced	 stage	 of	 public	
deliberation	 	 (He,	2014:	72).	The	 significance	 of	 “broaden	 the	 definition	 of	 deliberation”	 is	 not	 only	 raised	 in	 the	literature	around	Chinese	deliberation,	it	is	also	raised	in	the	literature	on	deliberation	practices	in	a	liberal	democratic	setting.	Deliberation	then	is	grouped	into	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberation	(see	next	section).	Therefore,	I	will	argue	that	the	“everyday	talk”	has	significant	deliberative	functions	in	a	larger	political-administrative	system	because	it	significantly	influences	the	deliberative	process	and	final	decision-making.	 		The	Western	literature	(Bohman,	1998;	Chambers,	2003;	Warren,	2002)	emphasises	the	connection	between	deliberation	and	democratic	institutions;	meanwhile,	it	criticizes	the	democratic	nature	of	Chinese	public	deliberation.	The	argument	 is	that	because	of	 the	lack	 of	 democratic	 elections	 and	 a	well-functioning	 rule	 of	 law,	 public	 deliberation	 is	symbolically	used	like	a	political	show.	The	controversy	here	is	rooted	in	cultural	bias,	as	I	will	explain	later.	Deliberation	in	China	is	rooted	in	the	traditional	Confucian	Moral	code;	however,	deliberation	in	the	West	is	rooted	in	liberal	democracy.	Therefore,	before	any	further	 discussion,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 illustrate	 the	 key	 features	 of	 authoritarian	deliberation	in	China.	In	bringing	together	real-world	deliberative	process	and	outcome	
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of	liberal	democratic	and	authoritarian	systems,	He	and	Wagenaar	(2018:	1)	summarize	“six	key	features	of	authoritarian	deliberation	in	China”:	1. Deliberation	 in	 China	 is	 a	 precarious	 balance	 between	 legal	 rule	 and	 state	intervention.	2. The	 Party	 appeals	 to	 public	 reason	 to	 address	 and	manage	 social	 conflict	 and	develop	the	soft	coercion	that	accompanies	much	authoritarian	deliberation.	3. This	highly	controlled	deliberative	process	does,	however,	allow	the	 freedom	of	local	participants	to	find	spaces	for	democratic	expression	and	local	experiments	to	develop	elements	of	deliberative	democracy.	4. Authoritarian	deliberation	is	characterized	by	mutual	instrumentalism.	5. There	 is	 an	 important	 administrative	 and	 policy	 perspective	 in	 authoritarian	deliberation.	6. The	concept	of	authoritarian	deliberation	is	not	limited	to	China.	 	Clearly,	authoritarian	deliberation	has	many	differences	from	deliberation	in	the	liberal	democratic	 system.	Before	we	 introduce	 the	 theoretical	 framework	of	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	important	to	understand	China’s	deliberative	culture	and	deliberation	practice	beyond	the	theoretical	constraints	of	its	democratic	nature	and	to	show	that	it	is	possible	to	find	deliberation,	even	democratic	deliberation,	in	an	authoritarian	context.	Tang	and	Dryzek	(2014:	109)	argue	that:	 	
Although	historically	the	theory	of	deliberative	democracy	was	developed	in	
Western	 liberal	 democracies,	 to	 ask	 whether	 deliberative	 democracy	 can	
travel	to	other	settings,	beyond	developed	Western	liberal	democracies,	is	not	
the	 right	 question.	 It	 is	 better	 to	 investigate	 instead	 the	 degree	 to	 which	
deliberative	practices	that	can	form	a	basis	for	democracy	can	be	found	in	the	
traditions	and	practices	of	particular	societies	and	systems	 	In	 addition,	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 has	 emphasised	 the	 demands	 for	 the	governance	 reforms,	 in	 particular,	 the	 empowerment	 of	 democratic	 elements.	 For	example,	the	CCP	emphasises	the	slogan	of	“power	must	be	supervised	by	the	people	and	exercised	 transparently”	 and	 “enriching	 democratic	 forms	 to	 show	 the	 advantages	 of	China’s	socialist	political	system”	(Tang	and	Dryzek,	2014:	110).	Therefore,	the	above	six	features	draw	attention	to	the	real-world	challenges	of	deliberative	democracy	theory	in	China.	As	stated,	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	role	of	democratic	deliberation	in	urban	village	
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regeneration,	thus	it	is	important	to	understand	how	deliberation	operates	in	real-world	practice.	 		
4.2.3	China’s	Deliberative	Culture	On	the	one	hand,	China	could	be	treated	as	a	single-party,	authoritarian	country,	on	the	either	 hand	 however,	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 is	 permeated	 with	 a	 series	 of	deliberative	and	participatory	practices	(He,	2006;	Nathan,	2003;	Mohanty	et	al.,	2007;	Ogden,	2002),	especially	at	the	local	level	(He	and	Warren,	2011;	He,	2006).	In	addition,	the	reality	of	China’s	contemporary	political	system	(see	chapter	3)	is	confusing	for	many	western	 scholars.	 They	 admit	 that	 there	 are	 many	 democratic	 elements	 being	implemented	in	China	and	that	these	practices	have	limited	the	defects	of	“authoritarian	rule”.	However,	in	the	final	analysis	they	argue	that	it	is	better	to	draw	the	conclusion	that	the	political	system	of	China	is	an	‘authoritarian	regime’	(He	and	Warren,	2011;	Mohanty	
et	al.,	2007).	These	conclusions	are	too	simplistic	to	do	justice	to	the	political	systems,	environments	and	cultures	in	China,	particularly,	at	local	level.	Instead,	“democracy	with	Chinese	 characteristics”	 (Keane,	 2017:	 143)	 is	 a	 crucial	 characterization	 of	 the	contemporary	China.	Keane	(2017:	143)	describes	these	democratic	elements	in	China	as	below:	 	 	
…	democracy	made	in	China	will	survive,	and	perhaps	thrive,	so	confounding	
the	normative	claims	of	those	who	judge	it	to	be	a	cut-and-dried	case	of	an	
‘authoritarian	regime’	in	need	of	‘liberal	democracy’.	China’s	democracy	is	a	
polity,	 indeed	 a	whole	way	 of	 life,	 in	which	 those	who	 exercise	 power	 are	
everywhere	subject	not	 just	 to	periodic	 ‘free	and	 fair’	elections,	but	also	to	
tight	 public	 scrutiny	 and	 sanction	 by	 a	 myriad	 of	 independent	 watchdog	
institutions	designed	to	tame	and	remove	the	corrupting	effects	of	arbitrary	
power	(Zhuanquan).	 	The	argument	above	offers	a	great	opportunity	 for	western	researchers	to	review	the	Chinese	 local	 institutional	 innovations	 and	 the	 political	 democratization	 in	 China.	 In	particular,	 it	 offers	 a	 tolerant	 perspective	 for	 western	 researchers	 to	 review	 the	deliberative	culture,	despite	the	political	and	contextual	differences.	 	
	
Deliberative	Culture	in	China	
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Deliberative	 culture	 is	 rooted	 in	 Chinese	 tradition,	 with	 deliberation	 having	 political	functions	since	ancient	times.	The	cultural	and	historical	lens	can	assist	western	scholars	to	address	the	contextual	differences	of	deliberation	between	western	world	and	modern	China.	This	section	will	argue	that,	the	current	practices	of	institutionalized	deliberation	are	 based	 on	 the	 Chinese	 traditional	 culture	 and	 history,	 they	 have	 become	 more	inclusive	and	accessible	 for	ordinary	people	 than	was	 the	 case	 in	ancient	China.	More	recently,	 it	was	 used	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 CCP	 to	 enhance	 its	 authority.	 Through	tracing	 the	 ideas,	 language	 and	 philosophy	 in	 ancient	 China,	 there	 are	 considerable	cultures	and	philosophies	that	form	the	basis	for	contemporary	deliberative	democracy	in	China.	He	(2014:	62)	points	out	that:	 	
…	the	Chinese	conception	of	deliberation	 is	historically	and	culturally	very	
deep	and	elaborate,	with	multifaceted	elements.	The	Confucian	ideal	of	mim-
ben	 (people-centric)	was	a	political	 foundation	 for	Confucian	deliberation.	
The	‘Confucius	sage’	(sheng),	revered	as	the	ideal	personality:	attentive	to	the	
opinion	 of	 the	 people,	 expressing	 the	 voice	 of	 the	 people	 and	 serving	 the	
people	 …	 Confucianism	 advocated	 a	 balanced	 theory	 of	 deliberation	 that	
required	 talk-centric	 politics,	 but	 with	 a	 pragmatic,	 authoritarian	 and	
necessary	form	of	discipline	or	control	 	In	detail,	the	key	moral	codes	in	Confucianism	are	ren	(humaneness),	li	(ritual)	and	junzi	(gentleman)	(He,	2014).	Under	the	guidance	of	the	Confucian	moral	code,	deliberation	became	crucial	as	a	counterbalance	of	the	abuse	of	power	and	to	against	malpractices	by	the	authorities.	The	ren	and	li	(礼)	show	the	political	values	of	justice	and	the	junzi	refers	to	elitism,	which	shows	the	hierarchical	essence	of	authoritarian	governance.	The	value	of	ren	refers	to	the	political	value	of	“justice”	in	terms	of	humaneness,	in	ancient	China	it	requires	 the	 ruler	 to	 be	 inclusive.	 The	 “li”	 defines	 the	 concern	 for	 harmony	 and	 the	priority	of	 the	correct	procedures	 in	deliberation	and	the	political	bargaining	process.	However,	 this	 priority	 of	 the	 procedural	 shows	 the	 essence	 of	 elitism:	 only	 junzi	(gentleman)	could	participate	in	the	deliberations.	The	gentleman	here	refers	to	the	well-educated	people	with	considerable	reputation.	Confucius	put	 forward	that	“in	a	world	following	 the	Way	 (dao	 道)	 in	 the	Analects	 of	Confucius,	 the	public	 is	not	 required	 to	discuss	the	politics”	(Legge,	2010).	Together	with	that,	the	public	“The	‘rites’	should	not	be	debated	or	deliberated	on	in	a	light	way”	(wuqing	yili	 毋轻议礼)	is	also	advocated	by	
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the	Analects	of	Confucius,	which	indicates	that	only	exemplary	persons	who	are	qualified	by	learning	and	practising	can	debate	or	deliberate.	He	(2014)	summarized	as	follows:	 	
The	domination	of	these	terms	indicates	a	political	order	in	which	the	rule	of	
gentlemen	prevailed,	the	notion	of	duty	was	central,	moral	concerns	overrode	
political	bargaining	processes	and	harmony	won	over	conflict.	The	practice	
of	 yi	 (deliberation)	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 junzi	 and	 regulated	 by	 the	 moral	
principle	of	ren	and	li	 	 (He,	2014:	62)15.	 	There	were	various	institutional	practices	of	deliberation	within	old	China,	even	within	the	 imperial	era.	The	 first	 formal	 institution	–	 termed	yanguan	 (remonstrating	office),	serving	as	the	key	deliberative	institutions.	Existing	records	of	remonstration	documents	reflect	 that	 officials	 offer	 loyal	 and	 sincere	 advice	 as	 well	 as	 criticism;	 whereas	 the	debates	as	well	as	reason-based	and	moral-based	argumentation	often	 involved	 in	the	remonstration	process.	This	deliberative	institution	in	ancient	China	not	only	acted	as	a	consultant	and	advisor	for	the	emperor,	but	also	acted	as	a	supervisory	institution	that	attempted	 to	 hold	 the	 emperor’s	 power	 to	 account.	 Another	 kind	 of	 deliberative	institutions	in	the	ancient	China	was	the	school	and	academy	(named	as	shuyuan),	where	scholars	and	elites	could	debate	public	affairs	and	policies	(Chen	and	He,	2006).	He	(2014)	suggests	that	the	‘scholars	in	ancient	China’	formulated	them	searching	for	an	identity,	together	with	 a	moral	 and	 community	 of	 the	 cultural	 autonomy,	 thereby	making	 the	realization	of	the	True	(or	Great)	Way.	This	referred	to	the	Confucian	daotong	tradition	(He,	 2014),	 an	 institutionalized	 mechanism	 wherein	 intellectuals	 were	 capable	 of	challenging	 a	 ruler’s	 behaviours,	 policies	 and	 decisions,	 instead	 of	 the	 rulers	 having	legitimacy	 claims	 and	 explanations	 without	 being	 supervised	 and	 monitored.	Functionally,	it	referred	to	an	institute,	representing	the	viewpoints	of	individuals;	also,	it	 referred	 to	 a	 place,	wherein	 researchers	 had	 the	 liberty	 of	pursuing	 their	 scholarly	investigation	and	cultivating	their	moral	character	(He,	2014).		The	political	function	of	deliberation	is	considered	as	a	check	against	the	tyrant,	aimed	at	avoiding	the	mistaken	political	decisions	and	developing	the	policies	that	favoured	the	individual’s	interests.	In	ancient	China,	with	regard	to	all	of	the	individuals,	including	the	
                         
15 In Chinese, different words may share the same pronunciation, therefore, both 礼 and 理 share the same English pronunciation “li”. However, 
li (礼) refers to ritual, and li (理) refers to principle. 
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emperors,	this	constituted	quite	a	serious	matter,	usually	determining	the	order	of	the	state.	Furthermore,	the	conceptual	space	for	“jian”	(admonishing)	accordingly	opened	up	to	correct	 the	path	(dao)	(Legge,	2010).	 In	China’s	history,	most	of	 the	public	protests	adopted	“jian”	as	a	slogan	to	show	their	legitimacy.	These	deliberative	moral	values	are	also	 significant	 in	 contemporary	 China.	 The	 deliberative	 culture	within	 contemporary	local	 governance	practice	 follows	 the	Confucian	normative	 ranking.	He	 (2014)	argues	that,	there	are	three	essential	forces	in	Confucian	thinking:	morality,	reason	and	might.	 	
To	persuade	people	one	must	try	morality	first,	reason	second	and	might	last.	
Morality	 is	 normatively	 higher	 than	 reasoning	and	 reasoning	 higher	 than	
might	 (以道服人高于以理服人，以理服人高于以力服人 ).	 Might	 is	
acceptable	only	after	deliberation	has	failed,	and	not	before.	 	(He	2014:	63)	 	This	normative	ranking	is	also	reflected	in	Chinese	everyday	language.	For	example,	the	Chinese	 individuals	 trust	 that	“truth	will	 emerge	 from	sustained	discussion	as	well	 as	deliberation	(li	yue	bian	yue	ming).”	In	the	course	of	addressing	conflict	and	disagreement,	Chinese	people	usually	adopt	these	kinds	of	terms,	for	example,	“bai	shi	shi,	jiang	dao	li”,	which	is	presenting	the	facts	and	the	rationales	to	sort	things	out.	In	a	case	where	one	party	has	a	feeling	of	unfairness	or	injustice	from	the	other	party,	one	usually	appeals	to	“shuo	 li”,	 which	 is	 “making	 an	 argument”.	 Usually,	 two	 conflicting	 parties	 seek	 out	 a	senior/authority	figure	and	ask	them	for	“pingli”,	which	indicates	that	both	of	them	are	presenting	their	arguments	and	opinions,	and	the	senior/authority	figure	will	make	an	arbitration	according	to	“li	 （理）”	(principle)”.	The	most	significant	point	here	is	the	term	“li	 （理）”	(principle),	which	refers	to	the	normative	ranking.	As	will	be	discussed	in	the	case	study	chapters,	“shuoli”	is	the	most	important	target	in	rural	deliberation.	 	
	
4.2.4	Conclusion	This	section	has	introduced	China’s	deliberative	practices,	deliberative	culture	and	the	concept	of	authoritarian	deliberation.	However,	it	seems	that	deliberation	in	China	is	a	‘soft	way’	of	persuading	the	public.	The	discussion	in	this	section	is	not	enough	to	answer	the	question	“Are	there	any	authentic	deliberations	in	China?”,	as	this	requires	a	more	in-depth	conceptual	discussion	because	the	concept	of	deliberation	 is	stretched,	not	only	
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existing	 in	 terms	 of	 contextual	 differences	 between	 “authoritarianism”	 and	 “liberal	democracy”,	but	also	by	the	existing	types	of	deliberation.	 		
4.3	Types	of	Deliberation	Deliberative	democracy	 is	rooted	 in	an	 ideal,	wherein	people	come	together,	based	on	mutual	respect	and	equal	status,	to	discuss	the	political	concerns	facing	them	and,	on	the	basis	of	those	discussing,	to	decide	on	the	policies,	which	are	subsequently	expected	to	impact	their	lives.	Gutmann	and	Thompson	(2004:	7)	define	deliberative	democracy	as:	
A	 form	 of	 government	 in	 which	 free	 and	 equal	 citizens	 (and	 their	
representatives)	justify	decisions	in	a	process	in	which	they	give	one	another	
reasons	that	are	mutually	acceptable	and	generally	accessible,	with	the	aim	
of	reaching	conclusions	that	are	binding	in	the	present	on	all	citizens	but	open	
to	challenge	in	the	future.	
(Gutmann	and	Thompson	2004:	7)		Their	research	defines	deliberation	itself	minimally	to	imply	the	mutual	communication,	involving	weighing,	 together	with	 having	 reflection	 on	 not	 only	 preferences,	 but	 also	values	and	interests	with	regard	to	the	matters	of	the	common	concerns	(Mansbrige	et	
al.,	2018).	Beyond	that,	deliberation	always	involves	direct,	face-to-face	interaction,	and	a	commitment	to	open	and	engaged	exchange	of	arguments.	“Deliberation”	is	rooted	in	democracy	 theories,	 which	 could	 be	 described	 as	 “informed	 debates	 and	 discussions	between	participants,	to	enhance	the	legitimacy	and	improve	the	quality	of	the	decision	making.	Meanwhile,	Gastil	and	Black	(2008:	2)	described	the	deliberation	process	as	one	in	which	“people	carefully	examine	a	problem	and	arrive	at	the	well-reasoned	solution	after	a	period	of	inclusive,	respectful	consideration	of	diverse	points	of	view	(2008:	2)”.	Thus,	deliberation	advocates	a	“talk-centric	approach	to	democracy”	(Chambers,	2002:	98).	According	 to	Dryzek	 (2002),	deliberation	 is	 a	 social	process	distinguishable	 from	“other	 kinds	 of	 communication	 in	 that	 deliberators	 are	 amenable	 to	 changing	 their	judgments,	preferences	and	views	during	the	course	of	their	interactions,	which	involve	persuasion	rather	than	coercion,	manipulation,	or	deception.”	(Dryzek	2002:	1).	 		One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 and	 difficult	 challenges	 for	 deliberative	 democrats	 is	 to	understand	how	many	sites	and	kinds	of	deliberation	are	enabled	and	constrained	by	
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their	 environments,	 how	 they	 interact	with	 established	 institutions,	 how	deliberation	translates	 from	 face-to-face	 to	 large-scale	 deliberation	 and	 how,	 more	 generally,	deliberation	contributes	to	a	democratic	political	system.	Dryzek	(2005)	raised	three	key	tests	 for	 deliberation:	 “the	 communicative	 process	 must	 be	 non-coercive,	 capable	 of	inducing	reflection	and	capable	of	linking	the	particular	experience	of	an	individual	or	group	with	some	more	general	point	or	principle”	(2005:	224).	As	will	be	discussed	later,	the	two	types	of	deliberation	can	lead	to	confusion	because	Type	one	deliberation	is	too	narrow	and	Type	two	deliberation	is	too	broad.	 		As	 will	 follow	 below,	 some	 deliberations	 hold	 firmly	 to	 the	 standards	 raised	 by	Habermasian	 communicative	 action	 (Type	 one	 deliberation),	 however,	 other	deliberations	 refer	 to	 any	 form	 of	 communication,	 or	 to	 deliberation	 (Type	 two	deliberation)	in	a	sort	of	sense	of	weighing	rational	arguments	systematically	(Bächtiger	
et	 al.,	2010).	 Also,	 some	 deliberation	 takes	 place	 in	 formal	 settings,	 and	 others	more	spontaneously	 in	more	 informal	 settings.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 these	 types	 of	deliberations	in	this	research	is	not	to	endorse	one	and	criticize	the	other;	instead,	the	aim	of	the	discussion	is	to	set	up	feasible	criteria	to	identify	deliberation	from	other	forms	of	communications	in	Chinese	context.	This	section	will	first	introduce	the	Type	one	and	Type	 two	 deliberation;	 then,	 followed	 by	 an	 introducing	 of	 the	 deliberations	 in	 both	formal	 and	 informal	 setting;	 and	 I	 will	 explain	 how	 to	 understand	 different	 types	 of	deliberations	in	different	settings.	 		
4.3.1	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberation	Type	 one	 deliberation	 refers	 to	 ideal-type	 deliberation	 which	 “is	 rooted	 in	 the	Habermasian	logic	of	communicative	action	and	embodies	the	idea	of	rational	discourse,	focuses	on	deliberative	 intent	and	the	related	distinction	between	communicative	and	strategic	action	and	has	a	strong	procedural	component.	In	this	view,	deliberation	implies	a	systematic	process	wherein	actors	tell	the	truth,	justify	their	positions	extensively	and	are	willing	to	yield	to	 the	 force	of	 the	better	argument.	The	ultimate	goal	of	Type	one	deliberation	is	to	reach	an	understanding,	or	consensus”	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010:	33).	Type	one	deliberation	is	based	on	Habermas’	idea	of	the	“ideal	discourse”	(1992:	370-2),	based	on	Habermas’	theory,	Cohen	(1989)	conceptualized	deliberation	as	an	“ideal	deliberative	
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procedure”.	 It	 distinguishes	 deliberation	 from	 other	 forms	 of	 communication	 by	 the	following	principles:	
• no	one	with	the	competency	to	speak	and	act	may	be	excluded	from	discourse;	
• all	have	the	same	chances	to	question	and/or	introduce	any	assertion	whatever	as	
well	as	express	their	attitudes,	desires	and	needs;	
• no	 one	may	 be	 prevented,	by	 internal	 or	 external	 coercion,	 from	 exercising	 these	
rights;	
• all	have	the	right	to	question	the	assigned	topics	of	conversation;	
• all	have	the	right	to	initiate	reflexive	arguments	about	the	very	rules	of	the	discourse	
procedure	and	the	way	in	which	they	are	applied	or	carried	out;	and	 	
• discourse	must	be	public	 	(Cohen	1989:	23).	According	 to	 the	 above	 principles,	 mere	 talk,	 information-sharing,	 or	 conversations	cannot	be	qualified	as	deliberations.	Type	one	deliberation	is	criticized	at	the	empirical	level	because	the	Habermasian	model	of	communicative	action	is	too	demanding	to	apply.	It	is	impossible	to	acknowledge	the	ineradicable	dimension	of	antagonism	that	pluralism	of	values	entails.	In	addition,	many	psychologists	are	similarly	sceptical	about	whether	people	 really	 possess	 the	 requisite	 abilities	 for	 making	 communicatively	 rational	discourse	 work	 (Rosenberg,	 2002).	 Type	 one	 deliberation	 is	 also	 criticized	 at	 the	macropolitical	 level	 because	 it	 ignores	 that	 “politics	 is	 about	 interests	 and	 power”,	politics	is	not	about	the	“understanding”	as	well	as	the	“better	argument”	(Shapiro	1999:	36).	 		 	Type	 two	deliberation	 focuses	on	 the	outcomes	 rather	 than	 the	process;	 it	pays	more	attention	to	overcoming	the	constraints	from	‘real	word	practices’	on	the	realization	of	normative	 ideals.	 In	 Type	 two	deliberation,	 the	 deliberative	 outcome	 is	 not	 generally	specified,	it	might	include	meta-consensus,	preference	structuration,	and	intersubjective	rationality,	etc.	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010).	In	contrast	with	Type	one	deliberation,	Type	two	deliberation	includes	all	forms	of	communication	including	emotional	discourse,	rhetoric,	or	story-telling,	etc.	At	its	limits,	the	concept	of	Type	two	deliberation	is	broadened	“to	include	all	activities	that	function	as	communicative	influence	under	conditions	of	conflict”	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010:	33).	That	 is,	 instead	of	identifying	“authentic	deliberation”	 that	
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properly	 differentiates	 communicative	 action	 from	 strategic	 action,	 Type	 two	deliberation	abandons	or	relaxes	the	sincerity	criterion	of	“authentic	deliberation”.	 		However,	 Type	 two	 deliberation	 is	 more	 tolerant	 and	 open	 to	 alternative	 forms	 of	communications	than	Type	one.	It	was	criticized	by	Type	one	theorists	because	it	seems	to	admit	most	communicative	forms.	It	might	be	a	risk	that	there	is	no	difference	between	deliberation	and	other	forms	of	communications	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010).	Meanwhile,	it	may	abandon	fundamental	regulative	principles.	For	instance,	the	sincerity	norm,	likely	governing	 any	 discourse	 despite	 being	 not	 entirely	 achieved	 in	 the	 real	world;	 is	 not	empirically	 well-understood	 in	 the	 procedures	 leading	 to	 the	 normatively	 promising	outcomes	of	Type	two	deliberation,	which	gives	rise	to	questions	regarding	whether	both	the	means	and	ends	connect	in	a	satisfying	manner.	As	Dryzek	(2000:	48)	comments:	
Some	deliberative	democrats,	especially	 those	who	traffic	 in	public	reason,	
want	 to	 impose	 narrow	 limits	 on	what	 constitutes	 authentic	 deliberation,	
restricting	 it	 to	 arguments	 in	 particular	 kinds	 of	 terms;	 a	 more	 tolerant	
position,	which	I	favour,	would	allow	argument,	rhetoric,	humour,	emotion,	
testimony	or	storytelling	and	gossip.	The	discussion	above	is	neither	to	deny	the	importance	of	Type	one	deliberation	theory,	nor	to	deny	the	conscientiousness	of	Type	two	deliberation	theory.	 Instead,	as	will	be	introduced	in	later	sections,	the	synthesis	of	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberation	theories	can	generate	an	appropriate	analytical	scheme	to	identify	the	deliberations	in	real	world	practices	and	evaluate	 the	quality	of	 these	practices	 in	 real-world	processes	of	policy	making.	 		
4.3.2	Formal	and	Informal	Deliberations	in	China	 	Since	1990s,	China	has	experienced	an	explosive	growth	of	social	conflicts	along	with	its	rapid	economic	development	and	the	state	enterprises	privatization	(Cai,	2010;	O’Brien	and	 Li,	 2006;	 Perry	 and	 Selden,	 2003).	 According	 to	 Tang	 et	 al.	 (2018:	 794),	 social	protests	and	citizens’	resistance	have	played	a	significant	role	in	establishing	deliberative	practice	in	China.	The	new-type	urbanization	policy	significantly	promotes	the	“human-oriented”	principle	 through	political	reform:	public	participation	 in	planning	has	been	enhanced,	with	the	aim	of	respecting	the	willingness	of	local	residents	to	participate	as	well	 as	 limiting	 the	 conflict	 between	 stakeholders.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	
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participation	channels,	a	series	of	forms	of	democratic	deliberation	had	evolved	in	urban	governance	practices.	Literately,	deliberation	is	rooted	in	the	“Mass	Line16”,	which	is	one	of	the	core	values	of	CCP.	Its	emphasis	that	the	Party	should	be	integrate	in,	and	work	with	the	public.	Because	of	the	rise	of	protest	in	the	last	two	decades,	the	“Mass	Line”	is	stressed	by	the	Central	Committee	since	the	18th	National	Congress	of	 the	Communist	Party	 of	 China.	 Deliberation	 was	 treated	 as	 the	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 political	instruments	of	the	CCP.	As	I	explained	before,	in	China,	local	deliberative	democracy	has	been	emerging,	despite	the	fact	that	it	seems	like	an	unlikely	place	(Fishkin	et	al.,	2010;	He	and	Warren,	2011).	In	the	real-world	practice,	the	deliberations	might	be	impacted	by	and	might	impact	the	social	and	political	settings.	Therefore,	to	facilitate	the	later	data	analysis	(see	Chapter	6),	at	very	beginning,	this	research	will	group	the	deliberations	in	China	in	terms	of	formal	and	informal	deliberations.	In	this	study	I	will	argue	that	the	only	difference	between	formal	and	informal	deliberation	depends	on	‘the	setting’;	meanwhile,	both	 formal	 and	 informal	 deliberation	 are	 parts	 of	 China’s	 deliberative	 system	 (See	chapter	6,	7,	and	8).	 		
Formal	deliberation	The	 formal	 deliberation	 refers	 the	 regularized	 deliberations	 led	 by	 government	 or	village/community	 authorities	 are	 formal	 deliberations.	 These	 include	 the	 designed	deliberative	democracy	experiments,	such	as	deliberative	 forums,	deliberation	polling,	and	 democratic	 roundtables	 (He,	 2014;	 Fishkin	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Wu	 and	 Wang,	 2012).	Meanwhile,	some	of	the	village	deliberations	include	the	village	congress,	and	these	also	act	 as	 formal	 deliberation	 (See	 Chapter	 6).	 These	 village	 deliberative	 forums	 were	developed	 in	 the	 1980s:	 a	 village	 committee	 would	 hold	 deliberation	 forums	 where	decision-makers	 (village	 officials)	would	 come	 together	 to	 discuss	 village	 affairs	with	villagers	and	facilitate	a	give-and-take	decision-making	process.	Beyond	the	basic	village	deliberative	 institutions,	 in	 some	provinces,	 like	Henan,	 the	village	deliberations	have	developed	 into	 a	 systematic	 institution	 like	 the	 4+2	 decision-making	 system	 (see	Chapters	6	and	7),	these	designed	practices	abide	strictly	by	their	design	and	structure	and	‘formally’	contribute	to	the	officials’	legitimacy,	authority	and	credibility.	
                         
16 Mass line: “qunzhou luxian 群众路线”in Chinese: See (Kennedy and Shi, 2014): "government 
officials at the county and township levels of government will accurately report conditions in 
villages and identify villager needs and concerns. (Kennedy and Shi, 2014: 218)” 
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Informal	Deliberation	The	 term	 ‘informal	 deliberation’	 will	 be	 used	 to	 describe	 deliberation	 beyond	institutional	processes	and	designed	forums.	 It	should	be	declared	that	as	 the	Chinese	traditional	 rural	 village	 administration	 relies	 on	 a	 ‘person-network’	 based	 on	 the	authority	 and	 credibility	 of	 the	 village	 cadre,	 deliberation	 on	 village	 affairs	 always	involves	many	informal	actions	like	street	talking	and	door-to-door	visiting	(Tang,	2015).	These	 deliberations	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6.	 Theoretically,	 these	 informal	deliberations	are	different	forms	of	“everyday	political	talks”.	Everyday	political	talks	are	“a	casual	by-product	of	social	interaction	that	incidentally	serves	political	functions”,	and	through	the	everyday	political	 talk,	 “citizens	gain	 information	and	exchange	 ideas,	ask	and	 answer	 questions,	 offer	 opinions,	 express	 emotions,	 and	 recount	 personal	experiences”	(Conover	and	Miller,	2018:	378).	Clearly,	it	is	difficult	for	everyday	political	talk	to	meet	the	criteria	and	standards	of	Type	one	deliberation	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010;	Conover	et	al.,	2002;	Walsh,	2004).	However,	it	plays	a	critical	part	in	the	success	of	a	deliberative	 democracy.	 Everyday	 informal	 deliberation	 is	 intertwined	 into	 the	conversations	naturally	between	family	and	friends;	it	helps	the	public	to	make	sense	of	social	dynamics	and	political	 agendas	and,	 finally,	 to	 influence	 those	political	 agendas	(Eveland	et	al.,	2011).	It	also	plays	significant	roles	in	terms	of	transmission	from	public	space	to	empowered	space	(Dryzek,	2009).	Therefore,	informal	deliberation	can	widen	participation	 and	 facilitate	 negotiation	 through	 involving	 a	 larger	 range	 of	 grassroots	groups	to	deliver	their	opinions	(Tang,	2015).	In	the	later	empirical	chapters	(Chapters	6,	7,	 and	 8)	 this	 research	 will	 show	 that	 the	 informal	 deliberation	 could	 help	 local	government	and	planners	to	improve	their	proposals	by	including	local	knowledge.		
4.3.3	Combination	of	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberation	 	Despite	the	types	of	deliberation,	the	essence	of	the	discussion	around	the	definition	of	deliberation	is	to	answer	an	important	question:	what	constitutes	authentic	deliberation?	To	evaluate	a	real-world	practice,	theoretically,	it	is	possible	and	productive	to	combine	the	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberation.	According	to	Bächtiger	et	al.	(2010),	both	types	of	 deliberation	 have	 “non-trivial	 normative	 and	 empirical	 blind	 spots”	 (ibid:	 54).	Therefore,	more	research	around	deliberation	outside	formal	fora	and	within	dispersed	policy	systems	might	be	eye-opening:	not	only	to	search	for	empirical	practices	that	might	
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engage	both	Type	one	and	Type	two	to	“sketch	up	the	middle	ground	more	clearly”	(ibid:	54),	but	also	to	link	deliberation	with	development.	 		This	 thesis	 will	 argue	 that,	 in	 the	 real-world	 practice,	 both	 Type	 one	 and	 Type	 two	deliberation	should	have	a	space	to	understand	the	deliberation	in	real-world.	That	is,	in	the	real-world	practice,	deliberations	take	places	in	the	different	circumstances	social-	political	context	(Dryzek,	2009),	thus,	the	theoretical	perspective	should	be	tolerant	and	inclusive	in	identify	a	genuine	deliberation	from	other	political	actions	(see	Type	two),	meanwhile,	it	should	also	be	able	to	evaluate	the	quality	of	deliberative	process	(see	Type	one	 deliberation).	 Therefore,	 Dryzek’s	 more	 relaxed	 criteria	 of	 “authenticity,	inclusiveness	and	consequentiality”	in	Type	two	deliberation	theory	are	selected	in	this	research	to	identify	the	genuine	deliberations	in	China.	In	detail,	these	three	criteria	are:	 	
• Authenticity:	 deliberation	 must	 induce	 reflection	 non-coercively,	 connect	 claims	 to	
more	general	principles	and	exhibit	reciprocity.	 	
• Inclusiveness:	this	applies	to	the	range	of	interests	and	discourses	present	in	a	political	
setting.	 Without	 inclusiveness,	 there	 may	 be	 deliberation	 but	 not	 deliberative	
democracy.	 Mutz	 (2006)	 worries	 that	 deliberation	 works	 against	 inclusion	 because	
“hearing	the	other	side”	induces	people	to	participate	less.	But	Mutz	is	referring	only	to	
unstructured	 talk	 in	 everyday	 life,	 not	 deliberation	 -	 still	 less,	 deliberation	 tied	 to	
particular	locations	in	a	political	system.	 	
• Consequentiality:	deliberative	processes	must	have	an	impact	on	collective	decisions	
or	social	outcomes.	This	impact	need	not	be	direct	-	that	is,	deliberation	need	not	involve	
the	actual	making	of	policy	decisions.	For	example,	public	deliberation	might	have	an	
influence	on	decision	makers	who	are	not	participants	in	the	deliberation.	This	might	
occur	 when	 an	 informal	 deliberative	 forum	 makes	 recommendations	 that	 are	
subsequently	taken	into	account	by	policy	makers.	Nor	need	the	outcomes	in	question	
be	explicit	policy	decisions;	they	might,	for	example,	be	informal	products	of	a	network,	
thus	entailing	“governance	without	government”.	 	(Dryzek,	2009:	1328)	Urban	 village	 regeneration	 is	 a	 complex	 and	 comprehensive	 development;	 therefore,	genuine	deliberation	around	 it	should	meet	 these	three	criteria.	First,	 the	deliberative	result	might	be	risky	if	the	deliberation	fails	in	authenticity,	as	the	result	generated	by	formalistic	deliberation	can	be	authoritarian,	 irrational,	and	one-sided	(Dryzek,	2009).	
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Second	 the	 deliberative	 results	 might	 be	 risky	 and	 stupid	 if	 the	 deliberations	 fail	 to	include	 the	 diverse	 opinions	 and	 interests,	 this	 is	 because	 the	 deliberation	 should	 be	responsive	to	what	matters,	otherwise,	 it	cannot	generate	relevant	results	 to	 the	right	problems	(Forester,	2018).	Third,	deliberation	should	be	consequential:	the	deliberative	results	should	commit	to	actions,	rather	than	just	talk.	 		Meanwhile,	the	genuine	outcomes	generated	from	deliberation	should	retain	some	forms	of	procedural	 legitimacy	and	 rational	warrant	of	 the	deliberation	process	at	 the	 same	time.	However,	given	the	defects	in	Type	two	theory,	it	is	not	enough	to	argue	that	these	deliberations	 are	 good	 deliberations.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 Type	 one	 theory	operationalizes	the	Habermasian	logic	into	an	analytical	scheme.	Steenbergen	et	al.	(2003)	proposed	the	Discourse	Quality	Index	(DQI)	to	measure	the	quality	of	the	deliberation	by	using	seven	indicators,	as	below:	1. Participation;	2. Level	of	justification	(do	speakers	just	forward	demands	or	do	they	give	reasons	for	their	positions,	and	how	sophisticated	are	such	justifications?);	3. Content	 of	 justifications	 (do	 speakers	 cast	 their	 justifications	 in	 terms	 of	 a	conception	 of	 the	 common	 good	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 narrow	 group	 or	 constituency	interests?).	4. Respect	towards	groups	(do	speakers	degrade,	treat	neutrally,	or	value	groups	that	are	to	be	helped?).	5. Respect	 towards	demands	(do	speakers	degrade,	 treat	neutrally,	value,	or	agree	with	demands	from	other	speakers?).	6. Respect	towards	counterarguments	(do	speakers	degrade,	ignore,	treat	neutrally,	value,	or	agree	with	counterarguments	to	their	positions?).	7. Constructive	politics	(do	speakers	sit	on	their	positions	or	submit	alternative	or	mediating	proposals?).	The	DQI	provides	an	appropriate	analytical	scheme	to	evaluate	the	quality	of	the	process	of	deliberations	to	warrant	the	procedural	legitimacy.	However,	it	has	some	operational	difficulties.	 For	 example,	 for	 the	 criterion	 level	 of	 justification,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	make	 a	judgement	about	“good	reason”	or	“bad	argument”	because	it	is	too	subjective	from	the	viewpoints	of	the	participants	themselves.	This	issue	can	be	reduced	if	we	go	through	the	supporting	documents	and	evidence	to	make	an	overall	understanding	about	how	well	it	
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retains	 the	 procedural	 legitimacy	 and	 provides	 a	 rational	warrant	 of	 the	 deliberation	process.	How	to	solve	these	practical	difficulties	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	5.	 		To	 sum	 up,	 through	 the	 combination	 of	 Type	 two	 (authenticity,	 inclusiveness	 and	consequential)	 and	 Type	 one	 (DQI)	 I	 have	 constructed	 a	 scheme	 to	 identify	 genuine	deliberation	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration.	 That	 is,	 a	 genuine	 deliberation	 should	 be	authentic,	inclusive	and	consequential;	meanwhile,	it	should	also	satisfy	the	quality	of	the	deliberation	process	to	warrant	procedural	legitimacy.	However,	the	discussion	above	of	the	 criteria	 is	 targeted	 at	 single-site	 deliberation,	 such	 as	 a	 forum,	 meeting,	 or	consultation.	Beyond	the	investigation	of	deliberation	itself,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	 role	 of	 deliberation	 in	 China’s	 political-administrative	 system.	 This	 raises	 an	important	 question	 of	 this	 research:	 how	deliberative	 is	 authoritarian	 deliberation	 in	China’s	 political-administrative	 system?	 Therefore,	 the	 next	 section	 will	 discuss	 the	deliberative	 system	 approach,	 which	 provides	 a	 systematic	 perspective	 to	 evaluate	 a	political	system	as	a	whole.	 		
4.4	Deliberative	System	Approach	as	a	Theoretical	Framework	The	 objective	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 evaluate	 the	 role	 of	 deliberation	 as	 a	 political	instrument	 for	 local	 administration;	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 deliberation	 in	 local	development	process	under	 the	 context	of	urban	village	 regeneration.	Despite	He	and	Warren’s	 authoritarian	 deliberation	 theory	 offering	 a	 useful	 framework	 for	understanding	China’s	deliberation	practices	in	general,	 it	is	important	to	examine	the	development	 of	 deliberative	 institutions	 in	 China	 within	 a	 specific	 Chinese	 political	context.	 These	 two	 main	 objectives	 concern	 the	 process,	 outcome	 and	 place	 of	authoritarian	deliberation	in	China’s	complex	governance	system.	In	this	section,	I	will	begin	with	the	discussion	of	the	concept	of	deliberative	system,	at	the	section	part,	I	will	discuss	the	relationship	between	deliberation	and	development	from	the	perspective	of	deliberative	 capacity	 building,	 finally,	 I	will	make	 a	 justification	 that	why	deliberative	system	approach	is	appropriate	in	this	research.	 	
	
4.4.1	Concept	of	Deliberative	System	 	 	 	“Deliberative	 system”	 suggests	 a	 systemic	 approach	 to	 understand	 the	 deliberation	practices	and	deliberative	elements.	It	seeks	to	allocate	“the	deliberative	essence”	in	each	
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single	forum	or	actions,	meanwhile,	it	also	seeks	to	allocate	these	deliberation	practices	within	 a	 “larger	 political	 system”	 to	 understand	 the	 “interrelation	 among	 the	 parts”	(Dryzek,	2017:	).	The	system	refers	to	“a	set	of	distinguishable,	differentiated,	but	to	some	degree	interdependent,	parts	often	with	distributed	functions	and	a	division	of	labour,	connected	 to	 form	 a	 complex	 whole”	 (Mansbridge	 et	 al.,	 2012:	 4).	 Based	 on	 this	conceptualization,	 the	 concept	 of	 “deliberative	 system”	 suggests	 a	 new	perspective	 to	understand	 deliberation	 practices	 and	 deliberative	 elements.	 This	 approach	 links	deliberative	 democracy	 theory	with	 real-world	 practice,	 and	 it	 broadens	 the	 research	around	deliberation	to	 include	the	complex	political	and	administrative	system	rather	than	isolating	the	research	within	the	“communication	process”.	As	Curato	et	al.,	(2017)	points	 out	 that:	 “the	 recent	 turn	 toward	 deliberative	 systems	 demonstrates	 that	deliberative	democratic	ideals	can	be	pursued	on	a	large	scale	in	ways	that	link	particular	forums	 and	more	 informal	 practices,	 such	 as	 communication	 in	 old	 and	 new	media.	Deliberative	democracy	 is	not	utopian;	 it	 is	 already	 implemented	within,	outside,	 and	across	governmental	institutions	worldwide”	(2017:	29).	 		Before	the	discussion	around	the	advantage	and	significance	of	the	deliberative	system	approach,	it	is	important	to	sketch	up	the	characteristics	of	deliberative	system.	Dryzek	(2009)	 theoretically	 conceptualize	 the	 characteristics	 of	 deliberative	 system	 as	 the	
general	scheme	for	a	deliberative	system.	This	scheme	suggests	that	a	deliberative	system	would	be	composed	of	the	following	elements:	 	
1. Public	 Space.	 A	 deliberative	 space	 (or	 spaces)	 with	 few	 restrictions	 on	 who	 can	
participate,	and	few	legal	restrictions	on	what	they	can	say,	thus	featuring	a	diversity	
of	viewpoints.	 	
2. Empowered	 space.	 A	 deliberative	 space	 for	 actors	 recognizably	 part	 of	 institutions	
producing	collective	decisions.	Public	space	and	empowered	space	can	both	be	tested	
for	the	degree	to	which	they	are	inclusive	of	relevant	interests	and	voices.	 	
3. Transmission.	Some	means	by	which	public	space	can	influence	empowered	space.	The	
relationship	between	public	space	and	empowered	space	can	be	critical,	or	 it	can	be	
supportive,	or	it	might	be	both.	 	
4. Accountability.	Some	means	whereby	empowered	space	is	accountable	to	public	space.	
Such	 accountability	 is	 key	 to	 the	 generation	 of	 broad	 deliberative	 legitimacy	 for	
collective	outcomes.	 	
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5. Decisiveness.	 Some	 means	 whereby	 these	 first	 four	 elements	 are	 consequential	 in	
influencing	the	content	of	collective	decisions.	 	(Dryzek,	2009:	1385).	The	general	scheme	for	a	deliberative	system	summarized	the	basic	characteristics	of	a	deliberative	system	in	real-world	practice.	Beyond	the	investigation	of	the	deliberation	itself,	 this	 scheme	 targeted	 at	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 It	 seeks	 to	 provide	 an	overview	around	diverse	sites	and	kinds	of	deliberative	practices	and	institutions	within	broader	systems,	such	that	even	imperfectly	deliberative	moments	can	serve	deliberative	functions.	In	following	discussions,	I	will	explain	that	this	scheme	provides	a	scheme	to	make	 an	 overall	 justification	 that	 whether	 a	 political	 system	 could	 be	 justified	 as	 a	deliberative	system.		
4.4.2	Justification	of	Deliberative	System	Approach17	Despite	He	and	Warren’s	authoritarian	deliberation	theory	offering	a	useful	framework	for	understanding	China’s	deliberation	practices	in	general,	it	is	important	to	examine	the	development	 of	 deliberative	 institutions	 in	 China	 within	 a	 specific	 Chinese	 political	context.	 Instead	of	 looking	at	“authoritarian	deliberation	practices	and	 institutions”	 in	urban	village	regeneration	in	isolation,	this	research	examines	the	interrelationships	and	interactions	 between	 them	 within	 a	 larger-scale	 deliberative	 system.	 As	 discussed	previously,	 deliberation	 theory	 is	 rooted	 in	 democracy;	 however,	 some	 of	 these	discussions	excessively	focus	on	China’s	authoritarian	context.	Critics	view	authoritarian	deliberation	pessimistically	as:	“a	relatively	limited	policy	instrument	that	in	an	overall	authoritarian,	 and	 intrinsically	 unjust,	 political	 system	 is	 employed	 by	 officials	 in	 an	instrumental	way	to	persuade	or	compel	citizens	to	accept	their	decisions	and	to	generate	political	support.	However,	this	is	too	one-sided	(Niu	&	Wagenaar,	2018:	691)”.	Instead	of	 strictly	 criticizing	 the	 deliberation	 practices	 in	 China’s	 urban	 village	 regeneration	according	 to	western	 theories	 (Warren,	2007),	 these	deliberative	moments	 should	be	understood	 comprehensively	 and	 objectively	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 entire	 governance	system.	 	
                         17	 This	section	is	developed	from	a	part	of	the	author’s	publication,	see:	Niu,	P.,	&	Wagenaar,	H.	(2018)	The	limits	of	authoritarian	rule:	policy	making	and	deliberation	in	urban	village	regeneration	in	China.	Japanese	Journal	of	
Political	Science.	19(4),	678-693.	
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	There	are	two	parallel	governance	systems	existing	within	the	urban	village	regeneration,	with	an	uneasy	and	unstable	mutual	 alliance	 (Niu	and	Wagenaar,	2018).	That	 is,	 “the	project-based	command-and-control	system”	is	downwards	extended	into	lower	levels	of	government	and	regimes,	and	this	system	is	directly	tied	into	the	CCP’s	authoritarian	rule	 (ibid).	 Meanwhile,	 the	 traditional	 village	 governance	 system	 is	 rooted	 in	 a	deliberative	cultural,	these	deliberative	governance	practices	are	endorsed	by	the	CCP	in	fact	(ibid).	This	research	also	encounters	the	informal	deliberation	efforts	by	district	and	village	 authorities	 that,	 with	 project	 management,	 form	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 a	 wider	administrative	 system	 that	 is	 targeted	 at	 economic	 development.	 These	 deliberative	moments	are	constrained	by	the	a	priori	performance	goals	that	are	a	priori	to	norms	of	communicative	 rationality,	 acting	 as	 constraints	 on	 the	 process.	 By	 evaluating	 the	functions	 of	 diverse	 actors,	 events	 and	 outcomes	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration,	 the	deliberative	 system	 approach	 integrates	 deliberative	 forums	 and	 informal	communication	into	one	micro-level	political	system	for	a	particular	governance	problem.	This	 approach	 also	 integrates	 how	 this	 deliberative	 system	 further	 affects	 local	governance	 in	 terms	 of	 policy-making	 and	 implementation	 and	 produces	deliberative	capacity	at	the	macro-level	of	the	public	sphere.	The	systematic	approach	provides	three	main	dimensions	to	understand	and	interpret	the	deliberative	system:	the	boundaries	of	the	 system,	 the	 deliberative	 qualities	of	 the	 deliberation	 and	 the	 functions	within	 the	system	that	should	be	evaluated.	The	section	following	will	explain	how	this	approach	can	be	applied	to	build	an	analytical	framework	for	this	study.	 		The	deliberative	system	approach	provides	a	more	tolerant	framework	to	examine	the	characteristics	and	evaluate	the	quality	of	these	deliberations	than	Type	one	deliberation	and	authoritarian	deliberation.	To	sum	up,	the	deliberative	system	approach	has	a	series	of	advantages:	it	can	include	diverse	(both	formal	and	informal)	deliberative	gatherings,	multiple	kinds	of	actors,	and	a	diversity	of	institutions.	The	next	part	will	discuss	how	to	use	the	deliberative	system	approach	as	the	analytical	scheme	for	this	research.	
	
4.4.3	Boundaries	of	Deliberative	System	To	evaluate	a	deliberative	system	initially	requires	its	“boundaries”	to	be	established.	The	boundaries	of	a	deliberative	system	are	drawn	by	the	formal	boundaries	of	a	political	or	
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administrative	system;	this	research	will	argue	that	the	scalar	governance	system	around	urban	 village	 regeneration	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 deliberative	 system	 (Niu	 and	Wagenaar,	2018).	Therefore,	the	system	is	“a	set	of	distinguishable,	differentiated,	but	to	some	degree	 interdependent,	 parts	 often	with	 distributed	 functions	 and	 a	 division	 of	labour,	connected	to	form	a	complex	whole”	(Mansbridge	et	al.,	2012:	4).	On	the	level	of	a	 larger	 deliberative	 system,	 the	 entities	 of	 that	 system	 may	 not	 meet	 the	 high	deliberative	 quality,	 but	 the	 overall	 deliberative	 system	 meets	 a	 higher	 deliberative	quality	(See	section	4.3)	than	its	entities;	similarly,	a	deliberative	system	may	not	meet	high	deliberative	quality,	but	the	it	can	contribute	a	comprehensive	and	complex	social	development	 through	 the	 deliberative	 capacity	 building.	 That	 is,	 “in	 a	 dynamic	 of	deliberative	complementarity,	when	one	instance	within	a	process	or	one	forum	within	a	system	is	low	in	deliberative	quality,	it	may	nevertheless	contribute	to	the	overall	quality	of	the	process	or	the	system	as	a	whole”	(Heller	and	Rao,	2015:	40).	In	this	research,	the	focus	is	on	the	events	(or	actions)	in	these	four	arenas:	1. The	 binding	 decisions	 of	 the	 local	 state	 (the	 policies	 themselves	 and	 their	implementation);	 	2. Activities	 directly	 related	 to	 preparing	 for	 those	 binding	 decisions:	 such	 as	communicative	processes,	e.g.	public	propaganda,	consulting	and	demonstrating,	between	actors	 (government	villagers,	 village	authorities,	 enterprises,	planning	professions,	etc.);	 	3. Informal	 talk	 related	 to	 those	 binding	 decisions	 such	 as	 home	 visiting,	 street	talking,	persuading,	(threats	of)	punishment,	discretion,	disobedience,	resistance,	etc.	 	4. Arenas	of	formal	or	informal	talk	related	to	decisions	on	issues	of	common	concern	that	are	not	intended	to	require	a	binding	decision	by	the	local	government	 	(Mansbridge	et	al.,	2012:	9).	Therefore,	in	this	research,	I	focuses	the	event	(or	actions)	in	these	four	arenas:	(1),	the	binding	 decisions	 of	 the	 local	 regime	 (both	 in	 the	 policies	 itself	 and	 policy	implementation);	(2),	activities	which	directly	contribute	to	prepare	 for	 those	binding	decisions	 such	 as	 communicative	 processes	 like	 public	 propaganda,	 consulting,	demonstrating,	 between	 actors	 (government	 villagers,	 village	 authorities,	 enterprises,	planning	professions,	etc.)	(3),	informal	communications	which	related	to	those	binding	decisions	 such	 as	 home	 visiting,	 street	 talking,	 persuading,	 (threats	 of)	 punishment,	
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discretion,	 disobedience,	 resistance,	 etc;	 and	 (4),	 arenas	 of	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	communications	related	to	decisions	on	issues	of	public	concerns	that	are	not	intended	for	binding	decision	by	the	local	government.		
4.4.4	Function	of	Deliberative	System	Admittedly,	deliberations,	deliberative	cultures	and	institutions	in	the	context	of	China	are	 different	 to	 those	 of	 liberal	 democracies.	 However,	 deliberation	 fulfils	 three	important	 functions	 in	 all	 governance	 systems	 (Mansbridge	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 namely:	 the	epistemic	function,	the	ethical	function,	and	political	functions.	 	
• The	 epistemic	 function	 of	 deliberation	 and	 a	 deliberative	 system	 can	 generate	
preferences,	opinions	and	“decisions	that	are	appropriately	informed	by	facts	and	
logic	and	derive	from	substantive	and	meaningful	consideration	of	relevant	reason”.	
• The	 ethical	 functions	 of	 deliberation	 and	 a	 deliberative	 system	 are	 to	 promote	
mutual	respect	for	the	citizens.	
• The	political	functions	of	deliberation	and	a	deliberative	system	are	to	promote	an	
inclusive	and	egalitarian	political	process.	 	 (Mansbridge,	2015:	42)	The	epistemic	function	is	based	on	“substantive	and	meaningful	consideration	of	relevant	reasons”,	and	it	could	“collectively	producing	preferences,	opinions	understandings,	and	decisions”	(op.	cit.,	11).	The	ethical	function	of	deliberation	and	deliberative	system,	is	“to	promote	mutual	respect	to	the	citizens”	(Mansbridge,	2015:	42).	The	deliberative	system	allows	citizens	and	other	actors	are	able	to	contribute	meaningfully	and	substantively	to	the	governance	of	their	society	as	autonomous	agents	(ibid.;	Dewey,	1954	[1927]);	and	Finally,	the	political	function	of	deliberation	and	deliberative	system	is	to	contribute	to	an	egalitarian	and	inclusive	political	process	(Mansbridge,	2015:	42),	through	organizing	a	 variety	 of	 inputs	 into	 the	 “liberation	 of	 the	 creative	 forces	 of	 society”	 and	 “the	understanding	 of	 complex	 problems”	 (Niu	 and	 Wagenaar,	 2018:	 Wagenaar,	 2011).	Beyond	 these	 functions,	 on	 the	 systems	 view,	 “when	 one	 deliberative	 site	 is	overshadowed	 by	 (say)	 purely	 strategic	 talk	 aimed	 to	move	 an	 issue	 onto	 the	 public	agenda,	another	site	could,	in	principle,	provide	the	balance	necessary	for	system-level	deliberative	outcomes”	(Tang,	2018:	666).		 	
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Based	on	the	basic	concept	of	a	deliberative	system,	the	standards	for	a	good	deliberative	system	could	be	evaluated	according	to	the	Mansbridge’s	three	overarching	functions	of	democratic	deliberation:	 the	epistemic,	ethical	and	political	 functions.	However,	 in	 the	following	 part,	 I	 will	 discuss	 that	 the	 examination	 could	 go	 beyond	 the	 deliberative	system	itself	to	a	broader	context.		
4.4.5	Deliberative	Capacity	Building	 	As	a	complex	and	comprehensive	development,	the	role	of	deliberation	in	urban	village	regeneration	should	be	reviewed	beyond	a	narrow	focus	on	participatory	projects	as	well	as	a	physical	and	economic	development	project.	According	to	Heller	and	Rao,	(2018:	1):	“building	 a	 deliberative	 system	 is	 a	 potential	 valuable	way	 of	 addressing	 inequality”.	Meanwhile,	 to	 evaluate	 a	 deliberative	 system,	 the	 examination	 could	 go	 beyond	 the	deliberative	 system	 itself.	 In	 this	 part,	 I	 will	 discuss	 how	 the	 conceptual	 scheme	 of	deliberative	capacity	building	could	be	used	to	understand	the	role	of	 the	deliberative	system	in	in	a	broader	context	in	terms	of	the	social	and	political	development	process	of	an	authoritarian	state	(democratization	as	deliberative	capacity	building).	This	scheme	could	provide	a	supplementary	scheme	of	Mansbridge’s	three	overarching	functions	of	democratic	deliberation	to	understand	the	role	of	deliberation	and	deliberative	system	in	a	complex	and	comprehensive	urban	development.	 		 	 	Deliberative	 capacity	 is	 a	 concept	 introduced	 by	 John	 Dryzek	 (2009),	 allowing	assessment	of	the	completeness	and	effectiveness	of	a	deliberative	system	in	comparative	settings.	It	could	be	used	to	review	the	democratization	process	of	an	authoritarian	state	like	China	and	describes	the	 future	development	of	deliberative	politics	 (Tang,	2014).	Based	on	the	deliberative	system	approach,	deliberative-capacity-building	 is	a	process	that	 includes	 the	 transmission	 from	 public	 space	 to	 empowered	 space,	 and	 the	accountability	 of	 empowered	 space	 to	 public	 space,	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 authentic,	inclusive	and	consequential	deliberations.	Deliberative-capacity-building	is	a	talk-based	system	 for	political	 conflict	 resolution	 intended	 to	provide	 just	outcomes	 for	all	 those	affected	(Tang,	2014:	120).	It	is	“driven	by	the	interrelations	between	different	parts	of	a	deliberative	system	and	also	can	be	driven	by	the	 interrelations	between	the	different	systems	 (Dryzek,	 2012:	 136)”.	 Tang	 (2014)	 advances	 the	 concept	 of	 “deliberative	capacity	 building”	 into	 a	 tangible	 analytical	 framework	 particularly	 in	 contemporary	
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China.	This	framework	addresses	three	interrelated	aspects	and	concerns	about	political	and	 social	 practices	 in	 China.	 The	 first	 concern	 involves	 the	 growing	 impact	 of	 the	diversified	 formats	 of	 deliberation	 in	 varying	 places	 in	 the	 public	 field.	 The	 second	concern	deals	with	the	association	existing	between	deliberative	activities	and	decision-making.	 Furthermore,	 the	 third	 concern	 is	 the	 democratic	 values	 and	 practices	 of	 the	participants	with	regard	to	their	reasoning	capabilities.	She	suggests	that	there	are	three	aspects	to	analysis	the	deliberation	system,	namely	social,	institutional,	and	participatory	capacity	(Tang,	2014).	This	conceptual	framework	could	provide	a	useful	and	significant	perspective	to	review	the	process	of	urban	village	regeneration	in	terms	of	social	capacity,	
institutional	 capacity	 and	 participatory	 capacity	 which	 are	 significant	 indicators	 for	evaluating	the	standards	of	a	deliberative	system.	 		The	first	indicator	is	the	social	capacity	of	a	deliberative	system,	which	is	rooted	in	the	public	sphere.	Tang	(2014:	112)	defines	this	indicator	as:	 	
the	 form	 of	 the	 (re)distribution	 of	 discourse	 power	 through	 various	
communicative	 processes	 in	 which	 citizens	 exchange	 opinions	 and	 form	 a	
consensus	in	public	settings	about	issues	that	affect	their	community,	society,	
or	state.	The	 social	 capacity	 is	 open	 to	 various	 communicative	 processes	 with	 a	 particular	emphasis	on	the	discourse	power.	At	an	operational	level,	this	indicator	means	that	both	media	discussion	and	everyday	talk	play	significant	roles	by	generating	public	political	awareness,	exchanging	information	and	forming	public	opinions	(see	Chapters	7	and	8).		The	 second	 indicator	 is	 institutional	 capacity.	 At	 an	 operational	 level,	 this	 indicator	emphasizes	 the	 effective	 institutional	 incorporation	 of	 communicative	 outcomes,	including	coordination	between	opinion	and	information	expression	channels,	between	policymaking	and	policy	implementation,	and	between	deliberative	and	non-deliberative	activities	 (Tang,	 2014).	 This	 indicator	 is	 significant	 particularly	 since	 it	 reflects	 the	comparison	 between	 two	 of	 an	 institution’s	 capacities	 (the	 village	 committee	 and	 the	resident’s	committee,	see	Chapters	8	and	9).		The	third	indicator	is	participatory	capacity.	Tang	(2014)	defines	this	concept:	
Participatory	 capacity	 could	 transform	 individuals	 and	 groups	 from	
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deliberative	 actors	 –	 those	 who	 are	 involved	 in	 different	 sections	 of	 a	
deliberative	system	–	to	deliberative	influences	–	those	who	can	exert	impacts	
on	other	participants’	opinions	through	reasoning	and,	in	turn,	orientate	the	
deliberative	outcome	(Tang,	2014:	126).	 	 	Therefore,	the	participatory	capacity	is	a	significant	indicator	to	evaluate	the	changes	of	state-society	relationships	(see	Chapters	7	and	8).	At	an	operational	level,	it	reflects	the	development	of	villagers’	capacity	in	terms	of	presenting	and	responding	to	reasons	and	arguments;	and	justifying	a	political	decision.		To	sum	up,	to	evaluate	a	deliberative	system,	deliberative-capacity-building	provides	a	supplementary	scheme	in	addition	to	the	Mansbridge’s	 three	overarching	 functions	of	democratic	deliberation.	Therefore,	role	of	deliberation	in	development	the	deliberation	can	contribute	to	form	a	deliberative	system	(see	chapter	7),	and	improve	the	quality	of	the	deliberative	system.	Meanwhile,	the	deliberation	and	deliberative	system	could	also	contribute	 to	 a	 complex	 and	 comprehensive	 social	 development	 through	 building	 the	participatory	capacity,	institutional	capacity,	and	social	capacity.	 		
4.5	Analytical	scheme	 	This	 chapter	discusses	 the	different	 criteria.	This	section	explains	how	 these	different	evaluative	criteria	overlap.	The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	understand	the	role	of	deliberation	as	a	political	instrument	for	local	administration	and	to	rethink	the	role	of	the	political-administrative	 system	of	urban	village	 regeneration	as	a	 comprehensive	and	complex	social	development.	These	two	main	objectives	concern	the	process,	outcome	and	place	of	authoritarian	deliberation	 in	China’s	complex	governance	system,	meanwhile,	 these	two	 objectives	 also	 lead	 to	 two	 tiers	 of	 evaluation:	 first,	 the	 evaluation	 of	 a	 “single	deliberation”,	such	as	a	forum,	discussion,	or	consultation;	second,	the	exploration	of	the	role	of	these	deliberations	from	a	“deliberative	system”	perspective.	 		In	the	first	tier,	single	deliberation	‘moments’	such	as	a	forum,	meeting,	or	consultation	will	be	examined	through	the	scheme	to	identify	the	types	and	forms	of	deliberation.	As	explained	in	Section	4.3,	his	work	distinguishes	deliberations	in	real-world	practice	as	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberations	as	well	as	formal	and	informal	deliberations.	Thus,	the	“deliberation	moments”	will	be	grouped	into	4	categories	(see	Table	4.2).	
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Table	4.2:	Types	and	Forms	of	Deliberation		 Type	one	deliberation	 Type	two	deliberation	Formal	deliberation	 Type	one	in	a	formal	setting	 Type	two	in	a	formal	setting	Informal	deliberation	 Type	 one	 in	 an	 informal	setting	 Type	 two	 in	 an	 informal	setting		All	 of	 these	 4	 categories	 of	 deliberation	 ‘moments’	 should	 be	 examined	 through	 the	scheme	 that	 combines	 Type	 two	 (authenticity,	 inclusiveness	 and	 consequentiality)	 to	evaluate	the	deliberative	outcome	and	Type	one	(DQI)	criteria	to	evaluate	the	quality	of	the	 deliberation	 process.	 On	 one	 hand,	 genuine	 deliberation	 should	 be	 authentic,	inclusive	and	consequential.	In	the	urban	village	regeneration,	“authenticity”	can	avoid	the	 “deliberation”	 which	 leads	 to	 coerciveness	 and	 is	 unable	 to	 exhibit	 reciprocity.	“Inclusiveness”	 warrants	 that	 the	 deliberations	 and	 results	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 right	problems.	‘Consequentiality’	ensures	that	the	deliberation	and	results	are	committed	to	actions.	On	the	other	hand,	genuine	deliberation	should	also	have	a	deliberation	process	of	relatively	satisfactory	quality	so	as	to	confirm	to	the	procedural	legitimacy	of	the	policy	process.	 Therefore,	 this	 research	 distinguishes	 the	 deliberations	 in	 the	 real-world	practice	by	genuine	deliberations	and	non-deliberative	actions	as	well	as	by	high-	and	low-quality	deliberation.	Thus,	these	“deliberation	moments”	will	also	be	grouped	into	4	categories	(see	Table	4.3).	
Table	4.3:	Quality	and	Outcome	of	Deliberation		 High	quality	 Low	quality	Deliberative	outcome	 	 Deliberative	 outcome	generated	 by	 high-quality	processes.	
Deliberative	 outcome	generated	 by	 low-quality	deliberations.	Non-deliberative	outcome	 Non-deliberative	 outcome	generated	 by	 high-quality	processes.	
Non-deliberative	 outcome	generated	 by	 low-quality	processes	Therefore,	 the	 analytical	 scheme	 above	 not	 only	 specifies	 the	 different	 types	 of	deliberation	 into	different	 settings,	 but	 also	 provides	 a	 comprehensive	 perspective	 to	understand	the	outcome	and	process	of	a	single	deliberation.	Theoretically,	for	example,	“high-quality	 deliberation	 generated	 by	 high	 quality	 process”	 can	 exist	 in	 informal	
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settings;	meanwhile,	a	“Non-deliberative	outcome	generated	by	a	 low-quality	process”	can	be	identified	in	a	formal	setting.	 		In	the	second	tier,	as	this	research	aims	to	understand	the	role	of	deliberations	within	the	urban	village	regeneration,	thus,	the	interpretations	of	the	deliberation	have	to	go	beyond	a	single	deliberation.	Therefore,	this	research	will	explore	the	role	of	“deliberations”	from	a	systemic	perspective.	According	to	Mansbridge	(2015)	a	good	deliberation	or	a	good	deliberative	system	should	have	epistemic,	ethical	and	political	functions.	Thus,	in	this	tier,	the	interpretation	on	these	“deliberations”	will	focus	on	how	these	actions	contribute	to	the	epistemic,	ethical	and	political	functions.	Theoretically,	for	example,	“high-quality”	deliberation	can	exist	independently	both	at	the	level	of	individual	acts	and	systemically,	meanwhile,	 “low-quality	 deliberation”	 and	 “non-deliberative”	 action	 could	 have	deliberative	 role	 in	 a	 deliberative	 system.	 Furthermore,	 this	 research	 will	 provide	 a	comprehensive	 discussion	 on	 how	 deliberative	 is	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 as	 a	political-administrative	system.	This	evaluation	is	based	on	the	concept	of	a	deliberative	system:	a	deliberative	system	should	have	 five	essential	characteristics	namely:	public	space,	empowered	space,	transmission,	accountability	and	decisiveness	(Dryzek	2009);	as	well	as	the	Mansbridge’s	standards	for	a	good	deliberative	system	(three	functions:	the	epistemic,	ethical	and	political	functions).	Finally,	to	discuss	the	role	of	deliberation	and	deliberative	 system	 in	a	 comprehensive	and	complex	 social	development	process,	 the	scheme	of	deliberative-capacity-building	(Tang,	2014)	point	out	3	 indicators	including	social	capacity,	institutional	capacity	and	participatory	capacity.	Therefore,	deliberations	might	contribute	to	build	a	deliberative	system,	which	not	only	has	epistemic,	ethical	and	political	 functions,	 but	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	 building	 of	 social	 capacity,	 institutional	capacity	and	participatory	capacity.		
4.6	Conclusion	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 introduced	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 and	 developed	 the	 theoretical	framework	for	this	study.	This	chapter	started	by	initial	discussions	around	the	concept	and	types	of	deliberation	theories,	which	introduced	the	theoretical	difference	between	the	 authoritarian	 context	 and	 the	 liberal	 democratic	 context.	 It	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	deliberation	practices	 in	China	within	an	authoritarian	political	 context.	 It	 introduced	China’s	deliberative	culture	deriving	from	Confucianism	and	deliberative	institutions	in	
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both	 urban	 and	 village	 grassroots	 governance	 systems.	 This	 provides	 an	 initial	theoretical	understanding	of	China’s	deliberation,	deliberative	culture	and	deliberative	intuitions	from	the	perspective	of	authoritarian	deliberation.	Recent	studies	focus	on	the	political	functions	of	deliberation	in	China,	the	deliberation	then	acts	as	a	technique	of	preference	 formation,	 decision-making	 and	 policy	 implementation.	 However,	 only	limited	research	has	been	done	to	explore	and	understand	the	role	of	deliberation	in	a	larger	 complex	 political-administrative	 system.	 This	 research	 adopts	 the	 deliberative	system	 as	 a	 theoretical	 perspective.	 Based	 on	 the	 theoretical	 discussion,	 this	 chapter	develops	the	analytical	scheme	of	this	research.	It	includes	the	boundaries	of	the	system,	the	quality	of	deliberations	and	the	standards	of	 the	deliberative	system.	Through	the	analytical	scheme,	this	research	answers	the	questions	around:	1,	in	what	ways,	under	what	 conditions	 and	 how	 well	 does	 deliberation	 fulfil	 these	 functions	 and	 2,	 it	 also	answers	 the	 question	 of	 how	 well	 deliberation	 fulfils	 its	 systematic	 functions	 in	 the	context	of	authoritarian	rule	in	China.	The	next	chapter	will	outline	the	methodological	issues	 in	 this	 study	and	show	how	 the	 systematic	 approach	 is	used	as	 the	 theoretical	framework.				 	
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Chapter	Five:	Design,	Methodology	and	Methods	
5.1	Research	aims	and	question	This	 study	 adopts	 a	 systematic	 framework	 to	 investigate	 the	 deliberation	 processes	involved	 in	 Chinese	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 the	 governance	 of	 regenerated	communities,	as	well	as	the	integration	of	villagers	into	the	urban	fabric.	This	research	was	 carried	out	 in	 response	 to	a	political	movement	by	China’s	 central	 government	–	‘New-type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020’.	The	aim	of	this	research	is	to	explore	the	role	and	 outcomes	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 as	 a	 political	 instrument	 for	 local	administrations	 in	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process.	 This	 research	 leads	 to	 the	following	research	questions:	 		
1. On	what	grounds	do	local	governments	adopt	democratic	deliberation	in	the	
urban	village	regeneration	practice?	This	 question	 addresses	 the	 complexity	 of	 Chinese	 urban	 development	 and	 social-political	changes	from	a	macro	perspective.	It	guides	the	readers	to	understand	the	social	and	 political	 context	 of	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 democratic	 deliberation	practices.	It	also	provides	the	rationale	of	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	and	the	necessity	of	the	deliberations.	The	discussions	around	this	question	not	only	focus	on	the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 programmes	 and	 deliberation	 itself	 but	 also	 on	 the	complexity	of	the	Chinese	political-administrative	system.		
2. How	does	the	process	of	democratic	deliberation	proceed	in	the	process	of	
urban	village	regeneration?	 	
• What	 role	 do	 the	 village	 administration	 and	 democratic	 deliberation	
play	in	the	regeneration	process?	 	
• What	 role	 do	 the	 “transferred	 village	 administration	 and	 democratic	
deliberation”	play	in	the	redeveloped	urban	village	community?	 	This	question	contains	two	sub-questions.	It	focuses	on	how	local	government	directs	the	deliberation	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme.	This	question	could	help	the	reader	 to	 understand	 the	 design,	 development	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	deliberation	and	deliberative	institutions	in	China.	Assisted	by	the	criteria	of	“types	and	forms	of	deliberation”	(see	Chapter	4.5	p.107);	these	two	sub-questions	guide	the	reader	to	understand	the	role	of	deliberation	as	a	political	instrument	for	local	administration.	 	
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3. How	 does	 the	 village	 deliberative	 system	 fit	 into	 urban	 community	
governance?	 	This	question	investigates	the	functions	and	challenges	of	the	village	governance	system	in	the	regenerated	community.	This	question	address	how	the	village	governance	system	has	been	 integrated	 into	 the	urban	administration	 system	and	how	 these	 continuities	exist	in	the	new	governance	system	in	regenerated	village	communities.		
4. What	 is	 the	 place	 of	 deliberation	 in	 the	 larger	 governance	 configuration	
around	urban	village	regeneration?	 	This	question	reviews	the	role	and	function	of	deliberation	in	an	urban	redevelopment	project.	 Assisted	 by	 the	 deliberative	 system	 theoretical	 framework;	 this	 question	explores	the	transformative	effects	of	the	developments.	 		
5. Is	authentic	deliberation	going	on	in	authoritarian	China?	
• Do	 the	 interactions	 between	 stakeholders	 have	 the	 general	
characteristics	of	democratic	deliberation?	 	
• To	 what	 extent	 is	 this	 a	 form	 of	 authoritarian	 deliberation,	 or	
deliberation	according	to	Chinese	history	and	culture?	 	This	question	provides	an	in-depth	understanding	of	the	deliberations	in	urban	village	regeneration.	 Following	 the	 examination	 through	 the	 criteria	 of	 “authenticity,	inclusiveness	and	consequentiality”	(see	chapter	4.5)	and	the	discussion	of	the	Chinese	deliberation	culture,	this	research	provides	an	understanding	of	the	interactions	between	the	stakeholders.	
 
5.2	Methodology	and	research	design	This	research	adopts	an	in-depth	case	study	design	in	urban	village	regeneration	because	of	the	following	three	considerations:	“the	type	of	research	question	posed”,	“the	extent	of	 the	 control	 an	 investigator	has	over	actual	behavioural	 events”,	 and	 “the	degree	of	focus	on	contemporary	as	opposed	to	historical	events”	(Yin,	1994,	p.	23).	Compared	with	other	research	strategies,	the	case	study	research	design	is	an	ideal	approach	to	address	“how”	and	“why”	research	questions	can	emphasize	events	that	the	investigator	has	little	control	 over.	 Therefore,	 the	 case	 study	 design	 is	 particularly	 useful	 in	 carefully	
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reconstructing	the	process	of	deliberation	among	groups,	the	regeneration	outcomes	of	stakeholders	 and	 how	 all	 this	 affects	 the	 integration	 of	 urban	 villagers	 (Yin,	 1994).	Meanwhile,	 this	 research	 uses	 detailed	 field	 research	 to	 inquire	 into	 deliberative	practices	 regarding	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 to	 advance	 the	 theoretical	 concept	 of	authoritarian	deliberation.	Therefore,	a	variety	of	evidence	and	data	need	to	be	collected	and	analysed,	including	interviews,	documents	and	observations.	The	in-depth	case	study	research	is	an	effective	approach	to	investigate	the	urban	village	regeneration	as	whole	complex	process.	 		An	 interpretivist	strategy	 is	selected	 in	this	research	because	 it	can	provide	a	 feasible	framework,	which	helps	researchers	understand	the	meaning	that	actions	embedded	in	the	interactions	and	practices	of	urban	village	regeneration	have	for	their	protagonists.	In	the	social	sciences,	interpretivism	is	particularly	useful	for	studying	the	process	and	development	of	a	phenomenon,	the	interaction	of	the	actors	that	drive	that	process	and	the	different	meanings	that	 these	actors	attach	to	the	phenomenon	(Wagenaar,	2011).	Wagenaar,	 commenting	 on	 the	 interpretive	 explanations	 that	 underlie	 qualitative	research,	 observes	 that,	 in	 social	 sciences	 interpretivist	 approaches	 focus	 on	 the	“meaning	of	 actions	and	 institutions,	based	on	precise	observation	and	 registration	of	data	(Wagenaar,	2011:	11).”	In	this	research,	the	arguments	and	claims	are	derived	from	the	in-depth	investigation	of	realities	of	deliberations	around	urban	village	regeneration.	The	stories	told	in	this	thesis	describe	what	local	authorities	and	other	relevant	actors	do	in	real-life	working	environments.	Therefore,	as	I	will	explain	in	later	sections,	led	by	the	case	study	research	design	and	 interpretivist	strategy,	a	series	qualitative	data	will	be	collected	and	analysed	to	identify	the	targets,	strategy,	policies,	institutions	and	practices	of	Chinese	urban	village	regeneration	as	well	as	identifying	the	actors,	institutions	and	functions	of	deliberation	within	Chinese	urban	village	regeneration	practices.	Meanwhile,	because	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 provide	 an	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 and	outcomes	of	democratic	deliberation	as	a	political	instrument	for	local	administrations	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	process,	later	sections	will	explain	that	the	data	analysis	has	proceeded	using	a	combination	of	“grounded	theory”	(Charmaz,	2006)	and	“thematic	analysis”	(Boyatzis,	1998).		
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5.3	Choice	of	the	cases	This	 research	 aims	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 and	 outcomes	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 as	 a	political	instrument	for	local	administrations	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	process	under	the	New-type	Urbanisation	Plan	(2014-2020).	As	justified	in	Chapter	2,	this	new	policy	 focuses	 on	 the	 social	 integration	 of	 the	 villagers	 more	 than	 the	 physical	development.	Therefore,	this	research	not	only	focuses	on	the	deliberation	in	the	physical	regeneration	process,	but	also	focuses	on	how	government	functions	in	the	regenerated	urban	village	according	to	the	New-Type	Urbanization	Planning	(2014-2020);	as	well	as	how	traditional	rural	deliberation	institutions	have	changed	and	become	integrated	into	the	urban	community	governance	system.	As	explained	in	Chapter	2,	the	whole	process	of	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	is	a	long-lasting	programme,	which	always	takes	more	 than	 three	 years	 to	 complete	 the	 physical	 regeneration.	 The	 political	 and	social	integrations	are	the	later	stages	following	the	physical	regeneration;	therefore,	the	two	selected	cases	have	to	cover	all	stages	of	the	regeneration	programme.		As	explained	before,	this	research	aims	to	reconstruct	the	process	of	deliberation	among	groups,	 the	 outcomes	 for	 stakeholders	 and	 how	 this	 affects	 the	 integration	 of	 urban	villagers	(Yin,	1994).	Therefore,	the	cases	under	study	must	have	the	following	features:	 	
• They	must	have	completed	physical	redevelopment.	
• The	village	committee	has	changed	into	a	committee	of	the	grassroots-level	authority.	
• The	hukou	of	former	urban	villagers	has	changed	into	an	urban	hukou.	Meanwhile,	 the	subject	of	 this	 research	 is	deliberation	as	 the	 instrument	of	 the	urban	village	regeneration;	therefore,	the	case	also	has	to	meet	the	following	criteria:	
• The	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process	 could	 have	 generated	 conflicts	 between	different	stakeholders:	such	as	local	government,	village	committees,	developers	and	residents.	
• The	interactions	between	the	above	stakeholders	should	be	open	to	investigation.	
• The	conflicts	have	involved	some	form	of	democratic	deliberation.	
• Data	on	these	cases	and	their	conflicts	should	be	accessible.		Within	these	guidelines,	this	researcher	chose	two	urban	village	regeneration	programs	in	Sunny	District,	Happy	City.	Happy	City	is	the	core	city	of	the	Central	Province	Urban	Agglomeration,	which	has	been	recognized	as	one	of	 the	most	 important	development	
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projects	at	the	national	level	in	the	New-type	Urbanisation	Plan	(2014-2020).	Within	this	context,	urban	village	regeneration	in	Happy	City	had	been	raised	as	the	most	important	urbanization	and	development	 target	of	Central	Province.	Currently,	 there	are	around	100	 urban	 villages	 in	 Happy	 City	 that	 will	 be	 regenerated	 by	 demolition	 and	redevelopment	within	2	years.	Other	cities	in	China	were	reported	to	have	experienced	illegal	 land	 seizures	 and	 forced	 evictions;	 however,	 the	 Happy	 City	 government	encourages	 the	 traditional	 rural	 village	 deliberations	 to	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	decision-making	process.	Therefore,	this	research	chose	Happy	City	for	the	case	study.		Village	N	is	the	first	urban	village	regenerated	by	Sunny	District,	which	provided	a	strong	basis	 for	 further	 policy-making	 around	 urban	 village	 regeneration.	 In	 addition,	 as	 an	experimental	programme,	 the	 local	government	was	patient	and	tolerant	of	 long-term	deliberations	and	discussions.	Deliberation	played	an	important	role	in	this	programme,	which	 was	 more	 than	 just	 limiting	 conflict	 between	 citizens	 and	 government,	 since	deliberation	also	contributed	to	building	the	consensuses	for	local	planning.	The	details	of	 Village	 N	 will	 be	 introduced	 in	 the	 next	 chapter.	 More	 importantly,	 as	 the	 first	experimental	programme,	the	time	limitation	of	this	programme	is	much	less	stringent	than	 the	 later	 cases,	 therefore,	 in	 this	 case,	 we	 can	 observe	 how	 various	 forms	 of	deliberation	function	as	the	policy	instruments.	 		Community	 T	 is	 a	 newly-built	 urban	 residential	 community	 aimed	 at	 reallocating	 the	urban	 villagers	 from	 3	 former	 urban	 villages.	 The	 new	 Residents’	 committee	 was	struggling	because	the	new	community	has	to	administer	the	villagers	from	3	villages.	The	 committee	 is	 organized	 by	 the	 semi-district	 government,	 which	 consisted	 of	 key	members	 (directors)	 from	 the	 3	 former	 villages	 and	 staff	 from	 the	 semi-district	government.	The	leadership	of	the	committee	has	one	director	who	is	appointed	by	the	street	office,	and	3	deputy	directors	who	are	the	former	directors	of	the	3	villages.	This	arrangement	 could	 provide	 efficiency	 in	 terms	 of	 facilitating	 policy	 implementation.	However,	 this	 arrangement	 also	 generated	 new	 challenges	 for	 the	 new	 community	governance	and,	for	this	reason,	is	valuable	to	research.	The	details	of	Community	T	will	be	introduced	in	the	next	chapter.	Meanwhile,	this	programme	also	introduced	efficiency	as	a	dominant	value	into	the	practice	and	discourse	of	governance,	and	subsequently	into	the	deliberative	process.	 In	 interviews	with	government	officials,	planners	and	village	
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leaders	of	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme,	efficiency	was	the	first	priority.	All	actors	 aspired	 to	 complete	 the	 process	 as	 fast	 as	 they	 could,	 preferably	 before	 the	deadline.	 Terms	 such	 as	 “time”,	 “speed”	 and	 “efficiency”	 frequently	 appeared	 in	interviews,	 government	 documents	 and	 officials’	 speeches,	 even	 in	 some	 cases	which	were	 not	 urgent	 at	 all.	 As	will	 be	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 this	 case	 is	 perfect	 for	 this	research	to	observe	deliberation	under	conditions	of	constraint,	in	this	case	the	context	of	“efficiency	as	a	priority”.		Two	cases	in	one	district	can	never	reflect	the	breadth	of	urban	village	regeneration	and	grassroots	governance	practices	all	over	China.	As	Chapter	2	and	Chapter	3	discussed,	the	urban	village	regeneration	is	carried	out	in	various	ways	by	the	local	government	and	the	grassroots	 level	 governance	 in	 the	 regenerated	 village	 differs	 according	 to	 their	 local	contexts.	These	two	cases	are	not	supposed	to	represent	the	specific	governing	practices	in	most	Chinese	urban	village	regeneration	as	well	as	the	regenerated	village	governance.	However,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 represent	 the	 role	 and	 outcomes	 of	 democratic	deliberation	as	a	political	instrument	for	local	administrations.	Therefore,	two	in-depth	case	studies	allows	me	to	provide	two	models	of	the	deliberation	processes	involved	in	Chinese	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 the	 governance	 practices	 of	 regenerated	communities,	as	well	as	the	integration	of	villagers	into	the	urban	fabric.	The	possibility	of	generalization	is	not	embodied	in	the	number	of	the	cases	but	in	the	representativeness	of	the	case	for	the	model	of	the	deliberative	system.		To	sum	up,	 these	two	cases	provide	two	different	deliberation	trajectories	 in	different	social	 and	 political	 contexts.	 As	 stated	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 in	 governance-by-project,	management	 requires	 that	 large	 tasks	 are	 broken	 down	 into	 smaller	 operating	procedures	which	are	allocated	to	different	people	(or	small	groups).	These	persons	or	groups	 will	 have	 some	 autonomy	 to	 accomplish	 their	 task,	 but	 they	 are	 also	 held	responsible	for	it.	Therefore,	by	taking	these	two	cases	together,	this	research	gains	the	overall	insights	into	the	central	research	questions	concerning	“how	village	deliberation	proceeds	in	urban	village	regeneration	and	the	governance	of	regenerated	communities”	within	different	social	and	political	contexts.	 		
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5.4	Data	Collection	 	Qualitative	data	was	collected	from	the	fieldwork,	governmental	policy	documents	and	news	reports.	Data	collection	in	fieldwork	includes	in-depth	qualitative	interviews	with	a	wide	 sample	of	stakeholders	 in	 the	 regeneration	process,	 ethnographic	observation,	and	document	analysis.	 		
Interviews:	Qualitative	interviews	were	carried	out	to	understand	both	the	experiences	and	ideas	of	individuals	in	the	mechanism	of	urban	village	regeneration.	Discussions	with	various	 stakeholders	 from	 varying	 perspectives	 helped	 investigate	 those	 associations	and	contacts	which	could	not	be	observed	in	a	direct	manner	(Weiss,	1995).	First	of	all,	in	this	research,	the	qualitative	interview	was	used	to	collect	the	data	to	develop	detailed	descriptions	of	the	regeneration	and	participation	process.	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	this	 research	 will	 adopt	 DQI	 to	 evaluate	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 deliberation	 process.	Qualitative	interview	“can	elicit	the	process	antecedent	to	an	outcome	of	interest”	(Waiss,	1995:	9);	and	it	can	provide	information	on	“what	are	the	processes	by	which	an	event	occurs”	(ibid).	Therefore,	 through	the	qualitative	 interview,	 this	research	collected	the	data	about:	1,	participants	and	 forms	of	participation;	2,	multiple	perspectives	on	 the	level	and	the	content	of	justification;	3,	multiple	perspectives	on	respect	towards	groups,	demands	and	counterarguments;	4,	multiple	perspectives	on	constructive	politics.	 		Meanwhile,	since	the	justifications	like	“level	of	justification”	and	“good	or	bad	argument”	are	 subjective	 and	 based	 around	 the	 viewpoints	 of	 the	 participants	 themselves,	 it	 is	crucial	to	learn	how	different	participants	interpret	these	events.	Qualitative	interviews	not	only	enable	investigating	the	interactions	amongst	the	participants	in	the	events	but	also	enable	access	to	the	perceptions	and	responses	of	participants	and	onlookers	to	be	undertaken.	The	detailed	interpretation	of	one	case	or	single	event	is	helpful	for	justifying	how	good	the	argument	is;	and	how	much	respect	is	given	amongst	the	participants.	 		The	 participants	 include	 planners,	 government	 officers,	 landlords,	 tenants	 and	developers.	As	explained	above,	the	key	informants	were	selected	through	snowballing	beginning	with	 the	mayor	who	 introduced	 the	 researcher	 to	many	 officials	who	 took	charge,	or	at	least	participated,	in	these	two	cases.	 	 In	particular,	this	helped	to	obtain	access	to	the	village	authorities,	and	village	authorities	helped	in	obtaining	access	to	the	
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villagers’	representatives,	Party	members	and	other	lower-level	cadres.	As	the	researcher	lived	in	the	regenerated	villages	for	3	months	in	total	(6	weeks	per	community),	there	was	direct	access	to	the	public	including	both	landlords	and	tenants.	The	details	of	the	interviewees	and	the	interviews	are	summarized	in	Table	5.1.		
Table:	5.1:	The	domains	and	forms	of	participation18	
Domains	of	Participation	 Community	T	 Village	N	Master	plan	at	district	level	 EC	 EC	Planning	at	semi-district	level	 EC,	CM	 EC,	CM	Planning	of	relocation	community,	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	Details	of	architectural	design	proposal	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	Demolition	agenda	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	Details	of	compensation	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	Relocation	agenda	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	Election	of	the	new	community	 VC,	RC,	SDP	 VC,	RC,	SDP	Routine	governance	in	the	new	community	 RC,	SDP	 RC,	SDP	Planning	of	government-acquired	land	 	 EC,	CM	 EC,	CM	Collective	property	and	economic	management	before	redevelopment	 VC	 VC	Collective	property	and	economic	management	after	redevelopment	 VC	 SDP		
Observation	and	Participant	Observation:	This	method	allows	the	observer	to	enter	the	group,	and	observe	them	with	an	appropriate	distance;	and	allows	the	researchers	to	“immerse”	 themselves	 into	 the	 circumstance	 and	 context	 being	 observed	 to	“comprehensively	understand”	a	group	or	an	event	 (Silverman,	2006:	68).	During	 the	
                         
18 In	this	table	the	following	acronyms	are	used:	‘EC’	=	Expert	Consultation,	‘PC’	=	Public	Consultation,	‘CM’	=	Coordination	Meeting,	‘VC’	=	Villagers’	Congress,	‘VRC’	=	Villagers’	Representative	Conference,	‘DV’	=	Door-to-Door	Visiting,	‘SDP’	=	Stakeholders’	Direct	Participation,	‘RC’	=	Residents’	Congress.	Meanwhile,	“Italic	letters”	are	used	to	distinguish	the	informal	deliberation	from	the	formal	deliberation,	for	example	“DV”. 
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data	collection	process,	this	method	was	used	throughout	the	fieldwork.	It	helped	give	an	understanding	 of	 the	 daily	 life	 of	 village	 landlords	 and	 migrants	 and	 provided	 a	comprehensive	context	to	understand	the	role	of	the	grassroots-level	routine	governance.		As	mentioned	in	Chapter	4,	lower	level	government	officials,	particularly	officials	in	the	street	 offices	 and	 authorities	 in	 the	 residents’	 committees,	 were	 very	 open	 to	communication.	They	invited	the	researcher	to	listen	and	join	some	of	their	meetings	and	small-group	deliberations,	which	related	to	the	community	issues.	In	the	end	of	2016,	I	stared	4	months	field	work	in	Sunny	District.	I	rented	an	apartments	in	each	case	study	area	so	that	I	could	observe	these	two	regenerated	communities	from	a	perspective	of	residents.	These	observations	were	carried	out	at	different	times	of	the	day	in	the	places	where	 residents	 often	 gathered	 or	 have	 conversations,	 physical	 exercises	 and	 other	activities.	However,	when	 I	 conducted	 the	 fieldwork,	 the	 indigenous	 residents	 always	asked	me	some	suspicious	questions,	such	as:	“where	are	you	come	from?	Are	you	a	new	staff	member	of	 residents’	 committee?	Are	you	working	 for	 the	government?”	When	 I	introduced	myself	as	a	tenant	in	the	community,	they	reduced	their	suspicious	attitudes	and	allowed	me	to	participate	their	conversations;	meanwhile,	I	also	participated	in	some	consultation	forums	and	other	community	events	with	other	indigenous	villagers.	These	experiences	 helped	me	 to	make	 a	 general	 sense	 the	 community	 life	 and	 participants’	actions	 consciously	 or	 unconsciously.	 When	 I	 observed	 these	 events	 and	 activities,	 I	wrote	research	diaries	to	record:	how	they	participated	in	the	community’s	events	and	forums;	how	they	communicate	with	different	actors;	how	they	interact	with	the	staff	and	local	authorities;	and	so	on.	On	the	one	hand,	this	method	helped	in	understanding	how	deliberation	 works	 in	 grassroots-level	 governance	 and	 its	 place	 within	 the	 political-administrative	system	as	a	whole.	On	the	other	hand,	 this	method	helped	me	to	make	sense	of	their	interpretation.	For	example,	during	the	forum	and	discussion,	through	the	observation	of	a	participant’s	actions	and	words,	I	can	better	understand	the	objective	terms	 like	 “good	 or	 bad	 arguments”	 “level	 of	performance”	 from	his/her	 perspective.	Meanwhile,	I	observed	and	recorded	the	participants’	way	of	speaking,	their	interactions,	as	well	 as	 their	 actions	 and	 reactions.	 Thus,	 this	method	 helped	me	 to	make	 a	 better	understanding	of	the	interview	data.	 		
Documents:	 	
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The	 documents	 were	 analysed	 as	 the	 complements	 of	 qualitative	 interviews	 and	observations.	These	documents	not	only	reflected	how	local	government	and	grassroots	level	 regimes	 implemented	 the	 top-down	 policy	 instruction	 in	 their	 practical	 work	according	to	their	local	context;	they	also	contained	much	information	on	the	outcomes,	role	 and	 the	 process	of	 the	 local	deliberation.	Examples	 from	 the	 government	 diaries	included	data	like	who	participants	were,	key	points	for	discussion,	important	arguments	raised,	decisions	made,	and	pending	actions	that	needed	more	discussion.	Thus,	 these	documents	 helped	 in	 evaluation	 on	 authenticity,	 inclusiveness,	 and	 consequentiality;	these	documents	also	contributed	to	the	analysis	of	the	following	questions	(1)	Do	speakers	just	forward	demands	or	do	they	give	reasons	for	their	positions,	and	how	sophisticated	are	such	justifications?	 	(2)	Do	speakers	cast	their	justifications	in	terms	of	a	conception	of	the	common	good	or	in	terms	of	the	narrow	group	or	constituency	interests?	 	(3)	Do	speakers	degrade,	treat	neutrally,	or	value	groups	that	are	to	be	helped?	 	(4)	 Do	 speakers	 degrade,	 treat	 neutrally,	 value,	 or	 agree	 with	 demands	 from	 other	speakers?	 Do	 speakers	 degrade,	 ignore,	 treat	 neutrally,	 value,	 or	 agree	 with	counterarguments	 to	 their	 positions?	 Do	 speakers	 sit	 on	 their	 positions	 or	 submit	alternative	or	mediating	proposals?		In	addition,	relevant	documents	were	chosen	following	the	guidance	of	four	dimensions	according	to	Scott	(1990):	‘authenticity’	for	ensuring	the	‘unquestionable	authoritative’	source	of	the	evidence;	‘credibility’	for	looking	at	the	producer	of	those	documents	and	focuses	on	the	accuracy;	 ‘representativeness’	for	ascertaining	the	‘typicality’	as	well	as	the	 ‘a	 typicality’	 associated	 with	 the	 data;	 and	 the	 ‘meaningful	 documents’	 with	 its	evidence	 understandable	 and	 apparent	 (Scott	 1990:	 6).	 The	 documents	 include	 5	categories:	1. Local	chronicles:	district	level	and	all	of	the	villages.	2. Government	working	and	meeting	records:	such	as	working	diaries,	meeting	records,	summaries	and	notes,	officials’	speeches	and	other	related	documents.	3. Plans:	municipal	and	district	level	master	plans	and	land-use	plans	from	district	level	to	village	level	were	obtained.	4. Policies,	rules,	regulations	and	laws.	5. Local	news:	the	news	from	2007-2014	was	searched	through	the	internet,	with	the	
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focus	 on	 the	 events,	 officials’	 public	 speeches	 and	 any	 public	 resistance/protests	against	urban	village	regeneration	in	city	Z.	 	 		These	documents	were	accessed	in	three	ways.	 	1. Some	 of	 them	 were	 accessed	 through	 the	 official	 government	 website,	 which	 is	available	to	the	public.	2. Some	of	 them	were	accessed	 through	 the	key	 informants	who	participated	 in	 the	redevelopment	project	in	the	case.	 	3. Some	 of	 them	 were	 accessed	 through	 the	 Sunny	 District	 Government,	 and	 the	Institute	of	City	Planning	and	Design	of	Central	Province,	such	as	the	detailed	land	plans	and	working	diaries,	for	which	access	needed	to	be	approved	by	the	officials.	 	The	national,	provincial	and	municipal	documents	were	collected	and	reviewed	before	the	fieldwork;	these	documents	provided	an	overall	image	to	understand	the	rationales	and	political	tasks	of	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	from	the	perspective	of	upper-level	 government.	Meanwhile,	 the	 documents	 at	 district	 level	 could	 be	 used	 to	interpret	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 Village	 N	 and	 Community	 T	 programmes;	 as	 well	 as	 to	understand	the	social	and	political	context	of	the	programmes.	The	street	and	village	level	documents	 were	 collected	 during	 the	 fieldwork.	 These	 documents	 not	 only	 directly	displayed	 how	 lower-level	 government	 and	 its	 agencies	 implement	 policies	 and	command	from	their	prior	governments	according	to	their	local	context	and	knowledge,	but	also	their	interactions	with	higher-level	government	in	both	policy-making	and	the	policy	implementation	process.	 		
5.5	Sampling	 	The	sampling	and	research	design	must	be	geared	to	the	theory.	Based	on	the	positions	they	took	and	the	interest	groups	they	represented,	the	53	interviewees	were	grouped	into	3	groups:	government	officials	and	planners,	village	and	community	level	staff,	and	the	public.	This	is	because	the	interviewees	were	key	informants	involved	in	these	two	regeneration	 programmes.	 Because	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 accessing	 the	 government	officials,	 this	 research	adopted	snowball	sampling	 to	 select	 the	participants.	Thus,	 the	researcher	was	embedded	in	local	social	networks,	indeed	the	mayor	of	Sunny	District	was	a	graduate	of	the	same	university	and	the	same	department	as	the	researcher.	This	shared	academic	background	enabled	access	to	 the	mayor	and,	consequently,	 to	other	
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officials	and	planners	which	facilitated	access	to	the	documents	of	village	committees	and	residents’	committees	at	grassroots	level.	During	the	fieldwork,	the	researcher	rented	an	apartment	in	both	Village	N	and	Community	T	whereby	the	landlord	provided	access	to	the	other	residents.		First	of	all,	this	researcher	approached	government	officials	including	district-level	and	street-level	bureaucrats.	This	is	because	 in	 the	regeneration	programme,	 this	group	of	interviewees	 is	 in	 charge	of	making	decisions	and	policies	 for	 these	 two	regeneration	programmes.	They	worked	closely	with	grassroots-level	authorities	and,	in	some	specific	events,	they	also	participated	in	the	deliberations	and	communicated	directly	with	the	public.	As	the	lower	levels	of	the	bureaucracy	in	China,	local	government	directly	links	the	society	the	state	and	occupies	a	strategic	position	in	Chinese	society	(Zhou,	2007).	Therefore,	 this	 group	 of	 informants	 can	 provide	 useful	 data	 to	 specify	 the	 policy	implementation	 around	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 local	 governance	programmes	at	the	local	level	(see	details	in	Appendix	1).		Second,	although	the	policies	are	originally	developed	and	issued	by	the	government,	the	grassroots-level	 authorities	 have	 certain	 discretionary	 powers	 to	 implement	 these	policies.	 As	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 two	 grassroots-level	 authorities	 (village	committee	in	the	rural	village	and	residents’	committee	in	the	urban	community)	act	as	the	 platforms	 that	 linked	 the	 public	 with	 the	 government.	 Therefore,	 this	 group	 of	informants	can	provide	useful	data	to	explore	how	the	deliberation	proceeds	in	the	urban	village	 regeneration.	 The	 details	 of	 the	 informants	 and	 the	 interviews	 are	 listed	 in	Appendix	1.		The	third	group	of	interviewees	is	the	residents	of	Village	N	and	Community	T.	Most	of	them	 are	 the	 native	 villagers	 of	 the	 former	 urban	 village.	 They	 experienced	 all	 of	 the	changes	caused	by	the	urban	village	regeneration.	As	 introduced	 in	previous	chapters,	their	 experiences	 could	 not	 only	 provide	 the	 data	 to	 examine	 the	 social	 and	 political	integration	according	to	the	New-type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020,	but	also	offer	an	insight	 on	 the	 deliberations	 involved	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 (see	 details	 in	Appendix	1).		
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5.6	Data	Analysis	The	qualitative	analysis	approach	was	adopted	in	the	case	studies.	First	of	all,	thematic	coding	was	used	to	identify	the	significant	moments	on	which	the	research	focuses	as	the	first	 tier	 (Boyatzis,	 1998).	 After	 that,	 grounded	 theory	 was	 used	 to	 construct	 the	theoretical	 sense	of	China’s	deliberative	 system	 in	 the	urban	village	 regeneration	and	regenerated	urban	village	community	governance	(Charmaz,	2011).		A	comprehensive	deductive	analysis	of	the	deliberative	process	is	conducted	using	the	conceptual	 scheme	 developed	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 According	 to	 Boyatzis	 (1998),	 thematic	analysis	is	a	process	for	encoding	qualitative	information	that	requires	a	list	of	themes.	As	Boyatzis	defines:	“A	theme	is	a	pattern	found	in	the	information	that	at	the	minimum	describes	and	organizes	possible	observations	or	at	the	maximum	interprets	aspects	of	the	 phenomenon	 (1998:	 vii)”.	 Thematic	 analysis	 enables	 observers,	 scholars,	 or	practitioners	to	use	multiple	types	of	data	and	information	in	a	systematic	manner,	which	increasing	their	sensitivity	or	accuracy	in	interpreting	and	understanding	observations	about	people,	events,	situations,	and	organization.	As	Boyatzis	(1998:	5)	suggests	that	the	thematic	analysis	could	be	used	as:	1. A	way	of	seeing.	2. A	way	of	making	sense	out	of	seemingly	unrelated	material.	3. A	way	of	analysing	qualitative	information.	4. A	way	of	systematically	observing	a	person,	an	interaction,	a	group,	a	situation,	an	organization,	or	a	culture.	5. A	way	of	converting	qualitative	information	into	quantitative	data.	There	are	variety	approaches	to	develop	a	thematic	code,	namely:	“theory	driven,	prior	data	or	prior	research	driven,	and	inductively”	(Boyatzis,	1998,	5).	The	themes	could	be	generated	 deductively	 from	 theory	 and	 prior	 research.	 This	 research	 adopted	 these	approaches	in	combination.	In	the	next	part,	I	will	explain	the	interaction	between	these	modes	of	developing	codes	 		
5.6.1	Analytical	scheme	and	coding	practice	 	The	 objective	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 evaluate	 the	 role	 of	 deliberation	 as	 a	 political	instrument	for	local	administration;	and	to	rethink	the	role	of	the	political-administrative	system	 of	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 complex	 social	
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development.	To	meet	this	objective,	the	investigation	should	cover	the	process,	outcome	and	 place	 of	 authoritarian	 deliberation	 in	 China’s	 complex	 governance	 system	 (see	Chapter	 4).	 At	 the	 beginning,	 each	 single	 deliberation	 such	 as	 a	 forum,	 meeting,	 or	consultation	will	be	examined	through	the	scheme	(see	Chapter	4,	Table	4.1)	to	identify	the	 types	 and	 forms	 of	 deliberation,	 and	 evaluate	 the	 outcome	 and	 qualities	 of	 these	deliberation	(see	Chapter	4,	Table	4.2).	Second,	to	explore	the	role	of	the	“deliberative	system”	 from	 the	 systemic	 perspective,	 the	 examination	 should	 go	 beyond	 a	 single	deliberation.	Based	on	the	basic	concept	of	a	deliberative	system	from	Dryzek	(2009):	public	space,	empowered	space,	transmission,	accountability	and	decisiveness	all	need	to	be	considered.	Meanwhile,	the	standards	for	a	good	deliberation	or	a	good	deliberative	system	 should	 have	Mansbridge’s	 three	 functions:	 the	 epistemic,	 ethical	 and	 political	functions.	 Finally,	 to	 discuss	 the	 role	 of	 deliberation	 and	 the	 deliberative	 system	 in	 a	comprehensive	 and	 complex	 social	 development	 process,	 the	 scheme	 of	 deliberative-capacity-building	 (Tang,	 2014)	 points	 out	 three	 indicators	 including	 social	 capacity,	
institutional	 capacity	 and	participatory	 capacity	 (see	 the	explanation	of	 the	 scheme	 in	Chapter	4).	The	introduction	above	explains	what	the	research	should	be	analysing;	the	following	discussion	will	turn	to	how	different	coding	practices	interact.		Qualitative	 data	 were	 analysed	 using	 a	 mixed-methods	 approach	 that	 combines	 the	deductive	 and	 inductive	 approaches.	 The	 conceptual	 scheme	 is	 used	 to	 deductively	interpret	 the	data	 as	 the	 first	 step.	 As	 soon	 as	 the	 data	 analysis	 process	 begun,	 these	criteria	will	be	reviewed	and	rewritten.	It	is	essential	to	check	their	compatibility	with	the	 raw	 information	 of	 this	 study.	 After	 this	 stage,	 this	 research	 proceed	 to	 detailed	evaluation	 of	 the	 achievements	 and	 consequences	 of	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	programme.	 Next,	 the	 inductive	 approach	 will	 be	 used	 to	 explore:	 “how	 democratic	
deliberation	 could	 contribute	 to	 this	 result”	 through	 the	grounded	 theory	method.	The	grounded	theory	is	a	method	involves	a	“systematic	process	of	theory-building”	through	the	“constant	comparative	analysis”,	in	order	to	explain	“action,	interaction	or	process	on	a	topic”	(Charmaz,	2011:	396).	As	this	research	aims	to	explore	and	understand	the	non-institutionalized	practice	of	democratic	deliberation	in	the	urban	village	redevelopment,	grounded	theory	is	used	as	it	can	interpret	and	explain	this	social	process	when	there	is	lack	 of	 an	 appropriate	 theory	 (Creswell,	 2017).	 Through	 taking	 full	 account	 of	
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participants’	interactions,	actions	and	views,	grounded	theory	generates	explanations	of	“how	people	are	experiencing	an	event,	incident	or	a	phenomenon”.	 		Charmaz	 (2006)	 points	 out	 that,	 the	 grounded	 theory	 method	 offers	 greater	 data	sensitivity	because	the	data	analysis	will	take	place	within	the	process	of	data	collection,	which	enables	the	researcher	to	rectify	the	observations	and	interviews.	Therefore,	this	research	started	inductive	analysis	as	soon	as	the	initial	data	was	collected,	because	this	arrangement	allows	the	researcher	to	redirect	the	data	collection	in	more	sensitive	ways.	It	should	be	noticed	that	the	grounded	theory	method	has	two	phases	of	coding,	namely	the	initial	coding	and	the	focused	coding.	As	soon	as	the	data	collection	began,	the	initial	coding	take	place.	During	the	initial	coding,	an	open	approach	is	used	by	remaining	open	minded	 while	 exploring	 what	 is	 going	 to	 happen	 in	 the	 following	 process,	 thereby	allowing	the	data	collection	to	be	redirected	when	new	ideas	are	generated.	
	As	will	be	identified	in	later	chapters,	the	“deliberative	system	approach”	was	used	in	this	study	 as	 a	 lens	 to	 interpret	 and	 understand	 the	 actors’	 actions	 systematically.	 This	approach	 emphasises	 that	 the	 previous	 work	 in	 this	 area	 employs	 the	 concepts	 of	“authoritarian	 deliberation”	 and	 a	 “deliberative	 system”	 in	 discussing	 Chinese	deliberation	practices.	However,	little	consideration	has	been	given	to	actors’	purposes,	needs	 and	 challenges,	 and	 to	 their	 interactions	 in	 the	 multi-scalar,	 “kaleidoscopic”	Chinese	governance	system	(Keane,	2017).	 In	addition,	each	urban	village	has	 its	own	conditions	and	characteristics	in	terms	of	its	geographical,	political,	social	and	economic	situation.	Thus,	a	two-stage	data	analysis	was	adopted:	first	of	all,	an	inductive	approach	was	adopted	to	understand	and	conceptualize	the	actors’	actions	as	the	first	tier	of	the	findings;	after	this	stage,	a	systematic	interpretation,	thematic	analysis	was	generated	to	regroup	and	interpret	the	findings	according	to	the	theoretical	framework.		
5.6.2	Deductive	analysis	The	conceptual	scheme	is	used	to	deductively	interpret	the	“deliberative	moments”.	This	section	will	take	the	“forms	of	deliberation”	as	an	example	to	explain	how	the	conceptual	scheme	 was	 used	 to	 interpret	 the	 deliberations.	 First	 of	 all,	 all	 of	 the	 deliberative	moments	during	the	regeneration	programmes:	public	consultation,	villagers’	congress,	villagers’	representatives’	conference,	coordination	meetings,	residents’	congress,	door-
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to-door	visiting,	stakeholders’	direct	participation	and	street	talking	were	summarized.	After	 that,	 according	 to	 the	 criteria	 (see	Chapter	4),	 these	deliberative	moments	were	grouped	into	formal	and	informal	deliberation:	 	
1. The	 formal	 deliberation:	 public	 consultation,	 villagers’	 congress,	 villagers’	representatives’	conference,	coordination	meetings	and	the	residents’	congress.	
2. The	informal	deliberation:	door-to-door	visiting,	stakeholders’	direct	participation	and	street	talking.	After	this,	the	formal	and	informal	deliberation	practices	identified	from	the	two	cases	were	mapped	into	different	domains	applicable	to	urban	village	regeneration	as	a	whole	(see	 Table	 5.1).	 This	 table	 not	 only	 contributes	 to	 mapping	 the	 role	 of	 a	 “single	deliberation”	in	the	real-world	practice	within	a	larger	complex	political-administrative	system;	 but	 also	 provides	 an	 overall	 picture	 of	 the	 deliberations	 in	 an	 urban	 village	regeneration	 programme.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 “forms	 of	 deliberation”,	 the	 deductive	analysis	will	also	be	applied	to	group	the	“single	deliberative	moments”	into	Type	one	and	Type	two	deliberation;	however,	the	detailed	results	are	too	extensive	to	display	in	this	thesis.	This	is	because	the	types	of	deliberation	should	be	specified	in	every	single	deliberative	 moment	 (such	 as:	 11/07/2005,	 village	 N,	 villagers’	 representatives’	conference)	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 “kind”	 of	 deliberative	 moment	 (such	 as:	 villagers’	representatives’	conference).		The	first	step	of	deductive	analysis	establishes	that	the	basis	for	this	study	is	that	it	maps	4	categories	of	deliberation	‘moments’	which	are	repeated	here	from	Chapter	4	(see	Table	5.2).	This	provides	an	 initial	 theoretical	understanding	of	 the	deliberation	practices	 in	China	within	an	authoritarian	political	context.	
	
Table	5.2:	Types	and	Forms	of	Deliberation		 Type	one	deliberation	 Type	two	deliberation	Formal	deliberation	 Type	one	in	a	formal	setting	 Type	two	in	a	formal	setting	Informal	deliberation	 Type	 one	 in	 an	 informal	setting	 Type	 two	 in	 an	 informal	setting		Secondly,	all	of	these	4	categories	of	deliberation	‘moments’	should	be	examined	through	the	scheme	that	combines	Type	two	(authenticity,	 inclusiveness	and	consequentiality)	
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criteria	to	evaluate	the	deliberative	outcome	and	Type	one	(DQI)	criteria,	and	map	these	deliberations	 in	 the	 real-world	practice	as	genuine	deliberations	and	non-deliberative	actions	as	well	as	high-quality	deliberations	and	low-quality	deliberation	(See	Table	5.3).	 	
	
Table	5.3:	Quality	and	Outcome	of	Deliberation		 High	quality	 Low	quality	Deliberative	outcome	 	 Deliberative	outcome	generated	by	high-quality	processes.	
Deliberative	outcome	generated	by	low-quality	deliberations.	Non-deliberative	outcome	 Non-deliberative	outcome	generated	by	high-quality	processes.	
Non-deliberative	outcome	generated	by	low-quality	processes.		As	indicated	above,	the	data	collected	by	the	interviews	and	documents	were	grouped	together	to	find	out	the	key	facts	of	important	events	and	moments.	The	DQI	provided	a	series	of	significant	indicators	for	understanding	these	events	and	moments.	For	example,	in	 16/03/2003,	 the	 Sunny	 District	 government	 arranged	 a	 meeting	 with	 the	 village	leadership	 to	 listen	 their	 comments.	Through	the	meeting	 records	and	 the	 interviews	with	some	participants,	the	facts	of	this	meeting	were	uncovered,	including:	participants’	information;	 participants’	 speeches,	 debates	 and	 the	 process	 of	 meetings;	 and	 the	comments	of	this	meeting	from	the	participants	and	villagers.	Assisted	by	the	DQI,	the	data	 were	 grouped	 according	 to	 the	 following	 indicators:	 (1),	 as	 shown	 in	 meeting	records,	 only	 village	 leaderships	 and	 government	 key	 officials	 are	 included;	 (2)	 the	meeting	records	show	that	most	of	the	speech	and	debate	provided	sufficient	reasons,	(3),	according	to	the	meeting	records,	most	of	the	arguments	are	focused	on	how	to	make	the	 project	 better,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 interviews,	 key	 participants	 agreed	 that	 they	attempt	 to	 integrate	 the	 narrow	 groups’	 interests	 together;	 (4),	 According	 to	 the	interviews,	the	participants	agree	that	the	atmosphere	relatively	friendly,	and	the	debate	is	open-minded;	(5)	According	to	the	records	and	interviews,	each	participants	speak	out	the	demands	of	 their	smaller	groups	 first,	and	they	attempted,	but	 fail	 to	compromise	with	others’	interests;	(6)	According	to	interviews,	some	debates	were	intense,	as	showed	in	the	records,	the	key	debate	points	were	highlighted;	(7)	According	to	the	records,	the	only	 further	action	agreed	was	that	both	of	 the	government	and	the	village	leadership	
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should	go	to	public	and	listen	to	villagers’	voice.	Thus,	compared	with	other	events,	the	quality	of	the	process	and	the	outcome	of	the	event	could	be	understand.	 		After	that,	it	is	also	important	to	explain	how	different	evaluative	criteria	(types	and	forms	
of	deliberation	as	well	 as	quality	and	 outcome	 of	deliberation)	overlap.	First	of	 all,	 the	“meeting	in	16/03/2003”	has	a	formal	meeting	proceedings,	and	took	place	in	a	formal	setting,	 thus,	 this	 events	 belongs	 to	 the	 “Type	 one	 and	 formal	 deliberation”.	 Second,	compared	with	other	events,	according	to	the	conceptual	scheme,	this	“deliberation”	is	relatively	 “authentic,	 inclusive,	 and	 consequential”,	 and	 it	 could	 meet	 the	 standard	 of	“deliberative	outcome”.	Meanwhile,	compared	with	other	events,	the	process	respected	the	 different	 groups,	 demands	 and	 counterarguments	 and	 being	 open	 to	 the	representatives.	This	means	that	this	“deliberation”	also	has	a	high-quality	process.	Thus,	the	moment	of	“meeting	in	16/03/2003”	could	be	understand	as	“Type	one	and	formal	deliberation”	which	got	a	“deliberative	outcome”	on	the	“reallocation	agenda”	generated	by	a	“high	quality	process”.		Therefore,	 the	 deductive	 analysis	 above	 not	 only	 specifies	 the	 types	 and	 forms	 of	deliberation,	 but	 it	 also	 maps	 them	 onto	 a	 larger,	 complex,	 political-administrative	system	with	an	evaluation	of	the	outcome	and	process.	This	provides	an	initial	theoretical	understanding	 of	 the	 deliberation	 and	 deliberative	 system	 around	 urban	 village	regeneration;	 however,	 more	 in-depth	 research	 should	 be	 done	 to	 discuss	 how	deliberative	 the	 deliberation	 and	 the	 deliberative	 system	 around	 the	 urban	 village	regeneration	is.	Therefore,	an	inductive	analysis	is	necessary	to	explore	and	understand	the	 non-institutionalized	 practice	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 in	 urban	 village	redevelopment,	 in	particular,	when	a	 theory	 is	not	available	 in	many	cases	 (Creswell,	2017).	 		
5.6.3	Inductive	analysis	 	As	soon	as	the	data	collection	had	taken	place,	the	initial	data	analysis	began.	Grounded	theory	allows	researchers	to	remain	open-minded	while	exploring	new	ideas	emerging	from	the	data	rather	than	emanating	from	a	pre-existing	framework.	Thus,	the	data	was	coded	line-by-line.	For	example,	an	interview	piece	with	a	former	village	cadre:	“When	we	
just	moved	to	this	community,	the	offensives	[sic.]	like	high-altitude	waste	disposal	are	very	
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common,	and	 triggered	many	potential	 risks”	was	classified	as	 ‘a	 typical	offence	with	
rural	characteristics’	by	a	newspaper.”	The	code	“offence	with	rural	characteristics”	was	developed	for	this	statement.	This	code	was	further	developed	in	later	interviews	with	villagers,	officials	and	community	staff.	The	actions	like	“throw	garbage	from	high	places”,	 “feeding	 chicken	 on	 a	 public	 staircase”,	 etc.	 were	 grouped	 into	 the	 code	 of	“offence	 with	 rural	 characteristics”.	 Similarly,	 other	 initial	 codes	 were	 constantly	developed	such	as	“refuse	to	participate”,	“personal	credits”,	and	so	on.	 		Subsequent	to	the	initial	coding,	the	focused	coding	began,	which	implies	the	use	of	the	most	considerable	or	frequently	employed	codes	in	order	to	“sift	through	large	amounts	of	data”	(Charmaz,	2006:	57).	With	regard	to	this	stage,	more	conceptual,	directed	and	chosen	codes	were	figured	out,	whereas	unanticipated	concepts	and	ideas	emerged	via	the	 comparison	 with	 one	 another	 of	 codes	 and	 data.	 For	 example,	 the	 observation	“efficiency	 as	 the	 priority”	 was	 suggested	 to	 conceptualize	 the	 constraints	 of	 local	government	in	urban	village	regeneration	that	were	imposed	by	the	regional	government.	More	specific	codes	such	as	“propagation	of	pressure”,	“vertical	command”,	“ideological	propaganda”,	and	so	on,	were	developed	to	compare	two	cases.	Then,	a	category	of	“top	priority	in	policy	making”	was	developed.	‘Efficiency	as	the	priority’	then	explained	the	various	 tactics	 local	 government	 used	 in	 balancing	 “deliberative”	 and	 “authoritarian”	tendencies	in	conflict	solving.	In	our	research,	concepts	such	as	“efficiency	as	the	priority”,	“rebuilding	public	trust”,	“credits	of	personal	authority”,	“participation	strike”	and	so	on	were	developed	to	explain	the	subtle	and	sometimes	contradictory	practices	encountered	in	the	field.	 		Facing	extensive	amounts	of	memos	and	coding,	the	next	step	for	the	data	analysis	was	to	compare	the	data,	leading	towards	making	conjectures	or	hypotheses	regarding	the	categories	that	compared	both	differences	and	similarities	in	the	two	empirical	cases	for	further	data	collection.	Four	categories	for	comparison	were	identified,	namely	“conflict	type”,	 “challenges	 and	 constraints”,	 “participatory	 process”	 and	 “role	 of	 the	 collective	economy”.	 After	 the	 comparison,	 two	 themes	 regarding	 the	 power	 of	 the	 collective	economy	were	generated.	Through	a	comparison	between	the	two	cases,	concepts	such	as	 “deliberation	 is	 a	 political	 instrument”	 and	 “deliberation	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 complex	political-administrative	system”	were	highlighted	in	the	data	analysis.	This	advanced	the	
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theoretical	 analysis	 in	 “villagers	 to	 government	 relationship”	 and	 “deliberation	 to	 the	political-administrative	system”.	
	
5.7	Accessibility	and	Research	Ethics19	Access	to	officials	is	a	perennial	issue	in	empirical	research	on	Chinese	governance.	In	the	hierarchical	culture	of	public	administration	in	China,	officials	are	secure	in	their	official	role	and	have	little	inclination	to	talk	to	outsiders.	Moreover,	such	talk	carries	risks	that	incautious	 statements	 to	 researchers	 might	 leak	 and	 result	 in	 sanctions.	 A	 defensive	attitude	is	thus	the	safest	strategy.	This	problem	was	addressed	in	several	ways.	First,	the	researcher	was	embedded	in	local	social	networks.	The	shared	academic	background	of	the	mayor	and	the	researcher	has	been	mentioned	above	and	helped	in	accessing	other	officials.	 In	general,	 it	was	 found	that	 lower-level	officials	were	open	to	discussing	the	practical	obstacles	to	deliberation	with	the	researcher	who	emphasized	to	all	participants	that,	although	a	Party	member,	he	did	not	represent	any	official	entity	or	interest	group	in	this	research.	The	researcher	had	enrolled	in	the	Party	as	an	undergraduate	student,	however,	this	did	not	mean	representing	the	Party’s	position	and	interests.	In	fact,	the	researcher	declared	himself	independent	of	any	stakeholder	in	this	fieldwork	although	the	 quotes	 in	 this	 thesis	were	 to	 be	 shared	with	 officials	 from	 local	 government	who	approved	them.	Regarding	villagers,	the	decision	to	live	for	3	months	in	a	regenerated	community	 was	 initially	 regarded	 by	 some	 villagers	 as	 making	 the	 researcher	 a	government	official;	however,	by	emphasizing	his	independence,	it	was	possible	to	gain	the	villagers’	trust.	The	purpose	of	this	period	of	participant	observation	was	to	get	first-hand	access	to	the	villagers’	experiences	of	deliberation	within	the	regeneration	process.	In	this	way,	the	researcher	was	able	to	participate	in	various	key	meetings	and	talk	to	many	villagers.	It	should	be	noted	that,	in	order	to	protect	participants’	identities,	names	and	places	have	been	changed.		
                         
19 This	section	is	developed	from	a	part	of	the	author’s	publication,	see:	Niu,	P.,	&	Wagenaar,	H.	(2018)	The	limits	of	authoritarian	rule:	policy	making	and	deliberation	in	urban	village	regeneration	in	China.	Japanese	Journal	of	
Political	Science.	19(4),	678-693.	
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5.8	Conclusion	and	methodological	significance	This	 chapter	 has	 introduced	 the	 methodological	 approach,	 including	 the	 research	questions,	 research	methods,	 case	 selections	 and	 the	methods,	 process	 and	 approach	used	for	data	collection,	sampling	and	analysis.	Two	in-depth	case	studies	were	taken	which	aimed	at	generating	conceptual	ideas	on	the	relationship	between	China’s	political-administrative	system	and	deliberation,	as	well	as	the	relationship	between	the	public	and	the	government.	As	identified	in	Chapter	4,	the	urban	village	regeneration	could	be	reviewed	as	a	part	of	China’s	complex	political-administrative	system.	This	research	uses	grounded	 theory	 (inductive	 analysis)	 and	 thematic	 analysis	 (deductive	 analysis)	 to	interpret	the	policies	as	represented	in	these	two	cases	in	order	to	conceptualize	China’s	deliberations	and	investigate	the	governance	system	as	a	whole.		Previous	work	 in	 this	 area	employed	 the	 concepts	of	 “authoritarian	deliberation”	and	“deliberative	 system”	 in	 discussing	 Chinese	 deliberation	 practices.	 However,	 little	consideration	 has	 been	 given	 to	 actors’	 purposes,	 needs	 and	 challenges,	 and	 to	 their	interactions	 in	 the	 multi-scalar	 Chinese	 governance	 system.	 In	 addition,	 each	 urban	village	 has	 its	 particular	 conditions	 and	 characteristics	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 geographical,	political,	social	and	economic	situation.	Thus,	this	research	adopts	an	inductive	approach	to	understand	and	conceptualize	the	actors’	actions	thereby	contributing	to	the	literature	on	deliberative	systems,	as	well	as	to	deliberation	and	policy-making	in	China.		 	
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Chapter	Six:	The	Introduction	of	Two	Cases:	Social	and	
Political	Background	and	Forms	of	Deliberation	
	
6.1	Introduction	This	chapter	will	present	two	cases	of	urban	village	regeneration	in	Sunny	District.	As	I	mentioned	 in	 the	previous	 section,	 the	policy	 context	of	different	 cases	varies	greatly	from	village	to	village.	Therefore,	in	this	chapter,	I	will	specify	the	political-administrative	context	of	these	two	cases.	This	chapter	is	aiming	for	introducing	the	background	of	these	two	cases:	Village	N	and	Community	Q.	This	background	information	on	the	political	and	social	context	is	important	for	understanding	the	later	policy	interpretation	(Chapter	7	and	 Chapter	 8).	 In	 section	 6.2	 I	 will	 introduce	 the	 political-administrative	 context	 of	Sunny	District,	and	relate	it	specifically	to	each	of	the	cases.	In	Section	6.3,	I	will	describe	the	key	institutional	innovation	introduced	by	the	local	government,	which	is	the	creation	of	 a	 ‘Command	 Centre’,	 the	 temporary	 headquarters	 for	 making	 decisions	 about	demolition,	compensation	and	reallocation	 for	the	most	 important	programme.	 In	this	section,	 I	 will	 also	 explain	 the	 role	 of	 deliberative	 institute	 and	 instrument	 in	 the	‘Command	Centre’.	In	section	6.4,	I	will	describe	how	the	formal	and	informal	democratic	deliberations	 were	 adapted	 to	 enable	 Sunny	 District	 government	 to	 overcome	 these	challenges	by	solving	the	conflicts	of	each.	Finally,	in	section	6.5,	I	will	introduce	the	key	participants	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme.	 	
	
6.2	The	Political-Administrative	Context	of	Urban	Village	Redevelopment.	 	As	 stated	 in	 chapter	 2,	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1970s,	 China’s	 local	 governments	 have	prioritised	 large	 infrastructure	 projects	 to	 attract	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 investments.	Since	then,	 the	main	economic	resources	 for	local	government	have	transformed	from	agricultural	 to	 large	 engineering	 projects	 on	 the	 one	 hand;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 local	government	also	expects	the	industrial	investment	will	contribute	the	cities	in	terms	of	revenues	 and	 job	 creation	 opportunities.	 To	 gain	 a	 competitive	 advantage	 over	 other	cities,	project	management	became	 the	 instrument	of	 choice	 for	 local	 governments	 to	create	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 such	 projects.	 Project	 management	 emerged	 from	 a	generally	 shared	 entrepreneurial	 image	 of	 governance.	 In	 governance-by-project,	
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management	 requires	 that	 large	 tasks	 are	 broken	 down	 into	 smaller	 operating	procedures	which	are	allocated	to	different	people	(or	small	groups).	These	persons	or	groups	 will	 have	 some	 autonomy	 to	 accomplish	 their	 task,	 but	 they	 are	 also	 held	responsible	 for	 it.	 This	 devolved	 operating	 structure	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 regime	 of	intense	monitoring.	Project	management	also	introduces	efficiency	as	a	dominant	value	into	the	practice	and	discourse	of	governance.	In	my	interviews	with	government	officials,	planners	and	village	leaders	of	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme,	efficiency	was	the	 first	 priority.	 All	 actors	 aspired	 to	 complete	 the	 process	 as	 fast	 as	 they	 could,	preferably	before	the	deadline.	Terms	such	as	“time”,	“speed”	and	“efficiency”	frequently	appeared	 in	 interviews,	 government	 documents	 and	 officials’	 speeches,	 even	 in	 some	cases	which	were	not	urgent	at	all.	In	the	following	chapters,	I	will	illustrate	how	project-based	governance	operated	through	the	2006	and	2010	urban	redevelopments	in	Sunny	District.	 	
6.2.1	Village	N	Village	N	is	located	in	the	centre	of	Sunny	District	and	is	one	of	the	largest	urban	villages	in	the	city	centre.	It	is	located	in	the	bustling	commercial	area	of	the	upper	block,	but	for	a	long	time	in	the	two	old	villages	of	Village	A	and	Village	B,	these	are	sub-units	of	Village	N.	Especially	in	the	Old	Village	B,	roads	were	poor,	vehicles	were	impassable,	drainage	facilities	were	backward,	and	infrastructure	was	poor.	There	was	sewage	crossflow	and	garbage	everywhere	and	these	conditions	seriously	affected	the	productivity	and	life	of	villagers.	In	order	to	speed	up	the	urban-rural	integration	instigated	by	Central	Province,	thoroughly	 change	 the	 long	 standing	 phenomenon	 of	 dirty	 disorder	 and	 improve	 the	living	condition	of	the	villagers,	Village	N	carried	out	the	demolition	and	regeneration	of	the	two	old	villages	in	two	phases	at	the	end	of	March	and	April	in	2006	and	2007.	Before	the	regeneration,	Village	N	had	an	area	of	2.1	square	kilometres	with	a	population	of	1150,	none	of	whom	was	engaged	in	agriculture.	This	is	because	the	Village	N	holds	a	significant	geographical	advantage;	it	next	to	the	District	Government,	which	is	the	administrative	and	economic	centre	in	Sunny	District.	Figure	1	(I	will	add	it	later)	shows	the	map	of	old	Village	 N,	 which	 was	 next	 to	 the	 district	 government.	 Because	 of	 this	 geographical	advantage,	 the	 district	 government	 had	 acquired	 the	 agricultural	 acreage	 since	 1980.	Most	of	 the	villagers	worked	 in	 industries	and	government	branches,	and	some	of	 the	villagers	 run	 small	 businesses	 near	 or	 within	 their	 village,	 some	
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further	outside.	As	an	urban	village,	Village	N	was	one	of	the	smallest	villages	in	terms	of	jurisdiction	area	in	the	Sunny	District;	however,	it	was	the	richest	one,	hosting	abundant	family-based	 enterprises,	 including	 convenience	 stores,	 hotels	 and	 even	 international	trade.	 	
As	one	of	its	most	significant	characteristics,	Village	N	has	an	extremely	strong	collective	economy,	which	 holds	 commercial	 real	 estate	 and	 properties	 on	 a	 considerable	 scale	within	Sunny	District.	During	the	District’s	fast	expansion,	the	site	fell	within	its	Central-administration.	 This	 brought	 huge	 difficult	 for	 the	 disctrict	 government	 to	 request	building	land	in	Village	N,	due	to	the	superiority	of	the	location	and	high	commercial	value	of	the	land	around	it.	Since	the	1980s,	the	government	requisitioned	the	farming	land	of	Village	 N	 to	 develop	 the	 urban	 area;	 the	 villagers	 and	 village	 committee	 received	 a	considerable	amount	of	compensation	and	used	it	to	develop	their	own	commercial	real	estate	 programme.	 As	 the	 map	 shows,	 there	 were	 many	 self-developed	 market	 and	commercial	buildings	within	their	old	village.	Unlike	the	illegal	or	informal	settlements	in	other	urban	villages,	the	district	government	officially	authorized	these	buildings	as	their	 collective	 operated	 enterprises	 (a	 kind	 of	 village	 collective).	 These	 commercial	developments	provided	abundant	collective	income	and	job	opportunities	for	Village	N	as	 a	 corporate	 entity,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 individual	 indigenous	 villagers.	 The	 indigenous	villagers	could	get	the	annual	income	from	their	bonus	shares,	which	were	higher	than	their	previous	agricultural	income.	 		In	contrast	 to	 the	superiority	of	 the	geographical	 location	and	economic	development,	however,	the	old	Village	N	(residential	area)	was	regarded	as	run-down,	chaotic	and	dirty.	The	physical	characteristics	of	old	Village	N	are	similar	with	the	other	urban	villages	in	China,	such	as	back-to-back	residential	buildings,	dirty	and	narrow	streets,	unmanaged	retail	activities	on	the	streets	and	densely	built	residential	buildings	with	poor	quality.	These	run	down	and	poor	neighbourhoods	had	a	serious	negative	impact	on	the	image	of	Sunny	District.	In	2001,	Sunny	District	initiated	a	political	movement	of	administrative	jurisdiction	reform,	which	unified	the	urban	governance	system	as	“street-office	to	the	residential	 community”	 see	 (chapter	 3).	 Before	 that,	 Village	 N	 was	 under	 the	administration	of	Town	X;	in	2001,	the	Sunny	District	government	divided	Town	X	into	4	Street	offices,	namely,	CR	street	office,	JY	Road	street	office,	XA	Road	street	office,	and	IR	
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street	office	(industrial	development	zone).	Since	2001,	the	government	has	attempted	to	integrate	Village	N	under	the	administration	of	the	District	government	as	an	urban	community	(see	chapter	4).	Therefore,	since	2003,	 the	District	government	has	begun	attempting	 to	 redevelop	Village	N	by	 collaborating	with	 the	private	developer.	This	 is	because	the	superiority	of	the	geographical	location	of	Village	N	might	be	profitable	for	the	developer	and	generate	considerable	revenue	for	the	government.	Beyond	that,	the	redevelopment	project	could	improve	the	physical	image	of	the	city	centre.	However,	as	I	will	discuss	later,	because	of	strong	public	opposition	and	controversies	over	the	reform	plan,	 the	 Sunny	 District	 government	 completed	 the	 Village	 N	 regeneration	 land	expropriation	by	2007.	Indeed,	the	government	spent	3	years	from	2003	persuading	both	the	village	authorities	and	the	villagers	to	accept	the	regeneration	agenda.	 		The	physical	changes	of	the	urban	village	were	significant.	By	April	2006,	Old	Village	N1	(part	 of	 Village	 N)	 was	 demolished	 with	 very	 limited	 conflicts,	 which	 affected	 175	households	 and	more	 than	 70,000	 square	metres	 of	 buildings.	 Since	 2006,	 these	 175	households	 in	 three	 villager	 groups	 in	 the	 Old	 Village	 built	 their	 newly	 regenerated	residential	community.	The	first	villager	group	has	built	10	new	resettlement	buildings	with	 a	 floor	 area	 of	 38000	 square	metres	 and	 has	 built	 420	 suites,	 while	 the	 second	villager	group	has	built	five	new	resettlement	buildings	with	a	floor	area	of	28000	square	metres,	 with	 a	 completed	 size	 of	 312	 suites.	 The	 third	 villager	 group	 built	 a	 new	resettlement	building	with	a	floor	area	of	8800	square	meters	and	84	suites.	The	three	groups	of	residents	moved	into	the	new	houses	in	May	2007.	In	April	2007,	Village	N2	(another	 part	 of	 Village	 N)	 was	 demolished	 successfully:	 242	 houses	 and	more	 than	90,000	square	metres	of	buildings	were	demolished.	The	fourth	villager	group	built	11	resettlement	buildings	with	a	 floor	area	of	55000	square	metres	and	built	454	suites,	while	the	fifth	villager	group	built	eight	resettlement	buildings	with	a	floor	area	of	52000	square	metres	and	completed	448	suites.	The	two	groups	of	demolition	moved	into	the	new	buildings	around	June	2008.	Beyond	the	physical	changes,	as	I	will	discuss	in	this	thesis	later,	process	of	urban	village	regeneration	could	reflect	 the	process	of	political	change	in	the	state-led	rural	society	under	the	background	of	modernization.		Compared	 with	 the	 compensation	 plan	 to	 be	 introduced	 later,	 the	 design	 of	 the	community	is	relatively	smooth	and	there	is	no	significant	conflict.	The	village	committee	
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will	build	a	resettlement	housing	in	batches	according	to	the	former	villager	group	as	an	administrative	 unit.	 The	 quantity,	 area,	 and	 size	 of	 the	 resettlement	 housing	 were	calculated	 by	 each	 villager	 group.	 The	 designing	 of	 the	 residential	 community	 is	undertaken	 by	 the	 developer.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 2005,	 the	 developer	 consulted	 Village	 N	Village	Committee	on	the	design	plan	for	the	resettlemenCommunity	T	according	to	the	compensation	 standard	 for	 demolition.	 The	 village	 committee	 hopes	 that	 the	 new	community	 will	 satisfy	 the	 design	 plan	 as	 much	 as	 possible.	 This	 is	 because,	 in	 the	demolishment	and	compensation	process,	 the	 relationship	between	village	 committee	and	the	villagers	were	getting	worse	(see	Chapter	7).	The	village	committee	attempted	to	improve	the	relationship	between	villagers	and	them.	Unlike	the	 former	urban	village,	this	 newly-built	 regenerated	 residential	 community	 is	 a	 clean,	modern	 and	 gentrified	urban	residential	community	with	various	supporting	facilities.	 	Figure	6.1:	regenerated	village	N	community	 	
	Source:	data	collected	from	fieldwork.	The	new	village	settlement	community	is	18500	square	metres,	with	27	bluestone-paved	roads	and	117	street	lamps	inside	this	area,	including	35	Wi-Fi	activated	street	lamp.	In	addition,	there	is	a	14500-square-metre	green	area	with	a	variety	of	plants	and	trees,	and	
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other	urban	facilities	like	36	garbage	bins,	8	sets	of	electronic	monitoring	equipment	and	235	 CCTV	 cameras.	 According	 to	 the	 final	 redevelopment	 plan,	 the	 Sunny	 District	government	 forfeited	 the	 revenue	 from	 urban	 land	 value.	 This	 arrangement	 aims	 to	protect	both	villagers’	and	developers’	benefits	to	limit	the	conflict	between	villagers	and	the	government.	After	the	regeneration,	Village	N	only	reserved	limited	parts	of	the	land	for	relocating	their	villagers;	other	parts	were	acquired	by	the	government	to	build	the	central	 library,	 youth	 palace,	 Zuozhao	 Park,	 Aluminium-City	 Park,	 and	 other	infrastructure.	 The	 regeneration	 project	 involved	 two	 residential	 sites	with	 a	 total	 of	150000	square	metres’	floor	area	of	the	properties,	including	the	417	villagers’	houses	and	village	collective-owned	3	hotels,	2	restaurants,	1	supermarket	and	other	mixed-use	commercial	buildings.	Apart	from	the	mixed-use	commercial	buildings,	Village	N	also	has	hundreds	 of	 retail	 places	 next	 to	 the	 Central	 Road.	 These	 collective	 properties	 were	rented	and	managed	by	the	village	committee	for	generating	collective	income,	since	the	village	 committee	 functioned	 as	 a	 proprietor	 and	was	 known	 as	 “collective	 economy	manager”.	The	village	committee	exemplifies	a	distinguishing	type	of	“village-cooperative”	in	China.	Village	N,	was	typical	of	this	type	of	village-cooperative,	featuring	firms	owned,	controlled,	 and	operated	by	 the	 indigenous	villagers	 for	 their	own	benefit.	Each	adult	villager	is	recognized	as	an	individual	member,	who	will	enjoy	equity	shares,	meanwhile,	the	participation	of	the	dicision	making	is	through	the	basis	of	the	one-member,	one-vote	principle.	As	the	richest	village	and	strongest	village-cooperative	in	Sunny	District,	from	2002	to	2005,	Village	N	had	10,928,3367	CNY	(around	1,300,0000	GBP)	total	 income,	including	 3,607,6757	 CNY	 (around	 400,0000	 GBP)	 disposable	 income.	 The	 village	committee	distributed	1,367,6252	CNY	(around	151,000	GBP)	to	indigenous	villagers	as	welfare.	 According	 to	 this	 plan,	 after	 the	 redevelopment,	 the	 Village	 N	 should	 be	transformed	into	an	urban	neighbourhood	community	in	terms	of	geographical	location,	administrative	relations,	management	methods	and	residents'	lifestyles.	However,	as	will	be	discussed	in	later	chapters,	the	physical	development	cannot	directly	contribute	to	this	transformation.	 the	Village	N	Committee	was	revoked	 in	the	governance	system,	 their	rural	governance	system	was	also	apparently	terminated	in	the	regenerated	urban	village.	The	urban	villages	and	villagers	are	far	from	integrated	into	the	urban	society,	and	the	integration	 the	 regenerated	 village	 into	 the	 urban	 governance	 system	 is	 far	 from	complete.		
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6.2.2	Community	T	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	As	I	stated	in	Chapter	5,	since	the	great	economic	crisis	of	2008	Sunny	District	faces	a	significant	 challenge	 of	 economic	 decline.	 Before	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 the	 economic	backbone	 of	 Sunny	 District	 was	 the	 aluminium	 industry.	 The	 economic	 crisis	 forced	Sunny	District	government	to	find	another	economic	growth	point.	Based	on	the	former	Sunny	 District	 Airport,	 Sunny	 District	 government	 decided	 to	 develop	 the	 aircraft	factories	and	 regenerate	 the	 regional	 airport.	The	 challenge	 for	Sunny	District	was	 to	create	enough	vacant	land	to	do	this.	Based	on	the	industrial	development	zone,	in	late	2010	to	early	2011,	supported	by	 the	provincial	 government,	 the	district	 government	made	a	redevelopment	plan	around	the	old	Sunny	District	Airport.	According	to	the	Plan,	before	the	end	of	2013,	Sunny	District	should	expropriate	the	5.3	square	kilometres	of	land	 around	 the	 airport.	 Before	 the	 end	 of	 2020,	 Sunny	 District	 will	 develop	 a	 22.3-square-kilometres	 aircraft	 industry	 development	 zone.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Happy	 City	Municipal	 Government	 and	 the	H	Provincial	 Government	 put	 forward	 an	 air-industry	development	plan.	Both	Happy	City	Municipal	Government	and	H	Provincial	Government	required	Sunny	District	to	speed	up	the	land	expropriation	in	order	to	set	up	the	newly	planned	 aircraft	 industrial	 development	 zone.	 The	 district	 government	 was	 acutely	aware	that	if	it	could	not	finish	this	task	within	an	agreed	period	–	in	this	case	before	the	end	of	2013	-	they	would	lose	this	development	opportunity.	
Making	the	desired	infrastructure	investment	possible	required	many	efforts:	to	acquire	a	large	tract	of	land	to	build	up	the	factories	and	the	local	airports;	to	release	the	land	with	 minimum	 land-transfer	 fees;	 to	 facilitate	 development	 through	 tax	 advantages,	improved	 water	 and	 energy	 supply;	 and	 to	 create	 better	 transport	 and	 housing	infrastructure.	To	provide	land	for	the	aircraft	enterprises	to	build	their	factories	and	the	local	airport,	it	was	necessary	for	Sunny	District	to	acquire	all	urban	villages	within	the	industrial	 development	 zone.	 This	 included	 the	 rural	 land	 of	 the	 villages	 around	 the	designated	 area.	 The	 first	 important	 challenge	 of	 expropriating	 villages’	 land	 is	 to	reallocate	 and	 compensate	 the	 villagers,	 to	 persuade	 them	 to	 accept	 the	 agenda.	 The	Provincial	government	put	a	great	deal	of	pressure	upon	the	Sunny	District	government	to	 complete	 the	 land	acquisition	process	as	 fast	 as	possible.	According	 to	government	meeting	records,	the	Mayor	of	the	district	commanded	that:	“We	need	to	strictly	adhere	to	the	time	schedule,	to	ensure	that	the	demolition	work	in	our	district	will	be	completed	
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in	2013.	This	applies	in	particular	to	urban	village	regeneration	projects.	The	relocation	of	villagers,	 the	demolition	of	 the	old	village	and	other	work	need	 to	 speed	up.	These	works	should	as	much	as	possible	be	finished	ahead	of	schedule.”	 	
In	this	context,	the	flagship	programme	for	Sunny	District	was	to	relocate	the	three	urban	villages	within	the	industrial	development	zone	into	a	newly-planned	urban	residential	community.	Unlike	Village	N,	these	villages	did	not	have	a	superior	geographical	location;	instead,	because	these	villages	were	located	far	from	the	city	centre,	it	was	difficult	for	the	government	to	find	a	developer	to	invest	in	this	project.	In	addition,	these	villages	had	low	density,	and	some	villagers	even	had	some	space	for	vegetable	cultivation.	Therefore,	the	 government	 decided	 to	 self-fund	 the	 redevelopment	 project,	 because	 a	redevelopment	 and	 relocation	 project	 could	 create	 considerable	 space	 for	 the	government	 to	 realise	 to	 the	aircraft-related	 industries.	 In	 contrast	 to	Village	N,	 these	three	villages,	namely,	Village	N1,	Village	N2,	and	Village	N3	were	relatively	small	and	economically	less	developed.	None	of	them	owned	a	strong	enough	collective	economy	to	provide	a	better	welfare	package	for	their	villagers	than	the	government.	Therefore,	the	redevelopment	agenda	did	not	seem	problematic	at	the	very	beginning.	According	to	the	agenda,	these	three	villages	were	demolished	on	31th	May	2012;	after	the	demolition,	the	villagers	 were	 relocated	 to	 the	 newly-built	 community,	 which	 has	 102	 residential	buildings	with	3094	apartment	and	145	retail	shops	for	4388	residents	from	the	three	villages.	As	stated	before,	the	task	of	the	government	was	to	create	more	space	within	a	limited	time,	therefore,	the	government	took	“promoting	efficiency”	as	their	first	priority	during	the	implementation	process.	The	detail	will	be	presented	in	later	sections.	
6.3	Policy	innovation	To	promote	efficiency,	the	local	government	employed	various	institutional	innovations.	One	 of	 the	most	 important	 innovations	was	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 ‘Command	 Centre’,	 the	temporary	 headquarters	 for	 making	 decisions	 about	 demolition,	 compensation	 and	relocation	for	the	most	important	programme.	As	I	will	explain	later,	the	command	centre	is	 a	 flexible	 political	 institution	 that	 can	 adjust	 its	 political	 course	 as	 needed,	 either	through	 authoritarian	 vertical	 commands	 or	 through	 democratic	 deliberations	 and	discussions.	
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6.3.1	Creation	of	the	‘Command	Centre’	 	The	 ‘command	 centre’	was	 generated	 from	 the	 ‘military	 command	 system’,	 aiming	 at	centralizing	 the	 power	 and	 resources	 to	 accomplish	 their	 political	 task	 in	 the	 most	effective	way.	This	is	because,	as	a	project-driven	state,	China’s	government	(both	central	and	local)	will	set	up	several	key	projects	as	the	tasks	for	the	year.	In	this	case,	the	key	task	for	2006	in	Sunny	District	was	to	complete	the	land	acquisition	of	Village	N	smoothly,	and	the	key	task	of	the	working	year	2010-2011	in	Sunny	District	was	to	complete	all	the	rural	 land	 acquisition	 within	 the	 district.	 Functionally,	 the	 ‘command	 centre’	 is	 an	effective	 platform	 for	 key	 participants	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus	 and	 unify	 them	 through	ideology,	communication	or	even	sometimes,	through	a	vertical	authoritarian	command.	Members	of	the	Command	Centre	were	selected	by	the	district	government	and	consist	of	representatives	of	relevant	departments,	street	(township)	level	government,	village	leaders,	planning	experts,	and	design	organizations	(the	public	sector,	Tongji	University	Planning	 Institute	 for	 the	Master	plan;	 and	 in	 the	private	 sector,	Yaxing	 company,	 for	community	 development).	 As	 the	 land	 acquisition	 programme	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	important	tasks	of	the	District	government,	which	always	generates	complicated	conflict	between	 different	 parties,	 the	 Sunny	 District	 government	 selected	 one	 of	 the	 deputy	mayors	 of	 the	 district	 as	 the	 head	 of	 the	 command	 centre.	 The	 Command	 Centre	exemplifies	 the	 permanent	 tension	 between	 authoritarian	 rule	 and	 the	 decentred,	deliberative	decision-making	process	that	characterizes	the	village	regeneration	process	in	all	its	phases.	Caught	between	awareness	that	the	process	of	demolition,	compensation,	and	relocation	is	exceedingly	complicated,	the	all-important	diktat	of	efficiency,	and	the	requirement	 of	 at	 least	 a	 minimum	 degree	 of	 legitimacy,	 the	 Command	 Centre	 is	structured	as	a	platform	 for	 collaboration	and	work	coordination.	Therefore,	 as	 I	will	discuss	 later,	 the	 command	 centre	 is	 a	 flexible	 political	 institution	 that	 can	 adjust	 its	political	course	as	needed,	either	through	authoritarian	vertical	commands	or	through	democratic	deliberations	and	discussions.	
It	 is	 in	 the	working	 relationships	between	 these	parties	 (the	District	 government,	 the	Command	Centre,	and,	as	we	will	see,	the	Village	Committee)	that	the	ambivalences	of	the	intricately	 and	 densely	 scaled	 Chinese	 government	 system	 -	 and	 the	 processes	 of	deliberation	 that	 are	 inscribed	 in,	 and	 shaped	 by,	 its	 rules,	 procedures	 and	operating	routines	-	come	to	the	fore	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010,	48).	First,	in	principle,	the	relationship	
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between	the	members	of	the	Command	Centre	and	District	government	is	cooperative	rather	than	subordinate.	Although	the	District	government	can	in	principle	overrule	the	Command	Centre,	the	broad	composition	of	the	latter,	meant	to	bestow	legitimacy	on	the	actions	 of	 government,	 suggest	 that	 the	 force	 of	 optimal	 information	 and	 the	 better	argument	should	resolves	conflicts	between	members.	Yet,	 as	we	will	see,	 the	District	Government	 steers	 the	 Command	 Centre’s	 activities	 by	 imposing	 a	 performance	 and	monitoring	 regime	 upon	 it.	 Second,	 because	 of	 its	 central	 and	 ambiguous	 role	 in	 the	regeneration	process	and	the	deliberation,	negotiation	and	bargaining	with	other	parties	with	which	 it	 engages,	we	need	 to	give	 special	 attention	 to	 the	position	of	 the	village	committee.	According	to	China’s	constitution,	the	villages	and	village	committees	are	self-governed	organizations.	They	are	not	subordinate	branches	of	any	level	of	government.	The	village	leadership	(both	the	head	of	the	Village	Committee	and	the	secretary	of	Village	Party	Branch)	is	democratically	elected	by	the	villagers,	rather	than	directly	nominated	by	the	upper	level	of	government.	On	the	other	hand,	to	ensure	the	leadership	of	the	Party,	the	 hierarchically	 higher	 township	 Party	 branch	 retains	 the	 power	 of	 dismissing	 the	secretary	 of	 the	 Village	 Party	 Branch	 on	 grounds	 of	 Party	 discipline.	 However,	 the	hierarchically	lower	villagers	also	have	the	power	of	dismissing	both	the	secretary	of	the	Village	Party	Branch	and	director	of	the	Village	Committee	through	voting	in	the	Village	Congress.	Under	this	institutional	arrangement,	the	Village	Committee	cannot	favour	one	group	 over	 another;	 instead,	 it	 occupies	 an	 uneasy	 position	 between	 the	 interests	 of	government	 and	 villagers.	 Therefore,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Village	 Committee	 is	 inherently	ambiguous:	it	represents	the	government	when	implementing	policies	in	the	village,	and	it	 represents	 the	 villagers	 to	 protect	 and	 argue	 for	 their	 interests.	 In	 the	 larger	governance	 configuration,	 the	 Village	 Committee	 is	 expected	 to	 act	 as	 the	 mediator	between	the	government	and	villagers	for	the	purpose	of	promoting	efficiency.	 	
6.3.2	Deliberation	instrument	in	the	Command	Centre	To	promote	the	efficient	integration	of	power	and	resources,	the	most	important	task	is	building	 consensus	 the	 thought	of	 the	key	participants.	To	achieve	 this,	 the	 command	centre	decided	to	hold	two	meetings	each	working	day:	one	in	the	morning	(7:30-8:30),	one	in	the	evening	(18:00-19:00).	Every	morning,	the	members	of	the	command	centre	led	 the	meeting;	 every	 key	 participant	 of	 the	 programme	 had	 to	 attend	 the	meeting.	During	the	morning	meeting,	they	would	discuss	and	explain	the	working	plan	and	tasks,	
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so	 that	 each	 participant	 could	 have	 a	whole	 picture	 of	 the	work.	During	 the	morning	meeting,	 each	 participant	 could	 have	 the	 chance	 to	 exchange	 their	 opinions	 and	 to	understand	how	to	deliver	the	tasks	and	the	rationales	behind	these	tasks.	After	the	each	day’s	work,	key	participants	would	report	their	work	at	the	evening	meeting.	The	evening	meetings	 were	 also	 led	 by	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Command	 Centre,	 and	 every	 key	participant	had	to	attend	the	meeting	to	report	on	their	work	and	other	related	issues.	Unlike	the	morning	meeting,	one	of	the	most	important	functions	of	the	evening	meeting	was	 to	 report	 to	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 implementation	 process.	 In	 particular,	 these	 key	participants	could	deliver	the	villagers’	concerns	and	arguments	to	the	evening	meeting,	and	both	members	of	the	Command	Centre	and	other	key	participants	could	collectively	discuss	these	issues	and	find	solutions	or	give	feedback	to	villagers	effectively.	 	
The	reports	for	the	evening	meeting	is	not	a	very	formal	style	report:	it	was	hand-written,	simply	listing	requests	without	any	detailed	explanation.	According	to	A	village	leader:	“we	do	not	need	to	make	a	formal	report,	the	important	thing	is	that	this	report	would	be	discussed	and	responded	to	at	the	evening	meeting.	All	people	know	each	other’s	work	quite	well,	so	we	do	not	need	to	explain	each	point	in	detail,	they	can	make	sense	of	it.	If	there	were	issues	raised,	I	can	give	a	further	explanation	[…]	the	most	important	point	is	these	 issues	 came	 from	 common	 villagers,	 and	 their	 concerns	 were	 important.”	 This	quotation	 reflects	 the	 deliberative	 functions	 of	 the	 evening	 meetings:	 the	 evening	meeting	is	an	important	platform	for	the	decision	maker	find	out	about	public	concerns.	In	 addition,	 the	 morning	 meeting	 and	 evening	 meeting	 provide	 platforms	 for	 each	participant	 to	 understand	 the	whole	 project.	 According	 to	 the	 former	 director	 of	 the	commend	centre:	“we	have	two	key	instruments	to	ensure	every	task	is	delivered:	the	first	 one	 is	 the	meetings,	 the	 other	 is	 public	 propaganda	 […]	we	 had	meetings	 every	morning	and	evening,	all	key	participants	would	report	their	issues	and	plans	to	everyone	in	the	room.	Every	meeting	will	be	an	important	experience	for	everyone:	the	meeting	helps	 everyone	 to	 understand	 each	 other’s	 individual	 tasks	 and	 the	 blue	 print,	 the	understanding	generates	 the	 consensus,	 and	 the	 consensus	generates	efficiency.”	This	arrangement	is	rooted	in	the	Chinese	deliberative	tradition	on	conflict	solving.	According	to	 He	 (2014),	 In	 the	 course	 of	 addressing	 conflict	 and	 disagreement,	 Chinese	 people	usually	 adopt	 these	 kinds	 of	 terms,	 for	 example,	 “bai	 shi	 shi,	 jiang	 dao	 li”,	 which	 is	presenting	the	facts	and	the	rationales	things	out.	In	a	case	where	one	party	has	a	feeling	
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of	unfairness	or	injustice	from	the	other	party,	one	usually	appeals	to	“shuo	li”,	which	is	“making	an	argument”.	Usually,	two	conflicting	parties	seek	out	a	senior/authority	and	ask	them	for	“pingli”,	which	indicates	that	all	of	them	are	presenting	their	arguments	and	opinions,	 and	 the	 senior/authority	will	make	 an	 arbitration	 according	 to	 “li	 （理）”	(principle)”.	The	command	centre	offer	them	a	platform.	This	will	be	discussed	in	detail	through	the	case	studies	in	later	chapters.	 	
6.3.3	Summary	As	 explained	 above,	 although	 the	 ‘command	 centre’	 is	 generated	 from	 the	 ‘military	command	 system’,	 it	 reflects	 the	 Chinese	 consultative	 and	 deliberative	 tradition.	Therefore,	 the	 ‘command	 centre’	 acts	 as	 a	 deliberative	 institution	 through	 which	participants	 can	 discuss	 the	 issues	 and	 affairs	 around	 the	 regeneration	 programme.	Functionally,	it	was	the	place	for	decision-makers	to	listen	and	discuss	the	concerns	and	willingness	of	the	public.	In	addition,	it	was	an	institution	where	public	opinion	was	able	to	challenge	decision	makers’	policies	and	decisions.	 	
6.4	Formal	and	informal	deliberation	at	the	local	level	 	Beside	the	‘command	centre’,	the	other	deliberative	institutions	at	the	grassroots	level	were	also	crucial.	These	grassroots	institutions	such	as	villagers’	congress	and	villagers’	representative	conferences	link	the	public	with	the	higher-level	deliberative	institutions	like	the	‘command	centre’.	At	the	grassroots	level,	the	forms	of	deliberation	are	various,	and	 include	 formal	and	 informal	deliberation.	Beside	 the	decision-making,	 the	district	government	adopted	‘public	deliberation’	aimed	at	limiting	conflict	between	citizen	and	government;	 thus	 public	 deliberation	 becomes	 increasingly	 important	 in	 terms	 of	building	 a	 consensus	 as	well.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 introduce	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	democratic	deliberations,	which	will	provide	the	background	for	later	analysis	of	how	formal	and	informal	deliberations	were	used	to	facilitate	Sunny	District	government	in	overcoming	these	challenges	by	solving	the	conflicts	associated	with	each.	 	
6.4.1	Definitions	of	formal	and	informal	deliberation	The	new	policy	of	New-type	urbanization	significantly	promotes	the	“human-oriented”	principle	through	political	reform:	public	participation	in	planning	has	been	enhanced,	with	the	aim	of	respecting	the	willingness	of	local	residents	as	well	as	limiting	the	conflict	between	stakeholders.	As	one	of	the	most	important	participation	channels,	a	series	of	
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forms	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 had	 evolved	 in	 urban	 governance	 practices.	Deliberation	 can	 facilitate	 the	 development	 of	 human-oriented	 policy	 because,	 in	 the	deliberation	 process,	 participants	 make	 decisions	 not	 simply	 by	 counting	 what	preferences	have	greater	numerical	support,	but	“by	determining	which	proposals	 the	collective	agrees	are	supported	by	the	best	reasons”	(Young	2000:	23).	In	recent	decades,	deliberation	 practices	 have	 been	 implemented	 accompanying	 the	 Party’s	 discourse:	“power	must	 be	 supervised	 by	 the	 people	 and	 exercised	 transparently	 and	 called	 for	“enriching	 democratic	 forms	 to	 show	 the	 advantages	 of	 China’s	 socialist	 deliberative	democracy	(Tang	and	Dryzek,	2014:	110)”	These	practices	raised	a	theoretical	discussion	around	deliberation	in	an	authoritarian	setting.	As	I	explained	in	Chapter	4,	‘informal’	and	‘unstructured’	deliberations	are	widely	observed	in	China’s	local	governance	practices.	In	 China,	 democratic	 deliberation	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 has	 developed	 from	previous	traditional	village	deliberation	practices.	This	evolution	can	be	seen	as	early	as	the	village	deliberative	forums	in	the	1980s:	a	village	committee	would	hold	deliberation	forums	where	decision-makers	(village	officials)	would	come	together	to	discuss	village	affairs	with	villagers,	and	facilitate	a	give-and-take	decision-making	process.	It	should	be	declared	that	as	the	Chinese	traditional	rural	village	administration	relies	on	a	‘person-network’	 based	 on	 the	 authority	 and	 credibility	 of	 the	 village	 cadre,	 deliberation	 on	village	affairs	always	involve	many	informal	actions	like	street	talking	and	door-to-door	visiting	 (Tang,	2015).	The	 role	of	 ‘unstructured’	 and	 ‘informal’	deliberation	 should	be	equally	 investigated	 in	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process.	 This	 is	 because	 these	actions	could	widen	citizen	participation	by	involving	a	larger	range	of	interest	groups	and	various	channels	to	exchange	opinions	(Tang,	2014).	 		As	this	research	focuses	on	the	Chinese	case,	I	will	borrow	the	term	‘informal	deliberation’	(Tang,	 2015)	 to	 describe	 the	 various	 communicative	 processes	 between	 government	officials,	experts	and	the	public.	The	only	difference	between	these	actions	and	‘formal’	actions	is	‘the	setting’:	these	actions	are	always	treated	as	informal	by	scholars	because	such	deliberations	have	always	happened	in	an	informal	setting,	such	as	street	talking	or	door-to-door	 visits.	 Based	 on	 Dryzek	 (1996:1),	 ‘the	 deliberation	 process	 should	 be	tolerance,	which	allows	argument,	rhetoric,	humour,	emotion,	testimony	or	storytelling,	and	gossip.	The	only	condition	 for	authentic	deliberation	 is	 then	the	requirement	that	communication	induces	reflection	upon	preferences	in	non-coercive	fashion’	(p.1).	These	
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informal	 deliberations	 should	 be	 respected	 equally	 with	 government-led	 formal	deliberations,	 as	 the	 forms	of	deliberation	 should	be	various	and	 flexible.	 In	addition,	these	 actions	 are	 led	 by	 government	 or	 village/community	 authorities.	 That	 is,	 these	actions	 are	 ‘formally’	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 officials’	 legitimacy,	 authority	 and	 credibility.	Therefore,	the	term	‘informal	public	deliberation’	will	be	used	to	describe	deliberation	beyond	institutional	process	and	designed	forums.	As	informal	deliberation	practices	are	very	 flexible	 and	difficult	 to	 for	western	 scholar	 to	make	 sense	of	 if	 they	do	not	have	enough	Chinese	knowledge,	I	will	introduce	them	with	the	case	in	later	sections.	The	local	government	 and	 village/community	 authorities	 lead	 these	 actions,	 aiming	 to	 widen	participation	and	facilitate	negotiation	by	involving	a	larger	range	of	grassroots	groups	and	non-elite	interest	groups	to	deliver	their	opinions	(Tang,	2015).	This	could	help	local	government	and	planners	to	improve	their	proposal	by	including	local	knowledge.	In	the	following	 sections,	 I	 will	 introduce	 how	 democratic	 deliberation	 (both	 formal	 and	informal	actions)	has	been	used	as	a	tool	to	facilitate	the	implementation	of	the	New-type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020	through	the	lens	of	urban	village	regeneration.	 		
6.4.2	‘Formal	deliberation’	Based	on	the	theoretical	definition	above,	I	identified	the	following	‘formal	deliberations’	which	happened	in	both	Village	N	and	Community	T	Cases.	
Expert	Consultation:	This	always	happens	at	the	plan-making	level.	The	planning	system	has	 been	 greatly	 opening	 up	 in	 China,	 and	 currently,	 the	 government	 has	 adopted	competition	 between	 external	 institutions	 instead	 of	 having	 internal	 local	 planning	bureaus	make	 the	plan.	Thus,	 the	plan-making	process	has	opened	up	 to	professional	organizations.	To	select	the	‘best	proposal’	for	local	development,	 ‘expert	consultation’	becomes	 increasingly	 important.	The	 ‘expert	consultation’	serves	as	 the	 ‘counsellor’	 to	provide	 suggestions	 and	 countermeasures	 for	 the	 government:	 they	 not	 only	 support	local	government	to	make	a	better	choice	in	designing	competitions,	but	also	support	the	selected	 planning	 institution	 to	 amending	 its	 planning	 proposal.	 In	 addition,	 ‘expert	consultation’	is	often	used	to	add	credibility	to	the	proposed	plan	and	urban	policy,	rather	than	simply	enhancing	democratic	authenticity.	
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Public	Consultation:	Public	 consultation	 is	 a	method	 for	 the	government	 to	publicise	their	proposed	local	policy,	plan,	and	the	particular	decision	to	ordinary	people,	and	it	is	also	a	channel	to	collect	public	opinion.	Sometimes,	it	will	take	place	through	the	media,	such	as	the	internet,	newspapers,	and	TV	programmes.	The	government	uses	the	media	to	publish	the	detailed	information	about	their	proposal	and	call	for	feedback	from	the	public.	 However,	 it	 is	 becoming	 more	 procedural	 rather	 than	 substantial	 in	 urban	regeneration	practices.	This	is	because	the	regeneration	programme	is	dominated	by	the	stakeholders,	 especially	 those	 who	 owned	 the	 resources,	 such	 as	 landlords	 and	developers.	 	
Villagers’	Congress:	The	villagers’	congress	is	a	branch	of	The	People’s	Congress	in	the	rural-governance	 system.	 It	 is	 the	 lowest	 level	 in	 the	 hierarchical	 electoral	 system	 in	China,	it	directly	elects	the	leadership	by	electors.	It	is	also	the	highest	decision-making	institution	 in	 the	village:	 every	 important	decision	 is	made	 through	direct	vote	at	 the	Villagers’	 Congress.	 According	 to	 He	 (2005):	 “the	 village	 meeting	 is	 an	 important	institution	 that	 gives	 villagers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 voice	 their	 opinions	 before	 major	decisions	are	made.	According	to	the	Organic	Law	of	Village	Committee,	village	meetings	should	 involve	 all	 villagers	 aged	 18	 or	 above.	 The	 meeting	 should	 have	 a	 minimum	quorum	of	half	of	those	eligible	to	attend	or,	alternatively,	two	thirds	of	the	household	representatives	of	the	village.	The	meeting	reviews	the	committee’s	work	at	least	once	a	year.	It	is	called	by	the	village	committee,	but	can	also	be	summoned	if	demanded	by	at	least	one	tenth	of	villagers.	(2005:	209)”	
Villagers’	 Representatives	 Conference:	 It	 should	 be	 noticed	 that	 the	 Villagers’	Representative	Conference	is	different	from	the	household	representatives	congress	in	the	Villagers’	Congress.	Villagers’	representatives	are	elected	by	and	from	the	household	representatives	in	different	villager	groups.	In	each	villager	group,	there	is	a	number	of	representatives	 to	 represent	 a	 number	 of	 households.	 The	 Villagers’	 Representative	Conference	is	central	to	obtaining	public	participation	in	urban	village	regeneration.	It	is	an	 important	 element	 in	 connecting	with	 the	native	 villagers.	 This	 conference	 always	happens	 prior	 to	 the	 Villagers’	 Congress.	 The	 leadership	 of	 the	 village	 will	 use	 this	institution	to	collect	the	first	round	of	opinion	from	the	villagers’	representatives.	It	will	also	ask	villagers’	representatives	to	collect	villagers’	opinions	and	bring	these	opinions	
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back	to	the	conference	as	a	second	round	of	opinion	gathering.	It	can	help	the	decision	makers	to	amend	their	proposals	and	agenda.	 	
Coordination	Meeting:	This	 is	a	kind	of	democratic	roundtable	meeting	held	by	small	groups	of	people	to	negotiate	some	proposal	or	agenda.	The	process	of	 the	meeting	 is	always	confidential;	only	direct	stakeholders	can	participate	in	it.	Where	some	specific	issues	in	the	programme	only	affect	a	small	number	of	stakeholders,	this	small	group	is	identified	as	direct	stakeholders.	Normally,	in	an	urban	regeneration	project,	there	is	a	series	of	coordination	meetings	held	by	different	people.	 	
Residents’	Congress:	This	directly	elects	the	leadership	of	the	community.	It	is	different	from	the	villagers’	congress	in	that	electors	in	the	urban	community	do	not	have	the	right	to	nominate	electoral	candidates.	The	electoral	candidates	must	be	worked	out	through	“discussion	and	consultation”	the	upper	level	of	government.	In	addition,	the	decision-making	 function	 of	 the	 Residents’	 Congress	 is	 also	 limited	 and	 symbolic.	 The	 most	important	decision	will	be	made	at	 the	upper	 level	of	 the	Peoples’	Congress	and	 local	government;	the	decision	will	be	‘informed’	rather	than	‘consulted	on’.	
6.4.3	‘Informal	deliberation’	 	Based	 on	 the	 theoretical	 definition	 above,	 I	 identified	 the	 following	 ‘informal	deliberations’	which	happened	in	the	case	of	both	Village	N	and	Community	T.	
Door-to-Door	Visit:	This	is	an	informal	technique	for	the	participants	to	persuade	others.	It	is	a	kind	of	home	visit.	It	is	particularly	useful	for	the	government	or	the	leader	of	the	village	to	resolve	issues	concerning	an	individual	opponent	or	small	groups	of	opponents.	
Stakeholders’	Direct	Participation:	This	is	not	a	formal	way	for	the	decision	maker	to	directly	collect	opinions	and	demands	 from	the	most	 important	stakeholders.	 It	might	involve	 a	 series	 of	 forms	 such	 as	 through	 telephone,	 street-talking	 and	 roundtable	discussion.	 The	 most	 important	 element	 is	 that	 the	 communications	 between	 the	participants	are	always	confidential	and	exclude	outsiders.	It	always	happens	before	a	formal	coordination	meeting.	
Street	talking:	This	 is	different	 from	the	other	kinds	of	participation.	Street	 talking	 is	mainly	used	as	a	pilot	for	a	community-level	regime	to	collect	opinions	on	some	issues.	
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Sometimes,	 the	 regime	 might	 use	 this	 method	 to	 generate	 some	 social	 pressure	 by	spreading	gossip.	 	 	
6.4.4	Summary	
In	this	section,	I	introduced	the	formal	and	informal	deliberation	practices	identified	from	two	cases.	The	domains	and	forms	of	participation	were	summarized	as	the	table	below.	 	
Table	6.1	Domains	and	Forms	of	Participation20	
Domains	of	Participation	 Community	T	 Village	N	Master	plan	at	district	level	 EC	 EC	Planning	at	street	office	level	 EC,	CM	 EC,	CM	Planning	of	relocation	community,	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	Details	of	architectural	design	proposal	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	 EC,	CM,	VC,	VRC	Demolition	agenda	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	Details	of	compensation	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	Relocation	agenda	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	 CM,	VC,	VRC,	DV	Election	of	the	new	community	 VC,	RC,	SDP	 VC,	RC,	SDP	Routine	governance	in	new	community	 RC,	SDP	 RC,	SDP	Planning	of	government	acquired	land	 EC,	CM	 EC,	CM	Collective	property	and	economy	management	before	redevelopment	 VC	 VC	Collective	property	and	economy	management	after	redevelopment	 VC	 SDP		This	table	not	only	contributes	to	map	the	role	of	a	“single	deliberation”	in	the	real-world	practice	in	a	larger	complex	political-administrative	system;	but	also	provides	an	overall	picture	 of	 the	 deliberations	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 programme.	 As	 we	 can	observed,	 through	 these	 two	 cases	 as	 lenses,	 the	 deliberations	 involve	 almost	 every	
                         
20In this table the following acronyms will be used: ‘EC’ = Expert Consultation, ‘PC’ = Public 
Consultation, ‘CM’ = Coordination Meeting, ‘VC’ = Villagers’ Congress, ‘VRC’ = Villagers’ 
Representative Conference, ‘DV’ = Door-to-Door Visiting, ‘SDP’ = Stakeholders’ Direct 
Participation, ‘RC’ = Residents’ Congress. These forms of participation include both formal 
deliberation and informal deliberations. 
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domain	 of	 policy	 and	 decision	 making	 process	 in	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	programme.	 In	 particular,	 the	 deliberation	 organized	 by	 the	 village	 authority	 like	Villagers’	Congress,	Villagers’	Representative	Conference,	and	etc	played	crucial	roles	in	the	 process	 of	 decision	 making	 and	 policy	 implementation	 around	 urban	 village	regeneration.	In	majority	domains,	informal	consultations	and	deliberations	are	used	as	important	 instruments	 by	 both	 village	 collectives	 and	 local	 governments	 in	 decision	making;	in	particular,	around	the	decisions	made	by	village	collectives	and	community	level.	 In	 some	 areas,	 informal	 consultations	 are	 used	 as	 an	 important	means	 by	 both	village	 collectives	and	governments;	 especially	village	 collectives.	Clearly,	both	 formal	and	informal	deliberation	practices	are	deliberative	actions	and	play	considerable	roles	from	decision-making	to	implementation.	These	characteristics	above	are	typical	in	these	two	 cases,	 however,	 two	 village	 adopted	 different	 approaches	 in	 the	 decision-making	process	around	collective	property	and	economy	management	after	redevelopment.	In	later	 chapters,	 I	 will	 explain	 how	 local	 authority	 adopt	 a	 particular	 form	 of	 the	deliberation	in	real-world	practice.	Meanwhile,	in	later	chapters,	I	will	also	explain	the	democratic	 deliberation	 in	 China’s	 urban	 development	 is	 different	 from	 Western	democratic	political	systems.	Public	deliberation	and	other	participations	are	political	instruments,	which	do	more	than	labelling	and	ensuring	legitimacy	for	the	proposed	plan.	Instead,	 in	 urban	 regeneration	 practice	 at	 Sunny	 District,	 local	 government	 adopted	‘public	deliberation’	with	the	aim	of	limiting	conflict	between	citizens	and	government.	Public	deliberation	becomes	increasingly	important	in	terms	of	building	a	consensus	for	local	planning.	
6.5	Key	participants:	The	above	sections	introduced	the	forms	of	grassroots	level	deliberations,	which	provide	the	 context	 for	 understanding	 the	 roles	 of	 different	 parties	 in	 the	 deliberation.	 This	section	continues	by	introducing	background	information	around	the	key	participants	in	urban	 village	 regeneration.	 These	 parties	 had	 diverse	 backgrounds	 namely	 power,	capacities	and	financial	resources.	As	 I	will	explain	 in	 later	chapters,	 these	differences	significantly	affect	their	strategies,	appeals	and	final	achievements.	 		 	
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6.5.1	District	government	Based	on	the	political	movement	of	“constructing	a	harmonious	society”	raised	by	the	CCP	central	committee	and	central	government,	the	idea	of	“harmony”	is	under	the	local	government’s	stress	when	it	comes	to	the	management	of	the	key	concerns	in	the	urban	village	regeneration.	The	focus	had	more	significance	in	the	year	2006	as	compared	to	the	early	2010s.	Furthermore,	as	set	out	in	Chapter	3,	village	autonomy	is	in	accordance	with	the	self-governance	system,	including	direct	elections	to	the	committee	of	villagers	as	well	as	the	collective	decision-making	system.	However,	when	economic	development	is	concerned,	there	conflicts	still	exist	between	local	development	and	village	property	acquisition.	 Moreover,	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 way	 of	 maintaining	 social	 stability	 whilst	enhancing	the	performance	of	government	services	have	emerged.	This	leads	to	the	issue	of	 the	 way	 of	 controlling	 and	 mobilizing	 the	 extensive	 population	 in	 the	 village.	Accordingly,	 the	 Z	 municipal	 government	 implemented	 a	 programme	 named	 as	“harmonious	removal,”	establishing	a	guideline	with	regard	to	relocating	and	removing	the	 villagers	when	 there	 is	 the	 urban	 village	 regrowth.	 Urban	 village	 regeneration	 in	Sunny	District	began	in	2006,	later	than	in	most	cities	in	China,	or	even	other	districts	in	Happy	City.	Aiming	to	limit	public	resistance,	to	decrease	financial	pressure	and	to	speed	up	 the	 acquisition	 process,	 the	 municipal	 government	 decided	 to	 limit	 the	 scale	 of	apartment	compensation	to	a	fixed,	transparent	and	non-negotiable	formula,	which	was	to	1.7	times	the	authorized	legal	size	of	a	rural	homestead.	In	2011,	after	surveying	the	legal	rural	homestead	size21,	the	district	government	decided	to	fix	this	figure	at	258	m2	per	homestead.	In	principle,	the	compensation	apartments	would	be	built	at	their	original	location.	To	encourage	villagers	to	accept	the	various	development	proposals,	the	village	committee	acted	as	a	mediator	to	help	the	villagers	to	arrive	at	an	acceptable	deal	with	government	and	developers.	 		
6.5.2	Developer	A	developer	only	played	a	role	in	the	case	of	Village	N.	The	developer	in	the	Village	N	case	was	Henan	Jianye-Yaxing	real	estate	cooperative.	The	full	redevelopment	project	of	this	region	 was	 constructed	 by	 the	 private	 developer,	 including	 People’s	 Square,	 Sunny	District	Library,	People’s	Park	and	New	Village	N	Community.	Specifically,	in	the	case	of	
                         
21 Rural homestead comprises the land on which rural residents have constructed their 
house. 
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Village	N,	the	district	government	developed	a	model	of	“zero	investment	and	zero	profit”.	In	the	model,	all	(re)development	projects	within	this	area	were	issued	to	one	developer.	The	local	government	would	not	request	any	fees	for	issuing	the	development	permission.	In	 return,	 the	developer	was	 responsible	 for	developing	a	 set	of	public	 infrastructure	facilities,	including	roads,	a	square,	a	park	and	a	library.	The	land	expropriation	and	the	compensation	for	villagers	were	agreed	cooperatively:	Sunny	District	government	would	negotiate	with	village	committee	and	villagers,	compensate	them	in	advance	and	sign	the	compensation	contract;	developer	have	to	pay	the	money	of	compensation	back	to	the	government	 later.	 That	 is,	 the	 developer	 did	 not	 closely	 engaged	 with	 villagers.	 The	villagers’	committee	consisted	not	only	of	the	organizer	but	also	the	implementer	in	the	relocation	mechanism.	The	villagers	were	encouraged	to	participate	in	the	deliberations	in	 selecting	 the	 resettlement	 location,	 together	 with	 project	 planning	 and	 quality	supervision	as	well	as	selecting	house	styles.	The	government	held	the	responsibility	to	construct	and	negotiate	with	the	committee	of	villagers.		The	first	challenge	for	the	district	government	and	the	developer	was	to	remove	and	to	relocate	the	villagers.	According	to	the	master	plan,	the	redevelopment	related	to	the	land	acquisition,	villagers’	houses	as	well	as	their	collective	properties.	The	second	difficulty	was	that	former	cases	of	removal	and	relocation	of	urban	villagers	in	other	part	of	Happy	City	had	been	conducted	by	developers,	with	a	sky-high	compensation	level.	However,	the	compensation	was	unaffordable	for	both	district	government	and	developer.	he	third	difficulty	lay	in	the	pursuit	of	economic	interests.	As	stated	in	chapter	2,	in	some	cases,	local	government	and	developer	might	tend	to	use	force	in	the	demolition	process,	which	lacked	a	secure	means	of	protecting	the	villagers’	interests.	This	results	in	protest	and	dissent	among	villagers.	However,	as	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	7,	a	new	framework	for	the	separation	of	the	relocation	from	developed	was	created	by	the	deliberation	between	villagers	 and	 the	 local	 government,	 entailing	 the	 empowerment	 of	 the	 committee	 of	villagers.		
6.5.3	Villagers’	committee	The	village	committee	played	the	most	crucial	role	in	informing	their	villagers	about	the	redevelopment	agenda,	legal	procedures	and	government	policies	for	the	redevelopment.	They	also	had	the	most	important	role	in	collecting	villagers’	opinions,	arguing	for	their	
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interests	and	reporting	their	needs	to	government	and	developer.	As	I	stated	in	Chapter	3,	 the	village	committee	 is	 the	self-governance	regime	and	authority	at	 the	grassroots	level,	and	aims	to	collectively	manage	villagers’	own	affairs	in	both	economic	activities	and	other	issues	in	daily	life.	Through	the	villagers’	congress	as	well	as	village	committee,	villagers	make	a	direct	election	of	their	leaders	as	well	as	village	cadres,	providing	the	crucial	 platform	 for	 villagers’	 participation	 in	 the	 village	 affairs	 as	 well	 as	 the	management	of	collective	properties.	In	both	of	the	cases,	the	villagers’	committee	took	charge	 of	 mediating	 the	 conflicts,	 organizing	 small-scale	 meetings	 between	 villagers,	distributing	and	collecting	 their	opinions	and	 interests,	 conducting	new	proposals	 for	demolition	and	providing	the	response	and	recommendations	to	the	district	government.	Encountering	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 redevelopment	 of	 the	 region,	 the	 district	 government	played	 an	 active	 role	 in	 mediating	 conflicts	 and	 reaching	 a	 consensus	 on	 demolition	proposals.		
6.5.4	Villagers	As	 already	 explained,	 the	 important	 decisions	 in	 the	 village	 were	 collectively	 made	through	 the	 decision-making	 system.	 The	 villagers	 could	 not	 only	 participate	 in	 the	decision-making	 on	 the	 village’s	 affairs	 and	 deliver	 their	 arguments	 to	 the	 village	committee,	they	could	also	protect	their	interests	through	the	democratic	election	of	the	village	committee.	Moreover,	since	the	political	movement	of	“constructing	a	harmonious	society”,	 local	 government	 take	 the	 social	stability	as	 their	priority	 to	avoid	 the	 social	issues	 such	 as	 “public	 protest”,	 “forced	 demolition”	 as	 well	 as	 “nail	 households”.	Meanwhile,	in	both	of	these	two	cases,	the	government	highlighted	the	“importance	of	villagers”	was	demonstrated	in	documents.	This	constituted	the	government	rhetoric	of	“the	mass	line”	(qun	zhong	lu	xian).	Thus,	both	of	government	officials	and	village	cadres	were	required	to	stay	close	with	villager,	to	enhance	their	legitimacy.		
6.6	Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 introduced	 two	 cases	 of	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 programmes	 in	Sunny	District,	with	the	focus	on	the	deliberative	institutions,	forms	of	deliberations	and	the	 actors	 involved.	 In	 particular,	 the	 basis	 and	 rationale	 for	 these	 deliberative	institutions	 and	 deliberations	 were	 investigated.	 Although	 the	 deliberations	 were	adopted	by	both	higher-level	authorities	and	grassroots	level	regimes,	there	are	different	
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forms	 of	 deliberation	 practice	 (formal	 deliberative	 meeting	 and	 informal	communications).	In	particular,	the	Chinese	deliberation	tradition	and	the	autonomy	of	local	governance	contributes	to	this	political	innovation.	That	is,	Chinese	people	believe	that	 truth	 becomes	 clearer	 and	 that	 conflict	 can	 be	 solved	 through	 debate	 and	deliberation,	and	these	deliberative	institutions	and	formal/informal	deliberations	offer	them	 platforms	 to	 participate.	 Another	 important	 finding	 is	 that	 the	 deliberations	 at	grassroots	 level	 combine	 both	 formal	 deliberations	 and	 informal	 deliberative	communication,	and	the	informal	deliberative	communication	plays	a	crucial	role.	This	background	information	provides	us	with	a	specific	context	to	analyse	and	interpret.	 		The	literature	suggests	that	both	formal	and	informal	deliberation,	even	deliberative	and	non-deliberative	 actions	 make	 their	 democratic	 contributions	 from	 the	 deliberative	system’s	perspective.	As	I	stated	in	Chapter	4,	on	the	one	hand,	democratic	deliberation	played	a	role	as	a	political	instrument	used	by	the	local	administrations	during	the	urban	village	 regeneration	 process;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 deliberation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 urban	village	regeneration	is	part	of	a	complex	political-administrative	system.	This	provides	the	 theoretical	 space	 for	 interpreting	 the	 roles	 of	 authoritarian	 deliberation,	 informal	deliberation	 and	 non-deliberative	 actions	 from	 a	 systematic	 perspective.	 This	perspective	also	allows	us	to	evaluate	the	defects	of	these	deliberations	and	the	political-administrative	system	as	a	whole.	Following	the	interpretive	approach,	the	Chapter	7	and	8	will	 tell	 stories	 of	 how	 deliberation	 plays	 roles	 in	 different	 stages	 of	 urban	 village	regeneration	programmes.	 		 	
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Chapter	Seven:	The	Micro-Politics	of	Village	Deliberation	in	
the	Chinese	Governance	System:	Two	Sites	
7.1	Introduction	 	 	The	research	objective	of	the	following	two	chapters	is	to	explore	and	understand	how	democratic	 deliberation	 played	 a	 role	 as	 a	 political	 instrument	 used	 by	 the	 local	administrations	 during	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process.	 Through	 the	 in-depth	investigation	 of	 two	 cases,	 this	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 Chinese	 rural	 regimes,	including	village	committees	and	village	Party	branches,	in	the	regeneration	process	and	the	 citizens’	 reactions	 to	 the	 deliberations	 lead	 by	 local	 regimes.	 Following	 the	 case	studies,	 this	 thesis	will	 argue	 that	 the	 scalar	governance	 system	around	urban	village	regeneration	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 deliberative	 system,	 which	 operates	 on	 different	spatially	and	functionally	distributed	registers	of	deliberation,	negotiation,	exhortation,	persuasion	and	top-down	decision-making.	These	two	chapters	address	three	questions:	
1)	What	 role	 does	 the	 village	 administration	 play	 in	 the	 regeneration	 process?	 2)	 How	
deliberative	 are	 the	 deliberation	 and	 deliberative	 system	 in	 urban	 village	 regeneration	
programme?	 3)	 What	 is	 the	 place	 of	 deliberative	 system	 in	 the	 larger	 governance	
configuration	around	urban	village	regeneration?	 	 		This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 micro-politics	 of	 village	 deliberation	 in	 the	 Chinese	governance	 system.	 It	 will	 introduce	 two	 kinds	 of	 deliberation	 practices	 in	 different	conditions:	 the	 public-discussion	 in	 non-emergency	 situations,	 and	 the	 4+2	 decision-making	 system	 in	 emergency	 situations.	 The	 structure	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 as	 follows:	Section	 2	 describes	 the	 deliberations,	 particularly	 the	 public-discussion	 in	 non-emergency	 situations.	 Section	 3	 describes	 the	 deliberations,	 particularly,	 the	 4+2	decision-making	system	in	emergency	situations.	Finally,	section	4	discusses	about	how,	according	 to	 these	 two	 cases,	 conflicts	 over	 compensation	within	 the	 complex	 scalar	Chinese	 policy	 system	 are	 threatening	 to	 turn	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 into	 an	unmanageable	policy	problem.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 cases	are	examined	 in	order	of	 the	timeline	of	the	regeneration	programme,	from	earlier	to	later.	Evidence	from	both	village	N	and	village	T	 illuminates	why	 land	expropriation	made	a	 significant	 contribution	 to	public	 participation	 in	 democratic	 deliberation	 around	 urban	 village	 regeneration.	Comparison	 of	 the	 sites	 suggests	 that	 non-emergency	 situations	 involving	 land	
 153 
expropriation	are	conducive	to	high-quality	elections	and	substantive	participation.	 In	addition,	the	deliberation	practices	in	the	two	sites	contained	many	non-deliberative	and	informal-deliberative	 actions.	 However,	 these	 actions	 also	 delivered	 significant	democratic	contributions	if	we	review	them	through	the	lens	of	the	‘deliberative	system’.	As	Rollo	(2017:	592)	comments:	
In	leaving	unanswered	‘the	question	of	the	evaluation	of	non-deliberative	acts	
and	practices,’	we	risk	losing	sight	of	two	important	deliberative	norms:	the	
reflective	position	citizens	take	up	with	respect	to	the	standpoints	of	others	in	
the	 process	 of	 exercising	 practical	 judgement	 and	 the	 requirement	 that	
citizens	understand	themselves	to	be	reasoning	together	to	establish	a	new	
shared	perspective.	 	For	 example,	 as	 I	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 sometimes	 a	 government’s	 actions	must	 be	authoritarian	 in	order	to	 force	 issues	onto	the	table	and	promote	the	efficiency	of	 the	programme	 and	 the	 respect	 for	 marginalized	 beliefs	 and	 practices	 (Mansbrige	 et	 al.,	2015).	Meanwhile,	villagers’	protests	are	“sometimes	viewed	as	contributing	only	to	the	extent	 that	 they	 articulate	 something	 akin	 to	 a	 reason	 that	 could	 be	 admissible	 as	 a	statement	 in	public	discourse”	(Rollo,	2017:	595).	 In	other	words,	 the	value	of	protest	need	not	be	assessed	according	to	deliberative	ideals.	 		
7.2	Deliberation	in	Non-emergency	Condition	
7.2.1	Self-governance	organization	in	Village	N	The	 village	 committee	 is	 the	 grassroots	 organization	 of	 the	 rural	 governance	 system	which	 act	 as	 a	 platform	 to	 link	 the	 local	 governments	 and	 the	masses	 (Zhou,	 2010).	According	 to	 the	Official	Document	of	Village	N	Histories	 (2000),	 in	1992,	 the	 current	leaderships	of	the	village	realized	that	the	governance	system	were	problematics,	and	it	caused	 many	 issues	 like:	 unregulated	 working	 style,	 undemocratic	 decision-making	process,	lack	of	transparencies	of	financial	management.	These	problems	generated	the	mistrust	between	village	 leadership	and	the	villagers.	Therefore,	since	1992,	Village	N	settled	a	Regulation	on	Open	Village	Affairs	which	aimed	to	improve	the	transparencies	and	accessibilities	of	decision-making	systems.	According	 to	 the	 regulations,	 all	 of	 the	important	 village	 affairs	 should	 open	 to	 the	 villagers	 (see	 details	 in	 footnotes),	 the	decisions	should	be	democratically	made	in	Village	Meetings,	Household	Representative	Meetings,	and	Villagers	Representative	Meetings	(See	the	details	in	footnotes).	 	
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	In	 addition,	 Village	 N	 has	 strong	 traditions	 on	 negotiation;	 the	 village	 leadership	encourage	village	cadres	and	village	representatives	to	negotiate	with	villagers	before	the	formal	village	meeting	to	get	consensuses	through	bottom-up	approach	(See	Figure	7.1).	 The	 deliberations	 are	 consultatively	 empowered;	 and	 various	 deliberations	 play	roles	in	the	village	self-governance	system.	As	I	summarized	in	the	diagram,	the	public	deliberations	in	the	village	governance	system	consists	of	the	formal	deliberation	(like	roundtables,	congress	and	other	formal	meetings)	and	informal	deliberations	(like	home	visiting,	 street	 chatting,	 and	 informal	 discussions).	 The	 informal	 deliberations	 always	take	 places	 at	 the	 proposing	 stages,	 the	 village	 leadership	 or	 the	 villager	 groups	leaderships	have	to	consult	with	the	public	to	draft	the	proposal	of	the	public	affairs,	like	the	 development	 of	 public	 infrastructure.	 All	 of	 the	 participants	 were	 welcomed	 to	comments	 on	 the	 village	 affairs	 at	 proposing	 stages.	 Village	 representatives	 and	household	representatives	will	bring	the	comments	to	the	upper	level	meetings	such	as	village	 representative	 roundtables	 to	 complete	 the	 proposal,	 and	 they	 will	 bring	 the	completed	 proposal	 to	 the	 public	 to	 collect	 the	 information	 as	well.	 Finally,	 the	 final	proposal	will	be	voted	at	the	village	congress	as	the	final	step	of	the	decision-making.	 	 		Figure	7.1:	village	decision	making	process.	
	The	decision-making	system	above	were	 implemented	by	two	aims:	 the	 first	one	 is	 to	enhance	the	transparency	of	the	village	administrations	to	enhance	the	credibility	of	the	
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leadership;	and	the	second	one	is	persuading	the	public	to	support	the	leadership.	The	only	 two	principles	 they	 have	 are:	 the	 programme	 should	 be	 feasible;	 and	 the	 public	protest	should	be	limited.	However,	as	an	early	stage	experiments,	there	was	not	a	clear	and	 formulated	 procedure	 for	 this	 decision-making	 system;	 for	 example,	 the	 village	committee	 can	 process	 the	 programme	 from	 the	 proposing	 step	 to	 the	 proposal-completing	 step.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 will	 introduce	 how	 this	 decision-making	system	 worked	 and	 evolved.	 The	 open	 village	 affairs	 have	 formed	 a	 wide-ranging	supervision.	The	majority	of	the	villagers	understand	the	works	of	the	villages	and	groups	very	well,	so	they	could	reach	the	mutual	objectives	and	together	work	toward	them.	At	the	same	time,	the	social	environment	has	also	been	purified	and	the	construction	of	a	clean	and	honest	administration	has	been	greatly	improved,	the	relationship	between	the	cadres	and	the	masses	are	closer	and	a	good	image	of	the	party	among	the	masses	has	been	established.		
7.2	Non-emergency	situation:	the	mass-discussion	in	Village	N	
7.2.1	Background	of	mass-discussion	As	introduced	in	the	last	chapter,	since	the	late	1990s,	Village	N	in	the	Sunny	District	of	Happy	City	started	a	slow	process	of	urbanization.	Government	buildings,	urban	housing,	factories	and	other	urban	infrastructure	cropped	up	around	the	village	residential	area,	gradually	absorbing	it	into	the	greater	Sunny	District	area.	This	regeneration	programme	began	in	2006	and	was	the	first	urban	village	regeneration	case	in	Sunny	District.	This	is	later	 than	 in	most	cities	 in	China,	or	even	other	districts	 in	Happy	City.	Since	2003,	 in	order	to	speed	up	the	process	of	urbanization	and	improve	the	urban	environment,	the	Happy	 City	 Municipal	 Government	 issued	 document	 No.	 32	 of	 2003	 (Happy	 City	Municipal	Government,	2003)	on	the	integration	of	urban	villages	in	the	city.	At	the	same	time,	 it	made	 relevant	 provisions	 for	 the	unification	 of	 the	 village	 governance	 system	within	the	urban	governance	system.	This	policy	document	proposed	that:	 	
• The	village	self-governance	system	is	transformed	into	the	urban	residents’	self-
governance	 system	 and	 the	 collective-owned	 land	 is	 transformed	 into	 state-
owned	land	according	to	law.	 	
• Villagers	who	have	peasant	hukou	will	be	transferred	into	urban	residents’	hukou.	 	
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• The	reconstruction	of	villages	in	the	city	should	follow	the	urban	master	plan	and	
land	use	plan,	any	kind	of	physical	permission	should	get	planning	permission	in	
advance.	 	
• The	transformation	of	the	village	in	the	city	should	be	carried	out	by	the	market	
operation,	 mainly	 by	 itself,	 or	 by	 the	 joint	 transformation	 with	 the	 urban	
development	project.	(source:	Regulation	No.	32	of	2003:	the	regulation	on	the	regeneration	of	urban	villages	in	Happy	City,	Happy	City	Municipal	Government,	2003)	According	to	the	proposal,	there	are	three	main	transformations:	transformation	of	the	collective	land	ownership	to	state	ownership;	transformation	of	the	peasants’	hukou	into	urban	 residents’	 hukou	 and	 transformation	 of	 the	 village	 governance	 system	 into	 an	urban	governance	system.	This	proposal	emphasises	the	role	of	the	market	instead	of	the	government.	 That	 is,	 the	 government	 does	 not	 have	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 regeneration	process	directly	 to	enhance	 the	efficiency.	 Since	2003,	 Sunny	District	 government	has	attempted	to	introduce	private	developers	into	the	programme	to	regenerate	Village	N.	However,	as	will	be	introduced	later,	it	was	difficult	to	reach	a	consensus	between	the	government,	developer,	village	committee	and	villagers.	 		
7.2.2	Epistemic	Functions:	Consensus	Building	 	In	early	2003,	the	district	government	sent	its	officials	into	Village	N	to	collect	opinions	to	outline	the	detailed	regeneration	proposal	with	the	Party	members	in	the	Village	Party	Branch.	This	initial	proposal	raised	by	the	district	government	included	three	parts:	
• The	whole	of	Village	N	would	be	expropriated	by	the	district	government	and	
would	 be	 redeveloped	 into	 a	 public	 square,	 district	 library	 and	 commercial	
residential	building.	
• Villagers	 in	 Village	 N	 would	 be	 compensated	 and	 relocated	 into	 a	 rebuilt	
residential	community	within	this	area.	
• The	 Village	 Committee	 and	 Village	 Party	 Branch	 in	 Village	 N	 should	 be	
transformed	into	an	urban	governance	system.	 	(source:	Regulation	No.	32	of	2003:	the	regulation	on	the	regeneration	of	urban	villages	in	Happy	City,	Happy	City	Municipal	Government,	2003)	Before	the	decision-making,	villagers	have	to	learn	the	urban	village	regeneration	policies,	and	 local	 government	 have	 to	 learn	 the	 demands	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 villagers.	 The	
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deliberation	here	plays	a	role	to	provide	a	communicative	platform	for	stakeholders	to	learn	the	facts,	logic,	and	concerns	from	each	other.	 		As	a	strategy,	the	government	arranged	a	meeting	with	the	village	leaderships	to	listen	their	comments	in	16/03/2003.	This	is	because	the	village	committee	has	two	different	roles	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	(See	Chapter	3).	First,	it	is	the	agency	of	the	local	government;	 it	 is	 the	 grassroots	 level	 regime	 to	 link	 the	 state	with	 the	 rural	 society.	Second,	it	is	the	elected	representative	of	their	villagers,	they	should	represent	for,	and	protect	their	villagers’	interests.	Therefore,	the	village	committee	is	a	platform	to	build	up	 the	 communications	 between	 villagers	 and	 local	 government.	 However,	 in	 case	 of	early	2003,	the	reactions	from	the	village	leadership	were	not	positive.	According	to	the	Former	Director	of	the	Village	N	Committee:	 	
We	 must	 not	 rush	 ahead	 but	 proceed	 steadily	 in	 accordance	 with	 our	
viewpoint	 of	 this	 huge	 reform	 of	 our	 village.	 The	 reform	 of	 the	 system	
would	be	a	profound	change	in	the	vital	interests	of	the	collective	and	the	
masses;	 and	 the	 situation	 would	 be	 very	 complicated	 […]	 Clearly,	 this	
reform	was	also	a	completely	new	work	with	a	strong	policy,	which	covers	
a	wide	range	of	areas.	One	of	the	tasks	of	the	government	this	year	is	to	
open	 up	 a	 breakthrough	 in	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 rural	 system	and	 to	 pilot	
projects	in	one	or	two	villages	first.	But	we	don’t	want	to	be	the	first	one.	(Source:	Interview	with	Director	N,	2017)	This	 statement	 shows	 that	 the	 village	 committee	 was	 very	 conservative	 to	 make	 a	conclusion,	because	they	were	worried	about	the	uncertainty	of	the	future.	This	initial	information	 and	 consultation	 initiative	 gave	 the	 district	 government	 insight	 into	 the	village	 leadership’s	 attitude	 towards	 the	 regeneration	 proposal.	 Through	 this	 initial	consultation,	 the	 local	 government	 realized	 that	 the	 village	 committee	 felt	 lost	 and	powerless	when	facing	these	changes,	so	they	agreed	that	the	regeneration	would	be	an	experiment	for	both	villagers	and	government.	Therefore,	both	of	the	district	government	and	 village	 authorities	 realized	 that	 they	 have	 to	 communicate	 with	 the	 public	 in	 a	cautious	 way,	 to	 avoid	 the	 potential	 unrests.	 Meanwhile,	 they	 realized	 they	 need	substantive	 communication	 with	 villagers	 and	 village	 committee	 to	 understand	 the	villagers’	 thought.	 Thus,	 the	 district	 government	 entrusted	 the	 village	 committee	 to	expand	 the	 consultation	 to	 include	 the	members	 of	 the	 village	 congress,	 namely:	 the	
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villagers’	representatives,	the	members	of	the	standing	groups	of	the	Village	Party	Branch	and	members	of	the	standing	groups	of	the	Village	Committee.	All	of	them	were	invited	to	participate	in	this	consultation	to	comment	on	whether	to	accept	this	initial	proposal	and	 draft	 the	 compensation,	 or	 directly	 refuse	 this	 proposal.	 According	 to	 a	 villagers’	representative:	 	
We	were	very	defensive	at	that	moment…	we	know	and	we	understood	that	
the	regeneration	was	necessary.	It	was	a	megatrend	of	nation,	no	one	can	stop	
the	development	[…]	we	know	that	the	basic	infrastructure	of	our	village	was	
poorer	than	the	urban	modern	communities,	but	we	are	satisfied	with	our	life	
[…]	We	were	frightened	of	risk,	we	didn’t	know	how	to	get	advantage	in	this	
trend	have	to	do	more	preparation	for	the	future.	 	(source:	interview	with	Village	Cadre	N2,	2017)	Unsurprisingly,	 because	 of	 the	 uncertainty,	 almost	 all	 of	 participants	 refused	 the	regeneration	proposal,	therefore,	the	first	attempt	at	a	Village	N	regeneration	programme	failed.	However,	this	code	also	reflects	that	the	significance	of	the	deliberation.	Although	the	 villagers	 are	 reluctant	 to	 regenerate	 the	 village,	 they	 start	 to	 understand	 their	circumstances	and	governments’	attitudes.		The	discussion	above	does	not	mean	the	local	government	did	not	play	a	role	or	take	a	responsibility	 in	 the	 public	 deliberation	 at	 that	 stage.	 Instead,	 to	 entrust	 the	 village	authorities	and	endorsed	the	village	deliberation	was	a	cautious	arrangement	to	reduce	the	villagers’	tension.	According	to	the	government	documents	(2003),	the	vice-mayor	of	the	Sunny	District	pointed	out	that:	 	
The	development	should	be	in	favour	of	the	public,	and	there	is	not	any	excuse	
for	us	to	frighten	the	villagers.	We	not	only	have	to	speak	to	them,	but	also	
have	to	 listen	to	them	and	 learn	their	requests.	This	is	 the	most	 important	
task	for	Village	N	committee.	 	(source:	regulation	No.	32	of	2003:	the	regulation	on	the	regeneration	of	urban	villages	in	Happy	City)	Through	the	consultation,	the	district	government	realized	that	the	villagers’	attitude	and	emotions	 are	 tough.	Meanwhile,	 the	 experiences	 from	other	 cities	 show	 that	 a	 forced	regeneration	might	cause	serious	public	petitions.	Based	on	the	facts	above,	both	district	government	and	village	committee	agreed	that	the	regeneration	of	Village	N	cannot	be	
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taken	in	a	short	time;	meanwhile,	the	village	authorities	and	villagers	also	realized	that	they	have	to	think	about	their	future	in	advance.	Therefore,	the	district	government	and	the	 village	 committee	 decided	 to	 hold	 a	 long-time	 public	 discussion	 to	 figure	 out	 a	humorous	solution.	 		
7.2.3	Ethical	Functions:	Learning	the	Policy	and	Policy	Learning	After	the	initial	consultation	in	the	March	2003,	the	villagers	realized	that,	as	cities	across	the	country	were	undergoing	urban	village	regeneration,	the	district	government	would	certainly	 require	 it	 again	 eventually.	 In	 the	 early	 April,	 the	 Village	 N	 authority	 (both	village	Party-branch	and	village	committee)	decided	that	to	organize	a	public	discussion	on	the	government’s	regeneration	proposal	because	they	believed	that	both	the	village	leaders	and	the	villagers	should	be	knowledgeable	about	urban	village	regeneration	to	identify	the	advantages	and	disadvantages.	According	to	the	village	documents	(2003),	there	are	2	initial	questions	raised	by	village	committee	at	the	very	beginning:	 	
if	we	regenerate	the	village,	what	benefits	might	we	lose?	and	if	we	refuse	to	
regenerate	the	village,	what	benefits	might	we	get?	 	Source:	Annual	Work	Report	of	Village	N	Committee	2003	All	of	the	villagers	were	encouraged	to	raise	questions	and	provide	their	opinions	to	their	villagers’	group.	The	villagers’	groups	raised	different	forms	of	discussion	meetings	every	week:	 formal	 household	 representative	meetings,	 street	 talking,	 offices	meetings	 and	home	visits.	As	figure	7.2	shows,	the	cadres	of	villager	groups	would	hold	a	roundtable	meeting	with	 the	head	of	villager	group	 to	discuss	 the	 findings	and	 report	 the	 issues.	Every	month,	 the	heads	of	 villager	groups	would	have	a	 roundtable	meeting	with	 the	village	authorities	to	discuss	the	issues	identified	in	the	discussion,	and	they	will	response	these	 issues	 to	 the	 village	 representatives	 at	 the	 village	 representatives’	 roundtable.	Every	quarter,	the	village	authority	will	make	a	report	to	summarize	the	outcome	of	the	discussion	and	raised	new	questions	for	the	next	round	discussion.	 							
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Figure	7.2:	Institutional	Arrangement	of	Public	Discussion	 	
		Unfortunately,	 the	 public	 discussion	 was	 a	 temporal	 institutional	 arrangement,	 the	meeting	records	were	not	well-written	and	reserved	by	the	village	committee.	Some	of	the	meeting	records	is	handwrited,	which	are	hard	to	read;	some	of	the	meeting	records	are	lost.	However,	the	existing	documents	shows	that	the	questions	raised	to	the	public	discussion	 became	more	 and	more	 details.	 For	 example,	 in	 late	 2003,	 to	 facilitate	 the	discussion,	the	village	committee	organize	training	for	the	key	members	of	the	discussion	groups	and	the	cadres	of	the	village	were	trained	in	order	to	further	unify	the	thought,	raise	the	understanding,	reasonably	divide	the	work,	clarify	the	task	and	carry	out	the	work	in	an	orderly	manner.	During	the	training,	they	invited	experts,	including	planners	and	lawyers,	to	provide	advice	and	explain	the	regulations;	meanwhile,	they	visited	many	regenerated	villages	around	China	 from	Happy	City	 to	Guangzhou	 to	 learn	 from	 their	experiences.	After	the	training,	these	members	shared	their	experiences	with	their	group	members	to	help	them	understand	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme.	However,	the	 village	 committee	 not	 only	 emphasised	 the	 necessity	 of	 regeneration,	 but	 also	emphasised	the	independency	of	their	village.	According	to	the	meeting	records	from	the	village	secretary	in	2003:	
Reform	 cannot	 be	 uniform,	 that	 is,	 we	 cannot	 simply	 follow	 others’	
experiences	 or	 simply	 follow	 the	 district	 government.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	
discussion	 is	 we	 have	 to	 figure	 out	 how	 to	 effectively	 protect	 the	 original	
collective	economy	and	the	 interests	of	 the	original	villagers	 from	loss	and	
influence	[…]	Reform	is	merciless,	but	we	cannot	refuse	the	reform	to	change	
just	because	we	fear	the	future,	and,	these	changes	will	come	sooner	or	later.	
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(Source:	Village	Congress	meeting	records,	Village	N	Congress;	2003)	They	 also	 encouraged	 the	 villagers	 to	 visit	 regenerated	 urban	 villages	 in	 Happy	 City,	which	was	very	convenient	for	villagers	to	make	sense	of	the	regeneration	programme.	On	and	off	for	a	year,	most	of	the	villagers	and	the	village	cadres	agreed	that	the	physical	image	 of	 the	 old	 village	was	 old,	 dirty,	messy	 and	 poor,	 which	was	 in	 contrast	 to	 its	superior	geographical	location	and	the	fast	development	of	the	upper	block	of	the	city	centre.	As	a	former	village	cadre	recalls:	
Every	establishment	inspection	from	the	district	government,	our	village	was	
the	focal	point.	The	village	collective	must	invest	in	many	funds	to	carry	on	
the	 clean-up,	 the	 rectification,	 however,	 after	 the	 inspection,	 the	 village	
remains	dirty	again.	Moreover,	our	villagers	lived	in	this	kind	of	environment	
for	a	long	time;	both	physical	and	mental	health	is	also	severely	damaged.	So,	
with	 the	 development	 of	 the	 city,	 old	 villages	 could	 never	 be	 kept	 forever,	
demolition	and	regeneration	would	come	sooner	or	later.	(source:	interview	with	Village	Cadre	N1,	2017)	It	 is	 clear	 that,	 during	 the	 deliberation,	 both	 villagers	 and	 village	 cadres	 got	 a	 better	understanding	of	the	current	political	situation	than	before.	The	massive	discussion	as	a	whole	could	be	reviewed	as	a	form	of	social-capacity-building	through	the	deliberations,	because	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 (re)distribution	 of	 discourse	 power	 through	 various	communicative	processes	in	which	citizens	exchange	opinions	and	form	a	consensus	in	public	settings	about	issues	that	affect	their	community	(Tang,	2014).	These	meetings,	forums,	 roundtable	 encourage	 the	 villagers	 to	 learn	 the	 policies,	 meanwhile,	 these	discussions	 require	 both	 of	 the	 village	 authority	 and	 local	 government	 to	 respect	 the	outcomes	and	participations.	This	 is	because,	 in	 the	 course	of	 addressing	 conflict	 and	disagreement,	Chinese	people	usually	adopt	these	kinds	of	terms,	for	example,	“bai	shi	shi,	
jiang	dao	li”,	which	is	presenting	the	facts	and	the	rationales	things	out.	These	forms	of	communications	 are	 rooted	 in	 the	 Chinese	 everyday	 language:	 “shangliang”	 means	“consult	and	discuss	things	over.”	This	is	also	rooted	in	Chinese	deliberative	moral	codes,	because	 traditional	 Chinese	 society	 deeply	 trusts	 that	 social	 collaboration	 and	communication	 could	 settle	 uncertainties	 and	 solve	 conflicts.	 The	 internal	communication	system	within	the	village	is	particularly	significant	when	the	village	has	to	make	an	important	decision	without	a	clear	understanding.	According	to	He	(2014:	62):	 	
Chinese	 people	 have	 faith	 that	 truth	 becomes	 clearer	 through	 debate	 and	
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deliberation.”	 Chinese	 daily	 languages	 exhibit	 a	 strong	 disposition	 for	
considered	judgement	such	as	“think	three	times	before	taking	action”	(三思
而后行),	 or	make	 a	 “careful	 consideration”	 (深思熟虑).	 The	 principle	 of	
considered	 judgement	 is	 reflected	 in	 one	 Chinese	 idiom	 that	 “you	 will	 be	
enlightened	if	you	hear	all	parties	or	listen	to	both	sides”	(兼听则明).	(He,	2014:	62)	The	 discussion	 above	 shows	 that,	 the	 deliberations	 successfully	 promote	 the	 mutual	respect	 between	 district	 government,	 village	 authorities,	 and	 villagers.	 Through	 the	public	 discussion,	 the	 villagers	 learned	 the	 policies	 around	 the	 urban	 village	regenerations;	their	feedback	also	contribute	to	village	authorities	and	local	government	to	make	 decisions.	Meanwhile,	 although	most	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 communication	 seem	informal	and	based	on	the	everyday	talking,	however,	according	to	the	DQI	(see	Chapter	4)	these	communications	have	a	strong	deliberative	nature.	They	are	open	to	the	public	to	participate;	the	participants	were	treated	neutrally	and	their	opinions	were	respected.	In	addition,	the	participants	put	forwarded	their	demands,	concerns	and	reasons	and,	as	will	be	discussed	 later,	 these	opinions	had	a	deep	 impact	on	the	decision-making.	The	discussion	 above	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 deliberation	 in	 China’s	 urban	 village	regeneration	are	good	enough	in	terms	of	deliberative	qualities	and	standards	and	the	urban	village	 regeneration	 is	 a	high-quality	deliberative	 system.	 In	next	 section,	 I	will	discuss	that	the	how	deliberations	were	instrumentally	used	according	to	their	political	functions.	 	 		
7.2.4	Political	Function:	Conflict	Solving	In	this	section,	I	will	argue	that	the	political	function	of	the	deliberative	system	in	China	not	 only	 means	 it	 promote	 an	 inclusive	 and	 egalitarian	 political	 process	 (Mansbrige,	2012),	however,	one	of	the	most	important	function	is	it	so	solve	the	conflict	and	relief	the	social	unrest	(He	and	Warren,	2011;	Tang,	2014).	As	I	discussed	in	previous	sections,	since	2003,	the	regeneration	of	the	old	village	has	been	a	topic	of	discussion	in	the	streets	and	lanes	of	Village	N	for	three	years.	To	encourage	all	of	the	villagers	to	participate	in	the	all	village	discussion,	the	village	committee	requested	every	household	to	authorise	a	representative	 of	 their	 family,	 the	 villagers’	 representative	 would	 organize	 the	 small	group	 discussion	 and	 the	 family	 representatives	 should	 participate	 in	 the	 discussion	
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regularly.	The	village	committee	wanted	to	prepare	for	the	negotiations	with	government	and	developer,	 thus,	 they	wanted	 to	 find	out:	why	villagers	had	 refused	 to	accept	 the	regeneration;	if	they	have	to	accept	a	regeneration	proposal,	the	interests	on	which	they	are	 not	 prepared	 to	 compromise;	 and	 what	 concessions	 might	 be	 likely	 and	 what	compromises	could	be	made.	According	to	the	village	committee’s	working	dairies	and	other	 supporting	 documents,	 since	 2003-2006,	 there	 were	 more	 than	 400	 different	meetings	were	 taken	 in	Village	N.	 Since	 20/04/2004,	 the	 discussion	 stepped	 into	 the	details	of	rearrangements	of	villagers’	welfare;	and	they	raised	a	compensation	proposal	in	very	details.	In	27/09/2004,	the	discussion	stepped	into	the	negotiation	strategy	with	the	developers.	Since	then,	the	public	discussion	moved	to	the	next	stage,	which	aimed	to	formulate	the	rules	for	compensation	for	demolition	and	resettlement	if	the	government	raised	the	regeneration	programme	again.	However,	these	rules	were	made	on	the	basis	of	the	investigation	of	the	villagers;	they	only	held	meetings	at	various	levels	to	discuss,	develop	and	draw	up	a	draft	plan	for	compensation	and	resettlement	for	demolition	and	relocation	 within	 their	 village.	 In	 2004,	 after	 the	 famous	 flagship	 urban	 village	regeneration	 case	 successfully	 launched	 in	 West	 Valley	 Village	 in	 Happy	 City,	 the	regeneration	 of	 the	 urban	 village	 has	 been	 labelled	 ‘sky-high	 price	 compensation’.	Learning	 from	 the	 West	 Valley	 Village,	 the	 villagers	 in	 Village	 N	 expected	 that	 the	regeneration	programme	would	be	a	way	to	get	rich	overnight.	According	to	a	villager:	 	
During	 that	 period,	 there	 were	 a	 lot	 of	 reports	 about	 the	 sky-high	 price	
compensation	for	demolition.	It	sounds	like	we	could	make	a	big	fortune	if	our	
house	would	be	demolished.	Therefore,	during	that	period,	our	expectations	
for	compensation	were	a	little	bit	higher	than	before.	(source:	interview	with	Villager	N	1,	2017)	The	 fieldwork	 located	a	photocopy	of	a	government	meeting	record	which	recorded	a	negotiation	meeting	between	Village	N	and	the	district	government	 in	2004.	This	was	another	attempt	by	the	district	government	to	regenerate	Village	N.	Following	regulation	
No.	32	of	2003	on	the	regeneration	of	urban	villages	in	Happy	City:	
The	regeneration	of	the	urban	village	should	be	carried	out	by	the	market	
operation,	mainly	by	villagers	themselves,	or	by	the	joint	collaboration	with	
the	investor	or	by	the	independent	development	of	the	investor.	 	(source:	regulation	No.	32	of	2003:	the	regulation	on	the	regeneration	of	urban	villages	in	Happy	City)	
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According	 to	 this	 regulation,	 the	 local	 government	 did	 not	 have	 to	 stipulate	 the	regeneration	 programme	 by	 intervening	 in	 the	 programme.	 In	 the	 2004	 negotiation	meeting,	the	role	of	the	government	was	like	a	mediator	to	bring	about	the	collaboration	between	 the	 village	 committee	 and	 the	 investor.	 During	 the	 meeting,	 the	 village	committee	raised	a	proposal	that	they	wanted	to	self-develop	the	new	village	committee	and	 each	 indigenous	 villager	 would	 be	 compensated	 with	 at	 least	 one	 two-bedroom	apartment	 plus	 additional	 cash	 compensation	 according	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 building.	Unsurprisingly,	the	investor	refused	to	invest	in	this	programme	because	they	could	not	afford	the	sky-high	compensation.	According	to	the	former	stuff	of	district	government:	 	
The	compensation	was	too	high	to	approach	[…]	that	was	a	crazy	price	at	
that	time	the	most	problematic	issues	were	the	redundant	illegal	expansions.	
[…]	How	to	compensate	these	buildings	were	controversial	[…]	The	developer	
were	not	charities,	government,	neither	was	the	district	government	No	one	
can	afford	this	price.	 (Source:	Interview	with	Official	D,	2017)	The	 discussion	 above	 does	 not	 argue	 that	 the	 villagers’	 claims	 and	 their	 actions	 are	irrational;	 instead,	 there	was	 rationality	 in	 their	 actions	 if	we	 look	 through	 the	whole	deliberation	process.	Compared	with	the	opening	government	documents	and	interviews,	during	 the	 fieldwork,	many	of	 the	 interviewees	 in	 the	village	 (both	village	 cadres	and	villagers)	 mentioned	 their	 feeling	 like	 “powerless	 and	 hopeless”.	 For	 example,	 most	villagers	raised	rhetorical	questions	to	me:	
why	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 state-owned	 land	 and	 collective-
owned	land?”	 (source:	interview	with	Villager	N	5,	2017)	
	
“why	we	cannot	expand	our	house	within	our	land?	I	cannot	understand	
this	law!”	 (source:	interview	with	Villager	N	6,	2017)	
	
“in	1990s,	when	we	became	wealthy	through	agriculture,	they	took	our	
farmland	 to	 build	 factories,	 now	 we	 became	 wealthy	 again	 through	 our	
housing-renting	and	village	collective	economy,	they	came	here	again	to	take	
our	housings,	why	always	us?”	
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(source:	interview	with	Villager	N	7,	2017)	
	These	rhetorical	questions	came	from	different	villagers,	and	reflect	the	sense	of	identity	of	the	urban	villagers	as	a	disadvantage	group.	Therefore,	it	will	be	argued	that	both	of	the	 actions	 of	 “illegal	 expansion”	 and	 the	 “claim	 of	 sky-high	 compensation”	 are	 their	“weapons	of	weak”	(Scott,	2007),	meanwhile,	these	actions	also	reflect	the	puzzle	of	their	consciousness	of	development	right.	These	actions	almost	need	not	prior	coordination,	they	use	 the	 tacit	understanding	and	 informal	networks	 to	engage	 the	 self-defence	of	attrition	with	low-profile	resistance	techniques	and	strategies,	to	fight	inequality	with	the	firm	and	tough	efforts,	and	to	avoid	directly	antagonizing	authority.	This	is	because	they	not	only	 felt	powerless	on	 the	urban	village	 regeneration	 itself,	 instead,	 they	 also	 felt	powerless	when	they	face	the	uneven	development	right	between	state-owned	land	and	collective-owned	land.	The	deliberations	provided	the	arenas	for	villagers	to	defend	the	regeneration	through	a	legal	way;	meanwhile,	deliberations	also	provide	times	and	space	for	 government	 and	 developer	 to	 elaborate	 on	 the	 current	 situations	 and	 clarify	misunderstandings	to	promote	regeneration.		From	2003,	 the	government	had	therefore	 failed	 in	 two	consecutive	evictions,	but	 the	government	has	never	given	up	on	the	demolition	and	regeneration	of	Village	N.	However,	the	results	of	deliberations	among	the	villagers	alerted	the	local	government	to	elaborate	their	policies	of	the	regeneration	programmes.	Tang	(2015)	point	out	that:	“one	of	the	most	 important	 features	 of	 deliberative	 democracy	 is	 its	 dynamic	 capacity	 for	 self-correction”	(2015:	153).	This	is	distinctive	in	the	policy	making	process	of	Village	N.	They	realized	 that	 the	 village	 cadres	 were	 more	 skilful	 than	 the	 government	 officers	 in	communicating	 with	 villagers	 and	 the	 understanding	 of	 their	 dilemmas	 was	 more	important	 than	 sympathy.	 To	 address	 these,	 since	 the	 end	 of	 2004,	 the	 district	government	not	only	“provide	the	reasons”	to	persuade	the	villagers,	instead,	they	tried	to	learn	the	practical	needs	of	villagers.	According	to	a	government	official:	
we	suddenly	realized	that	the	resistances	was	not	only	because	of	money,	we	
have	to	learn	their	practical	demands	rather	than	being	threatened	by	the	
price	they	raised.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Official	D,	2017)		
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The	district	government	agreed	 to	organize	more	public	discussions,	meanwhile,	 they	required	village	authority	to	bring	a	new	proposal	with	a	feasible	price	and	a	report	with	more	 comprehensive	 information	 about	 villagers’	 practical	 demands.	 This	 is	 because	since	 2005,	 based	 on	 the	 political	 movement	 “urban-rural	 integration”	 raised	 by	 H	Provincial	Government,	the	district	government	had	to	well	prepare	the	regeneration	of	Village	 N	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 provincial	 political	 movement.	 Therefore,	 the	 district	government	wanted	to	find	out	a	feasible	way.	From	the	numerous	talks	and	speeches	made	by	the	senior	officials	of	the	Sunny	District	Government	in	2005,	we	can	discover	their	determinations.	For	example,	the	speech	given	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Sunny	District	Party	Committee:	“no	matter	what	method	it	uses,	it	should	use	the	quickest	speed,	the	shortest	time,	the	highest	efficiency	in	the	demolition	and	regeneration	of	Village	N.”	 		However,	the	discussion	and	negotiation	are	seemingly	endless.	Although	the	villagers	also	put	forward	many	good	opinions	and	suggestions	for	demolition	and	reconstruction,	it	was,	however,	difficult	to	expect	the	villagers	to	raise	a	feasible	compensation	proposal	by	themselves.	According	to	the	 former	senior	officer	 in	 the	District	Government	who	participated	in	the	meeting:	
We	gave	them	three	years	to	discuss	but	they	did	not	provide	any	answer	and	
we	could	not	believe	that	they	could	solve	it	by	themselves.	But	how	is	it	going	
to	change?	How	to	compensate	the	real	estate	of	the	masses,	how	to	solve	the	
housing	of	the	masses,	how	to	guarantee	the	interests	of	the	masses,	how	to	
solve	 the	problems	of	 the	difficult	masses,	 how	 to	guarantee	 the	 collective	
interests,	and	so	on?	Everything	needs	to	be	solved	by	us.	(Source:	Interview	with	Deputy-Chairman,	2017)		Therefore,	 the	 government	 forced	 the	 village	 committee	 to	 provide	 a	 feasible	compensation	proposal	as	soon	as	possible.	However,	during	the	three	years	negotiations	and	discussions,	the	village	authorities	and	villagers	were	much	more	skilful	in	terms	of	negotiation	than	the	beginning.	They	believed	that	the	district	government	might	have	more	pressure	from	the	upper	level	government.	At	that	time,	the	village	authority	and	villagers	 were	 alliance	 partners	 aiming	 at	 get	 more	 compensation	 from	 the	 district	governments.	According	to	the	meeting	records	of	Village	Congress	18th,	July,	2006:	 	
According	to	the	new	master	plan	of	the	district,	although	we	have	got	some	
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prior	policies	from	the	district	government,	but	it	was	not	enough.	We	have	
to	think	of	our	next	generation,	now	we	will	have	no	agricultural	land,	and	
no	 renting	business.	What	we	 can	have	 is	 the	prior	policies	on	 investment	
promotion	of	our	village	and	a	better	compensation	package	for	individual	
household.	We	have	to	fight	for	our	children’s	future.	(Source:	meeting	records	of	village	congress	18th,	July,	2006)	According	 to	 the	Land-use	Law	at	 that	 time,	only	 commercial	 land	was	allowed	 to	be	developed	into	commercial	used	buildings.	To	facilitates	the	regeneration	programmes,	the	 local	 government	 agreed	 that	 after	 the	 regeneration,	 the	 village	 could	 transfer	portions	of	their	land	into	commercial	land	to	developed	the	retails.	However,	this	new	policy	initiative	triggered	a	strong	public	resistance	from	villagers.	The	villagers	believed	that	 their	 village	 leadership	 betrayed	 them	because	 they	 not	 only	worried	 the	 village	authority	would	not	support	them	anymore,	but	also	worried	that	the	village	authority	will	help	the	district	government	to	squeeze	down	the	prices	for	developer.	 		Since	the	end	of	2005,	learning	from	the	experiences	from	former	practices	in	Happy	City	and	other	 cities	around	China,	 the	municipal	 government	decided	 to	 limit	 the	 scale	of	apartment	compensation	to	a	fixed,	transparent	and	non-negotiable	formula,	which	was	limited	to	1.7	times	the	authorized	legal	rural	homestead	in	Sunny	District.	This	policy	aimed	 to	 limit	 public	 resistance	 (it	 will	 be	 introduced	 later),	 to	 enhance	 financial	feasibility	 and	 to	 stop	 the	 long	 and	 endless	 negotiation	 on	 compensation	 rates.	 This	authoritarian	command	is	according	to	the	local	planning	regulation:	the	legal	size	of	a	villager’s	house	cannot	be	more	than	1.7	times	their	rural	homestead.	Instead	of	pursuing	a	comprehensive	massive	discussion,	this	new	political	document	was	directly	sent	to	the	village	committee.	Meanwhile,	the	district	government	left	a	certain	space	to	negotiate	with	the	villagers,	as	in	the	speech	given	by	the	Mayor	of	the	District:	“no	matter	what	method,	no	matter	who	dismantled	and	who	built,	as	long	as	villagers	accept	demolition	and	 reconstruction	 in	 principle,	 anything	 is	 easy	 to	 talk	 about.”	 The	 authoritarian	command	described	above	seems	opposite	to	the	principle	of	the	deliberation,	however,	sometimes	action	must	be	non-cooperative	 in	order	to	 force	 issues	onto	the	table	and	promote	 respect	 for	marginalized	 beliefs	 and	 practices.	 That	 is,	 as	 Rollo	 (2017:	 592)	points	out,	 “in	 some	sites,	 anti-democratic	 action	may	still	 contribute	 to	a	 functioning	system”.	In	this	case,	the	non-negotiated	compensation	rate	forced	the	village	committee	
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and	 the	 villagers	 to	 go	 back	 to	 a	 ‘rational	 expectation’	 of	 the	 compensation	 package.	According	to	the	speech	given	by	the	director	of	the	village	committee:	
In	the	negotiation	on	demolition	and	regeneration,	our	 first	principle	 is	 to	
solve	 the	 problem,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 mean	 we	 will	 make	 an	 unprincipled	
compromise	with	 the	 government,	we	 insist	 on	 the	 premise	 ‘not	 to	 let	 the	
masses	suffer’.	Therefore,	according	to	the	current	situation,	we	need	to	grasp	
this	work	as	a	major	event.	It	requires	that	the	cadres	and	the	masses	of	the	
whole	village	further	unify	their	thinking,	concentrate	their	energies	and	pool	
their	wisdom	and	overcome	difficulties.	We	need	the	broad	masses	of	cadres	
and	 the	 masses	 to	 offer	 suggestions	 and	 our	 Party	 members,	 cadres	 and	
representatives	 of	 villagers	 should	 understand	 the	 wishes	 of	 the	 masses,	
communicate	more	with	the	masses,	and	solicit	suggestions	from	the	masses	
on	 the	 rationalization	 of	 the	 old	 villages.	 Under	 the	 new	 policy,	 the	 new	
proposal	should	benefit	the	masses	and	the	collective	and	can	be	accepted	by	
the	municipal	government.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Director	N,	2017)	In	response	to	the	positive	attitude	of	the	village,	this	time	the	government	abandoned	the	financial	revenue	from	land	release	from	the	developer	in	order	to	ask	the	developer	to	 deliver	 more	 general	 compensation	 to	 the	 villagers.	 Finally,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	apartment	compensation	of	1.7	times	their	rural	homestead,	the	developer	had	agreed	to	provide	compensation	in	cash	for	those	parts	of	the	homestead	that	exceeded	the	in-kind	compensation	 limit	 of	 1.7	 times	 the	 authorized	 legal	 rural	 homestead.	 As	 the	 village	secretary	recalls:	
The	 determination	 of	 the	 Government	 was	 so	 great,	 and	 the	 Government	
would	never	ignore	the	demolition	and	renovation,	no	matter	how	we	delay	
our	act.	It	is	clear	that	the	Government	would	definitely	act	within	the	scope	
of	the	law	to	carry	out	the	demolition	and	regeneration	and	acquire	land	in	
accordance	with	national	standards.	 		
If	 the	 government	 compensates	 us	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 national	
regulations,	at	 that	 time,	we	would	totally	 lose	 the	 initiative	 [...]	Clearly,	 it	
caused	problems	within	our	village,	but	 the	demolition	and	reconstruction	
would	never	stop	because	of	these	unexpected	difficulties	and	problems.	How	
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problems	 are	 solved	 and	 how	mass	work	 is	 done	 requires	us	 to	 face	 them	
conscientiously,	 but	 no	 matter	 how	 heavy	 the	 task	 is,	 how	 difficult	 the	
difficulties	are,	how	many	problems	we	have	to	face,	we	must	all	overcome	
them	and	solve	them	all.	 (Source:	Interview	with	Village	Secretary	N,	2017)	The	 case	 of	 village	 N	 shows	 that	 by	 accessing	 a	 variety	 of	 communicative	 resources,	villagers	were	more	likely	to	enter	the	public	sphere	and	participate	in	the	deliberation	around	 their	 village’s	 affairs.	 This	deliberation	 and	 the	 deliberative	 public	 sphere	 are	politically	 tolerated,	 even	 encouraged,	 by	 the	 local	 government.	 They	 respected	 the	village	committee’s	and	villagers’	willingness	in	participating	in	the	massive	discussion.	In	 this	 case,	 the	 local	 government	 showed	 their	 patience	 with	 the	 long-running	deliberation	 process.	 However,	 if	 we	 look	 at	 the	 political-administrative	 system	 as	 a	whole,	both	informal	deliberation	and	non-deliberative	actions	played	significant	roles.	The	 informal	deliberation	 includes	a	 larger	range	of	non-elite	 interest	groups	–	 in	 this	case,	the	informal	deliberation	allowed	the	villagers	to	acquire	knowledge	and	provide	their	 concerns.	 The	 villagers’	 knowledge,	 policy	 understanding	 and	 their	 negotiation	skills	were	developed	through	the	deliberation.	The	result	of	the	deliberation	not	only	influenced	 the	 village	 authorities’	 decision	 directly,	 but	 also	 influenced	 the	 local	government’s	policy-making.	During	the	policy-making	process,	non-deliberative	actions,	particularly	the	authoritarian	discretion,	also	contributed	to	the	system	because	it	could	force	 the	 villagers	 to	 go	 back	 to	 a	 ‘rational	 expectation’,	 which	 was	 the	 basis	 of	 the	deliberation.	However,	this	is	because	the	Village	N	regeneration	programme	was	not	an	emergency	situation,	therefore,	the	larger	social	and	political	context	allowed	the	local	government	to	be	more	patient	and	deliberative	with	the	villagers.	In	the	next	chapter,	the	story	from	Village	T	shows	how	deliberation	acted	in	an	emergency	situation.	
	
7.2.5	Outcomes	of	the	regeneration	programme.	 	
7.2.5.1	Physical	Outcome	By	 April	 2006,	 Old	 Village	 N1	 (part	 of	 Village	 N)	 was	 demolished	 with	 very	 limited	conflicts,	 which	 affected	 175	 households	 and	 more	 than	 70,000	 square	 metres	 of	buildings.	Since	2006,	these	175	households	in	three	villager	groups	in	the	Old	Village	built	their	newly	regenerated	residential	community.	The	first	villager	group	has	built	10	new	resettlement	buildings	with	a	floor	area	of	38000	square	metres	and	has	built	420	
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suites,	while	the	second	villager	group	has	built	five	new	resettlement	buildings	with	a	floor	area	of	28000	square	metres,	with	a	completed	size	of	(number	needed)	suites.	The	third	villager	group	built	a	new	resettlement	building	with	a	floor	area	of	8800	square	meters	and	84	suites.	The	three	groups	of	residents	moved	into	the	new	houses	in	May	2007.	In	April	2007,	Village	N2	(another	part	of	Village	N)	was	demolished	successfully:	242	 houses	 and	more	 than	 90,000	 square	metres	 of	 buildings	were	 demolished.	 The	fourth	villager	group	built	11	resettlement	buildings	with	a	floor	area	of	55000	square	metres	 and	 built	 454	 suites,	 while	 the	 fifth	 villager	 group	 built	 eight	 resettlement	buildings	with	a	floor	area	of	52000	square	metres	and	completed	448	suites.	The	two	groups	of	demolition	moved	into	the	new	buildings	around	June	2008.		Unlike	the	former	urban	village,	this	newly-built	regenerated	residential	community	is	a	clean,	 modern	 and	 gentrified	 urban	 residential	 community	 with	 various	 supporting	facilities.	 The	 new	 village	 settlement	 community	 is	 18500	 square	 metres,	 with	 27	bluestone-paved	roads	and	117	street	lamps	inside	this	area,	including	35	Wi-Fi	activated	street	lamp.	In	addition,	there	is	a	14500-square-metre	green	area	with	a	variety	of	plants	and	trees,	and	other	urban	facilities	like	36	garbage	bins,	8	sets	of	electronic	monitoring	equipment	and	235	CCTV	cameras.	According	to	the	final	redevelopment	plan,	the	Sunny	District	government	forfeited	the	revenue	from	urban	land	value;	instead,	they	requested	the	developer	to	develop	the	basic	infrastructure	within	this	area.	This	arrangement	is	according	to	previous	cases	in	other	cities,	because	the	land-related	revenue	has	been	a	primary	source	of	fiscal	income,	which	could	account	for	as	much	as	60%	of	total	fiscal	income	in	some	cities	(Ding,	2007).	This	arrangement	aims	to	protect	both	villagers’	and	developers’	benefits	to	limit	the	conflict	between	villagers	and	the	government.	After	the	regeneration,	 Village	 N	 only	 reserved	 limited	 parts	 of	 the	 land	 for	 relocating	 their	villagers;	other	parts	were	acquired	by	the	government	to	build	the	central	library,	youth	palace,	Zuozhao	Park,	Aluminium-City	Park,	and	other	infrastructure.	The	regeneration	project	involved	two	residential	sites	with	a	total	of	150000	square	metres’	floor	area	of	the	properties,	including	the	417	villagers’	houses	and	village	collective-owned	3	hotels,	2	restaurants,	1	supermarket	and	other	mixed-use	commercial	buildings.	Apart	from	the	mixed-use	commercial	buildings,	Village	N	also	has	hundreds	of	retail	places	next	to	the	Central	 Road.	 These	 collective	 properties	 were	 rented	 and	 managed	 by	 the	 village	committee	for	generating	collective	income,	since	the	village	committee	functioned	as	a	
 171 
proprietor	 and	 was	 known	 as	 “collective	 economy	 manager”.	 The	 village	 committee	exemplifies	a	distinguishing	type	of	“village-cooperative”	in	China.	Village	N,	was	typical	of	this	type	of	village-cooperative,	featuring	firms	owned,	controlled,	and	operated	by	the	indigenous	villagers	for	their	own	benefit.	Each	villager	contributes	equity	capital,	and	shares	in	the	control	of	the	firm	through	the	basis	of	the	one-member,	one-vote	principle.	As	the	richest	village	and	strongest	village-cooperative	in	Sunny	District,	from	2002	to	2005,	Village	N	had	10,928,3367	CNY	(around	1,300,0000	GBP)	total	income,	including	3,607,6757	 CNY	 (around	 400,0000	 GBP)	 disposable	 income.	 The	 village	 committee	distributed	1,367,6252	CNY	(around	151,000	GBP)	to	indigenous	villagers	as	welfare.		
7.2.5.2	Build	a	Deliberative	System	In	 principle,	 deliberation	 can	 be	 a	 part	 of	 any	 decision-making	 process,	 but	 in	development	 policy	 circles	 it	 has	 generally	 been	 thought	 of	 in	 the	 context	 of	 local	participatory	development,	where	deliberative	elements	are	 in	principle	 incorporated	within	a	system	of	community	management	and	control.	 	 	 		Beyond	 the	 physical	 development	 above,	 the	 deliberations	 in	 the	 urban	 village	regeneration	also	have	a	contribution	on	building	a	deliberative	system	to	address	the	inequality.	In	the	case	of	Village	N,	the	“traditional	village	deliberation”	is	a	platform	that	the	district	government,	village	leaderships,	cadres,	villagers’	representatives,	and	public	could	working	on	the	programme	together	through	structured	deliberations	to	reach	a	consensus.	That	is,	there	were	a	series	genuine	deliberations	existed	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme.	As	discussed	in	section	7.2,	at	the	beginning,	the	deliberation	around	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 started	 with	 a	 series	 “deliberative	 forums”,	including	 formal	 deliberative	 forums,	 informal	 deliberations,	 and	 non-deliberative	actions.	 These	 actions	 incorporated	 well	 within	 both	 traditional	 village	 governance	system	 and	 urban	 political-administrative	 system:	 within	 this	 system,	 deliberations	generated	a	consensus	of	generation	plan,	promote	the	mutual	respect	of	the	public,	and	contribute	to	an	inclusive	and	egalitarian	political	process.	Beyond	that,	these	traditional	rural	village	deliberations	were	gradually	 forming	 into	an	 institutional	and	systematic	arrangement.	The	systematic	deliberation	provided	possibility	that	all	of	villager	could	participate	 the	discussion,	 raise	 their	 concerns,	 argue	 their	 interest,	 and	express	 their	
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emotion.	These	deliberations	drive	the	traditional	village	decision-making	system	into	a	new	system	that	based	on	the	systematic	deliberations.	 		Therefore,	I	will	argue	that,	the	political-administrative	system	of	Village	N	regeneration	programme	has	transferred	into	a	deliberative	system.	According	to	the	general	scheme	for	a	deliberative	system	(See	chapter	4),	first,	it	has	public	spaces	that	people	can	gather	and	talk,	abundant	forums	and	informal	communication	removes	the	restriction	on	who	can	 participate.	 Second,	 it	 also	 has	 empowered	 space,	 include	 formal	 empowered	decision	making	body	(village	council	and	congress)	and	non-decision	making	body	(such	as	villagers’	representatives	meetings).	Third,	the	linkage	and	interactions	between	the	public	space	and	empowered	spaces	are	strong	and	effectively.	The	empowered	space	were	affected	and	supervised	by	the	public	spaces.	Forth,	through	the	transparency	and	accountability	 of	 empowered	 spaces	 were	 guaranteed	 by	 many	 mechanism:	 the	democratic	 election,	open	village	affairs,	 and	public	discussion	empower	the	public	 to	supervise	the	decision-making	body.	Finally,	these	elements	can	substantially	influence	the	 final	decision.	To	 sum	up,	on	 the	one	hand,	 the	deliberation	 is	 a	part	of	decision-making	process	and	policy	implementation;	on	the	other	hand,	the	deliberation	also	has	a	contribution	on	building	a	deliberative	system.	 	 	 		
7.3	Efficiency	as	the	priority:	Village	T	Since	the	late	1990s,	Village	T	in	the	Sunny	District	of	Happy	City	started	a	slow	process	of	 urbanization.	 Government	 buildings,	 urban	 housing,	 factories	 and	 other	 urban	infrastructure	cropped	up	around	the	village	residential	area,	gradually	absorbing	it	into	the	greater	Sunny	District	area	and	rural	incomes	without	obtaining	access	–	because	of	a	lack	of	hukou	–	to	the	urban	welfare	system.	This	necessitated	them	to	seek	alternative	sources	of	earnings	to	augment	their	insufficient	income.	With	the	migration	of	the	rural	population	into	the	cities,	the	demand	for	low-rental	accommodation	increased.	Urban	villagers	met	this	demand	by	illegally	adding	poor-condition,	low-rent	accommodation	to	their	houses	to	enjoy	additional	income	from	rents	(Lin	and	De	Meulder,	2012;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	This	rental	income	was	relatively	generous	and	stable.	As	a	consequence,	instead	of	developing	their	labour	skills,	many	village	residents	operated	a	cheap	rental	business	and	generated	considerable	profits	(He	et	al.,	2009;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	 		
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Urban	village	regeneration	in	the	Sunny	District	began	in	2006,	later	than	in	most	cities	in	 China,	 or	 even	 other	 districts	 in	 Happy	 City.	 Aiming	 to	 limit	 public	 resistance,	 to	decrease	 financial	 pressure	 and	 speed	 up	 the	 acquisition	 process,	 the	 municipal	government	decided	to	limit	the	scale	of	apartment	compensation	to	a	fixed,	transparent	and	non-negotiable	formula.	After	2011,	after	surveying	the	legal	rural	homestead	size22,	the	district	government	decided	that	the	scale	of	apartment	compensation	was	limited	to	1.7	times	the	authorized	legal	rural	homestead,	or	258m2	per	homestead.	In	principle,	the	compensation	apartments	would	be	built	at	their	original	location.	To	encourage	villagers	to	accept	the	various	development	proposals,	the	village	committee	acted	as	a	mediator	to	 help	 the	 villagers	 to	 arrive	 at	 an	 acceptable	 deal	 with	 the	 government	 and	 the	developers.	 	
	
7.3.1	“4+2”	decision-making	system	The	 “4+2	 decision-making	 system”	 is	 the	 traditional	 village	 deliberation	 system	 for	making	important	decisions	collectively.	The	‘4+2’	procedure	consists	of	a	system	of	four	stages	of	deliberation	and	two	stages	of	public	announcement	(si	yi	liang	gongkai).	In	the	first,	deliberative,	part	 it	stipulates	 in	detail	 the	process	of	how	to	make	a	decision	by	public	deliberation;	in	the	second	part,	announcement,	it	prescribes	after	the	decision-making	how	to	ensure	the	implementation	process	takes	place	under	the	supervision	of	the	public.	Task	targets	and	monitoring	are	additional	policy	instruments	added	to	the	4+2	decision-making	system	in	the	regeneration	process.	To	guarantee	that	targets	were	met,	the	leadership	of	the	Sunny	District	imposed	a	strict	instruction	and	inspection	upon	the	 Command	 Centre.	 The	 command	 centre	 and	 village	 committee	 were	 given	 seven	months	(May	2011	to	Jan	2012)	to	get	agreement	from	villagers.	At	this	crucial	juncture,	the	project-based	command	and	control	 regime	meets	 traditional	village	deliberation.	Since	2009,	the	CCP	has	legally	anchored	village	deliberation	in	the	regeneration	process	by	requiring	that	a	two-thirds	majority	of	villagers	endorse	any	regeneration	proposal.	It	also	stipulates	that	to	obtain	this	outcome,	the	4+2	deliberative	decision-making	system	must	be	adhered	to.	Meanwhile,	the	CCP	encourages	the	local	urban	government	to	learn	from	 this	 deliberation	 system	 in	 their	 routine,	 aiming	 to	manage	 their	 administrative	
                         
22 A rural homestead comprises the land on which rural residents have constructed their 
house. 
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system	more	“democratically”.	Therefore,	the	4+2	system	was	noticed	by	the	public.	This	institutional	arrangement	successfully	separates	the	‘right	of	proposing’	and	the	‘right	of	decision	making’.	Figure	1	illustrates	the	system	of	village	decision	making.	According	to	this	 figure,	 the	 village	 Party	 branch	 has	 the	 right	 to	 raise	 a	 proposal	 and	 the	 village	congress	will	make	 the	 decision	 after	 a	 deliberative	 process	 by	 voting.	 The	 system	 is	carefully	 calibrated	 to	balance	 rational	 communication	 through	Type	one	deliberation	between	the	villagers	and	the	village	authorities	with	the	Party	influence	represented	by	the	Village	Party	Branch.		
 175 
Figure	7.3:	The	process	of	village	decision-making	system	(4+2	system).	
	
	What	we	observe	here	is	the	existence	of	two	parallel	governance	systems	that	exist	in	an	uneasy	and	unstable	alliance	with	each	other.	On	the	one	hand,	we	see	the	project-based	command-and-control	system,	that	is	directly	tied	into	the	authoritarian	rule	of	the	CCP	and	that	extends	downwards	into	lower	levels	of	government.	On	the	other	hand,	we	see	the	traditional	deliberative	governance	culture	of	the	village	that	is	in	fact	endorsed	by	the	CCP.	To	obtain	a	better	understanding	of	how	this	deliberative	system	works	in	a	real-
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world	complex	governance	situation	in	which	two	interests	are	potentially	at	loggerheads	with	each	other,	we	will	unpack	the	course	of	events	in	two	urban	village	regeneration	cases	in	the	Sunny	District	in	the	next	section.	 	 		As	 stated	before,	deliberation	 in	 the	 context	of	urban	village	 regeneration	 is	part	of	 a	complex	political-administrative	system,	with	many	actors	whose	activities	are	often	not	aligned.	The	4+2	system	contains	diverse	forms	of	formal	and	informal	deliberations	and	negotiation.	Although	some	negotiations	are	 tactical,	 the	wider	policy	 system	 that	has	emerged	around	urban	village	regeneration	still	retains	many	deliberative	elements.	On	12	May	2011,	the	district	government	set	stage	1	of	the	4+2	system	in	motion	by	sending	its	officers	into	the	village	to	collect	opinions	to	outline	the	regeneration	proposal	with	the	 Party	 members	 in	 the	 Village	 Party	 Branch	 only.	 This	 initial	 information	 and	consulting	initiative	gave	the	district	government	an	insight	into	the	village	leadership’s	attitude	towards	the	regeneration	proposal.	Based	on	the	reactions	of	the	Village	Party	Branch,	 the	 district	 government	 drafted	 a	 compensation	 proposal	 and	 expanded	 the	consulting	 through	 the	 4+2	 decision-making	 process.	 The	 villagers’	 representatives,	members	of	the	standing	groups	of	the	Village	Party	Branch	and	the	Village	Committee	were	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 deliberation.	 The	 agenda	 consisted	 of	 one	 item:	 to	establish	a	compensation	package	that	is	acceptable	to	the	villagers.	(We	will	see	that	in	this	case,	this	goal	was	lowered	to	‘acceptable	to	the	required	two-thirds	majority’.)	The	remit	of	the	deliberative	process	is	framed	by	the	legally	mandated	compensation	rules	as	 described	 above.	 However,	 a	 lot	 of	 compensation	 elements	 remain	 that	make	 the	difference	 between	 an	 outcome	 that	 is	 deemed	 fair	 or	 unfair	 by	 the	 villagers.	Deliberations	 concerned	 the	 new	 committee’s	 locations,	 collective	 enterprise	arrangements,	villagers’	welfare	arrangements	and	employment	opportunities.	Given	the	pressure	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 quick	 outcome,	 the	 District	 Government	 had	 agreed	 to	compensation	 in	 cash	 for	 those	 parts	 of	 the	 homestead	 that	 exceeded	 the	 in-kind	compensation	 limit	 of	 258m2.	 Instead	 of	 simply	 asking	 ‘agree	 or	 disagree’,	 this	 step	focused	on	how	to	encourage	the	villagers	to	draft	the	proposal,	particularly	about	the	details	and	amount	of	compensation	packages.	After	the	village	Party	cadres	and	Village	Committee	representatives	agreed	on	a	compensation	proposal,	the	draft	was	distributed	to	each	household	in	the	village.	The	representatives	of	both	bodies	were	asked	to	collect	
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each	villager’s	reaction	and	they	were	required	to	negotiate	with	villagers	 to	pass	the	proposal	at	a	village	congress;	that	is,	they	needed	to	follow	the	4+2	system	step-by-step.	 		Under	 this	 arrangement,	 the	 villagers	 have	 access	 to	 the	 deliberation	 through	 the	following	channels.	They	can	express	their	opinions	to	their	representatives	and	ask	them	to	deliver	their	opinions	to	village	cadres	in	steps	2	and	3.	They	can	question	the	result	of	each	step	and	the	village	authorities	must	respond	to	their	questions;	they	can	express	their	argument	in	the	village	congress.	They	can	express	their	opinions,	suggestions,	or	dissenting	opinions	during	the	public	announcement.	They	can	also	accuse	and	impeach	the	 village	 authority	 if	 they	 do	 not	 implement	 the	 proposal	 strictly.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	compensation	proposal	was	amended	several	times	to	reflect	the	villagers’	positions.	The	amendments	included:	 	
• Cash	 compensation	 for	 homesteads	 over	 258m2	 up	 to	 600	 Yuan	 per	 m2,	 the	housing	is	evaluated	by	mutually	agreed	criteria;	 	
• The	land-use	plan	of	the	regenerated	area	has	been	amended.	The	amount	of	retail	space	has	been	increased	and	the	rental	income	of	these	spaces	are	distributed	to	villagers	as	welfare;	
• The	collective	economies	of	 the	village	will	be	registered	as	a	collective-owned	company.	The	formerly	collective-owned	land	will	be	transferred	as	state-owned	industrial	land	first,	and	these	lands	will	be	redistributed	back	to	the	collective-owned	company.	The	villagers	can	keep	sharing	the	land	rental	income	as	before;	
• The	district	government	provides	skill	training	for	unemployed	villagers;	
• All	the	villagers	move	out	before	1	June	2012.	The	final	compensation	proposal	passed	the	village	congress	in	Jan	2012	with	an	85%	majority.		Although	this	looks	like	a	satisfying	outcome	for	the	residents	of	village	T,	we	should	not	lose	 sight	 of	 the	 constrained	 nature	 of	 the	 village	 deliberations.	 It	 is	 commonly	understood	in	Chinese	political	culture	that	the	individual’s	interests	must	yield	to	the	collective’s.	 In	 the	 current	 political	 climate	 that	 often	means	 that	 individual	 interests	must	give	way	to	rapid	economic	development.	In	the	urban	village	regeneration	process,	the	“collective”	interest	of	the	district	is	to	establish	the	general	aviation	industry	group	within	 the	 industrial	development	 zone.	For	example,	 as	 the	government	working	 log	
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records	state:	“On	02/09/2011,	the	Director	of	the	District	People’s	Congress23	 gave	a	speech	 in	 Village	 T:	 “both	 village	 cadre	 and	 villagers	 should	 raise	 awareness	 of	 the	
importance,	arduousness,	long-term	and	complex	nature	of	urban	village	regeneration	and	
reallocation	 community	 construction.	 The	 command	 centre	 and	 village	 cadre	 should	
mobilize	villagers’	 initiative	and	enthusiasm	in	terms	of	building	a	good	home.”	The	key	target	 of	 the	 Command	 Centre	 was	 to	 persuade	 the	 villagers	 to	 accept	 the	 district’s	demolition	 and	 compensation	 proposal	 and	 to	 sign	 the	 contract	 for	 demolition	 and	compensation.	 		During	 these	 seven	months,	 the	 leadership	 of	 Sunny	District	 inspected	 the	 Command	Centre	month	by	month.	In	practice,	this	means	that	in	addition	to	the	legally	required	village	 deliberations,	 the	 District	 Government	 directly	 intervened	 in	 the	 process.	 For	example,	 the	 director	 of	 the	 District	 People’s	 Congress	 personally	 visited	 the	 village	during	the	deliberations	to	deliver	the	above-mentioned	speech.	The	purpose	of	the	visit	was	to	endorse	the	Command	Centre	and	village	committee	and	to	discourage	opposition	to	 the	 regeneration.	 He	 also	 visited	 villagers	 at	 home	 to	 demonstrate	 his	 personal	sympathy	for	them.	The	purpose	of	this	personalized	approach	is	not	an	open,	reciprocal	exchange	between	district	leadership	and	villagers,	but	to	obtain	the	required	two-thirds	majority	by	weakening,	albeit	in	a	considerate	and	respectful	manner,	the	resolve	of	any	opponents	who	had	petitioned	against	the	government’s	proposals.	 	 		The	scalar	governance	system	around	urban	village	regeneration	can	be	regarded	as	a	deliberative	 system,	which	operates	on	different	 spatially	and	 functionally	distributed	registers	of	 deliberation,	 negotiation,	 exhortation,	 persuasion	 and	 top-down	decision-making.	 The	 4+2	 system	 within	 the	 villages	 represents	 genuine,	 legally	 protected,	deliberation.	 In	 addition,	 we	 encounter	 the	 hastily	 assembled	 informal	 deliberation	efforts	by	the	District	authorities	that,	with	project	management,	form	an	integral	part	of	a	wider	administrative	system	that	is	aimed	at	economic	development.	These	deliberative	moments	are	constrained	by	the	a	priori	performance	goals	that	are	outside	of	any	norm	of	 communicative	 rationality.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 will	 encounter	 examples	 of	 the	
                         
23 In the Chinese political system, the director of the District People’s Congress is the 
third highest official within the district, who takes charge of elections and designs 
regulations. 
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shadow	that	the	efficiency	goal	throws	over	the	communicative	process	when	it	becomes	clear	that	villagers’	material	interests,	their	grief	and	anger	at	past	treatment	at	the	hands	of	 the	 authorities,	 or	 their	 suspicion	 of	 financial	 wrongdoing	 by	 the	 authorities,	 is	declared	off-limits	in	the	communication	about	compensation.	In	the	case	of	village	T,	the	village	 speech	 and	 home	 visits	 of	 the	 District	 authorities	 were	 unable	 to	 suppress	resistance	against	the	regeneration	proposals.	To	understand	why	this	was,	we	need	to	discuss	the	situation	of	the	village	residents	in	more	detail.	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
7.3.2	Constrained	Deliberation.	 	 	Concerned	about	social	stability	and	under	pressure	to	deliver	a	positive	formal	response	to	the	district	government	(which	itself	was	acting	under	a	9-month	completion	goal),	the	Village	Committee	and	Village	Party	Branch	decided	to	speed	up	the	village	deliberation	process.	Under	the	pressure	from	the	Command	Centre,	they	agreed	in	the	negotiation	meeting	to	merge	the	villagers’	representative	meetings	and	the	Village	Party	Congress.	This	 amounted	 to	 a	 blurring	 of	 village	 participation	 and	 Party	 command	 in	 the	deliberative	4+2	decision-making	procedure.	During	the	meeting,	the	village	committee	had	invited	one	of	the	senior	officers	from	the	district	government	to	introduce	the	draft	of	 the	 regeneration	 agenda	 and	 the	 compensation	 package.	 The	 senior	 officer	“emphasized	 the	 importance	 and	 significance	 of	 the	 program	 and	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	
decision-making	 progress”	 (Source:	 local	 government	 meeting	 summary).	 Under	 the	designation	 “condition	 of	 urgency”,	 the	 official	 asked	 the	 village	 Party	 members	 and	villagers’	representatives	to	bypass	the	carefully	calibrated	4+2	deliberation	procedure	about	 the	 compensation	 package	 agenda	 and	 restrict	 themselves	 to	 collecting	 the	villagers’	comments	about	it.	As	one	of	the	Party	members	recalled:	 	
Our	attitudes	are	not	important	for	them	(Command	Centre)	as	they	only	care	
about	the	voting	result	of	the	Villager’s	Congress.	They	only	want	some	insight	
into	the	villagers’	attitude,	as	 they	need	to	sign	the	compensation	contract	
with	 villagers.	 They	 asked	 us	 to	 keep	 working	 on	 this	 issue	 all	 the	 time,	
weekdays	 and	weekends,	 day	 and	 night	 ...	 Our	 task	was	 to	 collect	 general	
opinions	 from	 the	 villagers	 and	 to	 pass	 the	 proposal	 at	 the	 villagers’	
congress	…	they	need	to	know	how	to	persuade	the	villagers.	 	(source:	interview	with	Village	Cadre	T2,	2017)	
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	The	result	of	the	first	round	of	opinion	collection	showed	that	the	compensation	package	was	 acceptable.	 Indeed,	 almost	 70%	 of	 the	 villagers	 supported	 the	 village	 leaders	 to	proceed	with	the	regeneration	process.	The	opponents	were	villagers	who	had	informally	expanded	 their	house	after	2010	and	stood	 to	 lose	 the	most.	The	opponents’	 resisted	fiercely	as	the	loss	of	income	would	overturn	their	livelihoods.	However,	as	the	village	committee	had	a	sufficiently	large	majority	to	pass	the	vote,	they	immediately	convened	the	villagers’	congress	to	vote,	and	unsurprisingly,	the	decision	to	accept	the	regeneration	plan	was	accepted	by	a	comfortable	majority.	The	size	of	 the	majority	gave	the	village	leaders	strong	confidence	and	they	believed	they	represented	the	majority.	 		However,	 the	 truncated	 “4+2”	 decision-making	 process	was	 interrupted	 at	 the	 public	announcement	 stage,	 as	 the	opponents	of	 the	 compensation	decision	vocally	 resisted.	Those	villagers	whose	livelihood	exclusively	depended	on	rental	income	felt	ignored	by	the	village	leadership.	Their	concerns	escalated	when	the	village	committee	formally,	in	line	 with	 the	 4+2	 protocol,	 announced	 the	 7-day	 period	 of	 public	 comments	 on	 the	decision.	 Instead	 of	 declaring	 the	 decision	 invalid,	 the	 village	 leadership	more	 or	 less	ignored	the	critical	feedback.	Instead	of	cautiously	handling	the	collective	resistance,	the	village	committee	and	village	Party	branch	reported	these	issues	to	the	Command	Center	as	 “an	 issue	 that	was	 caused	by	an	unreasonable	and	conservative	minority’’	 (Source:	government	dairies,	Command	Center	of	Community	T	Programme,	2011).	According	to	a	villagers’	representative:	 	
It	was	a	terrible	misjudgement	to	simply	treat	them	as	‘minority	racketeers’,	
as	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 avoid	 ‘racketeering’	when	 you	want	 to	 attract	 a	 public	
project	in	a	village	...	Several	years	before,	we	built	the	water	tower	to	improve	
the	water	supply	system	for	our	village.	We	needed	to	cut	down	two	trees	from	
in	 front	 of	 two	 families’	 houses,	 as	 we	 needed	 to	 make	 more	 space	 for	
construction.	Although	there	is	no	evidence	to	prove	that	these	two	families	
owned	the	trees,	they	still	successfully	asked	for	compensation	...	Most	of	the	
time,	people	 think	public	projects	are	paid	 for	by	the	government,	and	the	
government	is	rich	enough	to	pay	their	‘racketeering’	...	Indeed,	we	never	held	
a	tough	attitude	towards	them	before	the	regeneration.	 	
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(source:	interview	with	Village	Cadre	T2,	2017)		Resistance	escalated	with	the	spread	of	village	gossip	about	the	regeneration	policy,	such	as:	 ‘Village	 A	 gains	more	money	 as	 hundreds	 of	 villagers	 petitioned	 the	 government	 for	
higher	compensation	packages’	(interview	with	a	villager).	These	rumours	encouraged	the	 villagers	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 formal	 petition	 against	 the	 Command	 Centre	 and	 the	Village	Committee	as	 they	argued	 that	 they	 requested	more	 compensation	 to	 sign	 the	contract.	 Instead	 of	 the	 village	 authorities’	 public	 propaganda,	 the	 villagers	 tended	 to	believe	the	rumours	and	directly	confronted	the	village	committee	and	Command	Centre.	Therefore,	the	first	priority	of	the	Command	Centre	and	village	committee	was	to	clarify	the	gossip	and	control	the	growing	complaints	about	the	demolition	and	compensation	proposal	draft.	They	used	 two	 trucks	with	huge	 speakers	 to	broadcast	 the	policy	 into	villages;	meanwhile,	they	distributed	more	than	500	posters	to	explain	the	policy	(Source:	government	dairies).	However,	these	efforts	at	a	public	announcement	were	unsuccessful.	 	One	reason	for	the	failure	of	the	public	announcement	stage	was	pervasive	rumours	of	corruption	 at	 the	 leadership	 level.	 The	 under-compensated	 properties	 and	 the	 village	leaders’	failure	to	prevent	the	government	from	taking	their	land	were,	in	the	minds	of	the	villagers,	 linked	to	the	 leaders	and	government	officials	accepting	bribes	 from	the	involved	enterprises:	
“It	began	with	the	town	expropriating	our	land.	The	government	just	took	it	
at	a	low	price.	The	village	committee	couldn’t	prevent	it	so	that’s	when	the	
mess	 began	 when	 the	 government	 began	 profiting	 from	 us	 ...	 Then	 the	
government	gave	that	huge	plot	of	 land	to	build	an	airport	 for	an	aircraft	
factory.	Basically,	it	all	went	to	one	company!	So	the	villagers	think	that	my	
colleagues	 and	 I	 had	 been	 defeated	 by	 corruption.	 But	 the	 truth	 is,	 as	 a	
monopoly,	the	aircraft	factory	almost	only	speaks	to	the	provincial	level,	they	
did	not	care	about	the	district	government,	they	just	ignored	us	...”	 	(Source:	Interview	with	Village	Cadre	T	1).	
	Up	against	the	combined	might	of	several	layers	of	government,	the	representatives	of	the	Party	at	all	these	levels,	and	well-funded	and	well-connected	corporate	players,	in	a	situation	in	which	open	conflict	and	protest	is	barely	tolerated,	the	villagers	could	only	
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employ	the	“weapons	of	 the	weak”	(Scott,	1987)	by	engaging	 in	a	participation	strike.	They	refused	to	participate	in	any	further	discussion	about	the	compensation	decision.	According	to	a	villager	(B):	
We	 might	 be	 tempted	 to	 dismiss	 the	 Party	 Secretary’s	 assertion	 as	
propaganda,	 if	 not	 for	 evidence	 that	 villagers	 insisted	 on	 participating	 in	
decisions	about	collective	 land	 ...	 Instead	of	participating	in	 the	discussion,	
the	villagers	put	pressure	on	the	leadership	by	refusing	to	participate.	
(source:	interview	with	Villager	T	1,	2017)		This	“participation	strike”	is	itself	a	feature	of	the	dispersed	Chinese	deliberation	system.	Although	it	rarely	makes	the	headlines,	it	is	well	known	that	Chinese	citizens,	despite	the	considerable	risk	to	their	freedom	and	safety,	frequently	engage	in	open	protest.	It	might	seem	perverse	to	call	such	protest	a	form	of	deliberation,	but	as	Rollo	points	out,	the	very	act	of	protesting	must	be	judged	by	its	symbolic	meaning	in	the	relational	configuration	in	 which	 it	 occurs.	 As	 he	 states:	 “Abjuring	 deliberation	 is	 not	 always	 an	 example	 of	‘shirking	 collective	 responsibilities’	 but	 rather,	 reflects	 the	 necessity	 of	 breaking	 ‘a	relationship	of	domination’”	(Rollo,	2016,	598.	Quotes	from	Warren,	2011).	By	engaging	in	 such	 drastic	 acts,	 the	 villagers	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 the	regeneration	process,	while	at	the	same	time	the	form	of	their	protest	is	conditioned	by	the	 asymmetry	 in	 power	 and	 resources	 (Rollo,	 2016,	596).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 citizens’	refusal	 to	 further	 participate	 expressed	 their	 disillusionment	 and	 lack	 of	 faith	 in	 a	communicative	setup	that	betrayed	its	own	stated	goal.	 		Facing	 a	 participation	 strike,	 with	 a	 considerable	 number	 of	 village	 residents	disillusioned	by	the	expropriation	process	and	low	land	compensation	payments	and	in	a	climate	of	corruption	rumours,	the	district	government	and	village	leadership	faced	an	acute	crisis	of	 trust	and	legitimacy	that	endangered	the	targets	of	 the	 land	acquisition	project.	As	a	next	step,	therefore,	the	Command	Centre	and	the	village	leadership	resorted	to	 face-to-face	 contact.	 They	 tried	 to	 persuade	 the	 opposing	 villagers	 through	 street	meetings	 and	 door-to-door	 visits.	 Their	 purpose	 was	 once	 again	 to	 weaken	 the	petitioners’	 resolve	 and	 ‘convince’	 their	 opponents	 by	 explaining	 the	 compensation	policy	and	dispelling	the	corruption	rumours.	Ten	small	teams,	organized	by	the	village	
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committee,	 engaged	 in	 these	 face-to-face	 meetings.	 Initially,	 this	 government-driven	informal	deliberation	effort	faced	an	uphill	battle.	Many	residents	were	distrustful	of	the	door-to-door	visit,	as	they	felt	powerless	in	their	discussions	with	government	officials.	Some	villagers	 felt	bullied	by	 the	 local	 government	as	 they	experienced	 their	unequal	social	position,	education	levels	and	personal	skills.	 	
I	can’t	debate	with	them,	I	can’t	express	my	opinions,	they	are	much	cleverer	
than	me...	 it	 is	difficult	for	me	to	state	my	opinions.	 I	 just	know	I	don’t	 like	
them,	and	I	want	more	money.	 	 (source:	interview	with	Villager	T	2,	2017)	
However,	gradually,	most	villagers	obtained	a	basic	sense	of	what	they	received	and	what	they	lost.	 	
I	was	misled	by	the	gossip	from	other	villagers,	 I	thought	that	I	would	lose	
everything.	The	government	staff	clarified	the	situation	for	me,	and	I	began	
to	 support	 the	 regeneration.	 It	was	not	a	bad	deal.	 I	 have	moved	 into	 this	
community	two	years	ago,	I	still	think	it	was	a	good	deal.	 	(source:	interview	with	Villager	T	3,	2017)	
These	 door-to-door	meetings	 helped	 the	 Command	 Centre	 to	 successfully	 amend	 the	compensation	 decision.	 After	 the	 collection	 of	 positions,	 they	 became	 aware	 that	 the	opposing	villagers	were	worried	about	their	livelihood	after	they	lost	their	rental	income.	The	 government	 then	 organized	 a	 roundtable	 meeting	 with	 enterprises	 nearby	 and	successfully	asked	 them	 to	provide	 lists	of	 employment	opportunities	and	conditions.	After	these	efforts,	almost	85%	of	the	village	residents	signed	the	compensation	contracts	before	the	start	of	the	demolition.	The	former	village	director	commented:	 	
We	finally	solved	the	problem	at	this	stage.	It	was	too	hard	to	persuade	the	
villagers	 otherwise	…	 I	 cannot	 do	more	 for	 them	because	 the	 government	
won’t	give	me	any	chance.	I	believed	in	the	existing	cases,	every	village	tried	
to	argue	something,	but	I	haven’t	seen	any	successful	cases.	The	compensation	
policy	never	changed.	 	
(Source:	Interview	with	Village	Director	T	2,	2017)	
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7.4	Deliberative	Capacity	Building	Deliberative	 Capacity	Building	 (See	 Chapter	 4)	 is	 a	 framework	 raised	 by	 John	Dryzek	(2009).	It	could	be	used	to	assess	of	the	effectiveness	and	completeness	of	a	deliberative	system.	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	Tang	(2014)	advances	the	analytical	framework	of	“deliberative	 capacity	 building”	 into	 contemporary	 China,	 namely	 social	 capacity,	institutional	capacity,	and	participatory	capacity.	 		First	development	is	the	social	capacity.	At	an	operational	level,	this	indicator	means	that	both	 media	 discussion	 and	 everyday	 talk	 play	 significant	 roles	 by	 generating	 public	political	awareness,	exchanging	information	and	forming	public	opinions	(see	Chapters	7	and	8).	Refer	it	back	to	the	Tang	(2014),	the	deliberative	capacity	building	theory,	we	can	 find	out	 that	 the	 form	of	 the	 (re)distribution	of	discourse	power	 through	various	communicative	 processes	 (both	 formal	 and	 informal)	 in	 which	 citizens	 exchange	opinions	and	form	a	consensus	in	public	and	private	settings	about	issues	that	affect	their	villages’	 regeneration.	 In	 both	 cases	 we	 can	 observe	 how	 a	 range	 of	 actors	 employ	deliberative	elements,	such	as	public	discussion,	home	visiting,	street	talking,	and	village	congresses;	even	more	institutionalized	forms:	the	“4+2	decision	making	system”.	Most	of	 them	 made	 certain	 contributions	 in	 terms	 of	 enhancing	 public	 participation,	representation,	inclusion	and	accountability.	Deliberation	seems	to	become	a	channel	in	(re)distribution	of	discourse	power	through	various	communicative	processes	in	larger	context	to	contribute	to	the	democratization	process.	However,	this	trend	can	hardly	be	identified	 in	 these	 two	 cases.	 The	 communicative	 channels	 and	 resources	 were	programme	based,	 however,	 the	 tolerances	 of	 the	 state	were	 only	 depended	 on	 their	political	 targets	 rather	 than	citizens’	 attitudes.	 In	addition,	 citizens,	 although	aware	of	their	exposed	social	and	political	position,	do	not	hesitate	to	express	their	opinion	about	decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 livelihood,	 health,	 ethnic	 identity,	 or	 their	 children’s	opportunities.	Among	ordinary	people,	authorities	often	carry	a	suspicion	of	being	prone	to	 corruption,	 stonewalling	and	 the	 cover-up	of	policy	 failure.	Others,	 as	 the	past	 two	decades	have	shown,	are	willing	to	risk	arrest,	detention	or	worse	in	resisting	what	they	perceive	to	be	unfair	and	unjust	treatment	at	the	hand	of	officials.	 		
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The	second	development	is	institutional	capacity.	In	both	cases,	the	effective	institutional	incorporation	of	communicative	outcomes	can	be	observed	in	both	cases.	We	can	see	how	local	government	and	village	authority	reach	consensus,	made	decision,	and	implement	the	regeneration	plan	according	to	the	communicative	outcomes	of	public	discussion.	In	the	 three	 years	 discussion,	 the	 public	 can	 not	 only	 access	 the	 information,	 but	 also	substantially	 access	 to	 the	 channel	 to	 express	 their	 arguments,	 interests	 and	 even	emotions.	Meanwhile,	this	also	contribute	the	local	government	to	improve	their	policies	and	the	ways	of	policy-implementation	to	cope	with	local	knowledge.	The	deliberation	contributed	to	the	positive	interaction	between	government,	village	authorities,	and	the	public.		The	third	development	is	participatory	capacity.	We	can	see	in	both	cases;	the	villagers	were	significantly	influenced	by	the	deliberations	and	deliberative	system.	Through	the	three	years	public	discussion,	we	can	observe	that	the	villagers	learned	the	policies	itself	and	 policy-making	 process.	 They	 got	 capacity	 to	 argue	 with	 and	 pressure	 the	 local	government	 to	 fight	 for	 a	 better	 compensation	 package.	 In	 the	 4+2	 system,	 also	 the	compensation	package	is	not	negotiable,	the	villagers	can	use	this	system	to	get	a	better	policy	 for	 their	 further	 development,	 such	 as	 working	 opportunities,	 professional	training,	 and	 other	 advantages.	 Instead	 of	 using	 violence,	 the	 villagers	 adopted	more	rational	ways	to	resistant	the	local	government.		To	 sum	 up,	 to	 evaluate	 a	 deliberative	 system,	 the	 examination	 could	 go	 beyond	 the	deliberative	system	itself,	to	discuss	the	deliberative	system	in	a	broader	context	in	terms	of	the	role	of	the	deliberative	system	in	the	democratization	process	of	an	authoritarian	state.	 Deliberative-capacity-building	 provides	 a	 supplementary	 scheme	 based	 on	Mansbridge’s	three	overarching	functions	(will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	9)	of	democratic	deliberation.	 		
7.5	Conclusion	This	 chapter	 focused	 on	 two	 main	 questions	 concerning	 the	 process	 and	 place	 of	authoritarian	 deliberation	 in	 China’s	 complex	 governance	 system.	 From	 a	 pessimistic	point	of	view	authoritarian	deliberation	is	exactly	what	it	claims	to	be:	a	relatively	limited	
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policy	instrument	that	in	an	overall	authoritarian,	intrinsically	unjust,	political	system	is	employed	by	officials	in	an	instrumental	way	to	persuade	or	compel	citizens	to	accept	their	decisions	and	to	generate	political	support.	But	 that	view	is	 too	one-sided.	 In	all	governance	 systems	 deliberation	 fulfils	 three	 important	 functions	 (Mansbridge	 et	 al.,	2012):	 the	 epistemic	 function	 of	 “collectively	 producing	 understandings,	 opinions,	preferences	and	decisions	that	are	based	on	‘substantive	and	meaningful	consideration	of	relevant	reasons’	”	(op.cit.,	11);	the	ethical	function	of	treating	citizens	and	other	actors	as	autonomous	agents	who	are	able	to	contribute	substantively	and	meaningfully	to	the	governance	 of	 their	 society	 (ibid.;	 Dewey,	 1954)	 and	 the	 democratic	 function	 by	organizing	 a	 diversity	 of	 input	 into	 the	 understanding	 of	 complex	 problems	 and	 the	liberation	of	the	creative	forces	of	society	(Lindblom,	1965;	Wagenaar,	2011).	These	two	examples	 show,	 although	 on	 a	 small	 and	 limited	 scale	 and	 hemmed	 in	 by	 the	hierarchically-imposed	demands	of	project	management,	how	deliberation	in	the	case	of	the	regeneration	of	village	T	was	able	to	fulfil	these	three	functions.	When	the	authorities	decided	to	listen	to	disgruntled	citizens,	the	latter,	after	they	had	overcome	their	initial	distrust,	felt	respected	and	taken	seriously.	Moreover,	authorities	were	forced	to	rethink	the	 rigid	 compensation	 scheme	 and	 came	 up	with	 a	 more	 creative	 scheme	 that	 was	responsive	to	the	needs	of	the	residents.	 		From	a	systemic	point	of	view,	in	a	situation	where	the	rule	of	law	is	weak,	the	diversity	and	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 Chinese	 governance	 system	 is	 the	 best	 guarantee	 for	 the	continued	 use	 of	 deliberation	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 governance.	 In	 the	 interstices	 of	 loosely	coupled	 governance	 configurations,	 where	 political	 authorities	 cannot	 manage	 the	multiplying	 interdependencies	 in	 the	 governance	 system,	 spaces	 emerge	 in	 which	deliberation	can	make	a	real	contribution	to	collective	decision-making.	The	 following	chapter	will	introduce	two	examples	where	local	officials	successfully	used	deliberative	strategies	 to	help	 villagers	make	 the	 sometimes	 difficult	 adjustment	 to	 a	more	 urban	lifestyle.	Despite	 their	constrained	character,	deliberative	practices,	as	 they	proliferate	throughout	the	Chinese	governance	system,	can	limit	conflict	and	enhance	governance.	
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Chapter	Eight:	Transformation	of	governance	system	
8.1	Introduction	This	chapter	 focuses	on	the	changes	to	community	governance	that	occurred	after	 the	urban	 village	 regeneration	when	 the	 villagers	were	 reallocated	 to	 a	 new	 community.	Beyond	the	physical	urbanization	of	the	village,	the	challenge	for	the	local	government	is	to	transfer	the	village	governance	system	into	an	urban	community	governance	system;	and	to	integrate	villagers	into	the	city	as	ordinary	citizens.	This	administrative	translation	created	 two	 problems:	 administrative	 problems,	 and	 economic	 problems.	Administratively,	a	new	regenerated	community	needs	to	merge	the	administration	with	the	urban	system,	and	act	as	a	branch	of	street	office.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	explain	that	there	 are	 different	 approaches	 to	 administrative	 integration,	 based	 on	 the	 collective	economic	power.	Economically,	 the	 former	villagers	of	regenerated	community	have	a	cooperative,	and	the	owners	not	only	get	benefits	from	the	shares’	distribution,	but	also	enjoy	the	public	services.	After	the	regeneration,	in	the	new	community,	the	indigenous	population	 of	 the	 villagers	 are	 diluted,	 and	 have	 no	 interest	 in	 sharing	 their	 public	services	 with	 newcomers.	 This	 brings	 consequences	 for	 the	 local	 government,	community	leadership,	and	public.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	introduce	how	deliberation	and	deliberative	system	contribute	to	overcome	these	consequences.	 		The	 first	 three	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 (section	 8.2,	 8.3,	 and	 8.4)	 introduce	 the	institutional	 changes	 of	 both	 Village	 N	 and	 Village	 T	 The	 discussion	 includes:	 the	administrative	 institution	 transformation,	 the	 role	 of	 village	 shareholding	 companies,	and	the	introduction	of	property	management	companies.	Following	these	discussions,	section	8.5	introduces	how	the	villagers	experienced	transitional	challenges	in	their	daily	lives	caused	by	the	reallocation	from	urban	village	neighbourhood	into	a	modern	urban	residents’	 community.	 To	 lead	 villagers	 in	 getting	 used	 to	 the	 new	urban	 life,	 former	village	cadres	play	a	significant	role,	such	as	intervening	in	the	local	conflicts,	applying	authorizations,	 and	 so	 on.	 Finally,	 through	 the	 comparisons	 of	 the	 experiences	 and	understandings	 from	 the	 former	 village	 deliberation	 and	 the	 urban	 community	governance	system,	section	8.6	discusses	the	transformation	of	the	deliberation	system.		
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8.2.	Political	Economy	background	of	two	cases	
8.2.1	Introduction	The	concept	of	“community	building”	(See	chapter	3)	in	urban	village	regeneration	was	borrowed	from	systems	of	urban	governance.	In	2000,	Happy	City	municipal	government	implemented	the	community	building	movement,	with	aims	to	set	up	a	grassroot-level	regime	to	replace	the	work	unit.	In	2003,	the	local	government	wanted	to	make	the	urban	villages	manageable,	 so	 they	 attempted	 to	 transfer	 the	 village	 committee	 to	 residents	committee.	This	is	because	they	wanted	to	integrate	the	urban	village’s	authority	into	the	urban	governance	system,	and	act	as	an	agency	of	street	offices.	As	I	explained	in	Chapter	3,	 “community”	 is	 a	 “self-governance	 organization”,	 however,	 it	 is	 a	 new	 territory	 for	governmental	intervention.	It	acts	as	a	branch	and	agency	of	street	office.		Since	 2006,	 Sunny	 District	 Government	 have	 introduced	 the	 “community	 building	movement”	in	urban	village	regeneration,	targeting	the	former	village	committee	as	the	“urban	 community	 authority	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 street	 office”.	 The	 central	government	 issued	the	“Promotion	of	New	Urbanization	 in	Rural	China”	 in	2009.	This	policy	was	 targeted	 on	 “urbanizing	 the	 rural	 villages’	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 civilizing	villagers;	providing	high	standard	public	services	into	the	rural	villagers”.	Therefore,	the	employment	of	the	‘community’	in	China’s	rural	society	indicate	an	institutional	reform:	introducing	 urban	 institution	 into	 rural	 society.	 Through	 the	 “community	 building	movement”,	 the	state	 targeted	at	developing	more	autonomous,	efficient	and	 localized	forms	of	governance,	meanwhile,	reinforcing	public	support	(Tang,	2015).		This	 section	 will	 introduce	 the	 “not	 rural	 but	 not	 urban” 24 	 governance	 system	 of	regenerated	village	communities	in	urban	areas.	These	newly	built	regenerated	village	communities	 have	 reallocated	 the	 indigenous	 villagers	 from	 former	 urban	 villages.	Physically,	 these	 communities	 have	 been	 developed	 as	 normal	 urban	 communities,	however,	 politically,	 considerable	 continuities	 exist	 between	 regenerated	 village	communities	and	former	urban	villages.	In	this	section,	I	will	introduce	how	the	village	governance	system	has	been	integrated	into	the	urban	administration	system,	and	how	
                         
24 This concept is from: Tang, B., 2015. “Not Rural but Not Urban”: Community Governance in China's 
Urban Villages. The China Quarterly, 223, pp.724-744. 
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these	 continuities	 exist	 in	 the	 new	 governance	 system	 in	 regenerated	 village	communities.	 Chapter	 7	 explained	 how	 deliberation	 could	 contribute	 to	 an	 elegant	political	process	as	well	as	a	deliberative	and	equal	outcome.	Particularly,	this	section	will	focus	on	how	rural	deliberation	and	the	deliberative	system	can	play	roles	in	the	social	integration	of	the	villagers.	Through	the	lens	of	the	two	cases,	I	will	introduce	how	the	rural	 government	 structure	 could	be	 integrated	 into	 community	governance,	how	 the	collective	economies	were	invited	by	street	office	into	the	area	of	the	community	services	for	 their	 shareholders,	 and	 how	 local	 government	 cultivate	 the	 self-governance	organization	at	grassroots	level.		
8.2.2	Institutional	differences	between	villages	and	urban	communities	Both	the	Chinese	villages	and	urban	communities	are	‘self-governing’	in	China’s	official	discourse.	 Legally,	 they	 must	 conduct	 democratic	 events,	 including	 campaigns	 and	elections,	public	participation	in	the	decision-making	and	democratic	supervision	(ibid.).	According	 to	 the	 Election	 Law,	 every	 eligible	 adult	 resident	 can	 vote	 and	 nominate	candidates	 to	 become	 members	 of	 the	 urban	 community	 or	 village	 committees;	meanwhile,	every	eligible	adult	can	be	nominated	and	voted	as	a	candidate	as	well.	The	number	 of	 candidates	 should	 exceed	 the	 number	 of	 positions,	 and	 legally,	 voters	 can	reject,	 review	 and	 modify	 committee	 decisions	 and	 recall	 elected	 members	 of	 the	committee	 and	 directly	 participate	 in	 the	 parliament.	 Some	 scholars	 believe	 that	 the	current	 laws	 and	 regulations	 can	 provide	 an	 institutional	 framework	 for	 public	participation	(Heberer,	2009:503),	particularly,	authoritarian	deliberation	(Tang,	2015,	2018)	in	both	the	urban	communities	and	the	villages.	However,	as	stated	in	Chapter	2	and	 3,	 the	 dual-track	 of	 land	 ownership	 differentiates	 the	 economic	 capacity	 and	functions	of	the	urban	residents’	committees	and	the	village	committees.	As	explained	in	Chapter	 7,	 the	 empowerment	 of	 the	 village	 deliberations	 successfully	 helped	 the	government	to	implement	the	physical	development;	therefore,	they	expected	that	the	village	deliberations	and	 the	village	governance	 system	could	play	a	 role	 in	 the	social	integration.	To	overcome	these	differentiations	and	peacefully	transfer	the	village	into	the	urban	community,	the	local	government	directly	nominates	the	members	and	leaders	in	the	new	residents’	committee	in	both	Village	N	and	Community	T.		Certainly,	many	functions	of	both	village	committees	and	urban	residents’	committees	are	
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similar	to	local	councils	that	you	might	find	the	world	over,	such	as	refuse	and	licensing,	managing	 local	 infrastructure,	 welfare	 applications,	 addressing	 their	 complaints	 and	processing	residents’	records,	as	well	as	mediating	disputes	and	conflicts	among	these	villagers.	 However,	 tasks	 like	 monitoring	 human	 reproduction/childbirth	 managing	collective	assets	and	 incomes	are	unique	 in	rural	China	 (Sargeson,	2016).	Particularly,	tasks	 of	managing	 collective	 assets	 and	 income	 are	 the	 top	 priority,	which	 should	 be	approved	by	the	majority	in	the	village	assembly	or	villagers’	representative	congress,	for	example,	 by	 requisitioning	 labour;	 applying	 for	 project	 grants	 or	 loans;	 spending	collective	 funds;	 allocating	 house	 sites	 and	 leases;	 distributing	 or	 spending	 land	compensation;	 and	 pricing	 salaries	 for	 staff.	 In	 contrast,	 literally,	 urban	 residents’	committees	are	authorized	by	the	law	and	endorsed	by	the	local	government	to	manage	the	 infrastructure	 and	 properties	of	 the	 residents’	 committee	 in	 an	 urban	 community	without	 independent	source	of	 income,	 instead,	 their	budgets	were	based	on	 itemized	funding	 from	 their	 prior	 governments.	 However,	 practically,	 these	 budgets	 are	 barely	sufficient	 to	 cover	 a	 committee’s	 expenses	 and	 members’	 salaries	 (Sargeson,	 2018).	Compared	to	the	village	committee,	urban	residents’	committees,	 thus,	have	very	 little	capacity	 to	make	 discretion	 in	 expenditure.	 As	will	 be	 explained	 in	 later	 sections,	 the	shortage	of	funding	limited	the	capacity	of	the	residents’	committee	and	generated	many	further	issues	in	the	regenerated	village	committee.	 		
8.2.3	Community	building	movement	in	regenerated	village	community	To	 promote	 the	 integration	 of	 villagers	 into	 the	 city,	 Sunny	 District	 government	introduced	 the	 “community	 building	movement”	 after	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration.	This	movement	is	part	of	 ‘building	a	harmonious	society’	movement	from	central	level	government.	In	line	with	urban	village	regeneration,	Sunny	District	government	carried	out	 a	 top-down	 process	 of	 administrative	 integration,	 the	 so-called	 “double	transformations”:	“transforming	village	to	community	(cun	zhuan	ju)”	and	“transforming	village	 collective	 economy	 to	 a	 village	 shareholding	 company	 (jiti	 jingji	 gaige)”.	 As	 I	introduced	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 village	 governance	 system	 has	 two	 main	 functions:	administrative	management	(like	a	government)	and	collective	economic	operation	(like	a	 collective).	 Simply	 speaking,	 the	 regenerated	 communities	 should	 have	 a	 residents’	committee	who	inherits	the	administrative	management	function;	meanwhile,	one	village	should	set	up	at	 least	one	village	shareholding	company	to	inherit	 the	 former	village’s	
 191 
properties	and	economic	management	function.	The	former	vice	mayor	of	Sunny	District	who	took	charge	of	all	urban	village	regeneration	projects	since	2006-2014	introduced	the	double	transformation	as	follows:	 	
The	“double	transformations”	political	movement	has	two	parts:	to	transform	
the	 village	 committee	 into	 residents’	 committee	 replicating	 urban	
neighbourhoods,	 and	 to	 change	 the	 rural	 collective	 economy	 into	 the	
collective	(villagers’	shareholding	company).	The	main	goal	is	to	separate	the	
administrative	responsibilities	and	economic	management	 functions	of	 the	
village	 committee.	 Previously,	 these	 functions	were	 not	 very	 clear	 in	 rural	
governance,	but	when	transformed	into	urban	communities,	they	had	to	be	
clarified.	After	becoming	a	residents’	committee	at	neighbourhood	level,	there	
is	no	legal	function	of	economic	management.	In	addition,	the	composition	of	
the	collective	members	is	also	different.	The	community	has	a	wide	range	of	
residents,	and	no	longer	comes	from	a	village	or	a	village	group	such	as	the	
urban	villages	in	the	past.	The	situation	is	now	fundamentally	different.	 	(Interview:	former	Vice	Mayor	of	Sunny	District,	2017)	The	 vice	 mayor	 introduced	 the	 main	 challenges	 of	 the	 “double	 transformation”	movement,	 the	 main	 concern	 is	 how	 to	 form	 a	 residents’	 committee	 and	 clarify	 the	relationship	between	a	collective	economy	and	an	administrative	authority.	Practically,	the	 first	 concern	 is	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 leadership	 group	 of	 the	 new	 residents’	committee.	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 leadership	 group	 of	 a	 residents’	 committee	 has	 a	director,	 vice	 directors	 (in	 larger	 communities)	 and	 numbers	of	 committee	members.	Based	on	the	village	regeneration	experiences,	in	the	ordinary	cases,	the	leadership	group	always	involves	both	local	government	officers	and	village	committee	members,	aimed	at	creating	a	more	collaborative	governance	system	between	government,	 former	village	authorities,	and	villagers.	It	also	targeting	at	cultivating	of	a	community-level	regime	and	transforming	of	government	functions	into	the	newly-built	administrative	pattern.	 		After	the	regeneration,	the	regenerated	urban	village	became	an	urban	community,	the	village	Party	branch	and	the	village	committee	were	transferred	into	the	Party-branch	of	residents’	 committee	 and	 the	 residents’	 committee.	 As	 I	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	residents’	committee	is	a	self-governing	organization,	which	should	include	a	community	members’	congress	as	well	as	a	community’s	affairs	committee.	The	residents’	committee	
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supervises	these	organizations.	The	members	in	these	two	committees	should	be	elected.	They	take	charge	of	the	administrative	routine	and	other	community	affairs.	Following	the	urban	Street	office	–	Residents’	committee	system,	the	Street	Office	should	work	with	the	Residents’	Committee.	However,	practically,	the	composition	of	the	leadership	group	reflects	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 continuities	 between	 the	 village	 governance	 system	 and	 the	residents’	 committee.	 For	 example,	 in	 some	 cases,	 the	 Street	 Office’s	 officials	will	 be	nominated	to	each	regenerated	village	community’s	Residents’	Committee,	meanwhile,	they	also	lead	the	policies	implementation	process,	public	services	even	appropriation.	To	 the	 contrary,	 in	some	cases,	 all	of	 the	 leaders	 in	 the	new	residents’	 committee	are	inherited	 from	 former	 village	 cadres,	 and	 none	 of	 the	 officials	 in	 the	 street	 office	 can	directly	 take	 charge	 of	 the	 residents’	 committee.	 The	 residents’	 committee	 acts	 as	 a	“grassroots-level	 branch”	 of	 the	 Street	 Office,	 however,	 as	 I	 will	 explain	 later,	 the	residents’	 committee	 in	 the	 regenerated	 village	was	 authorized	more	 autonomy.	 This	allowed	them	to	make	their	own	voice	heard	and	refuse	some	tasks	issued	by	the	street	office	 if	 they	 have	 a	 good	 reason.	 As	 the	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 heritage	 of	 the	regenerated	 community	 is	 the	 deliberative	 decision-making	 system.	 In	 the	 following	sections,	I	will	adopt	two	cases	in	order	to	examine	these	two	situations.	 		
8.2.4	The	Model	of	N	Village	Community	The	foundation	of	the	N	Village	Community	offers	a	lens	through	which	to	explore	how	the	continuities	(such	as	the	former	cadres,	traditions,	and	some	working	styles)	of	the	urban	 village	 governance	 system	 could	 play	 the	 dominant	 role	 in	 new	 community	governance.	 This	 model	 advocates	 and	 emphasizes	 the	 functional	 significance	 of	 the	traditional	 rural	 village	 governance	 system.	 As	 the	 first	 flagship	 case	 of	 community	building	and	“the	double	transformations”	in	Sunny	District,	the	foundation	of	the	Village	N	 Community	 was	 a	 significant	 policy	 experiment	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 maintain	 social	stability,	 the	 Central	 Road	 Street	 Office	 (CR	 Office)	 formally	 nominated	 the	 previous	village	collective	members	as	new	leaders	in	the	residents’	committee	and	empowered	the	 newly-founded	 collective	 shareholding	 company	 of	 N	 Village	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	community	governance.	Meanwhile,	the	CR	Office	allocated	some	staff	members	to	the	community	 to	 assist	 the	 new	 leaders,	 but	 these	 did	 not	 take	 up	 any	of	 the	 important	positions	 in	 the	 new	 committee.	 That	 is,	 the	 newly	 formed	 N	 Village	 Community’s	residents’	committee	inherited	the	former	village	governance	system	entity,	this	included:	
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institutions,	 cadres,	 and	 the	 financial	 resources,	 etc.	 The	 transformation	 of	 its	 public	administration	 system	 had	 previously	 existed	 on	 paper:	 literally,	 it	 became	 an	 urban	community	and	was	led	by	the	CR	Office.	 		As	explained	in	Chapter	3,	Residents’	Committees	in	China	are	now	considered	as	a	level	of	jurisdiction	within	the	whole	urban	government	system.	Nominally,	the	boundaries	of	the	 community	were	 defined	 as	 a	 sub-jurisdiction	 of	 the	 street	 offices.	Meanwhile,	 in	order	to	empower	the	Street	Office,	the	community-level	administration	was	reorganized	into	three	levels.	First,	at	the	decision-making	level,	the	main	decision	maker	is	the	street	office,	and	the	street	management	system	is	replaced	by	the	regional	management	system	because	 the	 street	 office	 has	 the	 authority	 to	 lead	 and	 coordinate	 with	 other	 local	government	 departments	 and	 bureaus.	 Second,	 at	 the	 operational	 level,	 the	neighbourhood	 committee	 is	 responsible	 for	 civil	 affairs,	 community	 services,	 public	security	and	community	finance	systems	on	behalf	of	the	subdistrict	office.	Third,	at	the	public	level,	residents,	autonomous	organizations,	local	businesses	and	associations	have	developed	a	“support	system”	to	promote	policy-implementation.	 		In	practice,	however,	 the	political	 function	and	 the	power	of	new	Village	N	Residents’	Committee	is	far	beyond	a	normal	residents’	committee.	Instead	of	acting	as	an	ordinary	urban	residents’	committee,	Village	N	kept	the	former	village	governance	working	style,	structures,	cadres,	and	institutional	arrangements.	This	is	because	the	Village	N	holds	an	extremely	 strong	 collective	 economy	 which	 could	 provide	 abundant	 funding	 for	 the	residents’	committee.	This	funding	provides	them	with	an	independent	primary	school,	property	maintenance	services	(I	will	explain	this	in	Section	8.4),	and	a	welfare	system.	In	addition,	the	strong	economic	power	not	only	help	the	village	leadership	to	gain	the	political	trust	from	their	villagers,	but	also	help	them	to	bargain	with	local	government	during	the	administrative	transformation.	As	a	result,	 the	staff	and	members	 from	the	Street	Offices	are	excluded	from	any	of	the	important	positions,	therefore,	none	of	them	are	powerful	enough	to	impact	the	decision-making	process.	As	a	result,	due	to	the	strong	collective	economic	strength	of	N	village,	although	the	N	Village	Community	is	officially	a	subordinate	of	CR	Office,	the	local	government	(both	District	government	and	CR	Office)	is	unable	to	carry	out	effective	vertical	management	of	policy	implementation	in	practice.	Due	 to	 the	 strong	 continuities	 of	 the	 urban	 village	 governance	 system,	 the	 power	
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relationship	between	local	government	and	the	residents’	committee	is,	in	essence,	the	same	as	the	relationship	between	government	and	the	village.	 		
8.2.5	The	Model	of	Community	T	In	opposition	to	the	case	of	Village	N,	the	foundation	of	the	Community	T	can	be	used	as	a	 lens	 through	 which	 to	 explore	 how	 the	 Street	 Office	 can	 play	 a	 dominant	 role	 in	community	 affairs,	 and	 empower	 certain	 elements	 of	 the	 urban	 village	 governance	system	to	assist	the	Street	Office.	The	Community	T	contains	three	different	villages:	A	Village,	B	Village	and	C	Village.	The	economic	conditions,	source	of	income,	and	physical	conditions	of	the	different	villages	are	widely	divergent.	Although	A	Village	is	relatively	stronger	 than	 others,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 enough	 to	 provide	 abundant	 funding	 to	 hold	 the	dominant	role.	Compared	to	the	Village	N,	A	Village,	B	Village,	C	Village	were	relatively	small,	 less-developed	villages	 located	at	 the	edges	of	 the	 industrial	development	zone.	Some	 of	 the	 village	 lands	 are	 among	 gullies,	 villagers	 historically	 relied	 on	 grain	production.	Since	the	1990s,	only	a	few	pieces	of	land	were	acquired	by	local	government,	therefore,	 the	 capacity	 of	 village	 collective	 economies	 is	 limited.	 Learning	 from	 the	experience	of	the	Village	N	Community,	to	ensure	the	central	control	of	local	government,	the	Industrial	Road	Street	Office	(IR	Office)	nominated	a	senior	officer	of	IR	Office	to	hold	the	 post	of	 the	Residents’	 Committee	 director.	 The	 new	director	 directly	 controls	 the	administrative	routine	in	the	new	community.	Meanwhile,	the	IR	Office	also	empowered	former	rural	collective	members	and	the	newly	funded	collective	shareholding	company	to	 play	 a	 subservient	 role	 in	 the	 Community	 T	 as	 the	 assistants	 of	 local	 government.	Therefore,	 the	 continuities	 of	 urban	 village	 governance	 system	 were	 transitioned	successfully	so	that	they	were	now	under	control	by	the	street	government.	 		In	practice,	therefore,	at	the	decision-making	level,	the	District	government	and	IR	Street	Office	 are,	 in	 essence,	 the	main	 decision	makers.	 At	 the	 operational	 level,	 the	 role	 of	Director	of	T	Residents’	committee	is	the	representative	of	the	street	office	who	supervise	community	service,	civil	affairs,	community	fiscal	system	and	public	security.	In	contrast	to	 Village	 N,	 the	 former	 village	 leaders	 are	 the	 committee	 members	 who	 assist	 the	Director	in	policy	implementation.	Meanwhile,	as	former	village	leaders,	during	the	policy	implementation,	 they	always	speak	 for	 their	 former	villagers’	 interests	 in	negotiations	with	the	Director	of	the	Residents’	committee	as	well	as	the	IR	Street	Office.	Thirdly,	at	
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the	public	level,	the	‘supporting	system’,	like	social	organizations,	and	local	enterprises	participate	voluntarily	in	community	services	and	governance.	In	contrast	to	Village	N,	the	 village	 shareholding	 companies	 in	 the	 T	 Communities	 are	 hierarchically	 equal	 to	these	social	organizations,	and	act	only	as	assistants	of	the	community.	Therefore,	within	this	system,	the	IR	Street	Office	is	able	to	carry	out	effective	vertical	management	of	most	community	affairs;	and	is	also	able	to	consolidate	its	power	at	the	grassroots	level.	The	former	village	cadres	were	employed	by	the	newly	established	community	as	Residents’	Committee	members;	and	officially	became	the	governments’	staff	and	workers.	That	is,	the	continuities	of	the	urban	village	are	empowered	to	play	the	assistant	role	in	the	new	community,	however,	they	are	under	controlled	by	the	local	government.	 		
8.2.6	Summary	This	section	introduced	the	formation	of	two	regenerated	village	committees.	Specifically,	it	 examined	 how	 the	 village	 governance	 system	 has	 been	 integrated	 into	 the	 urban	administration	system,	and	the	how	these	continuities	exist	in	new	governance	system	in	regenerated	village	communities.	 		The	main	difference	between	these	two	models	is	the	role	of	the	former	village	committee	and	village	shareholding	company.	 In	a	village	which	has	a	strong	collective	economy,	such	as	Village	N,	 the	 former	village	committee	and	village	shareholding	company	are	able	 to	 dominate	 the	 community	 governance.	 However,	 in	 case	 of	 Community	 T,	 the	village	 collective	 economies	 are	 not	 strong	 enough	 to	 do	 this.	 The	 local	 government	dominates	 the	 community,	 and	 the	 former	village	 cadres	and	 the	village	 shareholding	company	 only	 play	 an	 assistance	 role	 in	 village	 governance.	 The	 next	 section	 will	introduce	the	rationale	of	these	arrangements	with	particular	focus	on	how	these	village	collective	economies	backup	the	welfare	of	these	urbanized	villagers.	
	
8.3	Trade-off	between	collective	economy	and	local	government	The	institutional	arrangement	of	the	new	regenerated	community	is	in	accordance	with	the	power	and	capacity	of	the	former	village	authority.	As	stated	before,	there	are	lots	of	continuities	 in	 the	way	 that	 governance	 exists	 between	 the	 urban	 village	 governance	system	and	the	new	governance	system	in	the	newly	regenerated	village	community	in	urban	areas.	This	section	covers	two	main	points,	first	of	all,	I	will	explain	the	rationale	
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for	 these	continuities.	Practically,	 I	will	explain	how	these	village	collective	economies	could	back	up	the	welfare	of	these	urbanized	villagers.	Second,	I	will	explain	why	in	some	cases,	 these	 continuities	 were	 intertwined	 more	 than	 others.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	introduce	these	through	two	cases.	In	the	first	case,	I	will	examine	how,	because	of	the	extremely	 strong	 collective	 economy,	 Village	 N	 were	 able	 to	 keep	 their	 rural	 village	governance	system.	The	second	case	will	examine	how	local	government	can	limit	the	power	 and	 role	 of	 former	 rural	 collective	 members	 and	 new	 funded	 collective	shareholding	 companies,	 and	 successfully	 integrate	 them	 as	 government	 assistants	 in	Community	T.		
8.3.1	Village	N	As	stated	before,	due	 to	 the	 strong	collective	economy	 in	Village	N,	 the	newly	 funded	Village	N	Community	reserves	the	former	village	governance	system.	In	this	section,	I	will	introduce	how	the	former	collective	economy	was	transferred	into	village	shareholding	companies,	and	why	the	shareholding	companies	could	hold	the	dominant	position	in	the	new	regenerated	village	community.	 	 	 	 		Village	 N	 holds	 an	 extremely	 strong	 collective	 economy.	 To	 cope	 with	 the	 “double	transformation”	movement,	Village	N	set	up	two	shareholding	companies	to	take	on	the	duty	of	economic	management	in	2006.	As	stated	in	Chapter	7,	from	2003-2006	the	urban	village	 regeneration	 program	 caused	 many	 conflicts	 and	 tensions	 between	 Sunny	District’s	government	and	Village	N.	After	a	three	year	“battle”	between	the	government	and	Village	N,	the	district	government	was	acutely	aware	that	the	political	trust	between	local	government	and	villagers	was	weak.	As	the	local	government	had	already	acquired	the	land	from	Village	N,	the	speed	of	transformation	at	this	point	was	no	longer	treated	as	a	first	priority	by	local	government,	instead,	both	Happy	City	Municipal	government	and	 social	media	 put	 lots	 of	 pressure	 on	 Sunny	District	 government	 to	 complete	 this	“double	transformation”	process	as	smoothly	as	possible.	Therefore,	the	first	priority	for	the	local	government	was	to	avoid	any	significant	conflict	during	the	foundation	of	the	new	residents’	committee	and	village	shareholding	companies.	 		To	make	a	stable	and	smooth	transformation,	the	local	government	made	many	efforts.	First,	they	provided	urban	household	registration	(hukou)	to	former	villagers,	while	at	
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the	 same	 time	 allowing	 them	 to	 retain	 the	 advantages	 of	 their	 rural	 household	registration.	Second,	it	maintained	the	existing	village	leadership,	nominating	the	former	village	committee	director	as	the	director	of	new	Village	N	residents’	committee	and	the	former	secretary	of	village	Party	branch	as	the	secretary	of	Party	branch	of	new	Village	N	community.	Third,	some	of	 the	qualified	 former	village	cadres	were	hired	by	the	 local	government	 as	 formal	 government	 officials.	 Fourth,	 it	 endorsed	 the	 Village’s	Shareholding	Company	to	play	a	role	in	community	governance,	not	only	because	the	key	members	 of	 the	 shareholding	 companies	were	 the	 former	 village	 cadres	with	 certain	credibility,	but	also	because	the	shareholding	companies	control	the	welfare	system	of	their	members.	The	residents’	committees	attempted	to	take	charge	of	the	community’s	administrative	routine;	however,	it	did	not	work	well	due	to	the	lack	of	economic	capacity	and	 personal	 authority	 to	 endeavour	 to	 get	 credits	 from	 villagers.	 On	 the	 contrary,	Village’s	Shareholding	Company	manages	the	collective	property	of	the	villagers,	and	the	villagers	 can	 persistently	 get	 bonus	 and	 other	 welfares.	 Meanwhile,	 because	 of	 the	residents’	committee	was	treated	as	the	“outsider”	of	the	regenerated	village	community,	it	 lacks	 the	 credibility	 and	 political	 trust.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 Village’s	 Shareholding	Company	 is	 strongly	 recognized	 by	 villagers	 because	 of	 the	 connection	 of	 the	 asylum	relationship.	 Therefore,	 in	 some	 case,	 the	 “dual-track	 politics”	 model	 of	 community	governance	exist	 in	 the	 regenerated	urban	village	 community.In	practice,	because	 the	leadership	of	the	village	cooperative	is	composed	of	the	former	village’s	leadership,	they	gain	more	political	 trust	 than	the	new	urban	 leadership.	Finally,	 the	 local	government	provided	financial	and	human	resource	support	to	village	authority,	and	designated	staff	from	 the	 local	 government	 to	 assist	 the	 new	 residents’	 committee.	 Therefore,	 this	arrangement	allows	many	continuities	of	the	urban	villagers	to	exist	and	play	a	role	in	the	new	community.	 		One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 policy	 instruments	 employed	 by	 local	 government	 is	 the	empowerment	of	village	shareholding	companies,	because	these	companies	can	deliver	many	contributions	going	beyond	promoting	social	stability.	The	reason	behind	this	 is	that	 the	 urban	 government	 cannot	 easily	 replace	 the	 authority	 and	 reputation	 of	 the	former	village	leadership.	According	to	the	Vice	Mayor	of	the	district:	“These	village	card	holders	 provided	 a	 significant	 contribution	 in	 land	 acquisition.	 They	 are	 the	“communicators”	between	government	and	villagers.	We	should	learn	with	them	in	terms	
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of	how	to	stay	close	to	the	villagers.”	The	former	key	leaders	of	Village	N	are	the	Party	Secretary	of	Village	N	and	the	Director	of	Village	N.	In	the	era	of	the	urban	village,	they	considered	the	growth	of	the	collective	economy	as	their	first	priority	and	they	created	an	extremely	strong	collective	economy.	Drawing	on	their	geographical	advantages,	since	1990	they	have	invested	in	large	numbers	of	commercial	real-estate	projects	in	the	city	that	generated	abundant	profits.	Beyond	the	commercial	real-estate	projects,	the	village	leaders	expanded	their	businesses	to	include	hotels,	the	catering	industry,	and	primary	education.	 After	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration,	 most	 of	 their	 commercial	 real-estate	projects	were	also	retained,	and	the	regeneration	created	more	business	opportunities	for	 the	 retail	 industry.	 These	 extremely	 strong	 collective	 economic	 assets	 provided	legitimacy	and	authority	to	the	village	leadership	group,	and	the	N	villagers	also	enjoy	the	considerable	welfare	funded	by	the	village	collective	economy.	According	to	former	cadre	of	the	village:	
Our	leadership	group	is	great	and	stable,	we	took	charge	more	than	25	years	
and	we	are	deeply	trusted	by	the	village.	This	can	help	us	to	make	a	long-term	
development	plan.	We	only	distribute	40%	profits	as	welfare,	however,	this	is	
a	pretty	penny:	one	shareholder	can	get	more	than	31,000	yuan25.	We	will	
take	out	20%	of	the	profit	as	administrative	funds	and	salaries	for	cadres.	The	
remaining	40%	profit	 be	used	as	 investment	 to	keep	growth.	This	mode	 is	
hardly	 implemented	 in	other	villages,	because	some	of	 them	have	to	spend	
money	 to	 make	 a	 dollar.	 Their	 development	 is	 unsustainable	 and	 their	
Secretary	and	Director	of	village	won’t	be	stable.	Therefore,	their	people	do	
not	trust	them,	people	are	worry	about	the	corruption	of	village	leader.	Then	
people	 would	 ask	 for	 the	 income	 from	 collective	 land	 sales	 or	 rent	 to	 be	
distributed	as	soon	as	they	got	it.	So	no	village	can	copy	our	mode	to	develop	
a	strong	collective	economy.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Village	Cadre	N	1,	2017)	One	of	most	important	way	for	village	leaders	to	gain	credibility	and	trust	is	that	they	can	provide	 villagers	 a	 stable,	 abundant,	 and	 long-term	 welfare.	 These	 economic	arrangements	 reflect	 how	 the	 village	 leaders	 received	 strong	 political	 trust	 from	 the	villagers,	whilst	 also	 significantly	 enhancing	 the	 trust	 of	 the	 village	 authority	 as	well.	
                         
25 31000 yuan: about 3480 GBP (1 GBP = 8.9 Chinese yuan) 
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Based	on	the	long-term	political	trust,	after	regeneration,	the	entity	of	the	new	authority	of	 the	new	regenerated	community	 is	 the	 former	village	authority,	which	 includes	the	former	village	Party	branch	and	the	 former	village	committee.	Nominally,	 they	handle	administrative	 issues	 under	 the	 name	 of	 the	 residents’	 committee,	 and	 economic	investment	and	villagers’	welfare	through	two	new	funded	village	collective	shareholding	companies.	These	two	new	funded	shareholding	companies	are	collective	owned	by	all	indigenous	villagers	and	under	controlled	by	the	former	village	leadership.	In	practice,	the	village	collective	property	was	still	separated	and	managed	by	their	five	sub-villagers’	groups	as	 they	did	 in	 the	urban	village.	 Similarly	 to	how	 things	were	managed	 in	 the	urban	village	era,	the	head	of	the	villagers’	groups	has	the	autonomy	to	make	decisions	in	terms	of	collective	property	management	as	well	as	the	investment	project.	When	they	sign	the	contract	with	others,	they	will	borrow	the	name	of	the	A	or	B	company,	instead	of	sub-villagers’	group.	Therefore,	in	essence,	the	men	with	real-power	in	the	Village	N	did	not	change.	 		In	2006,	when	the	administration	transfer	took	place,	N	Village	started	a	“freeze	share”26	with	their	indigenous	villagers,	the	first	step	being	to	distribute	shares	to	the	villagers	under	the	name	of	these	two	shareholding	companies.	Because	the	village	shareholding	companies	are	acting	as	a	kind	of	collective,	only	members	can	get	the	benefits.	Therefore,	the	“freeze	share”	acts	to	align	the	identity	of	their	indigenous	villagers	with	other	new	residents.	 As	 discussed	 previously,	 all	 the	 indigenous	 villagers	 had	 transferred	 their	household	 registration	 from	Village	N	 to	 urban	 household	 registration	 in	Happy	City.	After	they	moved	into	the	new	communities,	the	household	registration	was	not	able	to	identify	the	beneficiaries.	Therefore,	the	shareholding	companies	allocated	the	“shares”	to	 their	 indigenous	 villages,	 meanwhile,	 the	 “share	 freeze”	 suspended	 the	 share	distributions	to	every	newly	born	child	until	they	reached	18	years	old.	In	addition,	newly	registered	 members	 (such	 as	 new	 members	 through	 marriage)	 were	 not	 allowed	 to	receive	 shares	 unless	 they	 inherited	 shares	 from	 the	 other	 shareholders.	 After	 this	process,	the	villagers	of	Village	N	successfully	protected	their	economic	interests	during	the	transformation,	however,	as	I	will	explain	later,	this	also	created	further	exclusion	for	new	residents.	 	
                         
26 Freeze	share:	the	village	cooperative	will	only	involve	eligible	villagers	in	the	new	administrative	set-up	or	those	inheriting	from	other	owners 
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	In	 principle,	 the	 residents’	 committee	 should	 take	 charge	 of	 the	 community’s	administrative	affairs	and	provide	public	services	not	only	for	indigenous	villagers,	but	also	for	migrants	and	tenants.	Meanwhile,	the	shareholding	companies	should	operate	in	parallel	to	look	after	their	shareholders	only.	However,	practically,	as	the	components	of	leaderships	of	residents’	committee	and	the	shareholding	companies	were	almost	same;	they	were	 selected	 from	 the	 former	village	 committee.	As	a	 result,	 the	new	residents’	committee	only	looked	after	their	indigenous	villagers.	Endorsed	by	the	economic	backup	from	 shareholding	 company,	 the	 leaderships	 come	 from	 indigenous	 Village	 N	 always	exclude	 the	 street	 offices’	 staff	 from	 the	 important	 decision-making	 processes,	 by	organizing	 a	 “shareholders’	 meetings”.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 shareholding	 company	provides	the	main	budget	for	community;	by	contrast,	the	street	office	only	contributed	a	very	limited	amount	of	budget.	One	the	other	hand,	this	is	because	the	key	decision-making	mechanism	in	community	governance	and	shareholding	company	management	is	 the	 same	 as	 the	 traditional	 rural	 unstructured	 public	 deliberation.	 Particularly,	 the	main	 component	of	 the	deliberation	 in	 community	government	 is	 still	 “elite	decisions	respond	to	persuasive	influences,	generated	either	among	participations,	or	in	the	form	of	 arguments	made	 by	 participants	 to	decision-makers”	 (He	 and	Warren,	 2011:	 274).	Village	N	has	a	different	approach	 in	 the	guise	of	 the	village	 shareholding	 companies.	They	 expanded	 the	 village	 governance	 style	 and	 network	 to	 the	 urban	 residents’	community.	The	former	village	officials	hold	the	leadership	position	in	both	of	the	two	shareholding	companies	which	was	headed	by	the	former	Party	secretary	of	Village	N,	the	other	one	is	headed	by	the	former	Director	of	Village	N.	In	addition,	these	two	key	leaders	also	became	the	Party	secretary	and	director	of	the	new	residents’	committee.	Therefore,	based	on	the	collective	economy,	Village	N	retained	their	cadres	and	former	village	governance	system	within	the	regenerated	village	community.	Therefore,	the	CR	street	 office	 cannot	 directly	 intervene	 in	 the	 collective	 economy,	 both	 the	 residents’	committee	of	Village	N	and	the	shareholding	company	maintain	a	certain	level	autonomy	and	self-governance.	 	 		In	summary,	the	strong	collective	economy	allowed	the	former	Village	N	leaders	to	take	the	 leadership	 positions	 in	 the	 regenerated	 village	 community.	 The	 local	 government	could	 not	 weaken	 their	 authority	 and	 leadership	 because	 their	 political	 trust	 and	
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authority	 were	 endorsed	 by	 their	 excellent	 performance	 in	 collective	 economy	management.	Therefore,	the	“double	transformation”	movement	in	Village	N	only	exists	on	 paper.	 In	 essence,	 none	 of	 the	 village	 governance	 systems	 and	 village	 collective	economies	were	successfully	integrated	into	the	urban	governance	system.	In	section	4	and	section	5,	I	will	examine	how	Village	N	rural	governance	system	performed	in	the	urban	area	and	led	the	villagers	to	urbanization.		
8.3.2	Community	T	The	 last	 section	 explained	 that	 the	 village	 authority	 might	 get	 an	 advantage	 in	 the	administrative	transformation	if	they	have	strong	enough	economic	power	to	funded	the	community’s	administration.	One	of	the	most	important	indicators	is	that	the	candidate	of	the	director	of	residents’	committee	will	be	selected	from	the	former	village	leadership	rather	than	nominated	from	street	office.	Unlike	Village	N,	none	of	the	three	villages	in	Community	T	had	strong	shareholding	companies.	This	 is	because	these	three	villages	had	 few	 collective	 properties	 to	 manage.	 In	 addition,	 as	 none	 of	 these	 villages	 hold	dominant	advantages	in	the	economy,	there	was	not	any	one	village	able	to	lead	the	whole	community.	This	created	an	opportunity	 for	district	government	to	 take	the	dominant	position	in	the	newly	regenerated	village	community	and	weaken	the	power	of	the	former	village	cadres	as	well	as	the	village	shareholding	companies.	 		As	 discussed	 previously,	 these	 three	 villages	had	 few	 collective	 properties	 to	manage	during	 the	 urban	 village	 era.	 Therefore,	 instead	 of	 seeking	 continuing	 profits	 through	investments,	 these	 villages	 distributed	 all	 of	 the	 land	 rental	 income	 directly	 to	 each	villager.	 Therefore,	 after	 the	 “double	 transformation”,	 the	 newly-funded	 villages’	shareholding	 system	 was	 founded	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 looking	 after	 the	 unallocated	compensations	 from	 land	 acquisition.	 This	 is	 because	 local	 government	 allocated	 the	previous	rural	land	compensation	to	the	village	collective	rather	than	to	individuals,	and	the	land	compensations	are	paid	annually	as	the	‘land	rent’.	Because	of	the	insufficient	collective	investment,	share	values	in	these	three	villages	were	lower	than	those	of	Village	N.	All	three	villages	retained	a	portion	of	collective	land	in	terms	of	collective	property,	which	is	crucial	for	developing	their	shareholding	companies	and	pursuing	continuous	growth.	However,	the	limited	capacity	of	its	collective	economy	was	not	enough	to	fund	the	community	.	Therefore,	the	ID	street	office	can	have	a	dominant	position	in	the	newly	
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funded	residents’	committee:	they	appointed	an	official	as	the	director	of	Community	T’s	residents’	committee.	Village	N,	by	comparison,	benefits	by	its	strong	economic	power	endorsed	by	their	shareholding	system,	members	from	the	former	village	authority	hold	the	most	 influential	position	 in	 the	new	administrations	 in	community.	As	a	result,	 its	authority	 was	 more	 limited	 which	 allowed	 the	 local	 government	 substantially	 more	control	over	the	institutional	arrangements.		Learning	 from	the	experiences	of	Village	N,	 the	district	government	also	endorsed	the	former	village	governance	system	and	the	newly	established	shareholding	companies	to	play	 a	 role	 in	 assisting	 Community	 T	 governance.	 However,	 the	 district	 government	nominated	 a	 new	 director	 of	 the	 residents’	 committee	 from	 the	 street	 offices	 as	 the	highest	 leader	 in	 the	 Community	 T.	 To	 assist	 the	 new	 director,	 these	 former	 village	leaders	from	the	three	villages	also	have	a	role	in	the	new	residents’	community	board	(from	member	to	vice-director).	 In	addition,	 these	three	shareholding	companies	have	few	 collective	 assets	 under	 the	 former	 village	 leaders’	 control,	 which	 provides	considerable	assistance	 for	new	community	governance.	As	a	 result,	 the	public	hiring	process	was	led	by	the	district	government,	meanwhile,	the	newly	founded	T	residents’	committee	 consists	 of	 well-educated	 young	 officials	 in	 urban	 government	 and	experienced	village	card	holders.	This	is	a	deliberative	arrangement	to	ensure	that	the	new	 residents’	 committee	 should	 abide	 by	 the	 current	 urban	 "community	 structure"	framework,	as	well	as	to	ensure	that	each	member	should	operate	according	to	rules	and	laws	rather	than	using	personal	relationships	and	village	ties	(Tang,	2015).		
8.3.3	Summary	 	This	 section	explained	 the	 rationale	of	 the	 continuities	 from	 the	urban	village	 system,	with	a	particular	 focus	on	how	the	village	collective	economy,	 in	particular	 the	village	shareholding	company,	serves	as	a	backbone	of	 the	social	and	economic	well-being	of	these	urbanized	villagers.	In	both	Village	N	and	T	communities,	the	continuities	existed	after	 the	 “double	 transformation	 movement”	 by	 evolving	 into	 community	 authority	(Village	N)	or	the	collective	shareholding	company	(both	Community	T	and	Village	N).	 		In	Community	T,	the	residents’	committee	is	dominated	by	the	street	office	and	they	avoid	getting	involved	in	the	activities	of	the	shareholding	companies.	The	role	of	the	residents’	
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committee	is	to	perform	administrative	duties,	for	instance,	family	planning,	household	registration	and	migrant	registration.	However,	in	the	N	Community,	both	the	residents’	committee	and	collective	shareholding	companies	are	led	by	the	former	village	authority,	the	villagers	 consider	 the	new	residents’	 committee	and	shareholding	 companies	as	a	transformation	 or	 a	 continuation	 of	 their	 former	 authority.	 This	 is	 also	 because	 the	former	village	authorities	successfully	operate	the	village	shareholding	companies	and	manage	the	village	collective	properties.	They	offered	not	only	the	financial	capability	to	provide	 social	 welfare	 to	 their	 villagers,	 but	 also	 offered	 budgets	 to	 the	 Residents’	Committees	to	sponsor	the	administrative	expenses.	As	the	result,	despite	the	fact	that	those	 villages	 are	 integrated	 into	 the	 urban	 governance	 system	 and	 are	 under	 urban	administrative	command,	as	will	be	explained	 later,	 the	 former	village	authorities	and	their	village	shareholding	companies	perform	most	of	the	social,	political	and	economic	activities	associated	with	community	life.	 		As	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 later	 sections,	 the	 field	 work	 revealed	 that	 the	 villagers	 still	frequently	ask	the	former	village	cadres	for	help	in	their	daily	life,	such	as	intervening	in	local	conflicts,	applying	authorizations,	and	so	on.	This	is	because	they	not	only	have	rich	local	knowledge,	but	also	have	an	extensive	 social	network	among	 the	 residents.	This	gives	them	credibility	in	both	villagers’	daily	life	and	community	activities.	 		
8.4	The	Introduction	of	the	Property	Management	Company	(or	The	
Introduction	of	Property	Management	Companies)	 	For	the	purpose	of	forcing	the	urban	village	regeneration	process,	a	series	of	policies	have	been	 released,	 providing	 the	 discrepancies	 between	 the	 government’s	 idealized	plans	and	villagers’	practical	demands	(Tang,	2015b:	150).	This	is	because	under	the	current	political	 context,	 the	 visible	 urbanization 27 	 has	 become	 increasingly	 crucial	 for	government	officials	to	demonstrate	their	performances	to	the	superiors	for	their	career	promotion.	 Consequently,	 such	 “promotion-oriented	 incentive”	 has	 resulted	 into	 a	number	of	short-term,	purpose-specific	domestic	urbanization	policies”	 (Tang,	2015b:	
                         
27 Refers	physical	development	and	economic	performance, such	as	real	estate	and	industry	development	as	well	as	the	growing	ratio	of	the	urban	population 
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150)28.	Through	a	policy	of	“introducing	property	management	company	into	regenerated	
village	communities”,	we	can	observe	the	unstable	alliance	between	district	government	and	the	regenerated	community	authority.	This	section	will	explain	how	the	implications	of	the	policy	failure	to	address	the	practical	problems	sits	within	the	social,	economic,	and	political	 context	 of	 regenerated	 village	 community.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 policy	implementation	process	also	 reflects	 the	 “problem-solving	 function”	of	 the	 traditional	rural	deliberative	system.	 		
8.4.1	Introduction	of	property	management	companies	in	China	The	term	‘property	management	company’	is	a	form	of	private	professional	enterprise,	which	provides	community	maintenance	services	as	well	as	management	for	a	particular	community	and	charges	the	residents	or	landlords	a	 fee.	With	charge	the	 landlords	or	residents	for	a	respective	fees	from.	In	China,	private	firms	started	to	participate	in	the	domestic	public	service	provision	by	privatising	the	urban	grassroots	administration	in	the	era	of	the	1990s.	As	discussed	in	previous	Chapters,	the	urban	land	use	rights	could	be	 shifted	 and	 traded	 by	 the	 local	 governments;	 meanwhile,	 urban	 citizens	 were	permitted	for	purchasing	the	property,	the	Dan-wei	(work-unit)	no	more	constituted	as	the	only	housing	supplier	since	the	private	sector	started	investing	into	the	urban	real-estate	market.	The	explosive	growth	of	the	commercial	housing	market	generated	a	large	demand	for	public	service	provision	and	basic	infrastructure	coverage.	This	change	also	generated	the	explosive	growth	of	the	property	management	industry	services	in	urban	communities	such	as	infrastructure	maintenance,	cleaning	and	security	guards.	 	 		In	 the	 newly	 built	 commercial	 residential	 community,	 the	 property	 management	companies	took	place	of	the	Dan-wei	in	the	provision	of	various	public	services,	besides	holding	 a	 responsibility	 to	 all	 of	 the	 residents	 and	 landlords	 of	 the	 community.	 In	comparison	to	the	Dan-wei	system,	in	a	commercial	residential	community,	a	property	management	company	is	recruited	by	the	residents	and	landlords	instead	of	offering	free-of-charge	 community	 services	 to	 secure	 worker’s	 wellbeing.	 Practically	 all	 of	 the	community	members	(instead	of	only	urban	households)	can	enjoy	the	services	while	
                         
28 Tang	(2015b):	the	local	official	will	separate	the	command	from	upper	level	government	into	quantizable	indicator.	To	gain	the	advantage	in	career	promotion,	they	will	prior	the	quantizable	short	term	task	rather	than	long-term	sustainability. 
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they	paid	for	the	service	charges.	Furthermore,	the	property	management	company	can	strike	the	service	and	quit	the	community	if	the	community	does	not	pay	the	bill	on	time.	In	the	meantime,	the	sector	was	competitive	and,	as	such,	the	residents	could	select	from	a	number	of	real-estate	firms.	Since	the	1990s,	the	property	management	industry	has	rapidly	 grown	 assisted	 by	 the	 national	 government’s	 policy	 assistance	 to	 become	 a	pivotal	 constituent	 of	 the	 community-building	 movement.	 In	 this	 movement,	 the	government	fully	affirmed	the	role	of	the	private	sectors,	meanwhile,	the	public	services	provided	 by	 private	 enterprises	 extended	 into	 many	 fields,	 such	 as	 infrastructure	maintenance	 and	 coverage,	 sanitation,	 letting	 agencies,	 greening,	 public	 security,	 and	services	for	the	widows,	disabled,	the	elderly	and	so	on.	At	present,	the	majority	of	the	Chinese	urban	communities	have	employed	a	property	management	company,	together	with	 outsourcing	 the	 growing	 types	 of	 community	 service	 to	 private	 enterprises.	Currently,	the	property	management	companies	are	not	only	employed	in	the	commercial	communities,	 but	 are	 also	 employed	 in	 Dan-wei’s	 accommodation	 communities.	 As	 a	stakeholder,	the	property	management	company	has	commonly	found	contacts	with	the	Residents’	 Committees	 (or	 Landlords’	 Committees),	 meanwhile,	 it	 play	 a	 crucial	 and	active	 role	 in	 public	 security	 and	 sanitation,	 delivery,	 environment	 maintenance	 and	neighbourhood	landscaping.	 		In	 the	 era	 of	 the	 urban	 village,	 the	 street	 office,	 besides	 a	 village	 committee,	complementarily	contributed	to	the	social	wellbeing	as	well	as	service	supply.	The	duty	of	 neighbourhood	 management	 remained	 underdeveloped	 until	 the	 urban	 village	regeneration	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 “double	 transformation”.	 The	 policy	 of	 “double	transformation”	 requires	 the	 regenerated	 village	 community	 treat	 the	 neighbourhood	management	as	paid	services	that	should	be	delivered	commercially.	However,	as	I	will	discuss	 later,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 the	 professional	 property	management	 company	 to	 be	recruited	by	the	regenerated	village	community.	This	 is	not	only	because	villagers	are	reluctant	 to	 pay	 the	 maintenance	 fees	 to	 property	 management	 company;	 but	 also	because	villagers	have	some	difficult	in	getting	used	to	the	new	urban	lifestyle.	 		
8.4.2	Challenges	of	“unaffordable	charges”	 	As	stated	previously,	the	first	challenge	for	the	community	was	that	the	residents	in	the	regenerated	village	community	were	reluctant	to	pay	the	fees	for	property	management	
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services,	and	furthermore,	some	of	them	could	not	afford	these	charges.	Therefore,	it	was	difficult	to	recruit	a	property	management	company	in	the	regenerated	community.	As	a	consequence,	the	community	is	lack	of	maintenance	because	the	duties	of	the	remaining	community	were	 left	 to	 the	 residents’	 committee	 and	 the	 residents.	 This	 situation	 is	different	 from	that	of	 the	urban	villages’	era.	Firstly,	 this	 is	because	the	urban	villages	remained	 in	 the	 rural	 governance	 system,	 and	 the	 rural	 villagers	were	 funded	 by	 the	government	for	public	services.	Therefore,	the	village	and	the	public	infrastructures	were	maintained	by	the	village	committee,	and	villagers	did	not	have	to	pay	any	fees	for	this	public	service.	Secondly,	in	the	era	of	urban	villages,	the	village	committee	could	receive	additional	 money	 by	 renting	 their	 assets	 to	 outsiders.	 For	 example,	 the	 village	committees	could	operate	the	car	parking	rentals	and	street	booth	rentals	businesses	and	these	incomes	could	be	used	to	fund	the	urban	village	maintenance	services.	Finally,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	the	condition	of	urban	villages	is	poor	and	chaotic,	however,	the	village	 committee	 are	 not	 expected	 to	 spend	 more	 money	 to	 provide	 better	 living	conditions	to	the	public.	 		While	urban	villages	have	been	 regenerated	 into	new	communities,	 the	acceptance	of	normal	urban	commercial	services	has	not	been	smooth.	The	first	reason	for	this	is	that	the	residents’	committee	“is	forbidden	to	tap	into	market	resources”	and	has	therefore	“turned	 into	 a	 purely	 administrative	 agency”	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 allowed	 to	 charge	 any	rental	or	maintenance	charges	(Wu,	2018:	1186).	As	the	result,	the	residents’	committee	cannot	get	additional	funds	for	maintenance	by	operating	businesses.	Secondly,	the	street	office	allocates	the	budget	of	the	residents’	committee,	however,	the	budget	is	far	from	sufficient	 to	 maintain	 the	 community.	 This	 is	 because	 before	 the	 integration,	 these	villagers	were	self-funded	by	their	village	collective,	the	government	did	not	have	enough	budget	to	fund	these	new	citizens.	Therefore,	it	is	impossible	for	the	residents’	committee	to	 pay	 for	 a	 professional	 property	 management	 company.	 Finally,	 the	 policy	 of	“integrating	urban	villagers	and	urban	villages	into	cities”	requires	that	the	regenerated	village	community	provide	higher-level	living	conditions	to	residents,	which	generates	higher	costs	than	the	urban	village	maintenance.	 		As	discussed	earlier,	in	urban	communities,	the	duty	of	community	management	is	taken	by	 the	 professional	 property	management	 company	which	 is	 collectively	 hired	 by	 all	
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apartment	owners.	All	the	costs	of	community	management	and	maintenance	are	paid	by	the	landlords.	However,	collecting	property	management	fees	from	villagers	is	never	easy.	Because	the	villagers	were	reluctant	 to	pay	the	property	management	 fees	at	 the	very	beginning,	the	street	office	had	to	require	the	residents’	committee	to	do	as	much	as	they	can.	 This	 situation	 happened	 both	 at	 Village	 N	 and	 Community	 T.	 According	 to	 the	director	of	Village	N.	 	We	tried	very	hard	to	solve	this	problem.	At	the	very	beginning,	we	tried	to	find	a	qualified	and	professional	property	management	company,	because	we	don’t	have	experience	to	deal	with	issues	of	high-rise	housing.	But	the	final	result	is	that	we	hired	some	old	villagers	from	our	community	to	serve	as	a	property	service	company.	This	is	because	the	qualified	and	formally	managed	company	is	costly,	and	villagers	do	not	want	to	pay	for	this.	Some	of	 them	 cannot	 afford	 these	 fees.	 What	 we	 can	 do	 is	 to	 hire	 some	unemployed	villagers	to	take	this	duty.	Although	this	is	not	good	enough,	but	this	choice	is	affordable.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Director	N,	2017)		The	 failure	 of	 introducing	 the	 professional	 property	 management	 needs	 the	 village	shareholding	 companies	 to	 maintain	 their	 role	 in	 neighbourhood	 administration.	Opposite	 to	 the	 urban	 villages	 era,	 which	 drew	 income	 for	 the	 village	 collectives’	properties	(car	parking	rentals	and	street-booth	rental	businesses),	the	new	regenerated	community	 does	 not	 possess	 these	 assets	 in	 order	 to	 create	 income.	 Faced	 by	 these	challenges,	 two	communities	adopted	a	different	way	 to	 solve	 it.	Based	on	 the	 strong	collective	economy,	the	Village	N	decided	to	pay	for	all	their	shareholders	only.	Before	the	 regeneration,	 the	 Villages	 are	 recommended	 to	 registrate	 a	 company	 by	 local	government.	The	village	allocated	the	membership	to	each	villager.	The	new-borns	won’t	have	a	membership	but	they	have	right	to	inherit	a	membership	from	their	parents.	For	the	service	costs,	each	resident	(both	members	and	the	incomers)	should	pay	the	cost	to	the	shareholding	company	first,	the	money	will	be	refund	to	each	member	at	the	end	of	the	year.	However,	as	a	collective	organization,	the	village	shareholding	company	cannot	keep	 continuing	 to	 pour	 money	 into	 community	 services	 without	 approval	 by	 the	villagers’	congress.	In	addition,	it	is	also	difficult	to	explain	the	cost	to	the	villagers.	As	the	Director	of	Village	N	recalled:	 	
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Everything	needs	money	in	this	new	community.	Some	of	the	money	spending	
is	 acceptable	 for	 the	 villagers,	 like	 replacing	 broken	 windows,	 lights,	 and	
cleaning.	This	part	is	the	same	as	what	we	did	in	urban	villages.	However,	the	
new	 community	has	many	 areas	where	 you	 spend	 a	 lot	 of	money	 but	 you	
cannot	observe	where	 it	has	gone.	Apart	 from	 the	professional	 repair	and	
maintenances	fees,	the	energy	costs	of	elevators,	public	 lighting,	and	pubic	
security	systems	are	very	high.	 In	addition,	maintaining	trees	and	grass	 in	
public	green	 spaces	 is	also	 costly,	 because	of	water,	 fertilizers,	 and	disease	
prevention.	I	just	take	some	examples.	We	have	to	explain	and	persuade	the	
villagers	to	accept	these.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Director	N,	2017)		To	 accept	 the	 property	 management	 services	 and	 charges	 was	 one	 of	 the	 transition	difficulties	 for	 the	villagers.	Faced	by	 this	 lifestyle	 change,	 the	villagers	had	no	 choice	except	 to	 accept	 it.	 From	 the	 local	 government’s	 perspective,	 both	 indigenous	 urban	villagers	and	migrants	are	welcome	as	 they	not	only	boost	 the	 local	economy	but	also	promote	 the	 land	market.	However,	more	 importantly,	 the	 local	 government	 requires	both	villagers	and	migrants	 to	be	managed	under	the	urban	community	model	 for	 the	sake	of	the	urban	and	neighbourhood	image.	 	According	to	the	Director	of	Village	N,	the	introduction	of	property	management	services	is	a	good	chance	for	villagers	to	make	sense	of	the	urban	lifestyle:	
Unlike	in	cities,	rural	areas	used	to	have	government	funds	for	public	services.	
The	rural	areas	are	all	production	teams	that	are	responsible	for	their	own	
profits	and	losses.	To	be	honest,	farmers	used	to	live	in	this	kind	of	garbage,	
sewage	turbulence	environment	for	a	long	time,	it	should	be	said	that	they	
have	become	accustomed	to	this	 living	environment	and	 lifestyle.	But	now,	
our	 economy	 is	 developing	 and	 our	 living	 standards	 need	 to	 be	 improved.	
After	moving	into	buildings,	garbage	will	be	collected,	sewers,	and	urban	and	
rural	 disparities	 are	 resolved	 in	 public	 services	 and	 infrastructure.	 This	
material	improvement	is	easy,	but	the	biggest	change	is	mental	quality,	which	
is	a	long-term	process.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Director	N,	2017)		
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The	management	fees	are	collected	by	door-to-door	visits,	which	is	a	good	opportunity	to	explain	the	reasons	and	costs	behind	the	fees.	However,	as	discussed	before,	the	Village	N	Shareholding	Company	and	the	Village	N	Residents’	Committee	are	almost	the	same.	Finally,	the	Village	N	Shareholding	Company	not	only	takes	the	duty	of	services	but	also	pays	 the	 property	management	 fees	 for	 their	 indigenous	 villagers	 under	 the	 name	 of	Residents’	Committee	of	Village	N.	As	a	result,	wealthy	village	cooperatives	have	played	a	more	influential	role	in	the	local	decision-making	process	because	of	the	patron-client	relationship	with	 their	Street	Office	and	 residents’	 committee.	As	explained	 later,	 this	relationship	also	affects	local	policy	implementation	in	guiding	the	villagers’	struggle	to	adapt	to	the	new	urban	lifestyle.	 		The	situation	in	Community	T	is	relatively	more	difficult	than	Village	N.	This	is	because	their	 community	no	more	belong	 to	 their	 former	village,	 instead,	 villagers	 from	 three	village	share	the	same	infrastructure,	public	space,	and	facilities	in	same	community.	In	addition,	the	new	Director	of	the	residents’	committee	and	the	newly-hired	community	staffs	had	barely	local	knowledge	in	order	to	solve	the	difficulties	of	introducing	property	management	service.	As	a	result,	the	Community	T	turned	for	help	to	the	three	villages’	shareholding	 companies.	 The	 property	management	 company	 in	 Community	 T	 is	 co-managed	 by	 three	 village	 shareholding	 companies	 and	 takes	 the	 duty	 of	 property	management	 services.	 In	 contrast	 with	 the	 Village	 N,	 because	 none	 of	 the	 village	shareholding	companies	were	willing	to	pay	the	costs	for	their	shareholders	(villagers),	the	property	management	fees	were	collected	from	each	household.	Because	of	some	of	the	 villagers	 were	 reluctant	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 property	 management	 fees,	 these	 three	shareholding	companies	decided	to	take	the	credit	of	management	fees	directly	from	the	villagers’	dividend.	As	a	cadre	in	the	village	shareholding	companies	stated:	
We	don’t	resistant.	In	fact,	we	cannot	make	our	lives	without	enough	money.	
All	we	can	do	is	identifying	malfunctions	and	fixing	tiny	problems.	 	(source:	interview	with	Village	Cadre	N1,	2017)	The	villagers	were	dissatisfied	with	this	action.	One	of	the	villagers	argued	that	he	refused	to	pay	the	management	fees	because	they	were	dissatisfied	with	the	services:	 	
Their	capacities	at	most	is	to	fixes	and	repairs	tiny	problem.	When	we	face	the	
big	problems	like	repairing	the	elevator	and	water	supply	system,	we	should	
wait	very	long	time.	Sometimes,	they	cannot	handle	the	sewage	blockages.	 	
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(source:	interview	with	Villager	N	3,	2017)	Clearly,	 the	 services	 by	 the	 village	 shareholding	 company	 have	 been	 constrained	 by	professional	skills.	This	problem	was	very	common	in	the	regenerated	village	community	(He	2015,	Wu,	2018),	however,	 this	 is	also	because	they	were	constrained	by	the	 low	standard	charges.	According	to	the	community	cadre	of	Community	T:	
After	 the	 entire	 relocation,	 this	 new	 community	 management	 is	 a	 big	
challenge,	even	if	you	want	to	save	money,	you	still	have	to	manage	and	solve	
the	 problem.	 We	 set	 up	 our	 own	 council	 and	 managed	 it	 ourselves.	 Our	
property	management	is	directly	assumed	by	the	board	of	directors.	We	have	
investigated	 that	 the	 average	 charge	 for	 a	 normal	 commercial	 property	
management	 company	 in	 the	upper	block	 should	be	0.45	yuan	per	 square	
meter,	while	our	charge	 is	only	0.2	yuan	per	square	meter.	We	don’t	make	
money	from	it,	we	just	care	about	the	cost	and	we	can	guarantee	the	basic	
operation.	 	 (source:	interview	with	Staff	member	T,	2017)	
The	 conflicts	 between	 villagers	 and	 the	 community’s	 property	 management	 services	generated	both	internal	and	external	pressure	for	both	the	Residents	Committees.	Within	the	community,	villagers	not	only	complained	about	the	low-standard	services,	but	they	were	also	angry	with	the	fees	were	collected.	On	the	other	side,	the	villagers	complained	to	the	media	that	the	residents’	committee	and	their	village	shareholding	company	were	stealing	their	money.	The	residents’	committee	and	street	offices	also	felt	powerless	to	resolve	 this	 problem,	 as	 they	 only	 had	 very	 limited	 resources	 and	 funding	 from	 the	government,	and	these	resources	were	far	from	enough	to	hire	a	professional	property	management	company.	Being	a	cadre	in	a	residents’	committee	within	a	new	regenerated	village	community	 is	not	easy,	and	often	means	working	overtime.	This	 is	because	the	residents’	committee	have	to	take	on	the	duty	of	guiding	the	villagers’	civilization.	 	
The	community	should	lead	these	farmers	to	adapt	to	the	urban	life	to	get	rid	
of	 this	 stereotype.	 The	 urban	 community	 is	 not	 a	 new	 thing	 to	 the	 urban	
residents,	but	for	them,	it	is	a	new	thing	[…]	Farmers	are	also	normal	people.	
When	they	first	come	into	contact	with	new	things,	they	need	a	process	for	
adaptation.	 Once	 they	 understand,	 they	 will	 naturally	 abandon	 some	
backward	 and	 inconvenient	 habits.	 That	 is	 why	 farmers	 gave	 up	 using	 	
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bicycles	when	 they	have	motorcycles,	 they	gave	up	motorcycles	when	 they	
have	cars,	now	they	have	cars,	and	they	also	want	to	have	electric	cars	or	new	
energy	vehicles.	This	is	a	process	of	renewal.	It	takes	time.	 	(source:	interview	with	Offical	J,	2017)	
	As	a	result,	the	policy	of	the	introducing	professional	property	management	companies	into	
regenerated	village	communities	 failed.	Surprisingly,	we	see	the	traditional	deliberative	governance	culture	of	the	village	playing	a	role	in	problem	solving.	Using	this	case	as	a	lens	through	which	to	examine	this	process,	we	can	observe	how	the	unstable	alliance	between	district	government	and	the	regenerated	community	authority	is	due	to	the	gap	of	lifestyle	and	political	culture	between	villagers	and	urban	citizens.	The	urban	project-based	command-and	control	system	is	difficult	to	accept	by	the	villagers	as	they	are	used	to	the	traditional	political	culture	of	village	deliberation.	They	believe	that	they	have	right	to	participate,	at	least	to	ask	for	the	information	behind	decisions.	For	example,	the	village	shareholding	company	had	to	explain	the	maintenance	costs	 to	 their	villagers	and	get	approval	 from	 them.	 However,	 differently	 to	 the	 project-based	 command-and	 control	system	in	land	acquisition,	both	the	Street	office	and	Residents’	committee	demonstrated	a	 relatively	 more	 deliberative	 attitude	 with	 greater	 patience.	 As	 I	 will	 explain	 later,	although	on	the	one	hand,	the	involvement	of	the	village	Shareholding	Company	solved	the	problem	of	 community	maintenance,	on	 the	other,	 it	 reduced	 the	authority	of	 the	Residents’	Committee.	 		 	
8.5	Challenges	of	Changing	Lifestyles	and	the	‘Civlizing	Offensive’	As	I	discussed	previously,	the	villagers	experienced	transition	challenges	in	their	daily	life	after	they	moved	in	a	modern	urban	community.	Village	cadres	play	a	significant	role	in	helping	villagers	adapt	to	their	new	urban	life,	such	as	intervening	in	local	conflicts,	applying	authorizations,	and	so	on.	This	is	because	the	board	members	with	extensive	local	 knowledge	 and	 dense	 social	 network	 in	 the	 regenerated	 community	 are	 highly	trusted	in	villagers’	daily	life	and	community	actives.	In	this	section,	by	using	cases	of	a	civilizing	offensive	as	examples,	 I	will	explain	why	the	 former	village	cadre	performed	better	than	residents’	committees	in	persuading	the	villagers	to	abide	by	the	regulations.	The	evidence	shows	that,	compared	to	the	Residents’	Committees,	who	govern	the	village	
 212 
through	 issuing	 government	 ‘commands’,	 the	 former	 village	 cadre	 rely	 on	 more	deliberative	means:	such	as	providing	reasons	in	order	to	persuade	villagers	to	change	their	live	style.	 	
	Compared	 with	 other	 urban	 communities,	 Residents’	 Committees	 not	 only	 perform	public	services	duties,	but	also	compel	former	villagers	to	integrate	into	urban	life.	This	process	affected	almost	thousands	urban	villagers	in	Sunny	District	and	rapidly	caused	a	conflict	between	former	villagers	and	residents’	committees.	The	Committee	listed	many	‘uncivilized’	 behaviours	 which	 included:	 feeding	 fowls	 in	 public	 areas,	 cultivating	 in	public	 green	 spaces,	 throwing	 garbage	 out	 of	 the	 window	 from	 a	 high	 rise	 building,	occupying	public	spaces,	etc.	These	actions	also	caused	strong	resistance	as	the	villagers	complained	 that	 the	 Residential	 Community	 bullied	 them	 because	 they	 were	discriminating	 against	 ‘traditional	 rural	 lifestyles’	 depicting	 them	 as	 ‘offensives’.	 The	complaining	raised	a	debate	about	how	to	distinguish	between	a	‘traditional	lifestyle’	and	an	‘uncivilized	behaviour’,	as	well	as	how	to	‘civilize	offensive	behaviour’.	 		The	controversy	between	‘uncivilized	behaviours’	and	‘discrimination’	had	been	raised	before	the	T	Residents’	committee	had	been	introduced	into	villagers’	lives.	As	soon	as	the	 regeneration	 project	 started,	 cadres	 from	 three	 former	 villages	 organized	 a	temporary	council	to	manage	the	issues	around	the	reallocations.	The	temporary	council	categorized	‘uncivilized	behaviours’	as	the	most	important	task	because	these	behaviours	not	only	negatively	impacted	its	public	image,	but	also	caused	risks	for	public	safety.	After	a	 short	 discussion,	 the	 three	 former	 village	 committees	 formed	 temporary	 leadership	groups:	the	three	former	directors	of	the	village	were	constituted	as	a	standing	committee.	Every	decision	about	 the	whole	community	would	 firstly	be	discussed	at	 the	standing	committee,	 and	 tasks	 would	 be	 separated	 village	 by	 village.	 That	 is,	 former	 villagers	within	 this	 community	 were	 still	 governed	 by	 their	 former	 village	 committee.	 The	temporary	council	of	the	committee	laid	out	a	list	of	prohibited	behaviours:	they	visited	several	reallocated	villages	to	learn	of	their	experience.	Based	on	their	experience,	a	draft	of	prohibited	behaviours	was	issued,	and	processed	for	opinions	collections.	According	the	Deputy	Community	directors:	
We	were	anxious	that	our	community	were	at	risk	of	 turning	back	 into	an	
urban	village	image,	if	we	did	not	stop	it.	…We	only	prohibited	very	limited	
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behaviours	 that	might	 affect	 public	 security	 and	 public	 interest.	 However,	
when	you	talk	to	the	villagers,	they	won’t	take	these	behaviours	as	a	serious	
matter.	But	it	has	a	very	significant	risk	if	we	put	these	into	this	community.	
We	need	to	involve	some	strike	and	force	action	to	prohibit	it.	The	starting	
point	of	these	rules	is	fewer	than	now.	We	modify	the	rules	according	to	our	
experiences	of	routine	administration.	 	(Source:	Interview	with	Staff	member	T,	2017)		As	soon	as	they	received	a	draft,	the	temporary	council	organized	a	series	of	lectures	and	forums	 to	 persuade	 the	 villagers	 to	 follow	 a	 ‘civilized	 lifestyle’.	 However,	 the	 actions	around	 ‘civilization’	 were	 questioned	 as	 ‘official	 discrimination’.	 As	 soon	 as	 these	villagers	moved	in	the	new	community,	this	criticism	came,	not	only	from	public	sources,	such	as	 the	media	and	various	scholars,	but	also	 from	an	 insider	 in	 local	government.	According	to	the	former	vice	mayor	of	Sunny	District:	
In	 the	 global	 perspective,	 China’s	 urbanization	 process	 is	 not	 based	 on	
human-oriented	urbanization,	instead,	it	is	oriented	by	physical	urbanization,	
or	land-oriented	urbanization.	In	this	mode	of	development,	we	lose	the	real	
economy	development	space	as	well	as	the	chances	of	low-cost	development.	
When	 this	 kind	 of	 urban	 landscape	 is	 formed,	 it	 forms	 the	 realistic	
exclusiveness	and	the	"urban	cleanliness".	Urban	subjective	designers	and	city	
managers	are	mostly	advocating	of	"urban	cleanliness",	who	cannot	see	the	
chaos	in	the	rapid	growth	of	urbanization.	If	the	appearance	of	the	city	is	not	
standardized,	it	is	unacceptable	to	have	a	gap	between	the	level	and	hygiene	
of	 vendors	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 government.	 Industry	 has	 also	
attached	importance	to	high-end	industries,	and	do	not	allow	"basic	services	
industry"	to	exist,	a	large	number	of	exclusions	of	the	market.	However,	we	
cannot	do	anything	but	 follow	[this	 trend],	otherwise,	we	cannot	catch	the	
chances.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Deputy	mayor	of	Sunny	District)	Under	this	“urban	cleanliness”	policy,	 the	villagers	were	 forced	to	participate	 in	many	public	lectures	about	a	“civilized	lifestyle”.	Some	villagers	criticized	them	arguing	that	the	local	 government	 bullied	 them	 via	 an	 unequal	 social	 structure,	 education	 levels,	 and	personal	skills.	 	
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They	invited	an	expert	to	introduce	the	‘goodness’	(Meide)	and	‘civilization’	
(Wenminig)	for	us.	I	still	remember	that	feeling.	The	expert	thought	he	was	
standing	high	above	us.	 I	can	only	 feel	 the	discriminations	and	pressures…	
How	can	I	make	a	debate?	He	is	the	expert.	I	just	expressed	my	dissatisfaction	
but	I	can’t	make	an	argument.	 	 (source:	interview	with	Villager	N	1,	2017)		
The	council	just	wants	us	to	follow	their	rules.	They	want	to	follow	the	local	
government.	Because	they	want	to	keep	their	position	of	leadership.	We	don’t	
believe	the	expert,	but	I	can’t	express	my	opinions.	 	(source:	interview	with	Villager	T	4,	2017)		It	 should	 be	 noticed	 that,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 skill	 of	 expressing	 opinions,	 villager	 H	 and	villager	 G	 are	 better	 than	many	 other	 villagers.	 During	 the	 interview,	 I	 found	 lots	 of	villagers	had	difficulty	expressing	their	experience	and	opinions.	This	is	because	they	are	not	good	at	articulating	their	needs	and	opinions,	they	have	difficulty	adding	their	voice	to	the	decision	makers’	throughout	the	deliberations.	The	forums	and	lectures	failed	and	generated	tension	between	villagers	and	the	temporary	council.	To	reduce	the	tension	and	pressure,	these	village	cadres	started	to	discuss	the	issues	around	a	‘civilized	lifestyle’	through	street	talking.	The	council	needed	to	reduce	the	tension	because	they	needed	to	ensure	that	they	had	enough	supporters	to	handle	the	public	issues.	For	example,	after	these	villagers	moved	into	the	Community	T,	some	of	villagers	cultivated	vegetables	in	the	public	green	space.	Although	the	temporary	council	made	the	decision	to	punish	these	behaviours,	 they	 still	 collected	 public	 opinion.	 According	 to	 the	 Deputy	 Community	directors:	
We	need	the	public	supporting	us,	we	need	to	explain	something	to	them.	We	
adopt	street	talking	and	door-to-door	visiting	rather	than	a	formal	residents’	
congress	because	an	informal	setting	helps	them	feel	easy	to	speak	out	[…]	we	
did	not	need	to	get	an	authorized	result	via	a	formal	meeting,	but	we	wanted	
more	supporters	to	support	us.	It	is	crucial	that	we	could	get	support	from	the	
majority	of	residents.	 	 (source:	interview	with	Staff	member	T,	2017)	
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It	is	clear	that,	the	culture	behind	the	street	talking	and	door-to-door	visiting	allowed	for	deliberative	communication.	Before	the	Temporary	Council29	 took	action,	they	adopted	these	informal	actions	to	set	up	a	channel	of	communication	with	the	villagers.	Compared	to	 holding	 a	 villagers’	 congress,	 these	 informal	 actions	 were	 much	more	 effective	 to	communicate	with	public.	However,	as	these	actions	were	not	taking	place	in	a	formal	setting,	 sometimes,	 the	 conversations	were	 confidential.	 This	meant	 that	 any	 actions	were	always	questioned	and	described	as	‘back	room	deals’	by	any	opponents.	According	to	the	villagers:	
I	don’t	believe	what	they	say.	A	hundred	households	planted	vegetables…	They	
ask	me	to	follow	the	people.	In	fact,	I	think	whatever	they	want	to	do,	they	will	
tell	us	this	is	public	opinions.	 	 (source:	interview	with	Villager	T	5,	2017)		
They	won’t	ask	my	opinion.	I	have	very	bad	relationship	to	the	director,	our	
representatives	never	ask	me	anything.	Sometimes,	they	just	inform	me	some	
decisions,	and	sometimes,	they	won’t	let	me	know	anything.	 	(source:	interview	with	Villager	T	6,	2017)	According	to	these	two	villagers,	the	fairness	of	these	actions	should	be	questioned.	The	decision	maker	might	establish	obstacles	for	the	opponents	by	limiting	their	opportunity	to	voice	their	arguments.	Because	any	actions	taken	were	based	on	a	system	of	personal	networks,	the	villagers	believed	mediators	might	be	biased	about	the	participants.	 		This	generated	another	issue.	The	credibility	and	authority	of	the	village	committee	was	situated	on	the	cadres	personally	rather	than	on	their	 ‘title	of	leadership’.	Most	of	 the	villagers	 I	 interviewed	expressed	that	although	they	respected	other	members	or	staff	within	 their	 community,	 emotionally,	 they	 preferred	 to	 trust	 their	 former	 village	directors.	This	is	because	the	village	director	had	taken	charge	in	their	village	for	a	long	time	and,	 therefore	the	villagers	 tended	 to	 respect	 the	 individual	performing	the	 role,	rather	than	the	title	of	the	role.	However,	this	situation	generated	a	big	challenge	in	the	Community	T,	as	it	was	created	from	three	villages.	As	soon	as	they	moved	into	the	new	community,	 the	village	directors	 found	 it	difficult	 to	gain	 the	 credibility	and	authority	
                         
29 Temporary	Council:	a	self-governance	action,	before	the	government	introduce	a	residents’	committee	into	the	community,	the	temporary	council	acts	as	the	authority	of	the	community. 
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necessary	to	lead	the	new	community	as	a	whole.	According	to	one	of	directors	of	 the	Residents’	committee:	
There	are	huge	differences	between	working	in	the	community	and	the	village.	
We	are	struggling	together	to	find	a	right	way...	as	you	see,	currently,	all	of	
the	staff	in	the	community	work	collectively	in	the	same	office.	Compared	to	
the	 former	 village	 council,	 this	 reception	 is	 symbolic…	 Only	 the	 title	 of	
leadership	is	nothing,	as	we	don’t	have	any	credibility	for	the	residents	from	
other	villages.	 	 (source:	interview	with	RC	Director	T,	2017)		As	a	result,	the	local	government	endorsed	the	temporary	council	and	integrated	it	into	the	Residents’	Committee.	The	three	former	village	leaderships	were	nominated	as	three	deputy	 directors,	 and	 the	 government	 designated	 a	 director	 from	 the	 street	 office.	 In	terms	of	conflict	solving,	the	former	village	leaders	took	charge	of	the	issue	and	made	the	decision	individually	when	the	conflict	was	raised	by	their	former	villagers.	According	to	the	former	village	directors	of	the	Village	B	in	Residents’	committee:	
Because	the	village	has	their	individual	administration	system,	village	affairs	
should	 be	 agreed	within	 the	 village,	 so	 I	 as	 the	 former	 cadre	 of	 village	 A	
cannot	 participate	 in	 village	 B	 affairs.	 Commonly,	 these	 villagers	 are	
habituated	to	our	former	institutional	arrangement,	they	want	to	find	their	
former	village	cadre	to	solve	their	problems	or	to	make	a	judgement.	They	
don’t	believe	a	new	authority	from	other	villages	as	well	as	local	government.	 	(source:	interview	with	Village	Director	T	2,	2017)	Under	that	arrangement,	their	former	governance	techniques	were	still	valid	in	practice.	It	 maintained	 the	 community	 governance	 by	 combining	 urban	 services	 and	 rural	deliberations.	Compared	to	the	urban	government	officials,	the	former	village	cadres	not	only	have	more	 credibility,	but	also	have	more	 local	knowledge.	Their	 sympathy,	 and	empathy	were	also	key	to	maintaining	communication	as	they	offered	villagers	a	more	in-depth	understanding	of	the	issues	than	local	government	staff.	 		As	 discussed	 previously,	 compared	 to	 the	 residents’	 committee	 and	 actions	 from	 the	street	offices,	 the	 former	village	cadre	played	a	significant	role	 in	civilizing	offensives.	Similarly	 to	 the	 policy	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 property	 management	 company,	 the	
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residents’	committee	and	local	government	failed	to	address	villagers’	traditional	life	and	their	practical	needs.	During	the	process,	key	elements	in	keeping	the	conversation	going	were	 the	pursuit	of	practical	 resolutions	and	 the	understanding	of	 the	problem,	or,	 at	least,	 showing	 their	 sympathy.	 Personal	 authority	 and	 credibility	 contributed	 to	 the	village	 cadres’	 effectiveness	 in	 organizing	 residents’	meetings	 to	 discuss	 solutions.	 In	addition,	 another	 significant	 finding	 is	 informal	 deliberation	 became	 increasingly	important	 in	 solving	 local	 conflicts,	 collecting	opinions,	 and	 keeping	 the	 conversation	going.	This	change	will	be	discussed	in	next	section.		
8.6	Transformation	of	deliberation:	
8.6.1	Ownership	and	participation	I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 local	 political	 participation	 was	 weaken	 because	 of	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 land	 ownership	 (from	 rural	 collective	 ownership	 to	 state	ownership)	 and	 people’s	 acquisition	 of	 private	 property.	 Existing	 research	 (Sargeson,	2016;	2018)	could	support	this	argument,	they	find	out	that	“collective	land	ownership	is	conducive	 to	 democratic	 participation”	 (2018:	 321).	 The	 comparison	 between	 the	urban/rural	 era	 and	 the	 urban	 regenerative	 village	 community	 reflects	 how	 land	ownership	 changes	 could	 affect	 the	 residents’	 political	 participation.	 This	 problem	 is	more	pronounced	in	China	because	land	acquisition	is	for	urban	expansion	and	ongoing	personal	property	registration	tests.	The	collective	land	ownership	of	village	and	village	joint-stock	enterprises	is	transformed	into	urban	communities,	which	brings	risks	to	self-government.	This	is	the	only	government	stage	in	China	in	which	the	public	can	directly	elect	 leaders,	 withdraw	members	 of	 the	 committee,	 participate	 in	 and	 supervise	 the	decision-making	(see	Chapter	3).		After	 the	 reallocation,	 these	 new	 urban	 residents	 seemed	 reluctant	 to	 participate	 in	community	 self-government.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 they	 use	 the	institutions	 and	 institutions	 of	 community	 autonomy	 to	 defend	 their	 homes	 through	petitions,	 lawsuits	 and	 protests.	 Previous	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 quality	 of	procedural	elections	and	public	participation	in	urban	community	elections	is	lower	than	in	 villages,	 and	 members	 of	 community	 self-governing	 organizations	 usually	 act	 as	higher-level	governments	rather	than	resident	representatives	(Sargeson	2016;	Heberer,	2009).	Although	existing	research	(Sargeson,	2016;	Heberer,	2009)	sketches	the	effect	of	
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political	participation	and	property	regimes	in	both	urban	communities	and	rural	village,	few	have	shown	how	urban	village	regeneration	and	village	urbanization	affect	political	participation	in	new	regenerated	village	communities.	In	addition,	Rollo	(2017)	points	out	that	the	villagers	silence	(exit	and	refusal)	is	not	only	due	to	a	lack	of	economic	and	land-ownership,	but	is	also	rooted	in	cultural	restrictions	on	representation.		 	This	 section	 focuses	 on	 the	 non-speaking	 citizen	 who	 is	 unwilling	 to	 participate	 in	community	issues.	Utilizing	the	case	of	transformation	of	the	4+2	system,	I	will	explore	the	reasons	for	this	unwillingness	to	participate.	As	I	will	discuss	in	this	section,	villagers	refused	to	participate	with	excuses	such	as:	lack	of	interest	and	lack	of	time.	The	reasons	behind	 these	 excuses	were	 rooted	 in	 lack	 of	 political	 trust.	 Because	 of	 their	 previous	relevant	 experiences	 in	 land	 expropriation,	 some	 villagers	 believed	 that	 the	 local	authority	may	not	be	 communicative	and	 the	deliberation	organized	by	 the	residents’	committee	 and	 local	 government	was	 exclusive	 and	 unequal.	 However,	 the	 fieldwork	shows	that	 informal	deliberation	remains	an	effective	way	of	rebuilding	political	 trust	and	a	platform	for	communication.		
8.6.2	Story	of	the	transformation	of	the	4+2	system	
8.6.2.1	Lack	of	motivation	In	 previous	 chapters,	 I	 stated	 that	 deliberation,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 urban	 village	regeneration,	is	part	of	a	complex	political-administrative	system.	Such	institution	of	the	deliberation	in	neighbourhood	has	been	transformed	from	“controlling	rural	neighbours”	into	“controlling	urban	societies”.	Within	the	whole	political-administrative	system,	the	‘4+2	deliberation	 system’	 contains	diverse	 forms	of	 formal	and	 informal	deliberations	and	negotiation,	and	played	a	significant	role	in	developing	a	consensus	on	compensation	and	 the	 reallocation	 process.	 After	 the	 administrative	 transformation	 in	 the	 new	communities,	the	4+2	system	also	fits	into	the	new	community	administration	system.	Learning	from	the	experiences	of	former	urban	village	regeneration	projects,	the	district	government	 believed	 that	 the	 former	 village	 leadership	 and	 the	 former	 village	governance	 system	 could	 significantly	 reduce	 the	 conflict	 between	 government	 and	public	 by	 building	 a	 platform	 for	 communication.	 Therefore,	 the	 district	 government	encouraged	communities,	even	government	branches	and	departments,	to	borrow	from	the	experience	of	the	village	4+2	system	in	policy	implementation.	 	
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	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	7,	deliberation	 in	the	new	community	 is	rooted	 in	the	 former	village	4+2	system,	which	is	designed	to	enhance	the	efficiency	in	implementing	policy	and	 solving	 conflicts.	 However,	 after	 the	 reallocation,	 the	 system	 should	 have	 been	readjusted	to	fit	the	changing	social	and	political	context.	First	of	all,	district	government	and	 community	 authorities	 targets	 were	 effectively	 changed	 from	 the	 relocation	 of	villagers	to	their	stable	‘civilization’.	The	priority	of	implementation	was	social	stability	rather	 than	 efficiency.	 Second,	 the	 public	 no	 longer	 participated	 in	 politics	 with	enthusiasm.	 This	 is	 because,	 within	 the	 community,	 affairs	 did	 not	 directly	 affect	 or	contribute	 to	 their	 economic	 income,	 instead,	 participation	 took	 up	 their	 time.	Throughout	 the	 fieldwork,	 almost	 none	 of	 the	 young	 employed	 adults	 showed	 any	interest	 in	 participating	 in	 community	governance	 issues.	 According	 to	one	 interview	source:	
I	 priority	 is	 to	 make	 a	 living	 for	 me	 and	 my	 family.	 I	 am	 not	 defaulting	
management	charges	and	I	do	not	need	to	claim	the	subsidy	for	low-income	
from	government,	so,	there	are	no	reason	for	me	to	be	an	activist?		 (Source:	Interview	with	Tenant	1,	2017)		
This	should	be	the	matter	for	the	community.	We	paid	management	charges	
and	we	don’t	have	to	pay	with	more	time.	 	(Source:	Interview	with	Tenant	2,	2017)		
I	attended	a	residents’	congress	once,	most	of	the	participants	are	elders.	Why	
I	have	to	waste	times	with	these	elders?	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Tenant	3,	2017)		These	 low	 participation	 rates	 required	 the	 new	 community	 authorities	 to	 find	 an	alternative	means	of	collecting	information,	as	their	former	4+2	system	was	not	effective	in	 mobilizing	 residents	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 new	 formal	 governance	 structure.	 This	situation	contrasts	with	the	era	of	land	expropriation	in	urban	village	regeneration.	At	that	time,	the	participation	rate	was	much	higher	than	in	the	current	situation,	because	the	villagers	desire	to	protect	their	rights	and	defend	their	interests	in	the	collective	land.	This	motivation	encouraged	the	villagers	to	spend	their	time	to	participate	the	meetings.	
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However,	the	community’s	affairs	rarely	significantly	affect	their	interests.	The	director	of	 the	 residents’	 committee	 blamed	 the	 low	participation	 rate	 and	 poor	 participatory	quality	of	residents	in	his	neighbourhood:	 	
It	was	almost	impossible	to	get	positive	feedback	in	the	community	congress.	
Residents	are	only	interested	in	entertainments	like	singing	and	dancing,	but	
no	one	contributes,	even	pay	attention	to	the	neighbourhood	affairs.	Only	few	
people	focused	do	the	work	but	majority	people	joined	in	the	fun.	 	(Source:	Interview	with	Staff	Member	T,	2017)		To	overcome	 this	 challenge,	 the	Director	 of	 the	T	Residents’	 Committee	met	with	 the	former	villager	cadres	time	after	time	to	present	these	cases,	although,	as	the	interview	acknowledged,	villagers	were	even	reluctant	in	discussion	when	dealing	with	the	policies	introduced	 by	 local	 government.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 to	 implement	 the	regeneration	agenda,	the	district	government	set	stage	1	of	the	4+2	system	in	motion	by	sending	 its	 policy	 into	 the	 community	 authorities	 to	 collect	 opinions	 from	 the	community’s	 Party	 members	 and	 community	 members	 to	 outline	 the	 proposal.	 To	implement	the	policy	of	“double	transformation”	and	“integrate	villagers	into	the	city”,	the	initial	information	and	consulting	initiative	gave	the	district	government	insight	into	the	context	and	challenges	of	 the	community	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	community’s	authority.	Through	 the	policy	 implementation	and	consulting,	 the	district	 government	leaned	 local	 knowledge.	 As	 the	 lowest	 government	 branch,	 the	 street	 office	 would	represent	 the	 district	 government	 to	 list	 the	 challenges	 and	 draft	 proposals	 for	implementation.	Learning	from	experiences,	the	staff	from	the	local	government	changed	their	working	style,	to	make	the	villagers	more	willing	to	communicate	with	the	staff.	The	form	of	communication	was	crucial	in	order	that	officials	could	show	their	deliberative	attitude.	According	to	the	interview	source:	
In	 the	 past,	 some	 leaders	 came	 to	 the	 grassroots	 to	 direct	 their	work	 and	
introduce	policies	to	the	masses	on	behalf	of	the	upper	echelons,	all	of	which	
were	official	terms.	Although	these	official	terms	are	scientific	and	accurate,	
they	are	difficult	for	many	people	to	understand	[…]	So	now,	starting	with	the	
general	secretary,	we	will	 tell	you	 in	 the	most	accessible	way	every	policy:	
what	are	we	going	to	do,	why	we	have	to	do	this,	what	we	can	get	when	we	
do	it,	and	what	difficulties	we	have	when	we	do	it.	We	understand	that	we	are	
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willing	to	listen,	understand	and	communicate	with	the	government.	 	(Source:	Interview	with	Official	C,	2017)		The	interview	reflects	that	the	form	of	communication	should	be	parallel	in	with	villagers’	capacity,	otherwise,	it	has	it	has	the	potential	to	cause	further	exclusion.	This	is	because	the	villagers	might	not	be	able	to	understand	professional	terminology.	Previously,	the	4+2	system	was	used	to	facilitate	those	participatory	activities	on	public	affairs	in	village	committees.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	mechanism	of	 the	 4+2	system	still	 exists	 in	 regenerated	village	communities	in	order	to	engage	villagers	in	the	discussion	and	decision-making	process.	However,	the	participation	rate	of	ordinary	people	was	low	because	of	a	lack	of	motivation.	Therefore,	I	argue	that	the	ordinary	urban	villagers	still	have	a	space	to	speak	and	act	in	the	regenerated	village	community,	but	they	prefer	to	“keep	themselves	away	from	public	affairs”.	 		
8.6.2.2	Passivity	and	silence	In	the	eyes	of	ordinary	people,	although	there	is	room	for	speaking,	many	people	still	like	to	remain	silent.	This	kind	of	passiveness	is	obvious	when	interviewing	local	residents.	During	 the	 fieldwork,	 the	 villagers	 said	 that	 they	would	 rather	 remain	 silent.	 This	 is	because	 they	 feel	 "helpless"	and	 “powerless”.	This	view	holds	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	of	uselessness	when	talking	to	anyone	about	their	opinions,	and	that	villagers	are	unaware	of	their	opinions	and	interests,	all	of	which	hindered	their	intention	to	speak	out.	Thus,	this	“alienation”	resembles	the	“participation	strike”	(See	chapter	4)	in	the	regeneration	process	 in	 essence.	 The	 “alienation”	 itself	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 dispersed	 Chinese	deliberation	system	as	well	as	a	 feature	of	“untutored	consciousness	of	political	right”	(zifaxing	quanli	yishi)	which	refers	to	spontaneous	actions	from	villagers	to	express	their	dissatisfaction.	During	 interviews,	 the	villagers	expressed	their	disappointment,	which	was	rooted	in	their	former	experience	of	the	regeneration	process:	
I	don’t	think	I	need	to	participate	in	that	meeting.	These	events	are	organized	
for	 the	 elders,	 just	 leave	 these	 things	 to	 them	 […]	 They	 [the	 residents’	
committee]	can	do	nothing,	they	achieved	the	government	target,	we	are	not	
important	now.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Villager	T	5,	2017)		
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I’m	not	against	them,	but	I’m	very	busy	and	I	don’t	have	time	on	these	things.	
If	I	close	the	door,	I	can	isolate	myself	from	this	community.	So	it’s	none	of	my	
business.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Villager	T	6,	2017)		The	 first	 part	 of	 interview	 above	 mentioned	 that	 organizing	 events	 for	 elders	 is	 an	important	political	instrument	in	community	governance.	This	is	because	in	the	era	of	the	rural	 village	 and	 urban	 village,	 the	 elders	 always	 lived	 with	 their	 children	 and	grandchildren.	 After	 retirement,	 these	 elders	 had	 sufficient	 time	 to	 participate	entertainment	events	and	some	meetings	for	community	affairs.	Because	of	the	difficulty	of	accessing	residents	of	other	ages,	as	an	alternative,	the	residents’	committee	contacted	the	 elders	 and	 asked	 them	 to	 speak	 to	 their	 families.	 For	 those	 residents	 who	 lived	independently	 from	 their	 elders,	 they	were	 usually	 reluctant	 to	 get	 involved	with	 the	residents’	committee.	This	is	not	only	because	there	was	not	any	necessity	to	be	involved,	but	also	because	the	residents’	committee	were	always	powerless	to	help.	This	is	rooted	in	cultural	restrictions	on	representation	in	terms	of	respect	of	elders	in	families	(Xiao),	and	to	“remain	silent	if	it	is	none	of	my	business”	(buguan	xianshi).	These	 current	 negative	 reactions	 to	 the	 call	 for	 deliberation	 are	 evidence	 that	 the	villagers	 easily	 compromise	 and	 show	 apathetic	 attitudes	 until	 they	 face	 significant	property	and	economic	rights’	disputes.	This	apathetic	attitude	is	increasingly	significant	particularly	when	viewed	within	the	context	of	asymmetries	in	power	and	resources.	This	is	because,	in	contrast	to	urban	community	issues,	in	the	relocation	process,	the	villagers	drew	attention	to	the	lack	of	legitimacy	of	the	regeneration	process	and	engaged	in	such	drastic	acts	because	the	actions	highly	affected	their	economic	rights	and	properties.	In	this	sense,	superficially,	these	refusals	to	participate	further	are	also	because	the	issues	lack	 traction	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 value.	 However,	 the	 underlying	 reasons	 for	 the	villagers’	refusal	is	expressive	of	(or	reflective	of)	their	disillusionment	and	lack	of	faith	in	a	communicative	setup	that	betrayed	its	own	stated	goals.	 	
The	meeting	spent	much	time	on	the	small	issues.	We	don’t	care	about	these	
small	things.	But	the	important	decision	making	is	never	open	to	us,	and	I	also	
believe	 the	 director	 of	 our	 community	 is	 not	 qualified	 to	 participate.	 Our	
meeting	is	worth	nothing.	 	 (Source:	Interview	with	Tenant	8,	2017)	
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This	statement	reflects	the	existing	research	on	“everyday	deeds”	and	“everyday	talk”	in	deliberative	 system	 taken	 by	 Rollo	 (2017),	 the	 “use	 of	 institutional	 privileging”	 to	promote	participation	harms	authenticity	of	the	deliberation,	because	it	cannot	deliver	a	non-coercively	communication.	Rollo	comments	that:	“institutional	privileging	of	speech	in	all	sites	of	deliberative	systems	risks	the	erasure	of	the	enactive	contributions	citizens	make	in	sites	that	focus	predominantly	on	deeds	[…]	The	privileging	of	deliberation	can	compel	 citizens	 who	 are	 otherwise	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 speak	 to	 enter	 sites	 of	deliberation	with	inauthentic	claims	strategically	designed	to	circumvent	the	obstacles	present	in	unresponsive	or	hostile	contexts	of	dialogue”	(Rollo,	2017:	602).	This	is	also	reflected	in	further	government	actions	in	informal	deliberation.	 		
8.6.2.3	Role	of	informal	deliberation	For	example,	as	an	alternative,	both	residents’	committees	and	the	village	Shareholding	Company	 resorted	 to	 face-to-face	 contact	 to	enhance	 the	participation	 rates.	Both	 the	street	 office	 and	 the	 community	 believed	 that	 they	 could	 persuade	 the	 villagers	 to	cooperate	with	them	through	street	meetings	and	door-to-door	visiting.	As	I	identified	in	an	earlier	chapter,	ideological	cultivation	as	well	as	in-person	persuasion	is	an	important	governance	 instrument	 in	 rural	 China.	 This	 provides	 the	 space	 for	 informal	 form	 of	authority	 in	 the	 rural	 area.	 The	 successful	 implementation	 of	 “4+2	 system”	 in	 the	previous	demolition	process	gave	local	government	and	former	village	cadres	a	strong	confidence:	they	believed	that	the	“4+2	system”	could	rebuild	political	trust	and	enhance	the	participation	rate.	It	is	through	the	practice	of	the	“4+2	system”,	which	is	an	efficient	way	of	promoting	formal	deliberation	and	delivering	moral	and	political	ideologies	to	the	public,	 aimed	 at	 ensuring	 the	 smooth	 government	 operations.	 Furthermore,	 the	 in-person	persuasion	constituted	an	informal,	gentle,	but	comparatively	more	productive,	approach	of	resolving	the	confliction	in	the	village.	According	to	the	speech	of	the	Director	of	the	IR	street	office:	
Every	 individual	 requires	 continually	 working	 on	 the	 ideological	 and	
propaganda,	 together	 with	 enhancing	 the	 understanding,	 enhancing	 the	
understanding	and	reaching	a	consensus	on	community	building.	 	(Source:	Interview	with	Official	J,	2017)	In	the	 interviews	with	the	working	groups’	members,	 three	approaches	of	“ideological	propaganda”	 are	 figured	 out.	 First,	 the	 former	 villagers’	 committee	 will	 organize	
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discussions	with	villagers,	aimed	at	discussing	the	tasks	of	the	civilizing	offensive.	They	think	their	actions	can	deliver	better	living	conditions.	Second,	through	dispatching	the	working	groups	to	visit	and	persuade	the	households	who	strongly	opposite	their	actions,	they	 hoped	 to	 enable	 the	 villagers	 can	 discuss	 their	 concerns.	 Thirdly,	 through	 street	talking	and	organizing	events	 to	 create	 changes	 they	hoped	 to	 connect	with	villagers.	According	to	the	Director	of	the	T	residents’	committee.	
We	designed	a	 lot	of	games,	and	 in	order	 to	 solve	 their	 villagers’	 habit	 of	
littering,	we	 promoted	 a	method	 of	making	 enzymes	 (a	 kind	 of	 biological	
product,	which	can	be	used	to	make	toilet	soap	or	wash	powder),	and	we	took	
the	 orange	 peel	 and	 the	 watermelon	 peel	 that	 they	 might	 litter	 to	 the	
community,	and	after	six	months	of	fermentation,	it	can	be	used	to	made	the	
enzymes	wash.	We	want	to	encourage	residents	not	to	litter	the	public	space,	
so	for	every	ten	empty	bottles,	they	can	exchange	for	one	bottle	of	the	enzyme	
in	here.	It	can	also	enhance	the	cohesion	of	the	community.	 	
(Source:	Interview	with	RC	Director	T,	2017)	
This	ideological	work	is	crucial	for	the	new	residents’	committee,	because,	in	contrast	to	the	 elected	 village	 committee,	 the	 new	 residents’	 committee	 is	 nominated	 by	 local	government	without	any	elections.	In	addition,	because	of	the	historical	conflict	in	land	expropriation,	the	villagers	did	not	trust	local	government.	Compared	with	former	village	cadres,	 the	 community	 cadre	 from	 the	 local	 government	 does	 not	 have	 their	interpersonal	network,	 therefore,	 they	have	 to	enhance	 their	personal	 reputation	and	political	 trust	 trough	community	organized	events.	According	to	Wang	(1999),	 family-based	 social	 relations	 might	 not	 be	 dominant	 in	 the	 modern	 China,	 however,	 the	interpersonal	 network	 and	 personal	 relationships	 still	 influence	 the	 people's	understanding	 of	 rights,	 value	 and	 themselves.	 In	 addition,	 the	 government	 officials	repeatedly	emphasized	the	importance	of	face-to-face	communication	with	villagers	in	my	field	works.	They	believe	that	this	is	the	best	way	to	directly	understand	the	villagers'	needs	and	express	affection	for	villagers.	Therefore,	they	believe	that	they	can	create	a	more	comfortable	environment	for	the	villagers	to	express	their	concern	to	community	through	the	events,	or	at	least,	these	events	can	enhance	their	personal	relationships.	 	
Our	 community	 carries	 out	 activities	 based	 on	 this	 and	 according	 to	 this	
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demand.	At	first,	we	gave	the	elders	a	free	haircut	every	month.	The	haircut	
looks	 very	 simple	 but	 is	 necessary	 for	 elders.	 This	matter	 depends	 on	 the	
volunteers	we	recruited.	At	beginning,	people	also	said	that	we	were	making	
a	political	show	to	the	leaders,	and	did	not	believe	that	we	could	stick	to	it.	
But	this	activity	of	ours	has	continued.	The	starting	time	of	our	activity	is	8:	
30	a.m.	 those	elderly	people	are	queuing	up	at	7:	30	a.m.	every	time.	Then	
[they]	slowly	appeared	to	help	each	other	occupy	the	position.	We	began	to	
demand	that	we	must	arrive	here	and	issue	the	number	on	site.	In	this	way,	
an	 order	 has	 been	 cultivated	 and	 their	 awareness	 of	 that	 order	 has	 been	
established.	Let	them	form	this	kind	of	self	awareness.	This	virtually	lets	them	
know	to	obey	the	rules.	Since	we	stick	to	it	and	the	common	people	can	see	
what	the	community	is	saying,	they	will	know	that	we	are	not	doing	anything	
to	 cope	with	 the	 leadership	 check,	 but	doing	 something.	This	 establishes	a	
trust	relationship	with	each	other.	 (Source:	Interview	with	Official	J,	2017)	This	statement	shows	that	“reputation”	plays	a	significant	role	in	social	interactions;	and	it	also	reflects	the	significance	of	“informal	authority”.	Compared	with	urban	areas,	the	kinship	and	personal	ties	in	rural	area	are	closer.	This	social	context	promotes	the	village	committee	to	some	employ	some	deliberative	democracies	due	to	network	relationships.	In	rural	China,	the	traditions,	norms	and	symbolic	values	significantly	shape	the	people’s	daily	activities	and	conception	(White,	1999).	Moreover,	the	local	leaders	directly	elected	by	the	villagers	are	influenced	by	social	culture;	meanwhile,	villagers	are	intertwined	by	personal	relationships	and	informal	networks.	In	a	society	centered	on	relationships	and	descent,	 reputation	 is	 important	 to	 improve	 a	 person's	 qualifications,	 thereby	establishing	 and	 developing	 these	 personal	 and	 informal	 relationships.	 Therefore,	reputation	can	be	further	developed	through	the	transfer	of	the	kinship	network	from	one	 party	 to	 the	 other.	 As	 we	 can	 observed,	 "reputation"	 can	 informally	 come	 from	personal	interaction	in	the	village.	Fan	(2000)	believes	that	in	Chinese	traditional	culture,	a	set	of	core	values	-,	morality,	trustworthiness,	integrity,	shame	as	well	as	fear	of	shame	are	all	related	to	the	“reputation”.	However,	the	discussion	above	is	only	from	one	side.	The	“haircut	case”	also	reflects	the	“predominance	on	everyday	deeds”	of	a	deliberative	system.	 The	 “everyday	 deeds”	 of	 the	 residents	 committee	 can	 reduce	 the	 villagers’	
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concern	of	“strategically	designed	deliberation”.	The	positive	everyday	deeds	can	unblock	obstacles	in	the	unwilling	to	talk,	caused	by	lack	of	the	political	trust.	 		
8.6.3	Summary:	 	In	this	case,	organizing	activities,	consultations	and	home	visits	are	also	 important	 for	organizing	 event.	 These	 informal	 actions	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 face-to-face	communication	with	villagers,	direct	understanding	of	villagers'	needs	and	expression	of	feelings	towards	villagers.	Within	the	personal	and	informal	networks,	local	governments	in	rural	villages	care	about	their	reputation	and	personal	relationship	with	villagers.	In	addition,	as	mentioned	above,	when	the	local	government	conducted	investigations	and	collected	 opinions,	 it	 established	 close	 working	 relationships	with	 the	 former	 village	committees	and	village	stock	companies,	and	developed	relations	with	the	villagers.	In	this	sense,	I	argue	that	the	formal	“4+2	system”	in	the	rural	governance	system	is	tending	to	create	an	“informal	deliberation	based	deliberative	system”.	Within	this	system,	the	highest	challenge	 is	 lack	of	political	 trust,	which	caused	another	“participation	strike”:	people	prefer	 to	keep	 “silent”	 and	 “alienation”	 in	public	 affairs.	The	positive	everyday	deeds	of	the	deliberative	system	can,	however,	rebuilt	political	trust	between	the	public	and	authority	and	also	enhances	the	participation	rate.		
8.7	Conclusion	 	In	this	Chapter,	 I	 firstly	 introduced	the	 institutional	changes	of	both	N	Village	and	the	Community	T.	This	was	followed	by	comparisons	on	the	understandings	and	experiences	from	the	relationship	between	former	village	committees	and	 local	government	in	 the	urban	governance	system.	The	details	of	the	comparisons	were	summarised	as	following	table:	Table	8.1:	comparative	analysis	results	of	two	cases		 Village	N	 Community	T	Foundations	of	residents’	committee	
Same	as	former	urban	village	governance	structures	and	cadres;	only	accepted	non-leadership	staff	from	local	
Almost	achieve	as	a	normal	urban	community;	the	Director	of	residents’	committee	is	nominated	by	street	office;	other	cadres	are	selected	from	3	
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government;	staffs	from	local	government	are	excluded	and	only	played	limited	role;	the	vertical	steering	from	local	government	is	limited	
villages’	committee;	the	vertical	steering	from	local	government	is	significant;	 	
Role	of	collective	economy	
Extremely	strong	collective	economy	exists;	absolute	authority	and	leadership	role	in	community;	provide	abundant	welfares	for	villagers;	the	collective	economy	provides	better	public	services	than	local	government;	substantial	main	governance	body	 	
Standard	collective	economy;	significant	role	in	community	governance;	provide	considerable	welfare	for	villages;	important	assistants	for	residents’	committee	and	local	government;	
Transformation	of	collective	economy	
Transferred	into	shareholding	company;	the	candidates	of	shareholders	are	selected	form	villagers;	the	institutions	in	company	are	democratically	decided	by	villagers;	40%	profits	will	be	distributed	as	welfare	to	shareholders	
Transferred	into	shareholding	company;	the	candidates	of	shareholders	are	selected	form	villagers;	the	institutions	in	company	are	democratically	decided	by	villagers;	almost	all	of	profits	will	be	distributed;	
Property	management	 Shareholding	company	take	the	duty	of	property	management;	take	the	duty	of	routine	properties’	maintenance	and	providing	a	good	living	or	working	environment	for	the	
Shareholding	company	take	the	duty	of	property	management;	take	the	duty	of	routine	properties’	maintenance	and	providing	a	good	living	or	working	environment	for	the	residents;	the	management	fees	
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residents;	the	management	fees	will	be	collected	from	all	households	in	community;	the	management	fee	will	be	refund	to	all	shareholders	at	the	end	of	the	year.	 	
will	be	collected	from	all	households	in	community.	Property	management	services	are	under	the	supervision	of	community	council	(made	by	7	senior	village	cadres	and	clan	leaders)	organizations	 All	organizations	are	fund	by	the	shareholding	company	as	a	part	of	welfare	services;	include:	marriage	and	funeral	organization,	community	university,	primary	school,	 	
All	organizations	are	voluntary	services,	include:	community	university,	psychological	counselling,	legal	counselling;	gym;	Youth	UAV	training		
Forms	of	deliberations	 Formal	4+2	system	to	discuss	economic	issues	and	other	important	issues;	informal	deliberations	to	solve	small	conflict	between	neighborhoods;	led	by	community	(former	village)	cadres	
3	villages	shareholding	company	can	trigger	4+2	to	discuss	economic	issues	and	other	important	issues;	residents	committee	and	community	council	can	trigger	public	deliberation	to	solve	big	issues	like	offensives;	the	small-scale	conflict	can	be	solved	by	volunteering	counselling	and	village	cadres	Villagers	perceive	themselves	as:	
Members	of	N	village	first,	then,	shareholders	of	village	shareholding	company,	finally,	urban	citizens,	nothing	related	to	the	street	offices	and	community	
Urban	citizens	first,	do	not	care	about	the	membership	identity	neither	former	village	nor	new	community	 	 	
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Villagers	perceive	residents	committee	as	
For	the	residents’	committee	leadership,	they	treat	them	as	same	as	in	village	committee;	for	the	staffs	from	street	office,	they	treat	them	as	useless	outsiders.	
Leadership	from	urban	government,	has	considerable	authority	and	credits,	 	 	
Villagers	perceive	village	collective	economy	as	
Absolute	authority	and	leadership,	reps	of	their	interests,	
Authority	in	their	mind,	trustable	leadership	
In	 the	 first	 case	 discussed,	 that	 of	 the	 professional	 property	management	 company,	 I	showed	how	the	traditional	deliberative	governance	culture	of	the	village	can,	in	fact,	play	a	role	in	problem	solving.	Through	the	lens	of	this	case,	we	can	observe	that	the	unstable	alliance	between	district	government	and	the	regenerated	community	authority	is	due	to	a	gap	in	lifestyle	and	political	culture	between	villagers	and	urban	citizens.	The	story	of	the	“civilizing	offensive”	reflected	how	community	governance	combined	urban	services	and	 rural	 deliberations.	 Compared	 with	 the	 urban	 government	 officials,	 the	 former	village	 cadres	 not	only	have	more	 credibility,	but	 also	 have	more	 local	 knowledge.	 In	addition,	the	discussion	of	the	transformation	of	“4+2	system”	shows	the	“helplessness”	and	 “powerlessness”	of	 the	 indigenous	 villagers	 as	well	 as	 the	 “distance	 and	 gaps”	 in	government-citizen	relationships.	 		I	have	shown,	as	the	continuities	from	the	urban	village	governance	system	reveal,	both	former	village	cadres	and	village	shareholding	companies	play	important	roles	in	the	new	regenerated	 village	 communities’	 governance.	 In	 some	 cases,	 these	 continuities	were	stronger	than	others.	This	is	because	the	village	collective	economy	is	strong	enough	to	support	and	backup	the	socio-economic	well-being	of	the	urbanized	villagers;	as	well	as	the	 backbone	 for	 the	 former	 village	 cadre	 to	 self-governance	 in	 the	 new	 community.	However,	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	 result	 shows	 that	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 risks	uncoupling	collective	land	ownership	from	community	self-government.	The	first	reason	is	 because,	 after	 the	 land	 expropriation,	 the	 community’s	 affairs	 no	 longer	 affect	 an	individuals’	property	rights.	This	directly	reduces	the	necessity	for	villagers	to	participate.	
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The	second	reason	is	that	some	political	institutions	(like	the	4+2	system)	did	not	work	very	well	 in	community	self-government,	because	of	 lack	of	efficiency.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	motivate	working-age	adults	to	participate	in	public	affairs.	Significantly,	the	reasons	for	this	are	rooted	in	political	trust.	Because	of	their	previous	relevant	experiences	in	land	expropriation,	some	of	villagers	believe	that	the	local	authority	may	not	be	communicable	and	 the	 deliberation	 organized	 by	 the	 residents’	 committee	 and	 local	 government	 is	exclusive	and	unequal.	To	solve	the	issues	above,	the	informal	deliberation	provide	an	alternative	for	the	residents’	committee	to	rebuild	the	communication	platform	between	the	local	authority	and	the	public.	 				 	
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Chapter	Nine:	Conclusion	
9.1	Introduction	This	 study	 adopted	 a	 systematic	 framework	 to	 investigate	 the	 deliberation	 processes	involved	 in	 Chinese	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 the	 governance	 of	 regenerated	communities,	as	well	as	the	integration	of	villagers	into	the	urban	fabric.	This	research	was	 carried	 out	 in	 response	 to	 a	 political	movement	 by	 China’s	 central	 government	 -	‘New-type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020’.	The	aim	of	this	research	is	to	explore	the	role	and	 outcomes	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 as	 a	 political	 instrument	 for	 local	administrations	 in	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 process.	 This	 research	 leads	 to	 the	following	research	questions:	 	1. On	 what	 grounds	 do	 local	 governments	 adopt	 democratic	 deliberation	 in	 the	urban	village	regeneration	practice?	2. How	does	the	process	of	democratic	deliberation	proceed	in	the	process	of	urban	village	regeneration?	 	
• What	role	does	the	village	administration	play	in	the	regeneration	process?	 	
• How	does	democratic	deliberation	play	a	role	in	the	redeveloped	urban	village	community?	 	3. How	does	the	village	deliberative	system	fit	into	urban	community	governance?	 	 	4. What	is	the	place	of	deliberation	in	the	larger	governance	configuration	around	urban	village	regeneration?	 	5. Is	authentic	deliberation	going	on	in	authoritarian	China?	
• Do	the	interactions	between	stakeholders	have	the	general	characteristics	of	democratic	deliberation?	 	
• To	what	 extent	 is	 this	 a	 form	of	 authoritarian	 deliberation,	 or	 deliberation	according	to	Chinese	history	and	culture?	 		The	empirical	chapters	(Chapters	6,	7,	8)	have	explored	and	investigated	how	democratic	deliberation	played	a	role	as	a	political	instrument	used	by	local	administrations	during	the	urban	village	regeneration	process.	Following	the	empirical	discussions,	this	chapter	will	draw	an	overall	conclusion	about	this	research	and	reflect	the	wider	implications	of	the	 findings.	 This	 chapter	 will	 begin	 with	 the	 summaries	 of	 the	 empirical	 findings	(Questions	1,	2,	and	3)	and	go	on	to	discuss	the	wider	implications	of	these	findings	as	
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they	might	apply	to	deliberations	in	authoritarian	settings	(Questions	4	and	5).	Finally,	this	thesis	will	end	with	the	reflections	on	its	significances,	limitations	and	the	scope	for	further	research.		
9.2	Empirical	Findings	 	
Question	1:	On	what	grounds	do	local	governments	adopt	democratic	
deliberation	in	the	urban	village	regeneration	practice?	The	 discussions	 around	 this	 question	 were	 based	 on	 the	 social	 and	 economic	complexities	of	the	urban	village	regeneration	itself;	and	the	complexity	of	the	Chinese	political-administrative	system.	 		The	“urban	village”	is	one	of	the	side	effects	of	the	last	four	decades	of	China’s	doubled-digit	 economic	 growth,	 unprecedented	 urban	 expansion	 and	 social	 change	 (Liu	 et	 al.,	2009;	 Lin	 and	 Ho,	 2005;	 Ho	 2003).	 The	 urban	 village	 is	 a	 common	 form	 of	 informal	settlement	consisting	of	communities	which,	although	geographically	part	of	a	city,	have	administratively	and	in	terms	of	property	rights	retained	their	original	village	structure	(See	 Chapter	 2).	 Functionally,	 the	 urban	 village	 is	 also	 a	 repository	 of	 affordable	accommodation	for	the	rural	migrants	who	cannot	access	social	housing	due	the	hukou	restriction	(Niu	and	Wagenaar,	2018).	Urban	villages	are	regarded	in	both	Chinese	and	the	 international	 academic	 discourse	 as	 slum-like	 areas	 with	 high	 crime	 rates,	 high	population	density	and	poor-quality	housing	(Zhang	et	al,	2003;	Liu	et	al.,	2010).	 		For	various	reasons,	Chinese	local	governments	have	embarked	on	a	programme	of	urban	village	 regeneration	 since	 the	 early	 2000s.	One	 of	 the	most	 important	 reasons	 is	 that	urban	villages	often	have	high	potential	land	values	because	they	almost	always	occupy	geographically	attractive	sites	within	the	city	(Hao	et	al.,	2011).	Initially,	most	of	these	initiatives	 were	 heavy-handed	 demolition-redevelopment	 projects	 which	 not	 only	offered	local	government	desirable	revenue	by	selling	the	land	to	the	developers,	but	also	provided	a	modern	urban	physical	image.	The	rationale	behind	this	policy	programme	is	the	 Chinese	 Central	 Government’s	 strategy	 aimed	 to	 attract	 foreign	 and	 domestic	investment	by	encouraging	competition	between	cities	in	the	early	1990s.	Initially,	the	two	major	policy	instruments	in	this	strategy	of	internal	competition	were	the	revised	Planning	Act	and	the	so-called	Tax-Sharing	system.	The	1990	Planning	Act	strengthened	
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the	role	of	the	city	in	‘development	control’.	The	tax-sharing	system	was	introduced	in	1994	and	aimed	at	encouraging	local	government	to	focus	on	economic	development.	It	was	 a	 significant	 incentive	 to	 transform	 Chinese	 urban	 governance	 from	 socialism	towards	entrepreneurialism	(Wu,	2003).	In	this	arrangement,	central	government	only	took	part	of	 the	 revenues	generated	by	 local	 government	and	 left	 the	 remainder	as	 a	financial	 resource	 to	 enable	 local	 government	 to	 seek	 further	 development.	 The	arrangement	led	local	officials	to	seek	a	high	GDP	growth	rate.	In	addition,	the	revenues	from	local	economic	development	were	also	needed	to	pay	 for	public	services	and	the	welfare	system.	In	practice,	the	tax-sharing	revenue	arrangement	proved	to	be	a	strong	incentive	for	local	governments	to	maximize	revenues	from	land	release,	including	land	auctions	and	land	transformation	fees.	When	the	land-value	is	not	high	enough	(in	the	urban	 fringe)	 the	 government	 released	 such	 land	 for	 very	 low	 prices	 to	 stimulate	industrial	development.	This	process	accelerated	after	China	formally	joined	the	WTO	in	2001,	and	increasingly	opened	up.	Foreign	capital	was	from	then	on	allowed	to	directly	invest	in	real	estate,	the	land	market	and	other	industries	outside	the	‘special	economic	zones’.	The	result	was	a	significant	acceleration	of	land	acquisition	by	local	authorities	and	consequent	urban	expansion.	 		Urban	 village	 regeneration	 was,	 thus,	 a	 strategy	 to	 acquire	 valuable	 urban	 land	 for	purposes	of	local	economic	development,	a	process	that	was	made	easier	by	the	negative	reputation	 of	 urban	 villages.	 As	 said	 above,	 initially,	 this	 process	 took	 the	 form	 of	“demolition	and	development”	(Zhang,	2005).	Within	the	targeted	area,	all	buildings	and	infrastructure	 were	 completely	 demolished,	 after	 which	 the	 area	 was	 redeveloped	following	the	new	planning	proposal.	The	redevelopment	usually	consisted	of	a	mix	of	high-quality	commercial	housing,	shopping	malls,	offices	and	industrial	site	development.	However,	 although	 demolition	 development	 resulted	 in	 urban	 modernization	 and	economic	 development,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 controversial	 as	 it	 led	 to	 many	undesirable	side	effects,	such	as	large-scale	displacement	of	residents,	housing	bubbles	and	a	growing	sense	of	injustice	among	residents.	One	of	the	drivers	of	these	negative	unanticipated	consequences	is	the	complex	process	of	property	acquisition	(land,	houses	and	infrastructure)	that	precedes	the	regeneration.	 	 		
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In	 pursuing	 long-term	 economic	 growth	 and	 social	 development	 while	 avoiding	 the	problems	with	the	demolition	and	development	approach,	the	Party	changed	course	and	announced	a	national-level	policy	–	“New-type	Urbanization	Plan	2014-2020”	in	2014.	According	to	Taylor	(2015),	 the	plan’s	primary	objective	of	urban	village	regeneration	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• Unblock	the	internal	dual-track	system	of	the	city,	in	terms	of	social	form,	property	ownership	and	citizenship,	 such	as	 redeveloping	 the	 slum-like	areas	 into	modern	residential	communities;	the	integration	of	ownership	of	rural	collective-owned	land	(urban	villages)	into	the	state-owned	land;	and	the	transfer	of	the	rural/urban	based	
hukou	system	into	a	unified	household	registration	based	on	residential	address.	
• Promote	 the	 new-type	 urbanisation	 strategy	 to	 facilitate	 the	 integration	 of	 100	million	migrant	workers	into	the	city	(2015:108).	This	new	policy	stimulated	the	urban	village	regeneration	programme	throughout	China.	However,	 the	 existing	 regeneration	 programmes	 had	 proved	 that	 urban	 village	regeneration	 is	 controversial.	 To	 understand	 the	 problems	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	regeneration	process,	two	further	aspects	of	the	wider	environment	are	important.	First,	village	residents,	who	are	organized	in	the	village	collective,	own	the	land	in	the	urban	village.	The	municipality	needs	to	 find	ways	to	acquire	the	 land	at	 the	 lowest	possible	price,	thereby	pitting	the	interests	of	the	city	against	those	of	the	village	collective.	Second,	in	all	cities,	urban	village	regeneration	was	organized	as	a	PPI	arrangement	with	private	developers	doing	most	of	the	development	work	in	exchange	for	a	share	of	the	profits.	This	arrangement	is	complicated	by	the	asymmetrical	power	relations	between	villagers	on	the	one	hand	and	the	 local	and	district	authorities	and	property	developers	on	the	other.	 		To	obtain	 the	necessary	property	 rights	 in	 the	areas	occupied	by	urban	villages,	 local	governments	 followed	 one	 of	 two	 strategies.	 The	 first	 is	market-based.	 This	was	 the	earliest	 approach,	 and	 was	 mostly	 prevalent	 in	 East-Coast	 Cities	 where	 the	 need	 to	redevelop	 urban	 village	 sites	 was	 initially	 felt	 most	 acutely.	 After	 government	endorsement,	 the	 private	 sector	 was	 allowed	 to	 directly	 negotiate	 with	 the	 village	residents	 and	 establish	 land	 and	property	 values	 according	 to	market	 rates.	 	 Private	developers	also	had	a	certain	autonomy	to	amend	the	compensation	for	each	individual	as	they	felt	necessary.	As	village	residents	were	free	to	negotiate	with	developers,	they	
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adopted	 petitioning	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 argue	 for	 higher	 compensation	 packages.	 To	compensate	 for	 the	loss	of	rental	 income	from	their,	 largely	 illegal,	additions,	villagers	were	 offered	 compensation	 in	 the	 form	of	 newly-built	 apartments	 in	 the	 reallocation	community.	 Usually,	 each	 household	 was	 compensated	 by	 at	 least	 two	 to	 three	apartments,	 but,	 to	 diffuse	 the	 petitions	 and	 protests,	 government	 and	 developers	increased	the	compensation	ratio,	in	effect	rewarding	continued	resistance.	In	some	cases,	native	villagers	were	able	to	obtain	numerous	apartments	this	way.	This,	in	turn,	resulted	in	overbuilding	and	the	emergence	of	local	housing	bubbles.	 		This	 arrangement	was	 supported	 by	 the	 expectation	 that	 the	 superior	 location	 of	 the	villages	and	the	high	potential	market	value	of	the	developed	property	would	generate	considerable	 profits	 (Chung,	 2009;	 Lin	 and	 De	 Meulder,	 2012;	 Hin	 and	 Xin,	 2011).	However,	while	these	financial	projections	were	largely	met	in	the	large	East-Coast	cities,	the	profits	were	much	lower	in	smaller	central	cities	such	as	Happy	City,	our	case	study.	For	this	reason	developers	and	construction	consortia	began	to	shy	away	from	taking	full	responsibility	 for	 the	 regeneration	 process.	 Instead,	 the	 state	 stepped	 in	 and	 local	government,	 such	 as	 in	 Happy	 City,	 took	 charge	 of	 the	 process	 of	 land	 acquisition,	demolition	and	reallocation,	with	the	aim	of	limiting	the	negative	consequences	of	land-centred	 urbanization	 whilst	 pursuing	 financially	 sustainable	 urban	 development.	However,	the	negative	side	effects	of	the	market-driven	strategy	had	become	an	obstacle	in	 the	 implementation	of	 the	government-led	strategy.	The	villagers’	negotiating	skills	has	 raised	 their	 expectation	 of	 compensation	 to	 levels	 far	 beyond	 the	 government’s	capacity.	To	make	the	strategy	financially	viable	and	to	create	optimal	space	for	revenue-generating	and	job-creating	commercial	developments,	the	government	more	or	less	shut	down	 the	 possibility	 for	 village	 residents	 to	 negotiate	 the	 size	 of	 the	 compensation	package.	Compensation	for	native	villagers	took	the	form	of	the	allocation	of	apartments	in	government-constructed,	high-density,	high-rise	developments	(Lu	et	al.,	2015).	 		To	cope	with	the	financial	and	legitimacy	challenges	of	urban	village	regeneration	and	address	the	internal	dual-track	system	of	the	city,	within	which	there	are	urban	villages	and	urban	neighbourhoods,	state-ownership	and	rural	collective	ownership,	and	(hukou)	urban	citizens	and	 (non-hukou)	 rural	migrants,	 the	Party	 stipulated	deliberation	with	village	 residents	 as	 a	 central	 instrument	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 New	 Type	
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Urbanization	Policy.	In	general,	this	new	policy	places	more	emphasis	on	the	involvement	of	village	residents	in	the	regeneration	process.	In	the	implementation	of	this	new	policy,	the	 role	 of	 rural	 village	 regimes	 became	 increasingly	 important.	 It	 is	 here	 that	deliberation	plays	a	 role	 in	 the	process	of	urban	village	 redevelopment.	Based	on	 the	practices	 of	 democratic	 deliberation	 at	 local	 level,	 the	 Chinese	 central	 government	explicitly	endorses	the	importance	and	validity	of	employing	democratic	deliberation	in	the	community	governance	system.	The	overt	goal	is	to	promote	a	harmonious,	stable,	and	 ‘controllable’	 society	 by	 building	 up	 harmonious,	 stable,	 and	 ‘controllable’	communities.	 		In	 theoretical	 terms,	 deliberation	 over	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	governance	 system	 that	 consists	 of	 different	 and	 disparate	 elements,	 such	 as	authoritarian	 rule,	 command-and-control	 regulation,	 corporate	 project	 management,	public-private	 arrangements,	 traditional	 village	 deliberation,	 popular	 protest,	 rumors,	subterfuge	and	‘playing	the	system’.	The	diversity	and	complexity	of	this	system	imposes	severe	limits	on	the	effectiveness	of	‘vertical	steering’.	Deliberation	partly	originates	in,	and	expresses,	genuinely	felt	Confucian	traditions	of	wise	rule	and	serving	the	people,	but	is	partly	co-opted	 in	an	 instrumental	way	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	 this	 fragmented	governance	process,	 to	massage	away	 resistance	among	citizens	and	 to	 legitimize	 the	crack-down	 on	 the	 last	 ‘holdouts’	 against	 development.	 Thus,	 deliberation	 in	 an	authoritarian	 setting	 represents	 a	 complex	 amalgam	 of	motives,	 traditions,	 laws	 and	regulations,	 political	 actors	 and	 institutions,	 administrative	 techniques,	 corporate	assessments,	 and	 pushback	 from	 ordinary	 citizens.	 Deliberation	 in	 the	 authoritarian	setting	of	China	is	related	to,	and	dependent	on,	other	ways	of	decision-making.	 	 It	is	one	element	in	a	large	number	of	techniques	of	preference-formation,	decision-making	and	policy	implementation.	This	raises	the	question	whether	this	type	of	deliberation	can	be	considered	deliberation	at	 all,	 or	 if	 this	 is	 a	 case	of	 concept	 stretching	 (Steiner,	2008;	Bächtiger	et	al.,	 2010).	We	will	 argue	 that	 authoritarian	deliberation	 in	 the	 context	of	urban	village	regeneration	can	be	considered	as	an	example	of	Type	two	deliberation,	albeit	 in	a	 constrained	 form,	described	as	 involving	 “more	 flexible	 forms	of	discourse,	more	 emphasis	 on	 outcomes	 versus	 process,	 and	 more	 attention	 to	 overcoming	 ‘real	world’	 constraints	 on	 realizing	 normative	 ideals”,	 such	 as	 rational	 consensus	 and	sincerity	 (Bächtiger	 et	 al.,	 2010:	 33).	 In	 this,	 it	 does	 not	 differ	 in	 principle	 from	 the	
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deliberative	 systems	of	 the	 liberal	democracies	of	 the	West.	 In	each	 case	deliberation	fulfills	 epistemic,	 ethical	 and	 democratic	 functions	 within	 the	 larger	 system	 of	governance	(Mansbridge	et	al.,	2012:	11).	In	what	ways,	under	what	conditions	and	how	well	 it	 fulfills	 these	 functions	 must	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 empirical	 inquiry.	 How	 well	deliberation	fulfills	its	systematic	functions	in	the	context	of	authoritarian	rule	in	China	is	the	subject	of	this	thesis.	 		
Question:	2:	How	does	the	process	of	democratic	deliberation	proceed	in	the	
process	of	urban	village	regeneration?	 	
• What	 role	 does	 the	 village	 administration	 play	 in	 the	 regeneration	
process?	 	
• How	does	democratic	deliberation	play	a	role	in	the	redeveloped	urban	
village	community?	 	The	systematic	approach	of	deliberative	democracy	provides	a	framework	to	examine	its	characteristics	and	evaluate	the	quality	of	these	deliberations.	It	helps	the	researchers	to	understand	the	designs,	developments	and	the	implementations	of	the	deliberations	and	deliberative	institutions	in	China,	despite	contextual	differences	(Tang	and	Dryzek,	2014;	Tang,	2015).	Therefore,	it	is	important	to	investigate	the	larger	political	system	around	the	urban	village	regeneration	from	the	very	beginning.	To	attract	foreign	and	domestic	investment,	China’s	central	government	has,	since	the	end	of	the	1970s,	prioritised	large	infrastructure	 projects.	 During	 these	 years	 of	 economic	 transformation,	 large	engineering	projects	or	 fixed-asset	 investment	projects	have	mushroomed	throughout	the	country.	To	create	favourable	conditions	for	such	projects	and	to	gain	a	competitive	advantage	over	other	 cities,	project	management	became	 the	 instrument	of	 choice	 for	local	governments.		Project	 management	 emerged	 from	 a	 generally	 shared,	 entrepreneurial	 image	 of	governance.	In	governance-by-project,	management	requires	that	large	tasks	are	broken	down	into	smaller	operating	procedures	which	are	allocated	to	different	people	(or	small	groups).	These	persons	or	groups	will	have	some	autonomy	to	accomplish	their	task,	but	they	are	also	held	responsible	for	it.	This	devolved	operating	structure	is	accompanied	by	a	 regime	 of	 intense	 monitoring.	 Project	 management	 also	 introduces	 efficiency	 as	 a	dominant	 value	 into	 the	 practice	 and	 discourse	 of	 governance.	 In	 interviews	 with	
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government	officials,	planners	and	village	leaders	within	the	urban	village	regeneration	program,	efficiency	was	the	first	priority.	All	actors	aspired	to	complete	the	process	as	fast	 as	 they	 could,	 preferably	 before	 the	 deadline.	 Terms	 such	 as	 ‘time’,	 ‘speed’	 and	‘efficiency’	 frequently	 appeared	 in	 interviews,	 government	 documents	 and	 officials’	speeches.	 		It	 is	 in	 the	working	relationships	between	 these	parties	 (the	District	Government,	 the	Command	Centre	and,	as	we	will	see,	the	Village	Committee)	that	the	ambivalences	of	the	intricately	 and	 densely	 scaled	 Chinese	 government	 system	 -	 and	 the	 processes	 of	deliberation	 that	 are	 inscribed	 in,	 and	 shaped	 by,	 its	 rules,	 procedures	 and	operating	routines	-	come	to	the	fore	(Bächtiger	et	al.,	2010:	48).	First,	in	principle,	the	relationship	between	 the	members	of	 the	 command	centre	and	district	 government	 is	 cooperative	rather	than	subordinate.	Although	the	district	government	can	in	principle	overrule	the	command	centre,	the	broad	composition	of	the	latter	is	meant	to	bestow	legitimacy	on	the	actions	of	the	government	and	to	demand	that	conflicts	between	them	are	resolved	by	 the	 force	 of	 optimal	 information	 and	 the	 better	 argument.	 Yet,	 as	we	will	 see,	 the	district	government	imposed	a	performance	and	monitoring	regime	upon	the	command	centre.	Second,	because	of	its	central,	and	ambiguous,	role	in	the	regeneration	process	and	the	deliberation,	negotiation	and	bargaining	with	other	parties	with	which	it	engages,	we	need	to	give	special	attention	to	the	position	of	the	village	committee.	According	to	China’s	constitution,	the	villages	and	village	committees	are	self-governing	organizations.	They	are	not	the	subordinate	branches	of	any	level	of	government.	The	village	leadership	(both	the	head	of	the	village	committee	and	the	secretary	of	the	village	Party	branch)	is	democratically	elected	by	the	villagers	instead	of	being	directly	nominated	by	the	upper	level	of	government.	Although	the	township	level	of	the	Party	branch	must	authorize	the	secretary	of	the	village	Party	branch,	this	authorization	is	in	practice	symbolic	rather	than	a	 top-down	nomination.	On	 the	other	hand,	 to	ensure	 the	 leadership	of	 the	Party,	 the	hierarchically	 higher	 township	 Party	 branch	 retains	 the	 power	 of	 dismissing	 the	secretary	 of	 the	 village	 Party	 branch	 on	 grounds	 of	 Party	 discipline.	 However,	 the,	hierarchically	lower,	villagers	also	have	the	power	of	dismissing	both	the	secretary	of	the	village	 Party	 branch	 and	 the	 director	 of	 the	 village	 committee	 through	 voting	 in	 the	Village	 Congress.	 Under	 this	 institutional	 arrangement,	 the	 village	 committee	 cannot	favour	 one	 group	 over	 another;	 instead,	 it	 occupies	 an	 uneasy	 position	 between	 the	
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interests	of	government	and	villagers.	 	 Therefore,	 the	role	of	 the	village	committee	 is	inherently	ambiguous:	it	represents	government	to	implement	policies	into	the	village,	and	 it	 represents	 the	 villagers	 to	 protect	 and	 argue	 for	 their	 interests.	 In	 the	 larger	governance	 configuration,	 the	 village	 committee	 is	 expected	 to	 act	 as	 the	 mediator	between	government	and	villagers	for	the	purpose	of	promoting	efficiency.	 		Task	 targets	 and	 monitoring	 are	 additional	 policy	 instruments	 in	 the	 regeneration	process.	For	example,	 to	guarantee	that	 targets	were	met,	 the	 leadership	of	 the	Sunny	District	 imposed	a	strict	 instruction	and	 inspection	upon	the	command	centre.	At	 this	crucial	 juncture,	 the	 project-based	 command-and-control	 regime	 meets	 traditional	village	 deliberation.	 Since	 2009,	 the	 CCP	 has	 encouraged	 the	 village	 committees	 and	village	Party	branches	to	adhere	to	the	regulated	rural	deliberations,	which	is	known	as	the	 ‘4+2’	 decision	making	 system:	 a	 system	with	 four	 stages	 of	 deliberation	 and	 two	stages	 of	 public	 announcement	 (si	 yi	 liang	 gongkai).	 This	 institutional	 arrangement	successfully	separates	the	‘right	of	proposing’	and	‘right	of	decision	making’.	It	is	carefully	calibrated	 to	balance	 rational	 communication	through	Type	one	deliberation	between	villagers	and	village	authorities	and	Party	influence	through	the	position	of	the	village	Party	branch	in	the	process.		This	research	identifies	the	existence	of	two	parallel	governance	systems	operating	in	an	uneasy	and	unstable	alliance	with	each	other.	On	the	one	hand,	we	see	the	project-based	command-and-control	system,	that	is	directly	tied	into	the	authoritarian	rule	of	the	CCP,	and	that	extends	downwards	into	lower	levels	of	government.	On	the	other	hand,	we	see	the	traditional	deliberative	governance	culture	of	the	village	that	is	in	fact	endorsed	by	the	CCP.	 	 		
Question	3:	How	does	the	village	deliberative	system	fit	into	urban	community	
governance?	 	 	This	research	identified	the	“not	rural	but	not	urban”	governance	system	of	regenerated	village	communities	in	urban	areas.	These	newly	built	regenerated	village	communities	have	reallocated	the	 indigenous	villagers	 from	former	urban	villages.	Physically,	 these	communities	have	been	developed	as	normal	urban	communities,	however,	politically,	considerable	 continuities	 exist	 between	 regenerated	 village	 communities	 and	 former	
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urban	 villages.	 Chapter	 8	 introduces	 how	 the	 village	 governance	 system	 has	 been	integrated	into	the	urban	administration	system	and	how	these	continuities	exist	in	the	new	governance	system	in	regenerated	village	communities.	Based	on	these	observations,	this	research	found	that	deliberation	could	contribute	to	an	elegant	political	process	as	well	as	a	deliberative	and	equal	outcome.	More	importantly,	the	rural	deliberation	and	the	 deliberative	 system	 facilitates	 the	 social	 integration	 of	 the	 villagers.	Furthermore,	through	the	lens	of	two	cases,	this	research	explains	how	the	rural	government	structure	could	be	integrated	in	community	governance,	how	the	collective	economies	were	invited	by	street	office	into	the	area	of	the	community	services	for	their	shareholders,	and	how	local	government	cultivate	the	self-governance	organization	at	grassroots	level.			In	 China,	 villages	 and	 urban	 residents’	 communities	 are	 ‘self-governing’	 organization.	Legally,	 they	 should	 conduct	management	 decision-making,	 democratic	 elections,	 and	supervision.	However,	as	stated	 in	Chapters	3	and	8,	 the	dual-track	of	 land	ownership	differentiates	the	economic	capacity	and	functions	of	urban	residents’	committees	and	village	committees.	To	overcome	these	differentiations	and	peacefully	transfer	the	village	into	the	urban	community,	 the	 local	government	directly	nominates	the	members	and	leaders	of	the	new	residents’	committee	in	in	our	two	case:	Village	N	and	Community	T.	Through	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 experiences	 and	 understandings	 from	 the	 relationship	between	 former	 village	 committees	 and	 local	 government	 in	 both	 Village	 N	 and	 the	Community	T,	this	research	reconstructs	two	typical	forms	of	institutional	changes	in	the	urban	governance	system.	The	details	of	the	comparisons	are	summarised	in	the	table	8.1	(see	chapter	8)		As	the	continuities	from	the	urban	village	governance	system	reveal,	both	former	village	cadres	and	village	shareholding	companies	play	important	roles	in	the	new	regenerated	village	 communities’	 governance.	This	research	uses	 the	 concept	of	“not	rural	but	not	urban”	to	describe	the	governance	system	in	the	regenerated	urban	village.	Through	the	lens	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 professional	 property	 management	 company	 in	 the	regenerated	 urban	 village	 community,	 I	 showed	 how	 the	 traditional	 deliberative	governance	culture	of	the	village	can,	in	fact,	play	a	role	in	urban	problem	solving.	The	unstable	 alliance	 between	 the	 district	 government	 and	 the	 regenerated	 community	
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authority	 is	 due	 to	 differences	 in	 lifestyle	 and	 political	 culture	 between	 villagers	 and	urban	 citizens.	 The	 story	 of	 the	 “civilizing	 offensive”	 reflected	 how	 community	governance	combined	urban	services	and	rural	deliberations.	Compared	with	the	urban	government	officials,	the	former	village	cadres	not	only	have	more	credibility,	but	also	have	more	local	knowledge.	In	addition,	the	discussion	of	the	transformation	of	the	“4+2	system”	shows	the	“helplessness”	and	“powerlessness”	of	the	indigenous	villagers	as	well	as	 the	 “distance	 and	 gaps”	 in	 government-citizen	 relationships.	 In	 some	 cases,	 these	continuities	were	stronger	than	others.	This	is	because	the	village	collective	economy	is	strong	enough	 to	 support	and	backup	 the	socio-economic	well-being	of	 the	urbanized	villagers;	as	well	as	providing	the	backbone	for	the	self-governance	of	the	former	village	cadre	in	the	new	community.	 		However,	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	 result	 shows	 that	 the	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 risks	uncoupling	collective	land	ownership	from	community	self-government.	The	first	reason	is	 because,	 after	 the	 land	 expropriation,	 the	 community’s	 affairs	 no	 longer	 affect	 an	individual’s	property	rights.	This	directly	reduces	the	necessity	for	villagers	to	participate.	The	second	reason	is	that	some	political	institutions	(like	the	4+2	system)	did	not	work	very	well	in	community	self-government,	because	they	were	inefficient.	It	is	difficult	to	motivate	working-age	 adults	who	make	 long	working	 hours	 and	 often	 negotiate	 long	commutes	to	participate	in	public	affairs.	In	addition	political	trust	plays	a	role.	Because	of	 their	previous	 relevant	experiences	 in	 land	expropriation,	 some	of	villagers	believe	that	the	local	authority	may	not	be	communicative	and	the	deliberation	organized	by	the	residents’	committee	and	local	government	is	seen	as	exclusive	and	unequal.	To	solve	the	above	 issues,	 the	 informal	 deliberation	 provides	 an	 alternative	 for	 the	 residents’	committee	to	rebuild	the	communication	platform	between	the	local	authority	and	the	public.	 	
	
9.3	Wider	Implementation:	
Question	4:	What	is	the	place	of	deliberation	in	the	larger	governance	
configuration	around	urban	village	regeneration?	This	 thesis	 reviews	 the	 role	 and	 function	 of	 deliberation	 in	 urban	 (re)development	project,	and	finds	out	that	deliberation	in	development	is	deserve	more	focuses	beyond	the	 simply	 “participatory	 project”.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 deliberation	 could	 have	 the	
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transformative	effects	on	following	aspects	of	developments.	1:	Building	a	deliberative	system	 is	 a	 potentially	 valuable	way	 of	 addressing	 inequality.	 How	 does	 deliberative	democracy	 differ	 from	 and	 complement	 electoral	 democracy	 (Heller	 and	Rao,	 2018)?	How	does	deliberation	work	in	various	contexts	related	to	development?	What	is	the	role	of	the	communicative	process	in	decision-making	and	development	(ibid.	Odugbemi	and	Jacobsom,	 2008)?	 Urban	 development	 projects,	 such	 as	 urban	 village	 regeneration,	always	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 create	 a	 complex	 social	 and	 political	 context	 for	implementation.	 The	 first	 role	 of	 deliberation	 is	 to	 bring	 people	 together	 to	 reach	 a	consensus	to	work	on	the	complexities	and	challenges	in	the	development	programme.	Second,	 it	 might	 contribute	 to	 building	 a	 deliberative	 system,	 which	 is	 a	 different	approach	 to	 both	 designing	 and	 researching	 the	 policies	 and	 policy-making	 process.	Third	it	can	have	a	transformative	effect	on	many	other	aspects	of	development	extending	beyond	 the	 development	 project	 itself,	 such	 as	 social,	 institutional	 and	 participatory	capacity-building.	 	
As	we	can	observe	 in	 these	two	cases,	both	public	discussions	 in	Village	N	and	village	deliberations	 in	 Village	T	were	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 generally	 deliberative	 system	with	 a	certain	deliberative	quality.	The	topics	of	 the	deliberations	started	 from	a	single-issue	orientation	(conflict	solving)	and	progressed	to	a	series	of	comprehensive	discussions	and	reflections	covering	the	topics,	issues	and	policies	of	urban	village	regeneration,	such	as	shared	living	conditions,	the	arrangement	of	welfare	and	collective	properties,	and	the	prospects	for	improvements.	From	the	epistemological	perspective,	these	meetings	are	instructive,	as	they	not	only	work	at	consensus	building,	but	help	the	public	to	learn	the	policy-making	 process	 through	 engaging	 in	discussions,	 criticisms	 and	 even	 petitions.	Therefore,	first	of	all,	it	will	be	argued	that	deliberation	in	urban	village	regeneration	is	oriented	towards	“problem	solving”,	which	is	instrumentally	used	by	the	local	authorities	due	 to	 its	 political	 function.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 ethical	 function	 helped	 the	 participants	(governments,	 village	 authorities,	 developers	 and	 villagers)	 to	 build	 up	 trusted	relationships	beyond	the	conflicts	thereby	creating	communicable	platforms	or	arenas	for	participants	to	present	their	concerns.	The	relationships	also	helped	participants	to	build	mutual	respect	between	the	conflicting	parties.	Moreover,	the	political	and	ethical	functions	of	“problem	solving”	contribute	to	the	series	of	deliberations	around	one	policy	programme	to	formulate	a	tiered	decision-making	system	(see	4+2	system).	Within	these	
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tiered	or	even	institutionalized	deliberations,	the	“epistemological	function”	is	significant.	This	function	not	only	played	a	significant	role	in	terms	of	problem	formulations,	which	helped	the	participants	to	identify	the	“problems”	and	“matters”	from	the	conflicts,	but	it	also	played	a	significant	role	in	generating	preferences	and	opinions	leading	to	potential	problem	solutions.	Thus,	 the	 decisions	made	by	 deliberation	 are	 appropriate	 because	they	are	informed	by	the	substantive	discussions	and	deliberative	consideration	of	the	facts,	 logic	 and	 emotions.	 Therefore,	 the	 scaler	 political	 and	 administrative	 system	around	urban	village	regeneration	could	be	regarded	as	a	deliberative	system	with	a	fair	standard,	which	can	deliver	a	relatively	deliberative	outcome	in	terms	of	development	promotion.	 	
However,	 the	meanings	 of	 the	 development	 have	 broadened	 from	 the	 “economic	 and	physical	development”	to	take	a	more	complex	and	comprehensive	view	which	includes	social	 development,	 environmental	 sustainability,	 social	 justice	 and	 democratization	(Sen,	2000;	Heller	and	Rao,	2018).	First	of	all,	in	the	(micro-)	urban	planning	contexts,	“How	to	involve	appropriate	expertise;	how	to	represent	values,	interests,	or	concerns	that	matter,	and	not	least	of	all,	how	to	shape	commitments	to	action”	(Forester,	2018:	595)	 require	 consideration.	 The	 deliberative	 results	might	 be	 risky	 and	 stupid	 if	 the	deliberations	fail	in	incorporating	diverse	expertise	(ibid.);	meanwhile,	the	deliberation	should	be	responsive	to	what	matters,	otherwise	it	cannot	generate	relevant	results	to	the	right	problems.	Finally,	and	most	important,	the	deliberative	results	should	commit	to	 actions,	 rather	 than	 just	 talk.	 In	 the	 cases	 of	 regeneration	 of	 urban	 villages,	 the	deliberations	 successfully	 involved	 the	 village	 cadres	 and	 village	 authorities	 as	 the	sources	 of	 expertise	 and	 local	 knowledge.	 They	 successfully	 translated	 the	 villagers’	concerns,	 worries	 and	 dissatisfactions	 to	 the	 government	 thereby	 securing	 their	inclusion	within	the	formulated	problems	and	matters.	Then,	during	the	negotiation	with	the	government	or	the	developer,	they	not	only	represented	the	villagers’	interests	and	successfully	shaped	the	 final	decision	to	a	certain	extent,	but	also	represented	a	route	through	 which	 local	 government	 could	 communicate	 with	 villagers.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	argued	that	the	village	authorities	and	the	village	deliberative	institutions	are	the	basis	of	the	deliberative	system	around	urban	village	regeneration	where	they	not	only	act	as	the	expertise	to	translate	the	local	knowledge,	but	also	act	as	the	representative	for	both	villagers	 and	 governments.	 These	 active	 roles	 of	 village	 authorities	 and	 deliberative	
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institutions	 not	 only	 promoted	 the	 regeneration	 programme	 as	 a	 whole,	 but	 also	contributed	 to	 formulating	 trusted	 internal	 relationships	 between	 each	 part	 of	 the	deliberative	system	including	single	actors	and	interest	groups.	This	system	successfully	avoided	the	risks	of	deliberations	in	planning	practices	and	urban	development	projects,	such	as	“stupid	results”,	“irrelevant	results	or	solutions	to	the	wrong	problems”	and	being	stigmatised	as	“just	talk”	(Forester,	2018:	595).	 	 	
Question	5:	Is	authentic	deliberation	going	on	in	authoritarian	China?	
• Do	 the	 interactions	 between	 stakeholders	 have	 the	 general	
characteristics	of	democratic	deliberation?	 	
• To	 what	 extent	 is	 this	 a	 form	 of	 authoritarian	 deliberation,	 or	
deliberation	according	to	Chinese	history	and	culture?	 	
	
Do	the	interactions	between	stakeholders	have	the	general	characteristics	of	democratic	
deliberation?	 	This	study	presents	two	cases	of	urban	village	regeneration	in	Sunny	District.	Through	these	empirical	cases,	we	can	observe	the	interactions	between	stakeholders	within	the	urban	village	regeneration	process.	Admittedly,	deliberations,	deliberative	cultures	and	institutions	within	China	are	different	from	those	in	liberal	democratic	contexts.	However,	this	research	argues	that	following	the	examination	through	the	criteria	of	“authenticity,	inclusive	 and	 consequential”	 in	 Type	 two	 deliberation	 theory	 (Dryzek,	 2009),	interactions	 between	 stakeholders	 have	 the	 general	 characteristics	 of	 democratic	deliberation.	 Meanwhile,	 this	 research	 also	 argues	 that	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	deliberation	practices	are	deliberative	actions	and	play	considerable	roles	from	decision-making	to	implementation.	 	
First	of	all,	in	terms	of	“authenticity”,	the	deliberative	practices	are	“non-coercively”	talk-based	politics	 that	rely	on	persuasion	to	 influence	events.	These	“interactions”	exhibit	“reciprocity”,	not	only	because	they	enhance	social	stability	and	generate	legitimacy	for	the	 CCP’s	 governance,	 but	 because	 they	 also	 allow	 the	 public	 to	 communicate	 with	government.	Through	the	communication	with	the	government,	 the	public	can	deliver	their	concerns	and	demands	to	the	local	government.	Their	concerns	and	demands	are	crucial	for	local	government	to	make	and	to	implement	a	policy	or	decision.	
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Second,	in	terms	of	“inclusiveness”,	in	urban	village	regeneration,	stakeholders	includes	villagers,	 local	 governments,	 village	 collective	economy,	 and	other	relative	parties	are	included	in	the	deliberation	through	a	range	of	forms	of	deliberations	(mainly,	Type	Two	deliberation)	were	 implemented	 in	various	political	settings.	These	allow	the	different	stakeholders	 to	 present	 their	 interests	 and	 discourses.	 This	 research	 finds	 that	 the	district	 government,	 street	 office	 and	 grassroots	 level	 regimes	 implemented	 various	forms	 of	 deliberation	 practice	 (formal	 deliberative	 meetings	 and	 informal	communications,	 see	 Chapters	 4	 and	 6).	 As	 explained	 in	 these	 chapters,	 the	 Chinese	deliberation	tradition	and	the	autonomy	of	local	governance	contribute	to	this	political	innovation.	 	
Third,	in	terms	of	“consequential”,	many	examples	of	deliberations	are	presented	in	the	empirical	 chapters	 (Chapters	 6,	 7	 and	 8).	 These	 interactions	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 both	collective	 decisions	 and	 physical	 and	 social	 outcomes.	 This	 includes	 both	 direct	 and	indirect	 impacts	 –	 that	 is,	 deliberations	 not	 only	 involve	 the	 actual	 making	 of	 policy	decisions,	but	also	have	impacts	on	decision	makers	who	are	not	direct	participants	in	the	 forums	 or	 communication.	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 direct	 impacts	 is	 that	 these	deliberations	have	 shown	 the	epistemic	 function	of	 consensus	building.	 In	 the	 case	of	Public	 Discussion	 (see	 Chapter	 7),	 through	 the	 long-term	 deliberation,	 the	 district	government	 realized	 that	 the	 villagers’	 attitudes	 and	 emotions	 created	 instances	 of	considerable	 resistance.	The	deliberation	helped	both	district	 government	and	village	committee	to	realize	that	the	regeneration	of	Village	N	could	not	be	undertaken	in	the	short	time	that	was	allotted	for	it.	Another	example	of	indirect	impact	is	that	deliberations	also	 have	 ethical	 functions.	 The	 deliberations	 successfully	 promote	 mutual	 respect	between	 the	district	 government,	 village	authorities	and	villagers.	Through	 the	public	discussion,	the	villagers	learned	the	policies	involved	in	urban	village	regeneration;	their	feedback	 also	 contributed	 to	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 village	 authorities	 and	 local	government.	 This	 impact	 could	 be	 identified	 in	 many	 informal	 deliberative	 forums,	although	these	forums	did	not	make	subsequent	recommendations	that	could	be	directly	considered	by	policy	makers.	However,	they	are	products	of	a	mechanism	or	a	platform	that	allows	stakeholders	to	communicate	with	each	other,	thus	facilitating	“governance	without	government”.	 		
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Therefore,	 based	 on	 these	 findings,	 it	 is	 argued	 that,	 most	 of	 these	 forms	 of	communication	seem	informal	and	based	on	everyday	conversations,	however,	according	to	 Dryzek’s	 scheme	 of	 “authenticity,	 inclusiveness	 and	 [being]	 consequential”,	 these	communications	not	only	have	general	characteristics,	but	also	have	a	strong	deliberative	nature.	 They	 are	 open	 for	 the	 public	 to	 participate;	 the	 participants	 were	 treated	neutrally	and	their	opinions	were	respected.	In	addition,	the	participants	provided	their	demands,	concerns	and	reasons	and,	as	will	be	discussed	later,	these	opinions	impacted	decision-making.	The	discussion	above	does	not	mean	that	deliberation	in	China’s	urban	village	regeneration	is	good	enough	in	terms	of	deliberative	qualities	and	standards	or	that	 urban	 village	 regeneration	 involves	 a	 high-quality	 deliberative	 system.	 The	 next	section	 will	 discuss	 how	 deliberations	 were	 instrumentally	 used	 according	 to	 their	political	functions.	 	 		
To	what	extent	is	this	a	form	of	authoritarian	deliberation,	or	deliberation	according	to	
Chinese	history	and	culture?	
Deliberative	 culture	 is	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 Chinese	 tradition,	 with	 deliberation	 having	political	functions	since	ancient	times.	This	research	argues	that	the	current	practices	of	institutionalized	deliberation	are	based	on	Chinese	traditional	culture	and	history;	they	have,	however,	become	more	inclusive	and	accessible	for	ordinary	people	than	was	the	case	in	ancient	China.	The	empirical	cases	show	that,	“shuoli”	(to	make	an	argument)	is	the	most	important	target	in	rural	deliberation.	
First	of	all,	deliberative	culture	in	China	is	rooted	in	the	Confucian	moral	code.	Under	its	guidance,	deliberation	became	 increasingly	 significant	as	a	 check	against	 the	abuse	of	power	and	for	the	avoidance	of	malpractices	by	the	authorities.	Originally,	the	key	moral	codes	 in	 Confucianism	 are	 ren	 (benevolence,	 or	 humaneness),	 li	 (ritual)	 and	 junzi	(gentleman).	 The	 value	 of	 ren	 refers	 to	 the	 political	 value	 of	 “justice”	 in	 terms	 of	humaneness.	In	ancient	China	this	required	the	ruler	to	be	inclusive.	The	“li”	defines	the	concern	for	harmony	and	the	priority	of	the	correct	procedures	in	deliberation	and	the	political	bargaining	process.	The	gentleman	here	refers	to	the	well-educated	people	with	considerable	reputation.	According	to	these	values,	the	political	function	of	deliberation	is	 considered	 as	 a	 check	 against	 the	 tyrant,	 aimed	 at	 avoiding	 the	 mistaken	 political	decisions	and	developing	the	policies	that	favoured	the	individual’s	interests.	In	ancient	
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China,	with	regard	to	all	of	the	individuals,	including	the	emperors,	this	constituted	quite	a	serious	matter,	usually	determining	the	order	of	the	state.	Furthermore,	the	conceptual	space	for	“jian”	(admonishing)	accordingly	opened	up	to	correct	the	path	(dao)	(Legge,	2010).	Therefore,	the	primary	functions	of	the	deliberative	institutions	in	ancient	China	not	only	acted	as	a	consultant	and	advisor	for	the	emperor,	but	also	acted	as	a	supervisory	institution	that	attempted	to	hold	the	emperor’s	power	to	account.	
These	 deliberative	 moral	 values	 are	 also	 significant	 in	 contemporary	 China.	 The	deliberative	 culture	 within	 contemporary	 local	 governance	 practice	 follows	 the	Confucian	 normative	 ranking	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	 In	 urban	 village	 regeneration,	 the	deliberative	institutions	and	systems	have	played	three	roles:	the	decision-making	role,	the	supervisory	role	and	the	advisory	role.	For	example,	in	the	decision-making	process,	the	Chinese	people	believe	that	“truth	becomes	clearer	through	debate	and	deliberation	(li	yue	bian	yue	ming)”.	Chapter	7	introduces	that	when	dealing	with	uncertainties	and	conflicts	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	urban	village	regeneration,	the	Village	N	committee	organized	a	three-year-long	public	discussion	to	present	the	facts	and	reason	things	out.	Meanwhile,	 the	 “4+2	 decision-making	 system”	 in	 Community	 T	 also	 shows	 that	 a	systematic	deliberative	institution	also	has	a	supervisory	role,	which	not	only	enhances	the	 transparency	 of	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 but	 also	 allows	 the	 stakeholders	 to	challenge	the	decisions.	In	a	case	where	one	party	has	a	feeling	of	unfairness	or	injustice	from	the	other	party,	one	usually	appeals	 to	“shuo	 li”,	which	 is	“making	an	argument”.	Usually,	 two	 conflicting	 parties	 seek	 out	 a	 senior/authority	 figure	 and	 ask	 them	 for	“pingli”,	which	indicates	that	both	of	them	are	presenting	their	arguments	and	opinions,	and	 the	 senior/authority	 figure	 will	 make	 an	 arbitration	 according	 to	 “li	 （理） ”	(principle)”.	The	most	significant	point	here	is	the	term	“li	（理）”	(principle),	which	refers	to	the	normative	ranking.	 	
9.4	Discussions	on	Theoretical	Generalization	
How	deliberative	are	the	deliberations	and	the	deliberative	system	in	urban	
village	regeneration	programmes?	 	Both	in	China	and	the	West,	democratic	deliberation	has	become	one	of	the	elements	of	a	wider	system	of	governance	and	public	administration.	In	both	cases	we	observe	how	a	range	of	actors,	first	of	all	national	and	local	administrations,	but	also	corporations,	NGOs,	
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third	 sector	 organizations	 and	 citizen	 groups,	 employ	 deliberative	 arrangements	 -	perhaps	 it	 is	more	accurate	 to	 speak	of	 arrangements	with	deliberative	elements	 -	 to	address	 problems	 of	 social,	 political	 and	 technical	 complexity.	 In	 many	 of	 these	arrangements,	 such	 as	 interactive	 government,	 co-production,	 citizen	 panels	 in	 the	context	of	New	Public	Management,	or	more	elitist	forms	of	deliberation	in	independent	regulatory	agencies	and	transnational	governance,	democratic	quality	seems	a	secondary	thought	(Papadopoulos,	2012).	Most	of	them	create	their	own	problems	with	regard	to	participation,	inclusion,	representation	and	accountability.	Deliberation	has	become	an	instrument	in	an	increasingly	varied	repertoire	of	governance	instruments.	 	
China	is	no	exception	to	this	trend.	Although	the	Party	extends	its	grip	deep	into	lower	levels	 of	 government,	 interdependencies	 and	 information	 asymmetries	 among	government	 agencies	 limit	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 vertical	 steering.	 In	 fact,	 urban	 village	regeneration	as	a	complex	policy	challenge	reveals	the	limits	of	authoritarian	rule	in	a	modern	national	and	 international	context.	On	the	one	hand,	 the	Party	encounters	the	same	problems	of	 technical,	 social	 and	 institutional	 complexity	 (Dryzek,	1990:	57-76;	Wagenaar,	 2007),	 with	 the	 ensuing	 limits	 on	 vertical	 steering,	 as	 administrations	 in	democratic	 countries.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 state	 runs	 into	 the	 moral	 limits	 of	authoritarian	rule.	To	safeguard	internal	coherence	at	acceptable	political	costs,	it	needs	to	 maintain	 a	 sufficient	 level	 of	 acceptance	 and	 compliance	 among	 the	 population.	Moreover,	even	a	country	steeped	in	Realpolitik,	such	as	China,	is	too	much	integrated	in	the	international	social	and	political	system	to	transgress	the	boundaries	of	acceptable	suppression	of	its	own	population	too	blatantly.	Thus,	the	Central	Party	Committee	relies	on	the	agency	of	regional	and	local	governments,	as	well	as	corporate	actors,	to	realize	its	ambitious	economic	development	goals.	However,	no	amount	of	goal	setting,	monitoring	and	 (threats	 of)	 punishment	 are	 enough	 to	 overcome	 problems	 of	 discretion,	disobedience,	resistance	and	gaming	the	system.	In	addition,	citizens,	although	aware	of	their	exposed	social	and	political	position,	do	not	hesitate	to	express	their	opinion	about	decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 livelihood,	 health,	 ethnic	 identity,	 or	 their	 children’s	opportunities.	Among	ordinary	people,	authorities	often	carry	a	suspicion	of	being	prone	to	corruption,	stonewalling	and	the	covering-up	of	policy	failure.	Social	media,	although	censored	and	restricted,	are	nevertheless	powerful	 tools	 in	disseminating	 information	and	rumours.	As	a	result,	many	citizens	hold	a	cautious,	skeptical	view	of	the	authorities.	
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Emulating	corrupt	officials,	some	citizens	try	to	play	the	system	to	their	own	financial	advantage.	 Others,	 as	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 have	 shown,	 are	 willing	 to	 risk	 arrest,	detention	or	worse	in	resisting	what	they	perceive	to	be	unfair	and	unjust	treatment	at	the	hands	of	officials.	 	
Ironically,	the	absence	of	an	independent	judiciary	and	the	weak	rule	of	law	act	against	the	Party’s	 interests	 in	 this	situation.	Where	the	possibility	of	 independent	arbitration	allows	for	the	resolution	of	conflicts	with	the	state	and	curtails	arbitrary	behaviour,	the	Party	has	to	find	other	ways	to	defuse	social	conflict	and	gain	legitimacy.	It	is	there	that	deliberation	 plays	 an	 important	 role.	 As	 these	 two	 cases	 show,	 the	 negotiations	 and	decision-making	surrounding	urban	village	regeneration	can	be	construed	as	an	example	of	 Type	 II	 deliberation	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	 In	 the	 real-word	 environment	 of	 the	 Chinese	hierarchical,	 scalar,	 governance	 system,	 a	 number	 of	 actors,	 operating	 under	 the	constraints	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 laws,	 planning	 deadlines,	 injunctions	 from	 higher	 levels	 of	government,	conflicting	interests,	the	threat	of	losing	a	lucrative	business	opportunity	to	a	competing	city	and	powerful	cultural	norms,	have	to	find	ways	to	arrive	at	a	successful	outcome.	Success,	 in	 this	situation,	 is	often	akin	to	squaring	the	circle;	 the	 investment	must	be	secured	within	the	self-imposed	tight	timeframe	while	the	residents	of	the	village	have	to	agree	to	their	own	displacement.	Traditional	village	deliberation	plays	a	central	role	in	this	complex	governance	field.	Within	this	deliberative	system,	communication	is	a	 curious	 amalgam	 of	 genuine	 deliberation,	 bone-hard	 negotiations,	 entreaties	 and	appeals	 to	 the	 collective	 interest.	The	deliberative	process	 is	safeguarded	by	a	 legally	prescribed	elaborate	procedure.	Only	when	 two-thirds	of	 the	villagers	approve	of	 the	compensation	 proposal,	 is	 the	 District	 Government	 allowed	 to	 go	 ahead	 with	 the	demolition	of	the	village.	Several	procedural	rules	(such	as	obtaining	the	initial	approval	of	the	village	Party	branch	or	the	power	of	appeal	in	the	announcement	stage)	inject	a	measure	of	communicative	rationality	into	the	4+2	village	deliberation.	Nevertheless,	a	formal	procedure	is	as	good	as	the	ethos	with	which	it	is	enacted,	and	in	this	case,	the	authorities,	straining	under	a	tight	deadline,	approached	the	village	deliberations	with	a	strategic	mind-set.	Their	purpose	was	to	quickly	obtain	the	two-thirds	majority	and	not	bother	too	much	about	the	dissidents.	For	this	purpose	they	managed	to	persuade	the	village	 authorities	 to	 curtail	 the	 4+2	 procedure	 and	 portray	 the	 dissenters	 as	 self-interested	 schemers.	 Although	 a	 comfortable	majority	was	 easily	 obtained,	 the	 tactic	
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nevertheless	backfired.	The	dissenters	protested	and	withdrew	their	participation	in	the	procedure	 altogether,	 forcing	 the	 authorities	 to	 step	 in	 and	 engage	 in	 genuine	deliberation.	 	
These	two	cases	demonstrate	a	number	of	things.	They	show	the	considerable	capacity	for	 authoritarian	 behaviour	 of	 the	 higher	 authorities	 in	 China’s	 complex,	multi-scalar	governance	 system.	The	 cases	 show	 that	 deliberation	 in	 the	 real	world	 is	 at	 all	 times	vulnerable	to	being	usurped	by	strategic	considerations.	However,	the	cases	also	show	that	deliberation	is	more	than	just	the	enactment	of	(legally	mandated)	procedures	and	that	it	resonates	with	widespread	cultural	understandings	of	how	officials	ought	to	relate	to	citizens	(He,	2014).	Finally,	the	examples	show	that	by	relying	on	informal	deliberation,	officials	could	fall	back	on	traditional	relations	within	villages.	Both	cases	demonstrate	that	 the	 deliberations	 were	 effective	 in	 terms	 of	 collecting	 opinions	 and	 conflict	resolution	and	played	a	significant	role	in	each	stage	of	the	urban	village	regeneration.	These	deliberations	in	urban	village	regeneration	built	upon	the	 former	village	cadres	and	 their	 credibility	 and	 authority	 within	 their	 rural	 village	 network.	 The	 village	committee	always	plays	a	leading	role	in	organizing	the	deliberations.	As	the	organizer	and	mediator,	their	credibility	and	authority	were	attached	to	personal	status	instead	of	formal	authority.	 	
However,	the	deliberations	in	urban	village	regeneration	also	show	their	authoritarian	character.	This	was	a	severely	curtailed	form	of	deliberation	in	which	the	authorities	held	lots	of	advantages.	Asymmetries	in	power,	information,	reputation,	education	level	and	communication	 skill	 significantly	 impacted,	 and	 at	 times	 dominated,	 the	 deliberation	process.	 For	 strategic	 reasons	 the	 district	 government	 and	 village	 committee	 focused	their	attention	on	those	participants	who	showed	a	willingness	to	compromise,	excluding	the	opponents.	This	generated	a	new	‘injustice’,	because	the	disadvantaged	groups	faced	considerable	obstacles	 in	order	to	 fight	 for	 their	rights.	 In	addition,	although	 informal	actions	 brought	 about	 the	 sought-after	 efficiency	within	 the	 governance	 process,	 this	arrangement	brings	controversy	and	risks.	 It	 is	because	these	communications	always	take	place	in	an	informal	setting,	like	the	street	or	the	home.	Lack	of	supervision	might	invite	 back	 room	 deals	 or	 corruption,	 and	 the	 deliberation	 process	 tends	 to	 become	overshadowed	 by	 personal	 relations	 threatening	 the	 very	 publicness	 and	 appeal	 to	 a	common	cause	that	is	a	key	characteristic	of	deliberation	(He,	2014:	64).	
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9.5	Significance	 	This	study	provides	a	new	perspective	on	China’s	urban	village	regeneration	by	analysing	it	as	a	deliberative	system	thereby	providing	a	new	understanding	of	the	deliberations	occurring	 in	 China’s	 urban	 and	 rural	 governance.	 Deliberation	 in	 China	 acts	 as	 one	element	in	a	large	number	of	techniques	of	preference	formation,	decision-making	and	policy	implementation.	In	this	it	does	not	differ	in	principle	from	the	deliberative	systems	of	the	liberal	democracies	of	the	West.	In	each	case,	deliberation	fulfils	epistemic,	ethical	and	democratic	functions	within	the	larger	system	of	governance	(Mansbridge	et	al.,	2012:	11).	In	what	ways,	under	what	conditions	and	how	well	it	fulfils	these	functions	must	be	the	subject	of	empirical	inquiry.	How	well	deliberation	fulfils	its	systematic	functions	in	the	context	of	authoritarian	rule	in	China	is	the	subject	of	this	research.	This	study	not	only	 contributes	 to	 exploring	 the	 deliberation	 theories	 beyond	 the	 liberal	 democratic	settings,	but	will	also	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	deliberation	in	the	policy	making	and	implementation	process.	 	
This	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 the	 Chinese	 academic	 discussion	 on	 urban	 China	 from	 a	governance	perspective.	Following	China's	large-scale	urbanization	in	the	last	4	decades,	more	 than	 230	 million	 rural	 migrants	 have	 moved	 to	 cities.	 This	 has	 generated	considerable	 challenges	 for	 governments	 at	 different	 scalar	 levels,	 in	 particular	 local	governments,	to	help	them	integrate	into	urban	society.	To	cope	with	these	challenges,	governments	 in	 China	 have	 not	 only	 issued	 numerous	 national	 policies/programmes	such	 as	 urban	 village	 regeneration,	 providing	 access	 to	 public	 schools	 for	 migrant	children	and	household	registration	reform;	but	also	implemented	political	instruments	at	 the	micro-level	such	as	public	deliberation	and	consultations,	community-level	self-governance	 and	 authoritarian	 discretion	 during	 implementation	 of	 these	projects/policies.	These	political	practices	have	stimulated	abundant	discussions	about	China's	complex	urban	political-administrative	system	in	terms	of	policy-making,	policy	implementation	and	policy	regimes	and	what	they	mean	for	the	(un-)democratic	nature	of	Chinese	governance.	It	is	paramount	to	reflect	upon	the	grounded	experiences	around	policy-making,	policy	implementation	and	other	everyday	practices	adopted	by	different	entities	if	we	want	to	grasp	the	trajectory	of	urbanisation	and	the	integration	process	of	migrant	groups	 in	urban	China.	 Thus,	 this	 research	 not	only	 attempts	 to	develop	 and	
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further	the	existing	research	in	this	field,	but	also	contributes	to	provide	a	clear	image	of	China’s	local	governance	and	its	urban-rural	society.	
This	 thesis	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 discussion	 on	 policy-making	 and	 the	 political-administrative	system	in	Chinese	academic	circles.	Current	research	has	provided	some	angles	to	review	these	political	practices,	for	example,	He	and	Warren	(2011)	proposed	the	concept	of	“authoritarian	deliberation”	to	understand	the	Chinese	democratic	process	and	 government	 strategies.	 Similarly,	 democratic	 theorist	 John	 Keane’s	 concept	 of	“phantom	 democracy”	 (2017),	 an	 authoritarian	 “post-democratic”	 system	 that	 allows	extensive	local	democratic	practices,	must	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	gauge	the	true	nature	of	China’s	political	system.	Empirically,	Beibei	Tang	(2015),	Tang	and	Dryzek	(2014)	and	Niu	and	Wagenaar	(2018)	researched	the	deliberative	system	approach	to	examine	the	Chinese	 urban	 and	 rural	 everyday	 deliberations	 at	 grassroots	 level;	 and	 Fulong	 Wu	suggested	institutional	analysis	and	developed	the	concept	of	“urban	entrepreneurialism”	to	 understand	 the	 policy	 practices	 and	 programmes	 around	 rural-urban	 integration.	Meanwhile,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 social	 justice,	 Hyun	 Bang	 Shin	 suggested	 building	 alliances	between	migrants	and	urban	residents	as	the	way	forward	for	all	urban	inhabitants	to	achieve	a	“right	to	the	city”	in	China.	 	Enlightened	and	encouraged	by	this	research,	we	believe	that	the	discussions	around	the	integration	of	migrant	populations	will	make	a	significant	 practical	 and	 theoretical	 contribution	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 policy	process	 in	 an	 authoritarian	 society.	 More	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 discussions	 are	needed	around	how	governments,	grassroots-level	regimes	and	other	entities	play	their	roles	in	the	integration	process	of	migrants	on	different	levels?	Through	revisiting	and	investigating	these	practices,	we	can	observe	how	democratic	elements,	such	as	public	participation,	democratic	deliberation	and	authoritarian	discretion	manifest	themselves	within	 a	 political	 authoritarian	 setting,	 such	 as	 public	 participation,	 democratic	deliberation	and	authoritarian	discretion.	This	will	not	only	generate	more	 innovative	and	just	urban	development	policies,	but	also	expand	the	current	theoretical	discussion	on	policy-making	and	policy	implementation	in	China.	This	thesis	not	only	provides	an	empirical	study	that	reveals	the	complexities	and	challenges	in	the	field	of	policy-making	and	 implementation	 around	migrants'	 integration;	 but	 also	 discusses	 democracy	 and	democratic	 governance	 in	 China,	 such	 as	 rural	 village/urban	 communities’	 self-governance,	public	participation	in	migrants'	issues	and	the	deliberative	system.		
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Finally,	 this	 research	will	be	eye-opening	 for	western	 scholars	wishing	 to	understand	China’s	 deliberation	 from	 a	micro-political	 perspective.	 This	will	 enrich	 the	 academic	literature	 concerning	 deliberation	 theories.	 He	 and	 Warren	 rightly	 argue	 that	deliberation	emerges	in	policy	situations	that	exceed	the	government’s	problem-solving	capacity	 (He	 and	 Warren,	 2011).	 However,	 they	 have	 little	 to	 say	 about	 the	 way	deliberation	relates	to	the	activities	of	other	policy	actors	in	dynamically	complex	policy	environments	or	how	it	contributes	to	the	policy-making	process.	By	studying	the	micro-politics	 of	 deliberation	 in	 a	 real-world	 setting,	 this	 research	 contributes	 to	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 democratic	 deliberation	 and	 public	 policy	making.	Even	in	the	liberal	democracies	of	the	West,	that	relationship	is	tenuous	at	best	(Papadopoulos,	 2012:	 126).	 Harnessed	 to	 policy	 making,	 deliberative	 arrangements	suffer	 from	 limited	 inclusiveness,	 capture	 by	 power	 elites,	 problems	with	 democratic	accountability	and	the	failure	of	deliberative	achievements	to	affect	other	institutions	in	the	wider	policy	system	(Papadopoulos,	2012:	146;	Mansbridge	et	al.,	2012:	23).	 	
9.6	Limitation	A	methodological	 limitation	 of	 the	 qualitative	 research	 design	 lies	 in	 the	 researcher-induced	bias	and	this	 is	particular	significant	 in	grounded	theory	method	(Bryant	and	Charmaz	2007).	In	some	extent,	researchers	can	and	should	reduce	their	bias.	To	reduce	this	bias,	this	research	introduced	a	thematic	coding	(Boyatzis,	2008)	and	an	analytical	scheme	into	this	research	as	a	check	balance.	The	second	concern	in	methodology	is	the	qualitative	 interviews.	The	potential	 risk	of	relying	 the	data	 from	 the	 interview	 is	 the	“lack	of	neutrality”	of	the	interviewee.	To	reduce	this	risk,	this	research	introduced	other	data	 collection	 approaches,	 includes	 documents	 and	 participation	 observation.	Integration	of	other	data	sources	is	helpful	in	triangulating	the	data	and	improving	the	‘reliability’	of	 the	data.	The	 final	concern	of	 this	study	is	 the	generalization.	Two	cases	within	 one	 City	 will	 be	 never	 enough	 to	 reflect	 nether	 urban	 village	 regeneration	programme	 in	 China,	 nor	 China’s	 deliberation	 in	 policy	 making	 and	 implementation.	More	empirical	studies	are	required	in	this	field.	As	I	mentioned,	this	research	aims	to	pursue	the	“in-depth	understanding”	rather	than	“generalization”.	Although	this	research	concluded	with	 case-	 and	 context-specific	 arguments,	 it	 is	 worthy	 of	 for	 other	 cases’	reference	under	the	similar	conditions	and	situations.	
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9.7	Future	research	agenda	 	This	 thesis	 has	 offered	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 deliberation	 in	 the	 urban	 village	regeneration	 project.	 As	 previous	 discussion	 shows	 that,	 the	 deliberation	 and	deliberative	system	in	urban	village	regeneration	projects	includes	indigenous	residents	into	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 However,	 there	 are	 many	 significant	 issues	 worth	attention	in	further	research.	An	agenda	here	should	include	empirical	studies	that	not	only	 place	 the	 deliberations	 in	 the	 local	 development	 context,	 but	 also	 lay	 out	 the	potential	and	challenges	of	the	deliberation	according	to	the	political	and	social	theory.	In	particular,	future	research	is	needed	to	find	out	the	role	of	deliberation	in	addressing	the	inequality	in	the	authoritarian	context.	 	
First	of	all,	more	research	on	the	exclusion	of	the	tenants	and	rural	migrants	 in	urban	village	regeneration	needs	to	be	done.	In	the	current	thesis,	the	role	of	the	tenants	and	rural	 migrants	 are	 not	 discussed	 in	 detail,	 because	 they	 are	 excluded	 from	 any	deliberations	 and	 decision-making	 process.	 However,	 this	 process	 of	 social	 and	institutional	exclusion	 in	urban	village	regeneration	needs	to	be	 focused	on	 in	 further	research.	As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	Two	and	Chapter	Three,	the	social	and	institutional	exclusion	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 rural	 governances	 system	 and	 the	 land	 ownership	 system.	Firstly,	 the	 local	governments	and	the	village	authorities	only	 focus	on	the	 indigenous	residents	and	landlords,	not	only	in	the	compensation	process	but	also	in	the	reallocation	process.	Due	to	the	land	and	property	ownership	system,	lands	and	the	properties	within	the	urban	villages	were	owned	by	the	indigenous	villagers	only,	so	that	the	regenerated	urban	 village	 communities	 are	 built	 around	 compensation	 and	 reallocation	 for	 the	indigenous	villagers.	Secondly,	the	problem	is	not	merely	about	the	lack	of	ownership;	more	importantly,	the	migrants	are	not	politically	empowered	to	participate	in	the	local	issues.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	villages	are	self-governed	by	their	villagers,	and	the	village	authority	is	only	responsible	for	their	villagers	who	hold	a	hukou	within	the	village.	This	system	provides	an	institutional	obstacle	for	migrants	to	participate	in	the	village	deliberations	at	all.	Constitutionally,	the	migrants	are	not	the	collective	owners	of	the	land	and	properties	within	the	urban	villages;	meanwhile,	the	migrants	do	not	have	political	rights	to	elect	or	be	elected	as	the	leadership	within	the	urban	village,	so	that	local	government	and	village	authority	have	no	motivation	to	negotiate	with	the	tenants	in	 the	 land	acquisition	process.	Thus,	not	only	 in	 these	two	cases,	 in	 the	urban	village	
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regeneration	 programme	 among	 China,	 rural	 migrants	 have	 almost	 no	 ability	 to	participate	the	regeneration	process	and	share	the	benefits	 from	the	(re)development	projects	 (Zhang,	 2005;	 Lin	 and	De	Meulder,	 2012;	Hong,	 2015).	 The	migrants	 can	 do	nothing	but	leave	the	regenerated	urban	villages	and	find	alternative	accommodations	(Lu	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 These	 migrants	 cannot	 argue	 for	 their	 interests	 through	 the	deliberations	in	the	urban	villages	because	the	village	and	village’s	properties	are	owned	and	managed	collectively	by	indigenous	villagers	only.	 	
The	discussion	above	is	not	about	finding	an	excuse	for	the	local	government	to	exclude	the	tenants	and	rural	migrants	out	of	 the	redevelopment	process	and	the	deliberation	process.	Instead,	this	research	wants	to	raise	a	crucial	question	for	further	research:	“can	deliberation	or	deliberative	system	provide	an	answer	for	the	inequality	and	exclusion	in	urban	 village	 regeneration	 and	 other	 urban	 development	 projects?”	 There	 are	 two	potential	ways	to	research	this	question	in	the	future.	From	the	institutional	level,	can	deliberation	 empower	 the	 migrants?	 According	 to	 Heller	 and	 Rao	 (2016:	 13),	 the	disadvantaged	groups	have	three	possible	channels	of	empowerment:	“voting,	bargaining,	and	arguing”.	In	the	current	system,	the	migrants	are	excluded	from	voting	because	it	is	institutionally	 tied	 with	 the	 hukou	 system.	 However,	 can	 they	 recognize,	 expose	 and	critique	the	regeneration	programme	effectively	through	more	inclusive	and	deliberative	deliberation?	Apart	from	the	institutional	level,	the	operational	level	plays	a	significant	role	in	addressing	inequality	(Appadurai,	2016).	In	authoritarian	China	the	deliberations	are	used	as	the	policy	instruments	which	are	targeted	at	problem-solving	and	enhancing	governance	 effectiveness,	 the	 local	 governments	 are	 lack	of	motivation	 to	 include	 the	potential	stakeholder	who	cannot	legally	affect	the	redevelopment	process	(Niu,	2015).	However,	as	discussed	 in	Question	4,	 the	deliberation	 itself	can	have	a	 transformative	effect	on	many	other	aspects	of	development	extending	beyond	the	development	project	itself,	 such	 as	 social,	 institutional	 and	 participatory	 capacity-building.	 Both	 media	discussion	 and	 everyday	 talk	 paly	 significant	 roles	 by	 generating	 public	 awareness,	exchanging	information	and	forming	public	opinions.	Can	media	discussion	and	everyday	talk	contribute	to	an	inclusive	deliberation?	
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Appendix	one	Index	Label	 Personal	Detail	 Data	Collection	Planner	A	 Planning	team	member	in	Tongji	Planning	institution	 	 Face	to	face	interview	 30	Minutes,	recorded	Deputy	mayor	 Deputy	mayor	of	Sunny	District	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 First	time:25	Minutes,	Unrecorded,	note-taking,	Second	time:	Face	to	face	interviewed,	40	Minutes,	recorded	Deputy-Chairman	 Deputy-Chairman	of	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	People’s	Congress	in	District:	
Face	to	face	interviewed	 45	Minutes,	recorded	
Secretary-General	 Secretary-General	of	Sunny	District	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Official	A	 Chief	Executive	of	the	IR	street	office	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		30Official	B	 Division	Chief	of	the	New-type	Urbanization	Office	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		31Official	C	 Chief	Executive	of	the	CR	Street	Office	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 25	Minutes,	Unrecorded,	note-taking	Official	D	 Section	Chief	of	the	Compensation	Group	–	led	by	New-type	Urbanization	Office	
Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		
Official	F	 Section	Chief	of	the	Publicity	Group	–	leaded	by	New-type	Urbanization	Office	
Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		
Official	G	 Section	Chief	of	the	Headquarter	of	Land	Acquisition:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 60	Minutes,	Unrecorded,	well-written	keynotes32.	Officer	H	 Staff	member	of	the	Compensation	Group	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Official	I	 Staff	member	of	the	Publicity	Group:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 30	Minutes,	recorded		
                         
30 I	worked	with	him	for	4	weeks	to	observe	the	routine,	we	also	have	a	lot	of	talk	with	my	two	cases,	and	I	wrote	down	
the	key	points 
31 Instead	of	talk	about	his	story,	he	provided	the	working	dairy	and	some	document	of	the	district	government.	Some	of	
the	documents	are	confidential,	therefore,	I	can	only	write	down	some	keynotes,	but	I	cannot	get	the	photocopy.) 
32 This	officer	is	extremely	prudent,	as	the	stories	he	experienced	are	very	sensitive.	The	conversation	is	mainly	around	
the	force	demolishment,	collective	petition,	and	nail	house.	He	is	happy	to	talk	and	provide	enough	time	for	written	
down.	I	also	got	a	lot	of	photos	about	the	force	demolishment	from	him. 
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Official	J	 Section	Chief	of	Public	Security	Department	of	the	IR	street	office	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 45	Minutes,	recorded		Staff	member	T	 Deputy	Director	of	the	Residents’	committee	of	 	Community	T,	Former	village	cadre	in	village	C	
Face	to	face	interviewed	 55	Minutes,	recorded		
Staff	member	N	 Staff	member	of	the	 	Residents’	committee	of	Village	N	Community	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 45	Minutes,	recorded		RC	Director	N	 Director	of	Residents’	Committee	of	regenerated	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 80	Minutes,	recorded		RC	Director	T	 Director	of	Residents’	Committee	of	Community	T	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 40	Minutes,	recorded		Director	N	 Director	of	Village	Committee	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 75	Minutes,	recorded	Village	Secretary	N	 Secretary	of	the	Residents’	committee	of	Village	N	Community	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 30	Minutes,	recorded		Village	Director	T	1	 Cadre	in	Community	T	former	village	Director	of	the	Village	T1	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Village	Director	T	2	 Cadre	in	Community	T	former	village	Director	of	the	Village	T2	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 40	Minutes,	recorded		Director	T	 Director	of	the	Residents’	committee	of	Community	T	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Village	Cadre	N	1	 Party	Member	of	the	Standing	Group	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Village	Cadre	N	2	 Village	representative	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 30	Minutes,	recorded		Village	Cadre	T	1	 Cadre	in	Community	T	former	Party	Member	of	the	Village	T1	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Village	Cadre	T	2	 Cadre	in	Community	T;	former	villagers’	representative	of	the	Village	T2	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 50	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	1	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 55	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	2	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 25	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	3	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	4	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 20	Minutes,	recorded		
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Villager	N	5	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 15	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	6	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	7	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	8	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	N	9	 Native	Villager	of	Village	N	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 20	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	1	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	2	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 45	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	3	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 25	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	4	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	5	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 25	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	6	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 25	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	7	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 	 30	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	8	 Native	Villager	in	Community	T:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 30	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	9	 Citizen	Tenant,	retailer	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Villager	T	10	 Citizen	Tenant,	retailer	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	N	1	 Tenant	in	Village	N–	retailer:	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	N	2	 Tenant	in	Village	N-	street	restaurant	owner	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 15	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	N	3	 Tenant	in	Village	N-	Street	breakfast	restaurant	owner	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 25	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	T	4	 Tenant	in	Community	T:	transit	residents	of	resettlement	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	T	5	 Tenant	in	Community	T:	transit	residents	of	resettlement	 	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	T	6	 Tenant	in	Community	T	–	Junior	Government	staff	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	T	7	 Citizen	Tenant,	enterprise	staff	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		Tenant	T	8	 Citizen	Tenant,	retailer	 Face	to	face	interviewed	 35	Minutes,	recorded		
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